People v. Tucker CA4/1

CourtListener 10869059Calctapp01.06.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 5/29/26 P. v. Tucker CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D085930

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. SCD194308)

v.

WILLIAM TERREL TUCKER,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
David J. Danielsen, Judge. Reversed in part and affirmed in part with
directions.
John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Bob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natash
Cortina and Liz Olukoya, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
I.
INTRODUCTION

At a resentencing hearing under Penal Code1 section 1172.1,
subdivision (a)(1) for defendant William Terrel Tucker, the trial court
reduced defendant’s prison term by striking certain enhancements and re-
imposing a restitution fine under section 1202.4, subdivision (b). Defendant
appeals, arguing the court erred by failing to strike one of his gang
enhancements and re-imposing the restitution fine. The People concede the
gang enhancement must be reversed and the restitution fine vacated. We
accept the People’s concession, reverse the gang enhancement, vacate the
restitution fine, remand with instructions, and otherwise affirm the
judgment.
II.
BACKGROUND
In 2006, a jury convicted defendant of premeditated attempted murder
(§§ 664, 187 subd. (a), 189; count 1) and assault with a firearm (§ 245,
subd. (a)(2); count 2). For the attempted murder count, the jury found true
that defendant personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)), personally
discharged a firearm (id., subd. (c)), and personally discharged a firearm
causing great bodily injury (id., subd. (d)). For the assault with a firearm,
the jury found true that defendant personally used a firearm (§ 12022.5,
subd. (a)). In separate proceedings, defendant admitted to a prison prior

1 Undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.

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(§§ 667.5, subd. (b), 668) a serious prior felony conviction (§§ 667 subd. (a)(1),
668, 1192.7 subd. (c)), a prior strike offense (§§ 667, subd. (b) through (i),
1170.12, 668), and gang enhancements as to both counts (§ 186.22,
subd. (b)(1)).
The trial court sentenced defendant to life with the possibility of parole
on the attempted murder count, with a minimum parole period of 15 years
under the gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(5)), followed by 25 years to
life for the section 12022.53, subdivision (d) gun enhancement. The court
stayed punishment on count 2, assault with a firearm, and its related gang
enhancement, and it also stayed all other gun enhancements on counts 1 and
2. The court imposed a five-year consecutive sentence for the nickel prior
and, on its own motion, struck the first prison prior. The court ordered
defendant to pay a restitution fine of $10,000 under section 1202.4,
subdivision (b) and a parole revocation fine of $10,000 under section 1202.45.
Nearly 20 years later, the trial court initiated resentencing under

section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1).2 Focusing on his recent record of
rehabilitation, defendant contended his further incarceration was no longer
in the interest of justice. He asked the court to exercise its discretion under
section 1385 to strike the nickel prior and the section 12022.53, subdivision
(d) gun enhancement, which would result in a reduced aggregate sentence of
15 years to life. The People opposed resentencing arguing a reduced sentence
would endanger public safety.

2 Section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1) allows a court to recall and
resentence a defendant “if the applicable sentencing laws at the time of
original sentencing are subsequently changed by new statutory authority or
case law.” The court then sentences the defendant “in the same manner as if
they had not previously been sentenced[.]”

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The trial court held a resentencing hearing in early 2025. The court re-
sentenced defendant on count 1 to 15 years to life without striking the related
gang enhancement. It then struck all accompanying section 12022.53 gun
enhancements and in its place substituted a section 12022.5, subdivision (a)
gun enhancement under which it elected a four-year mid-term. The court
also struck the nickel prior. As to count 2, the court stayed punishment and
struck the related gun and gang enhancements. Thus, the court imposed an
aggregate sentence of 19 years to life in prison with the possibility of parole.
Finally, the court vacated the original restitution fines “nunc pro tunc” as of
October 2005 (the time of the crimes’ commission), and substituted in their
place a “mandatory minimum” restitution fine of $300 under section 1202.4,
subdivision (b) and a $300 parole revocation restitution fine under section
1202.45.
III.
DISCUSSION
A. Gang Enhancements
Defendant first contends the true findings to the gang enhancement on
count 1 must be reversed due to substantive amendments of the gang
statutes in Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 333).
He argues because Assembly Bill 333 changed the substantive elements for
gang enhancements under section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1), his admission to
that enhancement in 2006 does not establish the requirements for the
enhancement under current law. The People agree, as do we.
When defendant admitted to the enhancement, former section 186.22,
subdivision (b)(1) provided a sentencing enhancement for a person who
committed a felony “for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association

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with any criminal street gang, with the specific intent to promote, further, or
assist in any criminal conduct by gang members[.]” (Former § 186.22,
subd. (b)(1), Stats. 2005, ch. 482, § 1.) When a defendant violated this
section in the commission of felony punishable by imprisonment for life, like
defendant’s conviction for premeditated attempted murder, the defendant
was not eligible for parole “until a minimum of 15 calendar years ha[d] been
served.” (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(5).) Absent the gang enhancement on count 1,
defendant’s minimum parole period would have been seven years. (§ 3046,
subd. (a).)
In 2021, the Legislature passed Assembly Bill 333, effective January 1,
2022, which added new elements to gang enhancements in section 186.22.
(People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1207 (Tran).) It narrowed the
definition of “criminal street gang” and “pattern of criminal activity,” as well
as what it means for an offense to have commonly benefited a street gang.
(Id. at p. 1206.) Under the new legislation, “imposition of a gang
enhancement requires proof of the following additional requirements with
respect to predicate offenses: (1) the offenses must have ‘commonly benefited
a criminal street gang’ where the ‘common benefit . . . is more than
reputational’; (2) the last predicate offense must have occurred within three
years of the date of the currently charged offense; (3) the predicate offenses
must be committed on separate occasions or by two or more gang members,
as opposed to persons; and (4) the charged offense cannot be used as a
predicate offense.” (People v. Perez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 192, 206.) These
changes benefit defendants by raising the threshold for a true finding on a
gang enhancement. (See Tran, at p. 1207.)
Defendant and the People agree that defendant’s 2006 admission to the
gang enhancement on count 1 does not satisfy all the elements for a gang

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enhancement under the new legislation. Under our independent standard of
review, we find no reason to disagree. (See People v. Rosbury (1997) 15
Cal.4th 206, 209 [de novo review applies when legality of sentence is purely a
legal question].) Because defendant’s admission in 2006 would not satisfy the
elements for a gang enhancement under current law, his past admission
cannot now support beyond a reasonable doubt the additional punishment
allowed by the enhancement. (See People v. Miles (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1074,
1082 [elements of an alleged sentence enhancement must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt]; People v. Rodriguez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 451, 458
[guilty plea admits of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to every element of
crime charged].) The remaining question, then, is whether defendant is
entitled to retroactive application of Assembly Bill 333.
Our high court has already established that Assembly Bill 333’s
substantive changes apply retroactively to all cases not yet final. (Tran,
supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 1206–1207; People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388,
396 (Lopez).) When a sentence is recalled for resentencing, the matter is non-
final and subject to application of ameliorative amendments, like Assembly
Bill 333. (People v. Lopez (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 835, 845–846 [recalled
sentence not final]; see also Lopez, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 398–399
[recognizing a judgment becomes nonfinal when sentence is vacated and new
sentence is imposed].)
The record plainly supports that defendant’s case was not final because
his sentence was recalled under section 1172.1. He was therefore entitled to
the benefits of Assembly Bill 333. Accordingly, we reverse the true findings
on the gang enhancement.

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B. Restitution Fine
Defendant next contends his restitution fine under section 1202.4,
subdivision (b), should be vacated under section 1465.9, subdivision (d). The
People agree. The People add that defendant’s related parole revocation fine
under section 1202.45 must also be vacated. Although we accept the People’s
concession that the restitution fine under section 1202.4 must be vacated, we
disagree that the parole revocation fine must also be vacated.
At the time of defendant’s original sentencing, section 1202.4,
subdivision (b) required the court, “[i]n every case where a person is convicted
of a crime,” to “impose a separate and additional restitution fine, unless it
finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so[.]” (Former
§ 1202.4, subd. (b); Stats. 2005, ch. 240, § 10.5.) Section 1202.45, subdivision
(a) required the court “at the time of imposing the restitution fine pursuant
to subdivision (b) of Section 1202.4” and “[i]n every case where a person is
convicted of a crime and whose sentence includes a period of parole” to
“assess an additional parole revocation restitution fine in the same amount
as that imposed pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 1202.4.” (Former
§ 1202.45; Stats. 2004, ch. 223, § 4.) Effective January 1, 2025, however,
subdivision (d) of section 1465.9 provides, “Upon the expiration of 10 years
after the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to Section 1202.4,
the balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and
uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be
vacated.” (Italics added.)
As noted, the trial court originally imposed a restitution fine of $10,000
under section 1202.4, subdivision (b) and stayed the required additional
parole revocation fine of $10,000 under section 1202.45, subdivision (b).

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When defendant’s sentence was recalled nearly 20 years later, the court
vacated these fines “nunc pro tunc” and substituted in their place a
restitution fine of $300 under section 1202.4, subdivision (b) and a parole
revocation fine of $300 under section 1202.45.
The trial court plainly intended to re-impose the same restitution and
parole revocation fines it imposed in 2006, retroactively in a lesser amount.
But the original fines were imposed well over 10 years ago. Section 1465.9,
subdivision (d), thus, directs that the restitution fine under section 1202.4 is
“unenforceable and uncollectible” and must be “vacated.”
Section 1465.9, subdivision (d), however, does not similarly direct that
a parole revocation fine under section 1202.45 is unenforceable 10 years after
the date of original imposition. Rather, when a restitution fine is vacated
under subdivision (d) of section 1465.9, the parole revocation fine is still
required and set in the amount the restitution fine “would have been.”
(People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 17 (Kopp).) Defendant has not
challenged the court’s imposition of the $300 parole revocation fine and given
the court imposed the mandatory minimum (see § 1202.4, subd. (b)), we see
no grounds for relief. (See Kopp, at p. 30 [an inability to pay analysis applies
when the § 1202.4, subd. (b) fine is in excess of the $300 statutory

minimum].)3

3 Defendant alternatively argues counsel rendered deficient performance
by failing to object to the gang enhancement on count 1 and the restitution
fine. Because we consider these claims on the merits, we do not address this
argument.

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DISPOSITION
The gang enhancement is reversed and the restitution fine under
section 1202.4 is vacated. On remand, the People may retry the gang
enhancement allegation if they so elect. If a trial is not held for the gang
enhancement, the trial court shall prepare an amended abstract of judgment
reflecting a sentence on count 1 of life in prison with the possibility of parole
and a minimum parole term of seven years plus four years for the gun
enhancement, and that the restitution fine is vacated. In this instance, the
court shall forward a certified copy of the amended abstract of judgment to
the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The judgment is
otherwise affirmed.

MCCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

CASTILLO, J.

RUBIN, J.

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