Baird v. PulteGroup CA4/1

CourtListener 10869051Calctapp02.06.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 6/2/26 Baird v. PulteGroup CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

MARK A. BAIRD et al., D085988

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v. (Super. Ct. No. CVPS2201015)

PULTEGROUP, INC. et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Manuel Bustamante, Jr., Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded with directions.
Gelb Law, Yisrael Gelb; The Wright Law Firm and Jamie Wright, for
Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Beth S. Joseph, Joseph D. Magrisso,
Stephanie Schuster, Regina Agopian and Jason Mills, for Defendants and
Respondents.
Mark and Bradley Baird are a married couple who sought to buy a
home from defendant Pulte Home Company, LLC. Mark is a veteran, and
the couple intended to use a United States Department of Veterans Affairs
(VA)-backed home loan (a VA loan) to finance the purchase. The Bairds
applied for a VA loan from defendant Pulte Mortgage LLC, but were denied
on the ground that they did not have sufficient monthly income.
Pulte Home had a policy of limiting customization options for VA-loan
purchasers to 10 percent of the base purchase price, ostensibly because VA
appraisers were conservative in their appraisals and VA borrowers would too
often cancel after the customizations were complete based on a low appraisal.
This policy was communicated to the Bairds by their principal sales contact,
defendant Brett Picano. The sales process did not proceed smoothly, and at
one point Picano purported to “void the purchase agreement paperwork” after
a dispute with the Bairds about the terms of the agreement. The Bairds
claim Picano’s actions were retaliatory because they told Picano that Mark
had filed a complaint with the Civil Rights Department (CRD) for anti-
veteran discrimination.
Picano and his supervisor were replaced by a different sales team, and
the same or more generous terms were offered to the Bairds. Although the
Bairds were ultimately preapproved for a VA loan from a second lender and
signed a purchase agreement with Pulte Home, they withdrew from the
contract a few days later, instead purchasing a home from a different
company using a VA loan from a third lender.
The Bairds sued Picano, Pulte Home Company, and Pulte Mortgage, as
well as two affiliated entities, Del Webb Communities, Inc. and PulteGroup
Inc., under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), claiming

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discrimination on the basis of veteran status. The Bairds argued Pulte
Home’s 10 percent policy was discriminatory and that Pulte Mortgage had
denied their mortgage application for discriminatory reasons. The superior
court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants.
On appeal, the Bairds argue the Pulte Home policy constituted both
unlawful disparate treatment and disparate impact. Because defendants did
not seek summary adjudication of the Bairds’ disparate treatment theory
separate from the disparate impact theory, and because their arguments do
not negate the cause of action as a whole, Pulte Home is not entitled to
summary judgment or adjudication of this claim. Because the claims are
interrelated, we find Picano is not entitled to summary judgment or
adjudication of the Bairds’ claim that he aided and abetted Pulte Home’s
discrimination.
As to the remaining defendants and claims, however, we find that
summary judgment or summary adjudication was appropriate. The Bairds
fail to make any arguments establishing that Del Webb or PulteGroup
should be liable for the actions of any other defendant, thus forfeiting such
arguments. Although the Bairds argue Pulte Mortgage discriminated
against them by denying their loan application, we find Pulte Mortgage
presented a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for denying the Bairds’
loan application, and the record does not raise a reasonable inference of
discrimination. Thus, the trial court properly granted summary judgment
to Del Webb, PulteGroup, and Pulte Mortgage.
Finally, the Bairds seek to raise a new argument, claiming that Pulte
Home and Picano retaliated against them for protected activity by
temporarily voiding the sales contract. Because this argument was not

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raised in the trial court, where the Bairds denied that their claim concerned
the sales contract at all, we find it is not properly preserved for appeal.
We affirm the judgment in favor of PulteGroup, Pulte Mortgage, and
Del Webb, and reverse the judgment in favor of Pulte Home and Picano. We
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Bairds’ Dealings with Pulte Home and Picano

Pulte Home owns a new housing development in Riverside County,
called the Del Webb at Rancho Mirage. Buyers can select from several model
home styles and then add optional upgrades to the basic model, such as
higher-end cabinets, crown molding, or wood flooring. Pulte Home is an
affiliate of Pulte Mortgage, which offers financing, although buyers are free
to obtain financing through other companies.
The Bairds sought to purchase a new Rancho Mirage home in 2021
using a VA loan. Though they are sold by private lenders like conventional
mortgages, VA loans are guaranteed by the federal government and subject
to certain terms. One benefit of using a VA loan is that an eligible buyer can
borrow up to 100 percent of the loan’s value and thus does not need to make a
down payment to purchase a home. But a home purchased with a VA loan
must be appraised by a government-approved appraiser. According to the
parties, these appraisers “have a reputation for being conservative in their
property valuations.”
After learning the Bairds intended to use a VA loan, the Pulte Home
salesperson, Brett Picano, said that they “would not get one of the Rancho
Mirage homes if Mark used a VA Loan … and started immediately trying
to steer [the Bairds] to a conventional loan.” According to Picano, “with

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conventional loans [the Bairds] would get all these upgrades,” but with a
VA loan they “would be very limited with upgrades.” He showed the Bairds
a folder comparing the upgrades available for buyers using conventional
loans and the “significantly limited” upgrades available to purchasers using
VA loans.
Defendants dispute that Pulte Home has a policy of not allowing VA
loan users to add certain upgrades, but claim it “permit[s]” salespeople “to
counsel buyers intending to use a VA loan that upgrades of more than 10% of
the home’s purchase price may result in a low appraisal that affects their
ability to finance 100% of the purchase price.” As a Pulte Home employee
explains, “when buyers add what an appraiser considers an excessive amount
of optional upgrades and ‘over-improve[]’ the home, they can add tens of
thousands of dollars to the total purchase price, while the appraiser may not
value those options as adding the same amount to the home’s appraised
value.” According to this employee, “[u]pgrades can pose a particular
challenge for VA loan approvals where the buyer typically does not bring
any down payment” and the appraisers are more conservative.
This became a sticking point for the Bairds, as they wanted to add
more than 10 percent of their base home value in upgrades and were given
conflicting information about Pulte Home’s policy. Despite what he had said
in their initial discussion, Picano told the Bairds their optional upgrades
would not be capped at 10 percent, and they moved forward with a purchase
agreement. But they were later told that their upgrades would be capped at
10 percent. This led to a “heated discussion” with Picano, in which the
Bairds told him they had made a CRD complaint against him following their
first meeting. After the call, Picano sent an e-mail stating, “Due to your
recent and continued behavior as well as your continued threats along with

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not agreeing to the terms set forth by the seller I am going to void the
purchase agreement paperwork. … If you decide that you want to purchase a
home [with Pulte Home] and agree to the terms set forth by the seller I would
be happy to assist you.” Picano’s manager followed up, confirming that Pulte
Home “limits the availability of options offered to be selected to be at or below
10% of the base price of the home” and stating, “we ensure to have [zero]
exceptions for this policy.”
At this point, Pulte Home’s vice president of sales stepped in, directing
that the Bairds’ lot be held for them and assigning a new salesperson to the
account. He informed the Bairds that they could move forward with the
purchase, including any upgrades they wanted. Pulte Home offered the same
total purchase price and agreed to credit the Bairds with an extra $4,000
closing-cost incentive as well as $1,980 the Bairds claimed they had incurred
to hire an attorney.
The new salesperson continued to sow confusion regarding the options
cap, first telling the Bairds, “There is approval for you to spend over 10% of
the base price threshold on option upgrades,” but later stating, “In practical
terms you can spend up to $53,799,” or 10 percent of the base purchase price
of $537,990 “without additional deposits.” The parties dispute whether the
Bairds ultimately selected upgrades that cost more than 10 percent of the
base price of the home. Defendants claim the Bairds’ options amounted to
11.3 percent of the purchase price. The Bairds claim they paid cash for some
of the upgrades, and the remainder amounted to just 7.9 percent of the base
purchase price.
On October 4, 2021, the Bairds signed a contract to purchase a new
home from Pulte Home. A few days later, the Bairds decided to back out of
the sale. Pulte Home terminated the contract on October 8, 2021, and

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returned the Bairds’ deposit. The Bairds later contracted with a different
company to buy their current home.

B. The Bairds’ Mortgage Applications

In August 2021, the Bairds applied for a VA loan with Pulte Mortgage
to finance their Pulte Home purchase. They listed their income as Social
Security benefits amounting to $2,626 per month. At the time, it appears
Bradley had “recently started a commission position, with no earnings yet.”
The Bairds listed a $257,164 trust fund belonging to Bradley as “savings.”
A Pulte Mortgage employee reached out to the Bairds and told them
that their limited income would be a “hurdle” to approval, specifically
informing them that Pulte Mortgage would “want to see a total of $75,000
of annual income.” A different Pulte Mortgage employee asked the Bairds
if the trust could be recharacterized as income to help facilitate approval.
Bradley declined to do so “because this is not how [the] Trust is set up.”
A memorandum in the loan file states the application was “rejected by the
underwriter and confirmed by the regional operations manager” due to
“excessive obligations in relation to income” and “insufficient income for
amount of credit requested.”
The Bairds also applied for a VA loan from a second lender, which
preapproved a loan for the Rancho Mirage house from Pulte Home. This
second lender ultimately denied their application for a loan to buy their
current home because the Bairds could not show “there was … monthly
income from the trust.”
In June 2022, the Bairds applied for a VA loan with a third lender for
their current home, this time including $5,632 per month as income from the
trust and over $5,000 per month in Social Security benefits. The Bairds also

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received over $50,000 in gifts from a relative to help fund the purchase. The
third lender approved the Bairds’ loan application as to their current home.

C. This Litigation

The Bairds sued Pulte Home Company, Pulte Mortgage, Picano, and
two other “Pulte” entities (Del Webb and PulteGroup) under FEHA. They
alleged “one or more or all of” the entity defendants had a policy of limiting
optional upgrades for home buyers who used VA loans, and that the policy
was communicated to them and enforced by Picano. They alleged “Pulte
Home discriminated against [them] based on [their] veteran status or
association with veteran status by … imposing a discriminatory cap on
options purchases.” The Bairds claimed “Pulte Mortgage did not provide …
requested financial assistance because of a policy of discriminating against
VA loans.” They also alleged that Picano “canceled the[ir] purchase
agreement because [the Bairds] complained about the discriminatory options
cap and because [the Bairds] informed [him] that they had complained to the
[CRD] about discrimination.”
The Bairds’ complaint asserted a single cause of action against all

defendants under Government Code1 section 12955. They alleged defendants
violated:
(1) Section 12955(a), which “makes it unlawful for the
owner of any housing accommodation to discriminate
against or harass any person because of the veteran or
military status of that person”;

(2) Section 12955(d), which “makes it unlawful for any
person subject to the provisions of Section 51 of the Civil

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Government Code. For
brevity, we omit the word “subdivision” when referring to any subdivision of
section 12955.
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Code (business establishments), as that section applies to
housing accommodations, to discriminate against any
person on the basis of veteran or military status”;

(3) Section 12955(e), which “makes it unlawful for any
person, bank, mortgage company, or other financial
institution that provides financial assistance for the
purchase, refinance, organization, or construction of any
housing accommodation to discriminate against any person
or group of persons because of veteran or military status in
the terms, conditions, or privileges relating to the obtaining
or use of that financial assistance”;

(4) Section 12955(f), which “makes it unlawful for any
owner of housing accommodations to harass, evict, or
otherwise discriminate against any person in the sale of
housing accommodations when the owner’s dominant
purpose is retaliation against a person who has opposed
unlawful practices or informed law enforcement agencies of
practices believed to be unlawful”;

(5) Section 12955(g), which “makes it unlawful for any
person to aid, abet, incite, compel, or coerce the doing of
any of the acts or practices declared unlawful, or to attempt
to do so”;

(6) Section 12955(i), which “makes it unlawful for any
person or other organization or entity whose business
involves real estate-related transactions to discriminate
against any person in making available a transaction, or in
the terms and conditions of a transaction, because of
veteran or military status”; and

(7) Section 12955(k), which “makes it unlawful to otherwise
make unavailable or deny a dwelling based on
discrimination because of veteran or military status.”

Defendants moved for summary judgment or summary adjudication.
They argued the Bairds’ cause of action “against … PulteGroup and Del
Webb fails as a matter of law because PulteGroup and Del Webb … had no

9
involvement in or control over the day-to-day operations of the other
Defendants, nor did they employ any of the implicated representatives.”
Defendants argued they did not deny the Bairds a housing accommodation
because the Bairds cancelled the purchase contract. Defendants also argued
the Bairds’ cause of action “against Pulte Mortgage fails as a matter of law
because Pulte Mortgage’s denial of [their] mortgage application was not
based on a discriminatory motive.” Defendants argued they “did not take any
adverse action against [the Bairds] in retaliation for protected activity.”
Finally, defendants moved for summary adjudication of the Bairds’ claim for
punitive damages.
In their opposition, the Bairds argued they were not alleging that they
were unable to purchase a house, but rather that the 10 percent limit on
optional upgrades was discriminatory. Defendants responded that “the
purported options cap did not apply to” the Bairds and that “there was no
options cap – it was a misstatement” that was corrected before the Bairds
signed their purchase agreement.” (Italics omitted.)
The trial court granted defendants motion “in its entirety.” The court
specifically found (1) “PulteGroup and Del Webb are not … proper
defendants”; (2) “no FEHA claim exists for purportedly ‘discriminating’
against a [VA] loan”; (3) “Pulte Mortgage’s denial of Plaintiffs’ mortgage
application was not based on a discriminatory motive”; (4) “Defendants did
not take any adverse action against Plaintiffs in retaliation for protected
activity”; and (5) the Bairds’ prayer for punitive damages failed as a matter of
law.

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DISCUSSION

A. Summary Judgment and Summary Adjudication

We review a summary judgment or summary adjudication “de novo,
applying the same standard as the trial court.” (Manibog v. MediaOne of
Los Angeles, Inc. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1369.) A defendant moving for
summary judgment or summary adjudication has the burden of establishing
“that there is no triable issue of material fact and that [the defendant] is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) To meet this burden, a defendant must show
that at least one element of the cause of action cannot be established, or that
there is a complete defense to that cause of action. (Ibid.) If the defendant
does not meet its initial burden, the court must deny the motion. (Ibid.)
Otherwise, “ ‘the burden shifts to the plaintiff … to show that a triable issue
of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense
thereto.’ ” (Id. at p. 849.) “Courts deciding motions for summary judgment
or summary adjudication may not weigh the evidence but must instead view
it in the light most favorable to the opposing party and draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of that party.” (Weiss v. People ex rel. Department of
Transportation (2020) 9 Cal.5th 840, 864.)

B. The Discrimination Claim Against Pulte Home

The Bairds argue Pulte Home’s2 10 percent cap on optional upgrades
discriminates against veterans, either because the policy constitutes
disparate treatment of veterans, or at a minimum because it has a disparate

2 Although the Bairds’ claim, without citation, this was a PulteGroup
policy or a policy of all the defendants the only evidence cited in their
separate statement of undisputed facts indicates that it was Pulte Home’s
policy.
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impact on veterans. Defendants argue in response that Pulte Home did not
cap the Bairds’ upgrades; there is no policy of capping upgrades; and such
policy would not be facially discriminatory because disfavoring VA loans is
not the same thing as discriminating against veterans.
As for the theory that the 10 percent policy has a disparate impact on
veterans, defendants argue the Bairds forfeited this contention because they
failed to raise it in the trial court. Defendants also maintain that the claim
“ ‘Pulte was steering veterans to conventional loans’ is not a disparate impact
theory at all.” In reply, the Bairds assert that the complaint “did not limit its
scope to one specific variation of discrimination—whether intent or effect.” In
their view, it was defendants’ burden to negate all theories of liability in the
complaint and defendants failed to do so.
The Bairds alleged that “Pulte Home discriminated against [them]
based on [their] veteran status or association with veteran status by …
imposing a discriminatory cap on options purchases.” (Italics added.)
“ ‘Disparate treatment’ is intentional discrimination against one or more
persons on prohibited grounds,” but “[p]rohibited discrimination may also
be found on a theory of ‘disparate impact,’ i.e., that regardless of motive, a
facially neutral … practice or policy … in fact had a disproportionate adverse
effect on members of the protected class.” (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc.
(2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 354, fn. 20.) Thus, “housing discrimination under
FEHA may be established either by disparate treatment or by disparate
impact.” (Sisemore v. Master Financial, Inc. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1386,
1420, italics added; see § 12955.8, subd. (b).) In our view, the complaint’s
general reference to discrimination encompasses either legal theory.
“ ‘If a plaintiff pleads several theories [of liability], the defendant has
the burden of demonstrating there are no material facts requiring trial on

12
any of them.’ ” (Teselle v. McLoughlin (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 156, 163.) We
believe defendants advanced arguments in their motion that, if correct, would
negate the Bairds’ theory of discrimination in its entirety. Specifically, they
argued in their reply brief that “the purported options cap did not apply to”
the Bairds and that “there was no options cap – it was a misstatement.”
Given the arguments made by defendants, we do not think the Bairds
had the burden of separately highlighting the question of disparate impact.
Negating an alternative theory fairly encompassed with the plaintiffs’
pleading is part of the defendants’ burden on summary judgment. (Pultz v.
Holgerson (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1110, 1114.) We therefore do not agree that
the Bairds forfeited their disparate impact argument, and we do not see any
procedural failings on either side that would prevent us from considering the
parties’ arguments on the merits.
Defendants assert Pulte Home did not have a policy of capping options.
They rely principally on the declaration of Pulte Home’s vice president of
sales, who states Pulte Home “permit[s]” salespeople “to counsel buyers
intending to use a VA loan that upgrades of more than 10% of the home’s
purchase price may result in a low appraisal that affects their ability to
finance 100% of the purchase price.” The record also shows the Bairds were
told their options would not be limited on at least three occasions.
Nonetheless, the 10 percent cap was invoked a number of times by
Pulte Home representatives and was relayed to the Bairds as a firm policy
throughout the purchasing process. According to the Bairds’ declarations,
Picano informed them of the policy at their first meeting, showing them a
folder comparing the upgrades available for buyers using conventional loans
with the comparatively limited upgrades available to purchasers using VA
loans. Picano and his manager later reiterated, over e-mail, that Pulte Home

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had a 10 percent cap, going so far as to state there were “0 exceptions for this
policy.” A representative of Pulte Mortgage also informed the Bairds that
Pulte Home capped options at 10 percent of the base purchase price. And
shortly before the Bairds signed the purchase agreement, another Pulte
Home salesperson told them their options were limited to 10 percent. Based
on this evidence, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the Bairds,
there is a triable issue of fact as to whether Pulte Home had a policy of
imposing a 10 percent cap on optional upgrades for purchasers using VA
loans.
Relatedly, there is a genuine dispute as to whether the Bairds’ optional
upgrades were, in fact, limited. Defendants claim “the total purchase price
of $621,591 included $60,601 in optional upgrades selected by [the Bairds]”
or approximately 11.3 percent of the $537,990 base purchase price of the
home. The Bairds respond that they paid cash for a $18,200 solar energy
system, and that the balance of their chosen upgrades amounts to $42,401, or
approximately 7.9 percent of the base purchase price.
Both sides merely point to the purchase agreement, without providing
any further evidence about how the cap is calculated or to what extent a cash
payment for some of the upgrades would change the policy. But the Bairds’
argument is consistent with the e-mail from a Pulte Home salesperson who
stated they would be permitted to add additional upgrades if they made
“additional deposits.” Thus, given the limited evidence in this record, there is
a question of fact as to whether the Bairds were permitted to slightly exceed
the 10 percent cap only because they paid cash for the solar energy system.
With respect to disparate impact specifically, defendants argue the
Bairds’ “steering” theory is a disparate treatment claim, not a disparate
impact claim. This is true as to “ ‘racial steering,’ ” which usually refers to a

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discriminatory “ ‘practice by which real estate brokers and agents preserve
and encourage patterns of racial segregation in available housing by steering
members of racial and ethnic groups to buildings occupied primarily by
members of such racial and ethnic groups and away from buildings and
neighborhoods inhabited primarily by members of other races or groups.’ ”
(Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman (1982) 455 U.S. 363, 366, fn. 1.) But, while
they also use the word “steering,” the Bairds do not appear to invoke a
similar theory here.
Rather, the Bairds are using the term to mean that Pulte Home
pressured purchasers to use conventional loans by offering fewer optional
upgrades to those who use VA loans. We see no reason this theory of liability
would require intentional discrimination. Defendants concede that “the use
of a VA loan” is “a factor correlated with veteran status.” Regardless of
intent, a policy that discriminates against VA-loan users seems likely to
disproportionately affect veterans. Defendants do not dispute that offering
fewer purchase options on a basis that disproportionately affects veterans
would be discrimination under FEHA. We therefore find that defendants
have not negated the Bairds’ disparate impact theory of discrimination.
Accordingly, Pulte Home was not entitled to summary judgment.
This raises a question regarding the scope of our reversal. Parties may
seek summary adjudication of separate “causes of action” within an action.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f).) The Bairds combined different legal
theories and factual predicates into a single cause of action against all
defendants. However, courts have found that “a party may present a motion
for summary adjudication challenging a separate and distinct wrongful act
even though combined with other wrongful acts alleged in the same cause of
action.” (Lilienthal & Fowler v. Superior Court (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1848,

15
1854–1855.) Defendants moved for summary adjudication of fourteen

“issues” that, to some extent, address “separate and distinct wrongful acts.”3
We therefore find it appropriate to assess most of the issues raised on appeal
as a separate cause of action potentially appropriate for summary
adjudication.
But because defendants did not seek summary adjudication of the
Bairds’ disparate treatment theory discretely from the disparate impact
theory, and because the arguments raised do not negate this cause of action
against Pulte Home as a whole, we are unable to separately address the
Bairds’ disparate treatment theory. Thus, on remand, the Bairds may
continue to litigate their claim that Pulte Home’s 10 percent cap on optional
upgrades discriminates against veterans, either because the policy
constitutes disparate treatment of, or results in disparate impact on,
veterans.

C. The Aiding and Abetting Claim Against Picano

Section 12955(g) makes it unlawful “[f]or any person to aid, abet, incite,
compel, or coerce the doing of any of the acts or practices declared unlawful in
this section, or to attempt to do so.” The Bairds argue Picano aided and
abetted “Pulte’s discrimination.” Defendants contend because they “did not
violate any subsections of [s]ection 12955, they could not have violated
[s]ection 12955(g).”

3 Strictly speaking, parties may not seek summary adjudication of
“issues” under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (f), but must
do so under subdivision (t). That subdivision was not invoked by defendants,
and it seems its procedural requirements were not met. This ultimately
makes little difference to our resolution of this appeal, as disparate impact
was not raised as one of the defendants’ “issues” to be adjudicated.
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Because we find Pulte Home is not entitled to summary adjudication on
the discrimination claim, we have no basis to find Picano is entitled to
summary adjudication of the aiding and abetting claim under section
12955(g). On remand, the Bairds may continue to litigate their claim that
Picano aided and abetted Pulte Home’s discrimination.

D. The Claims Against PulteGroup and Del Webb

In their motion for summary adjudication, defendants argued the
Bairds’ cause of action “against Defendants PulteGroup and Del Webb fails
as a matter of law because PulteGroup and Del Webb … had no involvement
in or control over the day-to-day operations of the other Defendants, nor did
they employ any of the implicated representatives.” On appeal, the Bairds
have not made any direct allegations against Del Webb or PulteGroup, and
they fail to explain why these entities should be liable for the actions of other
entities. The Bairds make no mention of Del Webb in their briefing, and they
only suggest PulteGroup is responsible as the parent company of Pulte Home
and Pulte Mortgage. Indeed, they concede that these “Pulte entities were
named Defendants but play no significant role in this appeal.”
“Corporate entities are presumed to have separate existences, and the
corporate form will be disregarded only when the ends of justice require this
result.” (Laird v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 727, 737.)
The Bairds do not attempt to make this showing on appeal. “Their failure to
adequately develop their point with meaningful legal analysis forfeits the
argument.” (Meridian Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th
657, 701, fn. 15.) Accordingly, PulteGroup and Del Webb are entitled to
summary judgment.

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E. The Claims Against Pulte Mortgage

The Bairds claim Pulte Mortgage denied their loan “for discriminatory
reasons.” As an initial matter, the Bairds do not clearly articulate their
theory of liability. In their opening brief, they suggest Pulte Mortgage denied
the loan for retaliatory reasons, because “the Bairds reported that they were
going to report Pulte to the authorities.” But the Bairds failed to litigate this
retaliation argument below.
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment argued that no defendant
had taken adverse action against the Bairds in retaliation for protected
activity. In their opposition, the Bairds did not argue the denial of the
mortgage constituted retaliation under section 12955(f). The entirety of the
Bairds’ argument about section 12955(f) was as follows:
“Whether the statements made by Pulte employees [are]
harassment is a question of fact. By Defendants’ own
admission, there is a triable issue of fact. Defendants …
add that the comments made by Tasch and Picanto do
not interfere with the housing arrangement. But that is
exactly the point: it is a question of fact and one for the
jury.”

The Bairds’ theory that the mortgage was denied in retaliation for
threatening to “report Pulte to the authorities” is not preserved for appeal.
(See, e.g., Natkin v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (2013) 219
Cal.App.4th 997, 1011 (Natkin) [“Issues presented on appeal must actually be
litigated in the trial court”].)

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Even if it had not been forfeited, we would reject this argument because
the Bairds point to no evidence that Pulte Mortgage was aware the Bairds
threatened to “report Pulte to the authorities.” The Bairds argue, without
citation, “A reasonable jury could find that since the contract was canceled,
Pulte Homes would have to notify Pulte Mortgage that the mortgage
application would have to be withdrawn or canceled.” Even if this is true, it
does not show that the Bairds’ threat was also shared with Pulte Mortgage.
The Bairds also argue, vaguely, that the loan was denied for
“discriminatory reasons.” They have not adduced evidence supporting this
assertion. The Bairds were told after their loan application was submitted
that Pulte Mortgage wanted to see more income before they would approve
the loan, and Pulte Mortgage’s internal file reflects that the Bairds’
application was actually rejected because they lacked sufficient income.
A second lender also denied the Bairds’ application because they could not
show they were receiving income from the trust. In their third, successful
application, the Bairds represented that they received $5,632 per month as
income from the trust. The record thus reflects that Pulte Mortgage had a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for denying the loan.
The Bairds argue we should not credit this explanation because Pulte
Mortgage has not “set forth [its] internal requirements or regulations
showing why only annual income may be considered but not trust funds or
other sources.” We do not think such information is necessary here, as Pulte
Mortgage’s policy appears consistent with other lenders and there is
otherwise no evidence that would raise an inference of pretext.
The Bairds insist they were qualified loan applicants because they had
purchased a previous home using a VA loan. Without knowing more about
their financial circumstances at the time they were approved for that loan,

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this fact is not material. A different lender approving a loan at a different
time under unknown circumstances does not bear on Pulte Mortgage’s
analysis of the Bairds’ loan application in 2021.
The Bairds also argue they were ultimately approved for a VA loan
for their current home. But their June 2022 loan application included over
$5,000 per month in additional reported income from Bradley’s trust, over
$2,000 per month in additional social security income, and tens of thousands
of dollars in cash gifts to fund a deposit. These loan applications were
materially different. The Bairds’ ultimate approval for this loan does not
support a reasonable inference of discrimination.
Finally, the Bairds claim, without citation, “that Picano and Tasch had
made discriminatory remarks” and allude to “several comments by Picano
and other Pulte employees indicating a reluctance to originate veteran loans.”
But Picano and his manager were not employees of Pulte Mortgage, and the
Bairds fail to explain why their comments would reflect the policies or views
of Pulte Mortgage. Further, the Bairds fail to cite any evidence that an
employee of any defendant “indicat[ed] a reluctance to originate veteran
loans.” We thus find that Pulte Mortgage was entitled to summary
judgment.

F. The Retaliation Claim

The Bairds argue Picano retaliated against them by voiding sales
paperwork after the Bairds told him they had filed a CRD complaint. The
Bairds failed to press their retaliation argument below and have thus
forfeited the argument on appeal. (See Natkin, supra, 219 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1011.)
As discussed above, the Bairds’ opposition to defendants’ motion failed
to address retaliation at all. They certainly did not argue that Picano’s
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cancellation of the contract itself constituted retaliation under section
12955(f). To the contrary, the Bairds’ opposition papers asserted that their
claim was not “about purchasing a home,” but rather “PulteGroup’s refusal
to allow [the Bairds] to use their hard-earned veteran benefits.” In a
supplemental opposition brief, they emphasized this point, stating, “This
case is not about the ability to contract to buy a home or whether a contract
was breached. It is about Defendants’ tactics and corporate policy to prevent
veterans from using their VA backed loans.” Given their arguments in the
trial court, the Bairds have not preserved their retaliation claim on appeal.

DISPOSITION

The summary judgment in favor of defendants is reversed, and we
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The trial court
is directed to vacate its order granting summary judgment for all defendants
and enter a new order as follows: (1) granting summary judgment only as to
Del Webb, PulteGroup, and Pulte Mortgage; (2) denying the motion for
summary judgment as to Pulte Home and Picano; (3) denying the motion for
summary adjudication as to the Bairds’ claim that Pulte Home’s 10 percent
cap on optional upgrades is discriminatory; (4) denying the motion for
summary adjudication as to the Bairds’ claim that Picano aided and abetted
Pulte Home’s discrimination; and (5) granting the motion for summary
adjudication with respect to all other claims against Pulte Home and Picano.
The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.

DATO, J.
WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

KELETY, J.
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