CourtListener 10869048•In re A.D. CA2/4
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 6/2/26 In re A.D. CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
In re A.D. et al., Persons Coming B347522
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. Nos.
21CCJP00351,
21CCJP00351A, )
LOS ANGELES COUNTY 21CCJP00351B
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent.
v.
D.D.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Safaan K. Ahmed, Judge. Affirmed.
Jesse Frederic Rodriguez, under appointment by the Court of Appeal
for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County
Counsel, Kimberly Roura, Principal Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Father D.D. appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating his
parental rights over his son A. following a hearing pursuant to Welfare and
Institutions Code section 366.26.1 He argues that the court erred by failing to
apply the parental benefit exception to termination of his parental rights. We
find no error and therefore affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. Prior Proceedings
Father and mother, C.T., are parents to A., born in 2016, and R., born
in 2019. Mother also has two older daughters, with whom she failed to
reunify.2
In 2016, the juvenile court sustained a petition filed by the Los Angeles
County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) on behalf of A.,
based on mother’s substance abuse, including using methamphetamines
while pregnant with A. The court subsequently terminated jurisdiction with
a juvenile custody order awarding joint legal custody of A. to mother and
father, and sole physical custody to father.
II. Referral and Petition
In December 2020, DCFS received a referral stating that while in a
vehicle, father “backhanded” mother in the face. A. and R. were in the
backseat of the vehicle at the time. Father was arrested. Mother told the
police that she and father were arguing, then father hit her three or four
1
Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
2
Father appeals only the termination of parental rights as to A. Neither
R. nor mother’s other children are subjects of the appeal and mother is not a
party to this appeal. Mother’s older daughters lived under a legal
guardianship with maternal grandmother until the grandmother’s death in
2022. They were ultimately placed with a family friend as legal guardian.
2
times in the face with the back of his hand, causing her tooth to come out.
Mother had a large hematoma on her forehead and was bleeding from her
mouth.
In January 2021, DCFS filed a dependency petition on behalf of A. and
R. under section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b)(1). Allegations a-1 and b-1
alleged that mother and father had a history of engaging in violent physical
altercations in the presence of the children, including the December 2020
incident. The petition further alleged that on a prior occasion, father pepper
sprayed mother in the children’s presence.
The juvenile court removed A. and R. from both parents, placing them
in foster care. The court ordered monitored visitation for both parents, twice
weekly for two hours.
III. Jurisdiction and Disposition
In the March 2021 jurisdiction/disposition report, mother told DCFS
that despite the custody order giving physical custody to father, father
dropped off A. with mother in March 2020. A. had lived with mother since
that time.
Father had an initial visit with A. and R. on March 5, 2021. DCFS
reported that father had been uncooperative. He failed to attend a scheduled
meeting and would not engage with the CSW or provide any information
during a visit. He also did not inquire about visiting the children. The CSW
reported that there were no monitors available for visits on the days that
father and the children were available, and father had not provided contact
information for any other possible monitors.
DCFS filed a first amended petition, adding count b-2 regarding
mother’s failure to reunify with her older children, count b-3 alleging
mother’s substance abuse, and count b-4 alleging that father left the children
with mother despite mother’s substance abuse history and without making a
plan for their ongoing care and supervision.
In a last-minute information on March 14, 2021, DCFS reported that
father had monitored visits once a week as well as monitored phone calls
with the children. DCFS approved paternal grandmother (PGM) to monitor a
second weekly visit, but father rejected that offer. Father refused to
3
participate in a child and family team (CFT) meeting related to the case. He
also refused to discuss the allegations with DCFS.
As of April 2021, father was visiting the children once a week for about
two hours. At the end of a visit, the human services aide (HSA) monitor
reported that father became combative. R. had a tantrum and father did
nothing until the HSA suggested that he pick up the child. Father picked up
R. several minutes later and told the children DCFS did not care about their
safety.
At the April 2021 adjudication hearing, the court dismissed count a-1
as to mother, sustained counts b-1, b-2, and b-3 as to mother, and sustained
counts a-1, b-1, and b-4 as to father. The court ordered reunification services
and twice weekly monitored visitation for both parents. Father’s court-
ordered case plan included a drug and alcohol program and testing, a
domestic violence program, parenting classes, and individual counseling.
IV. Period of Review
Between April and September 2021, father failed to participate in court
orders, did not submit to random drug testing, and failed to remain in contact
with DCFS. In addition, father had not provided proof of participation in any
programs. In May, he told the CSW that he was not going to participate in
any part of his court-ordered case plan and began to raise his voice. The
CSW ended the meeting and father had refused to meet with DCFS since
then.
Father was visiting with the children once per week, when a monitor
was available. He declined the option to have a second weekly visit, although
PGM was approved as a monitor. DCFS did not have an HSA monitor
available in July, but reminded father that he could use PGM as a monitor.
Father did not respond and did not request visits for that month.
A. and R. continued to have monitored visits with father. The foster
parent, Ms. R., reported that father would call the children at bedtime, rather
than the scheduled time, and he was rude when he called. Father did not
participate in services for the children, including CFT meetings and therapy.
In March 2022, DCFS reported that father had not remained in contact
with the department and his whereabouts were unknown. Father continued
to refuse to submit to any of the court-ordered drug tests, programs, or
4
classes. He participated in three visits with the children in October 2021, but
had not contacted DCFS or the foster caregiver to request a visit since that
time. The foster caregiver reported that father spoke to A. on the phone once
per week for approximately 10 minutes. DCFS recommended terminating
services.
In March 2022, father called the CSW and said he wanted to
participate in visits. PGM had been visiting the children weekly, so the CSW
suggested they visit together, as PGM was approved as a monitor. Father
agreed. He still had not enrolled in any services or submitted to drug testing.
At the 12-month review hearing in March 2022, the court found that
father had not made substantial progress with his case plan. The court
terminated father's reunification services.
In June 2022, DCFS reported that father was not in regular contact
with DCFS. The children were doing well with their foster caregiver. Father
continued to speak with A. in one brief phone call per week. R. did not
participate in these calls. Father also had nine in-person visits, monitored by
PGM, between March and May 2022.
The court terminated mother’s reunification services in October 2022
and set the matter for a permanency planning hearing.
V. Termination of Parental Rights
In its section 366.26 report in December 2022, DCFS stated that
father’s visits had been inconsistent and he had not established a
relationship with the children. As of June 2023, DCFS reported that father’s
visits were still inconsistent and he was unable to engage the children during
visits.
DCFS was having difficulty locating an adoptive family for the boys,
largely due to R.’s behavioral issues. The boys remained in the foster home of
Ms. R., but she was not able to provide a permanent home for them. The
permanency planning hearing was continued several times in 2023 and 2024
to allow DCFS to continue to search for a permanent home for the boys.
Father participated in seven monitored visits from May to June, 2023.
DCFS reported that the visits generally went well, but during a visit on May
18, the foster caregiver warned the HSA to watch R. carefully because father
did not “do a good job in parenting.” Another monitor reported that father
5
allowed R. to run in and out of stores at the mall grabbing items. Father did
not take any action to keep R. safe, instead walking away during the child’s
behavioral outburst.
After June 28, DCFS did not have any monitors available. At the time
of DCFS’s report in July, a request for a new monitor was pending. Father
continued to participate in brief weekly phone calls with the children. The
children also continued to have weekly unmonitored visits with PGM.
Father had five monitored visits from early September to early
November 2023. The HSA from one visit reported that father was engaged
and patient with both children. Father had not visited the children since
early November because no monitor was available. He continued his ten-
minute weekly video calls with A. The foster caregiver told DCFS that since
the children’s visits with mother and father had been reduced, the children’s
behavior at home had improved.
At a February 2024 review hearing, the court ordered DCFS to ensure
that a monitor was in place for at least weekly visits with father and mother.
Father had four monitored visits from March to May, 2024. During these
visits, R. continued to display behavioral issues such as defiance and
tantrums. Father continued to have 10-minute weekly video calls with A.
Father had not contacted DCFS since May 23, 2024 to request a visit.
DCFS reported that there was no HSA available to monitor visits during the
month of June. DCFS noted that father did not request visits between July
30 and November 19, 2024.
A. and R. were placed in the potential adoptive home of Ms. D. and Ms.
M. in October 2024, after having visits with them for three months. A. (now
eight years old) told DCFS that he visited with both mother and father, but
father more frequently. A. stated that during his visits with father, they
would eat and play games. A. also stated that he wanted to live with Ms. D.
and Ms. M.
At a hearing in November 2024, the court trailed the permanency
planning hearing to allow the children time to adjust to their current
placement. At father’s counsel’s request, the court ordered DCFS to provide
father with a written visitation schedule within one week.
6
In January 2025, DCFS reported that it had not been able to secure a
monitor for visits from mid-November 2024 to January 7, 2025. After that,
father could resume weekly visits. The HSA monitored two visits with father
in January 2025 at a McDonald’s restaurant. Father sat at a table using his
phone, while the children played. R. told the CSW that he did not like
visiting father and did not want to visit him any longer. Ms. D. reported that
both boys regressed in their behavior since father had increased contact with
them. Specifically, R. exhibited more aggressive behaviors and A. had
become more defiant. Both boys told DCFS that they wanted to stay with
Ms. D. and Ms. M. and be adopted.
In its updated section 366.26 report in February 2025, DCFS reported
that father had not visited consistently. Father did continue to have regular
phone calls with A. In considering the extent of a beneficial relationship,
DCFS noted that the children were detained when A. was four and R. was
almost two, and had remained out of father’s care since that time, almost four
years. A. stated that he enjoyed his visits with father, but R. told DCFS that
he did not want to have calls or visits with father. A CSW reported that
father was sometimes rude to the caregiver and asked inappropriate
questions, including asking A. questions regarding mother. When the CSW
raised the matter with father, he started yelling and cursing at the CSW.
Father’s conduct affected the quality of the visits. Father also failed to follow
the food restrictions for the children during visits. DCFS also reported that
the children and prospective adoptive parents appeared to be very bonded to
each other and the boys expressed their desire to be adopted by them.
At a hearing in February 2025, A. told the court that his new home
with Ms. D. and Ms. M. was “great.” A.’s counsel also told the court that “A.
would like your honor to know that he misses his mom and dad very much,
and he would want to live with his dad, if he can’t with his mom. If he can’t
with [Ms. D. and Ms. M.], and he did want your honor to know that he feels
safe with [Ms. D. and Ms. M.]. Everything is okay at home, but he misses his
mom and dad very much.” The children’s counsel also shared the caregivers’
concern that delaying the permanent plan would not help stabilize the
children.
7
In a June 2025 report, Ms. D. and Ms. M. stated that the boys’ behavior
had stabilized. A. and R. said they were very happy and safe in their adoptive
home and were excited to be adopted. Since the last court date on February
20, 2025, father had been visiting every week for two hours and also
continued to have video calls with A. R. continued to attend the in-person
visits, but told the CSW that he did so because it allowed him to play at
McDonalds. A. and R. referred to their prospective adoptive parents as their
moms and DCFS observed a strong parent-child bond with Ms. D. and Ms. M.
At the permanent plan hearing on July 3, 2025, counsel for DCFS and
counsel for the children asked the court to terminate parental rights.
Counsel for father argued that the parental benefit exception applied, as he
had been regularly visiting the children and they were bonded to him.
The court found by clear and convincing evidence that A. and R. were
adoptable. Turning to the parental benefit exception, the court found that
father had not maintained regular visitation. The court noted that “the
visitation that the parents have had has recently only begun, that for a very
significant period of time in this case, the parents were not visiting with the
children.” The court found that father’s behavior during visits often was not
appropriate. The court also found that there “does not appear to be any
significant bond with the parents” that would outweigh the benefits of
permanency through adoption. Notably, the children “don’t appear to have
any strong significant emotional attachment to either parent” and that R.
had been acting inappropriately afterward. As such, the court concluded
there was no significant beneficial relationship between the children and
father, such that terminating it would be detrimental to the children. Having
concluded that no exceptions applied, the court terminated father's and
mother’s parental rights.
Father timely appealed from the court’s July 3, 2025 orders.
DISCUSSION
Father initially appealed as to both A. and R., but in his opening brief,
he asserted error only as to the termination of his parental rights over A.
Father did not file a reply brief. He has therefore failed to demonstrate error
as to R. (See, e.g., Aptos Council v. County of Santa Cruz (2017) 10
Cal.App.5th 266, 296, fn. 7 [“Issues not raised in the appellant’s opening brief
8
are deemed waived or abandoned.”]) Regarding A., father contends that he
met the requirements of the parental benefit exception. We find no error.
I. Legal Principles
A. Parental benefit exception
The express purpose of section 366.26 is “to provide stable, permanent
homes” for dependent children. (§ 366.26, subd. (b).) After reunification
services are terminated, adoption is the legislative preference. (§ 366.26,
subd. (b)(1); see also In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53 [“‘Adoption is the
Legislature's first choice because it gives the child the best chance at [a full]
emotional commitment from a responsible caretaker.’”]) Thus, once the
juvenile court finds the child is adoptable, “the court must order adoption and
its necessary consequence, termination of parental rights,” unless a parent
can establish one of the exceptions set forth in section 366.26, subdivision (c).
(In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 53; see also § 366.26, subd. (c)(1); In re
Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 625 (Caden C.).) These statutory exceptions
“merely permit the court, in exceptional circumstances, to choose an option
other than the norm, which remains adoption.” (In re Celine R., supra, 31
Cal.4th at p. 53; see also In re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1150.)
Father sought to apply the parental benefit exception, which permits
the selection of another permanent plan if a parent has “maintained regular
visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from
continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) In Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 631, our Supreme Court set forth three elements the
parent must prove to establish the parental benefit exception.
First, the parent asserting the exception must show “regular visitation
and contact with the child, taking into account the extent of visitation
permitted.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) This element is
“straightforward,” involving an assessment of whether the parent visits
consistently. (Id. at p. 632.)
Second, the parent must show that “the child has a substantial,
positive, emotional attachment to the parent—the kind of attachment
implying that the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.”
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) In assessing whether the child would
9
benefit from continuing the relationship with the parent, “the focus is the
child. And the relationship may be shaped by a slew of factors, such as ‘[t]he
age of the child, the portion of the child's life spent in the parent's custody,
the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between parent and child, and
the child's particular needs.’” (Id. at p. 632.) Thus, “courts often consider
how children feel about, interact with, look to, or talk about their parents.”
(Ibid.)
Third, the parent must show that terminating the parent-child
attachment “would be detrimental to the child even when balanced against
the countervailing benefit of a new, adoptive home.” (Caden C., supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 636.) “Because terminating parental rights eliminates any legal
basis for the parent or child to maintain the relationship, courts must assume
that terminating parental rights terminates the relationship. [Citations.]
What courts need to determine therefore, is how the child would be affected
by losing the parental relationship—in effect, what life would be like for the
child in an adoptive home without the parent in the child's life.” (Id. at p.
633.) This evaluation consists of a “subtle, case-specific inquiry[,]” including
consideration of whether “the benefit of placement in a new, adoptive home”
outweighs the harm the child “would experience from the loss of [a]
significant, positive, emotional relationship” with the parent. (Ibid.) In
making this detriment determination, the juvenile court does “not look to
whether the parent can provide a home for the child,” and “is not comparing
the parent’s attributes as custodial caregiver relative to those of any potential
adoptive parent(s).” (Id. at p. 634.)
B. Standard of review
We apply a mixed standard of review to a juvenile court’s findings
regarding the parental-benefit exception. The first two elements—regular
visitation and a beneficial relationship—involve determinations that are
essentially factual; we therefore review those findings for substantial
evidence. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.) The third element requires
the juvenile court to determine whether any harm the child would suffer from
the severance of the parental bond would outweigh the benefit to the child of
adoption. (Ibid.) Like the first two elements, the juvenile court must make a
series of factual determinations including determinations about the child’s
10
relationship with a parent, which we review for substantial evidence. (Id. at
p. 640.) However, “the ultimate decision—whether termination of parental
rights would be detrimental to the child due to the child's relationship with
his [or her] parent—is discretionary and properly reviewed for abuse of
discretion.” (Ibid.)
However, unlike in Caden C., the juvenile court here found that father
did not meet his burden of proving the exception. In such a case, where the
trier of fact has “expressly or implicitly concluded that the party with the
burden of proof did not carry the burden and that party appeals, it is
misleading to characterize the failure-of-proof issue as whether substantial
evidence supports the judgment. This follows because such a
characterization is conceptually one that allows an attack on (1) the evidence
supporting the party who had no burden of proof, and (2) the trier of fact's
unassailable conclusion that the party with the burden did not prove one or
more elements of the case.” (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528,
overruled on other grounds by Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989.)
Thus, to the extent father challenges the juvenile court’s findings regarding
his failure of proof, we determine whether the evidence compels a finding in
father’s favor as a matter of law, asking whether that evidence was
uncontradicted and unimpeached and of such a character and weight as to
leave no room for a judicial determination it was insufficient to support a
finding. (In re I.W., supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1528.)
II. Analysis
The juvenile court found that father did not establish any of the three
elements under Caden C. for the parental benefit exception. We find no error
in that conclusion.
For the first element, the court found that father failed to consistently
visit A. Father contends that any inconsistency in his visitation was due to
DCFS’s issues securing HSA monitors. While there were several periods
during which DCFS was unable to provide a monitor for father’s visits, the
record does not support father’s assertion that he visited the children to the
extent he was permitted. Although father was allowed two visits per week,
he never visited A. and R. more than once a week. He also declined DCFS’s
offer to have PGM monitor some of his visits, despite living with PGM for
11
several years and attending some visits together. Indeed, during several
periods over the four years of visitation, PGM maintained weekly visits with
more regularity than father did. For months at a time, father ignored
attempts by DCFS to contact him, refused to meet with the CSWs or involve
himself in the team meetings supporting the children, and made no request
for visitation. Notably, father ignores this evidence and focuses only on the
times when he was visiting more consistently or when no monitor was
available. In addition, father did not raise any issues with visitation during
any of the many juvenile court hearings, except for his counsel’s request in
November 2024 for a written schedule. Under these circumstances, the
record does not compel a finding in father’s favor that he maintained regular
visitation with A.
The second element required father to establish that A. had a
“substantial, positive, [and] emotional attachment” to him. (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 636.) That meant demonstrating that the child’s attachment
was “significant” and conferred more than “some incidental benefit” to A. (In
re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.) Father argues that the
evidence does not support the court’s finding that there was no substantial
attachment between him and A. But he cannot show, as he must, that the
evidence was “uncontradicted and unimpeached and of such a character and
weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination it was insufficient to
support a finding.” (In re I.W., supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1528.) Father
had not cared for A. for more than half of A.’s life, and never progressed to
unmonitored visitation, despite having more than four years of visitation to
do so. In fact, he showed no engagement in his case plan apart from the
visitation and no indication that he would ever progress past monitored
visitation. He was inconsistent in visiting the children, and the monitors
noted that during some visits father was unable to control R. and was rude to
the HSA and the foster caregiver. Although A. stated that he enjoyed playing
and eating with father during their visits and wanted the visits to continue,
both boys expressed their strong desire to be adopted by Ms. D. and Ms. M.
Thus, father has not shown that the evidence compelled a finding that he had
the strong bond with A. required to apply the parental benefit exception.
12
We also find no error in the juvenile court’s conclusion as to the third
element, i.e. that father did not establish that terminating his relationship
with A. would outweigh the benefits of adoption. Despite the years of
difficulty in finding a successful match for adoption, A. and R. had developed
a deep bond with Ms. D. and Ms. M., calling them “mom” and expressing that
they felt loved and safe in their care. By the time of the July 2025 hearing,
A. was almost nine years old and he expressed to DCFS his desire to stay
with his caregivers and his excitement at being adopted by them. Although
the children had some difficulties adjusting to a new placement, their
behavior had stabilized and the caregivers were devoted to providing a
permanent home for both boys and ensuring their needs were met. The
importance of stability and permanency to be gained from adoption is
particularly strong here, where the children endured several unsuccessful
potential adoptive matches and waited years to find adoptive parents who
could support the needs of both A. and R.
It is notable that father challenges the termination of his parental
rights only as to A. The evidence shows that father and R. had a limited
relationship, as the child expressed a desire not to attend visitation (or did so
only to play at the restaurant) and refused to participate in phone calls with
father. Father does not address how it would affect A. for father to maintain
a relationship with A. but not with R., when the boys were strongly bonded to
each other. Moreover, the court could consider that although A. expressed
that he missed father and enjoyed their visits, there was no evidence that A.
looked to father for comfort or guidance, or that he experienced any distress
or anxiety when visits ended or in the periods when father did not visit. To
the contrary, the caregivers reported worsening behavior by both children
when visits with father increased. The court could also consider the length of
time father was provided reunification services and his failure to complete
them, and his failure to progress beyond monitored visitation for over four
years. As such, the court was well within its discretion to conclude that the
benefits of allowing the boys’ adoption by their loving caregivers to whom
they were bonded outweighed any detriment from terminating father’s
parental rights.
13
DISPOSITION
The order terminating father’s parental rights over A. and R. is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
COLLINS, J.
We concur:
ZUKIN, P. J.
TAMZARIAN, J.
14
Was bedeutet dieser Text für Ihre Situation?
Kostenlose und unverbindliche Beratung
Schildern Sie uns Ihre Situation. Unser Team meldet sich per E-Mail bei Ihnen für Ihre Beratung.
Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort
Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.