People v. Harris CA2/4

CourtListener 10869032Calctapp02.06.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 6/2/26 P. v. Harris CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, B342031

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA038024
v.

JAMIL HARRIS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Victor D. Martinez, Judge. Reversed and
remanded for resentencing.
Wayne C. Tobin, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Jamil Harris.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Melanie Dorian,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
At a Penal Code section 1172.75 resentencing hearing,
appellant Jamil Harris moved to dismiss one of his two prior
strike convictions under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996)
13 Cal.4th 497.1 In denying his Romero motion, the trial court
erroneously found that Harris was a “fourth striker.” We hold
that it is reasonably probable that the trial court would have
granted Harris’s Romero motion had it not made this error. We
therefore reverse the judgment and remand the matter to the
trial court to reconsider Harris’s Romero motion.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1998, a jury convicted Harris of one count of robbery
(§ 211). Then, after a bench trial, the court found he sustained
two prior strike convictions (§§ 1172.12, subds. (a)–(d); 667,
subds. (b)–(i)), two prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd.
(a)(1)), and served two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The
court sentenced him to 37 years to life in state prison, consisting
of a term of 25 years to life on the robbery count imposed under
the “Three Strikes” law, two five-year prior serious felony
enhancements, and two one-year prior prison term
enhancements.
In 2024, the trial court recalled Harris’s sentence under
section 1172.75, then resentenced him by striking the two prior
prison term and two five-year prior serious felony enhancements,
reducing his sentence to 25 years to life in state prison. At the
resentencing hearing, Harris’s attorney asked the court to grant
Harris Romero relief, noting that because Harris had already

1 Subsequent unspecified statutory references are to the
Penal Code.

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served a lengthy sentence, he would only get meaningful relief if
the court changed his sentence from an indeterminate term to a
determinate one. The court denied Harris’s Romero motion.
Harris timely appealed.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In 1997, when Harris was about one week shy of his 26th
birthday, he committed the robbery that gave rise to his sentence
under the Three Strikes law. The victim was Pedro Gallardo. As
Gallardo withdrew $400 from an automatic teller machine,
Harris accosted him. After a struggle, Harris fled with the
money. Harris ran to a nearby apartment complex with the
victim in pursuit. West Covina Police Officers who arrived at the
scene gained entrance to the apartment in which Harris was
located and found the $400 in the refrigerator.

TRIAL COURT’S RULING
The trial court provided the following rationale for denying
Harris’s Romero motion.

“These are all difficult cases for the court looking at it. I
applaud Mr. Harris for the work he’s done in the last few
years. I think he’s committed to living a fruitful life once
he gets out. [¶] The issue for the court is whether he
comes within the spirit of the Three-Strikes law including
evaluating what he’s done while in prison. [The] [c]ourt
does note the majority of the work has only been in the last
few years. He has, as [the prosecution] indicated,
violations of the prison rules since he’s been in and he
didn’t have just one strike. He had three prior strikes.

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This was a fourth striker, and the strike he did was an
ATM machine which the Legislature deemed even more
egregious because that is now a first degree robbery when
you commit a robbery at an ATM machine because of the
dangers involved and the risks to people as they withdraw
money from an ATM machine. [¶] Based upon all that, the
court will be striking the two 667(a)(1) priors for ten years,
and the [prison priors] for two years. The court declines to
strike the strikes under Romero. I have taken everything
into account including the defendant’s age at the time it
was committed, age of 25, and the fact he’s . . . 53 in a few
weeks . . . However the sentence will be life with a
minimum term of 25 years . . . .”

DISCUSSION
A. Relevant Law
“The Three Strikes law consists of two, nearly identical
statutory schemes designed to increase the prison terms of repeat
felons.” (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 504.) In Romero, the
Supreme Court held that the trial court may, in furtherance of
justice, strike prior felony allegations in cases arising under the
Three Strikes law pursuant to section 1385, subdivision (a).
(Romero, at p. 503.) At the resentencing hearing in this case, the
trial court was required to apply Romero and subsequent
revisions to the Three Strikes law regarding enhancements.
The relevant revisions to enhancements were promulgated
in Senate Bill Nos. 136 and 483. “Prior to January 1, 2020,
[Penal Code] section 667.5, subdivision (b) required trial courts to
impose a one-year sentence enhancement for each true finding on
an allegation the defendant served a separate prior prison term

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and had not remained free of custody for at least five years.”
(People v. Jennings (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 664, 681, citing former
§ 667.5, subd. (b).) “Effective January 1, 2020, Senate Bill No.
136 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) [ ] (Stats. 2019, ch. 590) amended
section 667.5 by limiting the prior prison term enhancement to
only prior terms for sexually violent offenses.” (People v. Burgess
(2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 375, 380 (Burgess).) “Enhancements based
on prior prison terms served for other offenses became legally
invalid.” (Ibid.) The Legislature later enacted Senate Bill No.
483, effective January 1, 2022, to make the changes implemented
by Senate Bill No. 136 retroactive by adding former section
1171.1 (now section 1172.75) to the Penal Code. (Burgess, supra,
at p. 380, citing Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 1.)
Section 1172.75, subdivision (c) requires the trial court,
upon being properly notified that a defendant is serving a
sentence that includes a legally invalid prior prison term
enhancement (see § 1172.75, subd. (b)), to recall the sentence and
resentence the defendant. “A trial court has the authority to
strike prior strikes under section 1385(a) and Romero at a section
1172.75 resentencing.” (People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th
340, 345.)
A trial court must make its decision to strike or not strike a
prior conviction by considering factors that are intrinsic to the
Three Strike law’s sentencing scheme. (People v. Williams (1998)
17 Cal.4th 148, 161 (Williams).) The factors a trial court must
consider include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the current
conviction; (2) the nature and circumstances of the prior strike
convictions; and (3) the defendant’s “background, character, and
prospects[.]” (Ibid.) If the defendant falls outside the spirit of the
Three Strikes law, the court may, in furtherance of justice, treat

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the defendant “as though he had not previously been convicted of
one or more serious and/or violent felonies.” (Ibid.; see also
Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 529–530; § 1385, subd. (a).) We
review a trial court’s denial of a Romero motion for abuse of
discretion. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 373.)

B. Analysis
Harris and the Attorney General agree that the trial court
denied Harris’s Romero motion in part based on an erroneous
belief that he was a fourth striker when he was actually a third
striker. We agree with the parties that the trial court’s
characterization of Harris’s prior criminal record in denying
Romero relief was erroneous and, accordingly, we conclude the
trial court abused its discretion in denying Harris Romero relief.
The Attorney General argues Harris forfeited on appeal his
argument the trial court erroneously assumed he was a fourth
striker by not raising it in the trial court, and in any event, the
error was harmless. We will address the Attorney General’s
arguments concerning forfeiture and harmless error in turn.
Regarding forfeiture, it is true that Harris’s counsel did not
object to the trial court’s mischaracterization of Harris’s prior
criminal record. We have discretion, however, to reach the merits
of an argument that has not been preserved for review. (See
Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 161, fn. 6.) We exercise that
discretion here because it is in the interests of justice to address
Harris’s meritorious contention. Had the court granted Harris’s
Romero motion, this would have changed his sentence from an
indeterminate term to a determinate one. By reaching the
merits, we obviate the need to address the parties’ contentions
regarding whether trial counsel was prejudicially ineffective by

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not objecting. (See People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393,
400 [“To forestall [defendant’s] ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, we decline to find forfeiture under the circumstances of
this case”].)
Turning to whether the error was prejudicial, we conclude
it was. “When a trial court has given both proper and improper
reasons for a sentenc[ing] choice, a reviewing court will set aside
the sentence only if it is reasonably probable that the trial court
would have chosen a lesser sentence had it known that some of
its reasons were improper.” (People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324,
492.) Harris satisfies this test.
The trial court’s error relates to the second factor in its
analysis—“the nature and circumstances of the prior strike
convictions.” (Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 161.)
“The purpose of the Three Strikes law is to deter repeat felony
offenders and protect society.” (People v. Anderson (2019) 42
Cal.App.5th 780, 786.) Harris’s purported commitment of a
fourth strike is very significant because the trial court was under
the erroneous impression that, despite suffering the heavy
consequences of committing a third strike, Harris committed
another strike. As Harris explains: “Classifying a defendant as a
‘fourth striker’ is a serious matter. If one prior strike can double
a sentence and two prior strikes can lead to a life sentence, then
it is difficult to imagine leniency being granted to someone with
three prior strikes.” We agree. A reasonable judge could have
concluded Harris’s purported fourth strike weighed strongly
against granting Romero relief.
In analyzing whether the trial court’s error was harmless,
we also consider other facts that weighed in favor of granting
Romero relief. The trial court “applaud[ed]” Harris for his recent

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good behavior in prison and expressed its belief that he is
“committed to living a fruitful life once” he is released from
prison, suggesting the court may have been on the fence when
denying Romero relief. Further, at the time of the resentencing
hearing, Harris had already served a lengthy sentence spanning
nearly three decades. Consequently, if the trial court granted
Romero relief, Harris’s incarceration may have immediately come
to an end.
It is true the trial court denied Harris’s Romero motion in
part based on various factors unrelated to its incorrect belief that
he had three prior strikes, including the facts underlying Harris’s
robbery conviction and his behavior in prison. We are persuaded,
however, by Harris’s argument that being viewed as a fourth
striker cast him in a meaningfully different light than being a
third striker and significantly reduced the likelihood that he
would be granted Romero relief. Although it is certainly possible
the court may have still denied Harris’s Romero motion absent its
mischaracterization of his criminal record, we conclude it is
reasonably probable the court would have granted the motion
had it known Harris was a third striker and not a fourth striker.
We therefore agree with Harris that remand is appropriate.2

DISPOSITION
The case is remanded for a full resentencing hearing under
section 1172.75. At that hearing, the trial court is directed to
reconsider Harris’s Romero motion in light of this opinion. We

2 Because we agree with Harris that remand is appropriate
on this basis, we need not address his remaining contentions that
the trial court abused its discretion when denying his Romero
motion.

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express no opinion on how the trial court should rule on that
motion or what sentence the trial court should ultimately impose.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

TAMZARIAN, J.
We concur:

MORI, Acting P. J.

COGLIATI, J.*

* Judge of the Santa Cruz Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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