People v. Henderson CA4/1

CourtListener 10869031Calctapp02.06.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 6/2/26 P. v. Henderson CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D085245

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. SCD299229)
v.

CHARLES RAY HENDERSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Robert O. Amador, Judge. Affirmed.
Bases & Bases and Arielle Bases for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Robin
Urbanski and Donald W. Ostertag, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
Charles Ray Henderson appeals from a judgment following his
convictions on 23 counts of first degree burglary of an inhabited dwelling
house in violation of Penal Code sections 459 and 460, subdivision (a), three
counts of attempted first degree burglary of an inhabited dwelling house in
violation of sections 459 and 664,1 one count of second degree burglary in
violation of section 459, and 12 counts of conspiracy to commit a crime in
violation of section 182, subdivision (a)(1). He contends his convictions
should be reversed because the trial court abused its discretion by
disallowing evidence that individuals not linked to him had been burglarizing
homes in the same vicinity and time frame in which the offenses attributed to
him had occurred, and that they had done so using modi operandi similar to
those used in the charged offenses. In addition, he contends his sentence
should be reversed because, in imposing it, the court did not properly
consider trauma he had experienced as a child. The attorney general
disagrees, and so do we. Hence we affirm.
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
During the winter and spring of 2023, hundreds of burglaries and
related offenses occurred throughout affluent areas of San Diego County.
Among these were burglaries and attempted burglaries that occurred on:
February 10, 23, and 25; March 4, 11, 13, 18, 19, 22, and 23; and May 22 and
23. Using digital location data (i.e., data pertaining to the movement of
automobiles, cell phones, and other devices that communicate wirelessly with
cell towers), surveillance footage, and other evidence, police placed
Henderson—and, in most instances, Charelle Brumfield and Anthony
Robinson—at the scene of each of these offenses.
Such evidence also led police to stop a vehicle in which Henderson,
Brumfield, and Robinson were traveling. At the time of the stop, no license
plate was attached to the vehicle. A search of the vehicle yielded items
commonly used as burglary tools, including, for example, bear spray (used in
burglaries to incapacitate dogs), window punches (used to break glass),

1 All unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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walkie talkies, screwdrivers, black gloves, black balaclavas, a grey neck
gaiter, and other items of dark clothing. Subsequent searches of Henderson,
Brumfield, and Robinson’s homes revealed additional such items, along with
items that surveillance footage revealed the perpetrators wearing during the
charged offenses and items reported stolen from homes burglarized on the
dates set forth ante.
Henderson, Brumfield, and Robinson were charged with conspiracy and
burglary-related offenses in a 42-count information that named Henderson as
a perpetrator in 41 of the counts and that alleged several aggravating factors
within the meaning of the California Rules of Court, rule 4.421. The case
against Robinson was severed, and the case against Henderson and
Brumfield proceeded to trial. After two and a half weeks of testimony by 94
witnesses, Henderson was acquitted on two of the 41 counts against him and
convicted on the other 39. The trial court then sentenced Henderson to serve
a term of 38 consecutive years in state prison.
Henderson timely appealed.
II. THIRD PARTY CULPABILITY EVIDENCE
Henderson’s first contention is that the trial court abused its discretion
by disallowing evidence that crews associated with an organization dubbed
the Chilean Group were believed by law enforcement authorities to have
burglarized homes in the same vicinity and timeframe in which the charged
offenses had occurred, and that they had used modi operandi similar to those
employed in the charged offenses.
A. Additional Background
In pretrial motions and in an evidentiary hearing that occurred outside
the presence of the jury pursuant to Evidence Code section 402 (402 hearing),
the defense sought to introduce at trial, and the prosecution sought to
exclude, evidence (in the form of testimony from five police officers and two

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detectives) pertaining to a sample of six unsolved burglaries (the six
uncharged burglaries) that had occurred on dates other than the dates of the
charged offenses and that law enforcement authorities had attributed to the
Chilean Group. As the defense argued in limine:
“[A]round the time of the charged burglaries in this case, there was
a similar burglary series being conducted in San Diego County by a
group that SDPD Detectives referred to as ‘the Chilean
Series’ . . . The ‘Chilean Series’ was apparently ‘a group of South
American Nationals coming to the U.S. committing burglaries,’
throughout San Diego County. . .[2] The burglaries were occurring in
the same general area and around the same time (February to May
2023) as the burglaries in the instant case . . . .

“The Defense has been provided with police reports for six
individual burglary incidents that were allegedly
committed by this crew that occurred from February 5,
2023-June 4, 2023. This is the same time period that the
burglaries in this case allegedly occurred. The burglaries
all occurred in wealthy neighborhoods in San Diego
County, where rear glass doors were smashed, and high
value items were stolen.

“. . . [B]urglaries . . . linked to the ‘Chilean Theft Ring’ . . . eerily
resemble the incidents in this case.

“ . . . Apparently, the ‘Chilean Crew’ wears masks and hooded
sweatshirts to shield their identities. . . This crew often smashed . . .
rear sliding glass doors to gain entry into homes located in affluent
areas and targeted cash, safes, and jewelry. These characteristics

2 According to the defense: “[T]he District Attorney for San Diego County,
Summer Stephan, has made several news appearances and comments in local
media regarding ‘burglary tourism.’ She has stated that people involved in
these theft groups ‘travel to the United States through the ESTA Visa Waiver
Program,’ which allows them to fill out a quick online questionnaire and
receive a 90-day tourist Visa. They then use fraudulent identification or
driver’s licenses to rent cars to conduct the burglaries.”

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are identical to the allegations in this case. As such, the Defense
should be able to raise this information to the Jury because it
creates a doubt as to the identity of the actual burglars.”

The trial court disagreed. Thus it disallowed evidence pertaining to the
Chilean Group and to the six uncharged burglaries noted ante. But it
permitted the defense to elicit evidence, and to argue to the jury, that several
different burglary crews had been operating in the same communities and
timeframe in which the charged offenses had occurred and that these crews
had used modi operandi similar to those used in the charged offenses.
B. Legal Principles
In challenging the exclusion of evidence pertaining to the Chilean
Group and to the six uncharged burglaries, Henderson invokes principles
governing the use of evidence of third party culpability to establish a basis for
a jury to find reasonable doubt regarding a defendant’s guilt. “Like all other
evidence, third party culpability evidence may be admitted if it is relevant
and its probative value is not substantially outweighed by the risk of undue
delay, prejudice, or confusion, or otherwise made inadmissible by the rules of
evidence.” (People v. Turner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 786, 816 (Turner); accord
People v. Lopez (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 327, 339 (Lopez).) “ ‘To be admissible,
[such] evidence need not show “substantial proof of a probability” that the
third person committed the act; it need only be capable of raising a
reasonable doubt of [the] defendant’s guilt.’ ” (Turner, at p. 817, quoting
People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 833 (Hall); accord Lopez, at p. 339.)
But these things said, “[t]he defense that another person was the true
perpetrator of the crime is not without limits.” (2 Crim. L. Def. (Thomson
Reuters 2025), Third Party Culpability, § 211.) Thus, our state’s Supreme
Court has repeatedly emphasized that “we do not require that any evidence,
however remote, must be admitted to show a third party’s possible

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culpability” (Hall, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 833, italics added; accord Turner,
supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 816) and has “repeatedly upheld the exclusion of third
party culpability evidence when the third party’s link to a crime is tenuous or
speculative.” (Turner, at p. 817; accord People v. Bracamontes (2022)
12 Cal.5th 977, 1001 (Bracamontes).) In addition, our high court has
repeatedly “explained . . . [that] ‘admissible evidence of [third party
culpability] points to the culpability of a specific third party, not the
possibility that some unidentified third party could have committed the
crime’ ” (Bracamontes, at p. 1001, quoting Turner, at pp. 816–817; see also
Lopez, at p. 349) and that, “ ‘[f]or the evidence to be relevant and admissible,
“there must be direct or circumstantial evidence linking [that specific] third
person to the actual perpetration of the crime.” ’ ” (Bracamontes, at p. 1001,
quoting Turner, at p. 17; see also Lopez, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 341.)
C. Analysis
In contending that the trial court should have permitted him to
introduce evidence pertaining to the Chilean Group and to the six uncharged
burglaries, Henderson argues that the perpetrators in many burglaries
attributed to the Chilean Group, like the perpetrators in the charged
offenses: (1) operated in crews comprised of two, three, or four members;
(2) wore dark clothes, hooded shirts, balaclavas, masks, and gloves;
(3) targeted homes in affluent neighborhoods of north central San Diego
County; (4) gained access to homes by smashing rear glass sliding doors;
(5) ransacked homes in search of valuables; (6) targeted high value items,
such as jewelry and cash; and (7) traveled in expensive rented automobiles
that blended into the affluent neighborhoods in which they operated.

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But—even accepting this argument as true,3 and setting aside the fact
that the Chilean Group is not “a specific third party”4 (Bracamontes, supra,
12 Cal.5th at p. 1001; Lopez, supra, at p. 349; Turner, supra, 10 Cal.5th at
pp. 816–817)—we conclude that, considered in relation to modi operandi
employed in burglaries generally, none of the characteristics enumerated
ante, whether considered individually or together, are sufficiently distinctive
to qualify as “ ‘direct or circumstantial evidence linking [the Chilean Group] to
the actual perpetration of the crime” ’ ” within the meaning of the case law.
(Bracamontes, supra, at p. 1001; Lopez, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 341;
Turner, at p. 817.) Indeed, according to testimony elicited from detectives
during the 402 hearing: “rear door smashes are pretty common in residential
burglaries;” “there [were] hundreds of cases where the rear sliding glass door
was smashed as a mode of entry” during the relevant timeframe; burglary
crews often use expensive vehicles in affluent neighborhoods; it is common for

3 Testimony elicited during the 402 hearing was inconsistent with respect
to claimed similarities between modi operandi used by the Chilean Group and
modi operandi used by the perpetrators of the charged offenses. Thus, for
example, whereas one detective testified that, in burglaries attributed to the
Chilean Group, the perpetrators usually gained entry by shattering a back
sliding glass door, sometimes ransacked the breached homes, and typically
wore articles of clothing such as hooded shirts, masks, and gloves that made it
difficult to determine their race or hair color, a different detective testified that,
in such burglaries, the perpetrators typically did not smash rear sliding glass
doors to gain entry, but instead cut small holes in the doors just large enough
for a person to fit through, that they usually did not ransack the homes, and
that they often “weren’t trying to conceal their identity” (italics added).

4 According to one of the detectives who testified during the 402 hearing,
the Chilean Group was not a small or discrete group of individuals, but rather
a larger “organized crime group” comprised of “a series of random, constantly
changing” foreign nationals who would come to the United States on short term
tourist visas for the purpose of committing burglaries.

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burglarized homes to be ransacked; and it also is common for small items like
jewelry and cash to be taken.
Moreover, Henderson’s counsel conceded as much throughout the
proceedings, including while questioning witnesses, during closing
arguments, and during sentencing. Thus, for example, she observed: that
“burglary crews are often using high-end vehicles” in affluent neighborhoods;
that it is “common” for “burglary crews [to] wear dark clothing in order to
hide their identity;” that “[g]loves is something that we see across many
burglary crews,” that “going into the back area of a home for a burglary” and
“smashing the rear sliding glass door” as a “method of entry into a home is
not unique;” and that “breaking the rear glass window [and] going for small
valuables . . . is just how burglaries are committed.” “So the idea that this
specific crew ha[d] this really specific M.O. [of] smashing a glass door, using
high-end cars, taking high-end property, that’s actually not abnormal or
uncommon in the world of burglaries at all.”
For these very reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
disallowing evidence pertaining to the Chilean Group and to the six
uncharged burglaries. Simply stated, such evidence’s probative value would
have been exceedingly low, and would have been substantially outweighed by
the amount of time it would have consumed and the potential confusion it
would have engendered. (Evid. Code, § 352 [“The court in its discretion may
exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time
or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or
of misleading the jury.”]; Hall, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 834 [“[C]ourts
should . . . treat third-party culpability evidence like any other evidence: if
relevant it is admissible (§ 350) unless its probative value is substantially

8
outweighed by the risk of undue delay, prejudice, or confusion (§ 352).”];
People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1136 [even where third part
evidence “has been found relevant and admissible, the court may nonetheless
exercise discretion under Evidence Code section 352 to exclude it where its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of undue delay,
prejudice or confusion”]; People v. Gonzales (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1234, 1261 [“the
exclusion of weak and speculative evidence of third party culpability does not
infringe on a defendant’s . . . rights].)
III. SENTENCING
Henderson’s second contention is that, in determining a sentence, the
trial court improperly applied section 1170, subdivision (b). To illuminate
this contention, we begin with a brief introduction to the three specific
paragraphs of that subdivision—paragraphs (1), (2), and (6)(A)5—that
Henderson contends were improperly applied.
A. Legal Principles
Paragraph (1) of section 1170, subdivision (b), provides that: “When a
judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute specifies three
possible terms, the court shall, in its sound discretion, order imposition of a
sentence not to exceed the middle term, except as otherwise provided in
paragraph (2).” (Italics added.)
Paragraph (2) in turn sets forth circumstances in which the court may
depart upward from the middle term. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).) It provides that:
“The court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there
are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a
term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts underlying

5 Paragraphs (1), (2), and (6)(A) of section 1170, subdivision (b), are
hereafter referred to simply as paragraphs (1), (2), and (6)(A).

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those circumstances . . . have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at
trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.” (Id., italics added.)
Whereas paragraph (2) sets forth circumstances in which the court may
depart upward from the middle term, paragraph (6)(A) states circumstances
in which the court must depart downward from the middle term. ( § 1170,
subd. (b)(2).) It provides that: “Notwithstanding paragraph (1), and unless
the court finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances [such] that imposition of the lower term would be contrary to
the interests of justice, the court shall order imposition of the lower term if
any of the following was a contributing factor in the commission of the
offense: [¶] (A) The person has experienced psychological, physical, or
childhood trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation,
or sexual violence.” (Ibid.)
Interpreted together, paragraphs (1), (2), and (6)(A) provide inter alia
for the low term to be the default in situations in which the defendant is
found to have experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma that
was a contributing factor in the commission of the offense, but allow for an
upward departure to the high term when aggravating factors established
beyond a reasonable doubt at trial (1) outweigh the mitigating circumstances
to such an extent that imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the
interests of justice and (2) justify exceeding the middle term. (§ 1170, subds.
(b)(1), (2), and (6)(A).)
B. Additional Background
In the present case, Henderson waived his right to a jury on the
aggravating factors; and, following the verdict, the court conducted a bench
trial in which it made true findings beyond a reasonable doubt regarding four
circumstances that had been alleged in aggravation within the meaning of

10
California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(8), (a)(9), (b)(3) and (b)(5). These
findings were that: (1) the offenses as to which Henderson had been
convicted were carried out with planning, sophistication, and
professionalism; (2) they involved the taking of items of great monetary
value; (3) Henderson had served a prior prison term; and (4) his performance
while on probation or parole had been unsatisfactory. (Ibid.)
Subsequently, in anticipation of sentencing, the People filed a
statement in aggravation requesting a sentence with terms of imprisonment
amounting to 39 years four months to be served consecutively. Henderson
filed a statement in mitigation requesting terms amounting to 17 years four
months to be served consecutively (with additional terms to be served
concurrently). And a probation officer filed a report recommending terms
amounting to 38 years to be served consecutively.
Among the matters set forth in the probation report was Henderson’s
history of recidivism as a juvenile and as an adult. With regard to his
juvenile history, the report indicated: that the juvenile court had made true
findings on allegations against Henderson with respect to a robbery that
occurred in 1986 and possession for sale of a controlled substance in 1989;
that the juvenile court had sustained petitions as to allegations that in 1991
Henderson had participated in a robbery, transported a controlled substance,
and resisted an officer; and that the 1991 incidents had resulted in
Henderson being placed in the custody of the California Youth Authority
(CYA). Insofar as Henderson’s adult criminal history was concerned, the
report indicated, inter alia: convictions for falsification and assault in 1998

11
and for possession with intent to distribute cocaine in 2000,6 as well as
incidents of violence in which Henderson had engaged while serving his
sentence on the conviction arising from the 2000 drug offense.
The probation report also indicated that Henderson “denied current
drug or alcohol addiction” and reported statements by Henderson to the
probation officer, as follows:
“I do not like what happened. I did not like being in court
and hearing what happened. I apologize to everybody that
this happened to[ ]. . .

“[¶ . . . ¶]

“The undersigned explained to the defendant that the
victims wanted their family heirlooms returned and asked
the defendant to let them know where they could retrieve
their items since he wanted to ‘apologize to everyone.’ He
stated, ‘No, I feel sorry for what I heard. I did not say I did
all of these things. I would not do anything to an old lady.
I respect my elders. It made me sad. I did not do all these
things that they convicted me of. I did not do them all.’

“The undersigned . . . asked if he wanted to return the
items from the victims that he did steal from and he stated,
‘I feel remorse. I feel sorry for everybody. It hurts me to
know what happens to people. I feel bad for them. I really
felt bad for the 80 year old lady. I know if this happened to
my grandmother, I would be upset. I did not take any
items.’ ”

Among the materials filed together with the statement in mitigation
was a defense investigator’s report of an interview with one of Henderson’s
aunts in which the aunt (referring to Henderson as Charles) had stated that:

6 The conviction for the 2000 drug charge resulted in a sentence of 30 years
in federal prison that ended up being reduced to a shorter term based on a post-
sentence change in the law.

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− Charles’s father “was a gang member who was always in and out of
prison.” His mother, Linda, was ill-equipped to raise him. And,
throughout his childhood, he was passed around among his mother,
his grandmother, the aunt, and Child Protective Services (CPS).

− When Charles lived with Linda and his grandmother, “Linda would
leave with different men consistently” and then, on her return,
would beat Charles for having played with his toys despite her
having told him not to do so in her absence. She also would beat
him for escaping through a window to attend elementary school
even after she had deadbolted the door to prevent him from doing
so. “Linda beat[ ] Charles consistently. [She] would hit him with
closed fists, choke him, push him, and cuss him out.”

− When the aunt asked the grandmother “why she did not stop the
beatings” (italics added), the grandmother responded that, “if Linda
killed Charles, [then that] would get rid of two problems” because
“Linda would be in jail and Charles would be dead.”

− “Linda and Charles were homeless on and off;” and “[w]hen he was
in 4th or 5th grade, he got taken away by Child Protective Services”
for a period of time.

− The neighborhoods in which Charles lived as a child were “heavily
gang infested” and “unsafe.” He “would have to fight when going to
the store or walking down the street,” and he “began to become
gang affiliated.”

− When Charles was 15 to 16, his father got out of prison and
recruited Charles to sell marijuana for him.

− According to another aunt, “Linda would make Charles do drive by
shootings while living in Los Angeles[,] and Linda would be the
driver.”

Also among the items filed with the statement in mitigation was a
report in which a psychologist who had interviewed Henderson and reviewed
information provided by others stated that:
− Henderson’s father “was not involved much in Mr. Henderson’s
upbringing, as his father was in and out of jail and prison;” and “he
reported not having a prominent father figure in his life.”

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− “Henderson experienced teasing and isolation[ ] from peers for
being in special education and probable exploitation from others in
his rough neighborhood that was noted for poverty and gang
entrenchment.”

− Henderson sustained cognitive injuries and facial disfigurement as
a result of being struck in the head with a stick when he was six or
seven years old and as a result of being shot in the face when he
was 20 years old.

− Henderson could not read.

− Henderson “lost friends due to gang violence as young as the age of
12.”

− Henderson “was an East Coast Crip.”

At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor expressed himself forcefully
in response to what he characterized as an effort on the part of the defense to
downplay the seriousness of the offenses as to which Henderson had just
been convicted at trial, his involvement in those offenses, and his history of
recidivism; and he argued that the trauma Henderson had experienced as a
child many years earlier could not have contributed to his commission of the
offenses:

“Mr. Henderson does not come before this Court as a 26-
year-old or 22-year-old young man with no criminal history.
At the time of these crimes, he was 48 years old . . . I know
we’re going to hear . . . about . . . his upbringing, his family
life. It sounds like it was difficult. It sounds like there was
trauma . . . But . . . to say, as the defense said, that he was
. . . not raised in an environment that would provide
guidance as to right and wrong, well, certainly, the court
system at a very early age tried to provide that guidance to
. . . Mr. Henderson because at the age of 11, he had a true
finding for robbery; at the age of 14, a true finding for sale
of, looks like, crack cocaine; at the age of 16, a true finding
for another robbery and was committed to . . . what was
then the California Youth Authority, which is the ultimate

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sanction for juvenile offenders at that time. And you don’t
get to CYA back then, as the Court well knows, unless
you're an offender that can’t be handled in the local justice
system.

“And even after that . . . he had another possession or sale
[or] transportation of controlled substances. [And] that’s
just his juvenile history. To say there was no guidance,
perhaps not in his household, but certainly, the court
system tried to provide that guidance and support. I’ve
always firmly believed that the juvenile justice system is
the one true place that really can make a difference in
many offenders’ lives. And it apparently did not because
Mr. Henderson went on [to be convicted as an adult].

“[¶ . . . ¶]

“[The] defense asks . . . for the Court to impose the low
term under Penal Code § 1170 and recites various factors
relating to his youth. And the Court should not do that in
this case because there’s no evidence that the childhood
issues or his background contributed to the commission of
these offenses.

“. . . I submit that the aggravating factors and
circumstances of the crimes in this case, the seriousness of
the crimes in this case outweigh any mitigating
circumstances the defense can point to and that imposition
of the lower term for the principal term in this case would
be contrary to the interest of justice in this case.”

Henderson’s defense counsel pushed back on the prosecutor’s
arguments. She cited evidence of work Henderson had done following his
release from federal prison, including involvement in helping to mediate gang
wars and in programs to encourage youth to avoid crime—as evidence that he
had reformed. She argued the burglary spree “was an aberration for him.”
She suggested the death of his grandmother—“the woman that basically
raised him”—had triggered a sudden descent into drug abuse, gambling, and
infidelity, and that it was that descent that had led Henderson to deviate

15
from the prosocial path he had been on and to recidivate with the burglary
spree. In addition, she argued, he felt regret and remorse.
Thereafter, Henderson addressed the court. He echoed several of the
themes his defense counsel had expressed. So doing, he attributed his
participation in the burglary spree to a drug addiction, and he expressed
shame, embarrassment, regret, and remorse. Thus, for example, he said:
“I’d like to apologize, Wife. You hear me, Wife? [¶] And to
my family, my victims, like, to sit up here for all that time
to hear what was going on, I never knew that I was hurting
people like that. Just to get high, I mean, I never thought I
would be sitting right here again. I let 12 days ruin my life.
Like, I—I sit and think about that all the time, like 12 days
of ruining my whole life. It’s—what I did, what I was, that's
not me.”
The trial court acknowledged the evidence and arguments pertaining to
Henderson’s childhood. Remarking on that evidence, it observed that
Henderson had been “dealt a bad hand in life,” and it agreed that Henderson
had experienced significant childhood psychological trauma that qualified as
a factor in mitigation for sentencing purposes within the meaning of
paragraph (6)(A). (See also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.423(b)(3)
[“Circumstances in mitigation include that . . . [t]he defendant experienced
psychological, physical, or childhood trauma.”].)
In the course of making these findings, the trial court also commented
on three aspects of Henderson’s youth, as follows: First, it remarked on
Henderson’s “significant . . . history” in the juvenile justice system, including
his time at the CYA. So doing, it described the CYA as “the last stop for
recalcitrant minors” and added that youths from Los Angeles were not sent
there “unless they [were] recalcitrant or dangerous.” Second, adverting to
Henderson’s difficult childhood, the court speculated that that significant
history in the juvenile justice system might be attributable in part to the

16
“things that happened in that time period . . . regarding the area he grew up
in, what was happening to him and . . . being passed around.” And third, the
court remarked on the passage of time, observing that “that happened when
he was prior to 18 years old. He’s now 48. This is 30 years later.”
On the basis of this last observation (regarding the passage of time),
the court found, notwithstanding the difficult circumstances of Henderson’s
youth, that the trauma Henderson had experienced as a child did “not . . .
carr[y] much weight at this . . . time.”7 Then, weighing that mitigating factor
against the four aggravating factors, the court concluded that the latter
outweighed the former.
The court then spoke about the effects the burglaries had had, and
would continue to have, on the victims. Thereafter, it turned to the topics of
remorse, responsibility, and self-reflection:
“[T]he defendant, when he gave a statement to Probation,
his comment was mainly, [‘]I feel sorry for those
people’ . . . . But his second statement was, ‘it wasn’t me.’
He doesn’t take responsibility. And unless the remorse is
for your own actions, it’s truly not remorseful . . . So those
are great considerations for the Court in regards to what
has happened in this particular case.

“[¶ . . . ¶]

“. . . This defendant could have stopped at anytime [sic]. . .
He says to . . . probation [and] . . . to the psychologist that
drugs weren’t really a problem.

And so why did he do these particular crimes? Well, he
says that his life changed because he had deaths in his
family. COVID was happening at that time. Lots of people
had deaths in their family. It was a terrible time in this

7 In making this statement, the trial court appears to have rejected the
prosecutor’s contention that Henderson’s childhood trauma did not contribute
to the burglary spree at all.

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country. But to all of a sudden start to go on a burglary run
which lasted five months which impacted multiple people
and had other people involved is unconscionable to this
Court. He’s a threat to our community. He will remain a
threat to our community. The Court sees very little insight
into what actually happened.

On these bases the court in the exercise of its discretion sentenced
Henderson to a term of imprisonment of 38 years, comprised of: (a) an upper
term of six years on one of the first degree burglary convictions, which the
court deemed the principal term (see generally §§ 461, subd. (a), 1170.1, subd.
(a)); (b) 16 months (equal to one-third of the middle term) on each of the other
22 first degree burglary convictions (ibid.); and (c) eight months (equal to one-
third of the middle term) on the second degree burglary conviction and on
each of the three attempted burglary convictions (see generally §§ 461, subd.
(b), 664, subd. (a), 1170, subd. (h)(1), 1170.1, subd. (a))8—all to be served
consecutively (see generally § 669).
C. Analysis
In contending the trial court improperly applied paragraphs (1), (2),
and (6)(A), and that the sentence it imposed thus constituted an abuse of
discretion, Henderson argues: (1) that “[t]he court was inappropriately
dismissive of the lengthy and detailed documentation of [his] history of
trauma;” (2) that it was “inconsistent and unfair [for the court] to determine
on the one hand that [his] childhood abuse happened so long ago that it didn’t
‘carry much weight’ at sentencing and on the other hand, consider [his]
juvenile history (ages 11-14) to support an aggravated term;” and (3) that the
court should not have relied on Henderson’s pre-sentencing “denial of his role

8 A term of six years was imposed but stayed (see generally § 182, subd.
(a)) for each of the 12 conspiracy convictions.

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in at least some of the crimes to find he lacked remorse and therefore impose
the upper term.” We conclude that the trial court expressed itself inartfully,
but it did not abuse its discretion.
In arriving at this conclusion, we begin with the observation that “[t]he
abuse of discretion standard is highly deferential.” (People v. Mendoza (2023)
88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298 (Mendoza).) “When, ‘ “as here, a discretionary power
is statutorily vested in the trial court, its exercise of that discretion ‘must not
be disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the court exercised its
discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted
in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) We note also that, “[a]s a
reviewing court, we confront a cold record without the trial court’s benefit of
observing firsthand the . . . demeanor of the witness.” (People v. Lewis (2001)
26 Cal.4th 334, 359.)
As noted ante, the first of Henderson’s three arguments pertaining to
sentencing is that the trial court was inappropriately dismissive of the
trauma Henderson experienced as a child. We certainly see how one
particular remark the trial court made during the sentencing proceedings
could be construed as insensitive. We refer here to the second sentence in
this passage from the hearing transcript: “Mr. Henderson was dealt a bad
hand in life. That happens all of the time in matters of what happens with
people afterwards and what they have to deal with and such.”
Although this sentence’s structure renders its meaning somewhat
opaque, we recognize that one way in which it might be interpreted is as an
assertion that the upbringing Henderson experienced, though harsh, was
nonetheless not out of the ordinary. Were we to interpret the sentence in this
way, then we would agree with Henderson that the court was inappropriately
dismissive. But we do not interpret the court’s remark in this way. Instead,

19
we consider it in the context of the arguments that the prosecutor had just
made relating to guidance that Henderson would have been provided through
the juvenile justice system. And, considering the referenced remark in this
context, we construe it as just a clumsy way of saying that it is not unusual
for a person to be dealt a bad hand in life, and that it is important to consider
what that person has done with the proverbial bad hand they have been
dealt.
Interpreting the court’s remark in this fashion leads us to Henderson’s
second argument pertaining to sentencing. That is, his argument that the
trial court was inconsistent in its consideration of matters relating to his
childhood. Inasmuch as Henderson had many years and the interposition of
the juvenile justice system (and the adult justice system) to help guide him
toward a law-abiding path, we conclude it was neither inconsistent nor unfair
for the court to conclude that his experience of trauma as a child carried
much less weight as a mitigating factor at age 48 than it might have carried
at, say, age 28, and to simultaneously conclude that a criminal history of
recidivism that had begun when Henderson was a child and persisted into
adulthood carried some weight.
As for the third argument pertaining to sentencing (the argument that
the court should have disregarded the statements partly denying
responsibility that Henderson made at his probation interview), we recognize
that Henderson expressed remorse at the sentencing hearing. But, even
acknowledging that fact, we cannot conclude that—in determining that
Henderson had not taken responsibility and had exhibited very little insight
into his offenses—the court was acting in a manner that was “arbitrary,
capricious or patently absurd” (Mendoza, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 298), let
alone so much as to as to “ ‘ “ ‘result[ ] in a manifest miscarriage of

20
justice.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) Indeed, in the same remarks in which Henderson
expressed remorse at the sentencing hearing, he also repeatedly downplayed
his responsibility (“that’s not me,” “I never knew that I was hurting people”)
and attributed his offenses to the influence of drugs that, just three weeks
earlier, he had told the probation officer he never used.
Under these circumstances we cannot conclude the trial court abused
its discretion.
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment and sentence are affirmed.

KELETY, J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, Acting P. J.

RUBIN, J.

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