Wrenne v. JA Sutherland CA3

CourtListener 10869023Calctapp02.06.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 6/2/26 Wrenne v. JA Sutherland CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Shasta)

LINDA WRENNE et al., C102531
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
(Super. Ct. No. 24CV0204643)
v.

JA SUTHERLAND, INC., et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.

The California Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA; Lab. Code, § 3200, et seq.)1 is
a comprehensive statutory scheme governing the compensation employers must pay
employees for injuries suffered in the course and scope of their employment. (Charles J.
Vacanti, M.D., Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund (2001) 24 Cal.4th 800, 810 (Vacanti);
King v. CompPartners, Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1039, 1046, 1051 (King).) As a general
rule, the workers’ compensation system is the sole or exclusive remedy available for an
employee’s work-related injuries, including death. (Kuciemba v. Victory Woodworks,
Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 993, 1006 (Kuciemba).) This rule is known as the workers’
compensation exclusivity rule. (See Singh v. Southland Stone, U.S.A., Inc. (2010) 186
Cal.App.4th 338, 365.)

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Labor Code.

1
In March 2022, Kevin Wrenne, an employee of a Taco Bell in Redding, was
fatally stabbed in the restaurant’s parking lot during an unpaid 30-minute meal break.
Wrenne’s parents and his estate (collectively, plaintiffs) filed this wrongful death and
survival action against “Taco Bell Corp.” and others, asserting claims for premises
liability and negligence. Plaintiffs appeal from the judgment entered after the trial court
sustained the demurrers to the complaint without leave to amend. Plaintiffs argue the
trial court erred by relying on the “premises line rule” to conclude that their claims were
barred as a matter of law under the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule. In other
words, plaintiffs contend the trial court erroneously determined that Wrenne’s injuries
fell within the exclusive remedy provisions of the WCA, such that they were precluded
from bringing the instant civil action. We see no error and affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Because this appeal challenges an order sustaining two demurrers, we summarize
the facts underlying this action assuming, as we must, the truth of all properly pleaded
allegations in the complaint. (Heckart v. A-1 Self Storage, Inc. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 749,
753.)
Complaint
In 2022, Wrenne was employed by J.A. Sutherland, Inc. (J.A. Sutherland) and
Andrew Hennan, Sr. (Hennan),2 the owners and/or operators of a Taco Bell fast-food
restaurant located at 1220 Market Street in Redding. Nielsen Motor Co. (Nielsen Motor)
owned the real property and leased it to J.A. Sutherland. Wrenne was a crew member of
the subject Taco Bell.

2 According to J.A. Sutherland and Hennan, plaintiffs erroneously sued “Andrew
Hennan Sr.”

2
On the evening of March 28, 2022, Wrenne was fatally stabbed in his employer’s
parking lot in an unprovoked attack by Brent Close, “a transient individual.” At the time
of the stabbing, Wrenne was on a 30-minute unpaid lunch (or meal) break. After
clocking out, Wrenne went to the Taco Bell parking lot and sat down on the curb.
Thereafter, Close approached Wrenne and stabbed him five times in the neck and chest.
Close was subsequently arrested and found guilty of murder.
In March 2024, plaintiffs (i.e., Wrenne’s parents and his estate) brought this
wrongful death and survival action against J.A. Sutherland, Nielsen Motor Co., Taco Bell
Corp., and Hennan. The complaint alleged two causes of action: (1) dangerous and
defective condition of premises (i.e., premises liability), and (2) negligence. Plaintiffs’
claims were based on defendants’ failure to maintain safe premises and to take reasonable
safety precautions to protect against foreseeable criminal acts of third parties (e.g.,
provide proper lighting, suitable resting areas for employees, security guards,
surveillance cameras). According to plaintiffs, the fatal stabbing was foreseeable because
the Taco Bell was in a high crime area and there was an extensive history of violent
threats and acts at the restaurant, including “stabbings.” In support of their position,
plaintiffs alleged that more than 1,000 calls for service were made to the Redding Police
Department in the 10 years prior to Wrenne’s death, including 282 calls for service in the
preceding three years, 99 of which were made by Taco Bell employees.
Demurrers
In June 2024, J.A. Sutherland and Hennan filed a demurrer, which primarily
argued that the complaint was subject to dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
because plaintiffs’ claims fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the state workers’
compensation system, as Wrenne was fatally stabbed in his employer’s parking lot during
the course and scope of his employment. In making this argument, J.A. Sutherland and
Hennan relied on the “premises line rule,” which, in their view, made workers’
compensation the sole or exclusive remedy for the injuries Wrenne suffered on his

3
employer’s premises during an authorized unpaid break from his work shift. In other
words, plaintiffs claimed that the instant action was barred by the workers’ compensation
exclusivity rule.
In July 2024, Taco Bell Corp. and Taco Bell Franchisor, LLC3 filed a separate
demurrer, which also relied on the “premises line rule” to argue that the claims alleged in
the instant action were barred by the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule.
In August 2024, after the trial court granted Nielson Motor’s motion to strike the
punitive damage allegations and plaintiffs decided not to amend their complaint, the
demurring parties refiled their respective demurrers.
In September 2024, plaintiffs filed separate written oppositions to the demurrers.
Trial Court’s Ruling
In October 2024, after a hearing, the trial court sustained the demurrers without
leave to amend. In so ruling, the court stated, in relevant part, as follows:
“[Section] 3600 et seq limits employer liability for injuries alleged to have been
sustained by employees arising out of, and in the course of employment. See ...
§ 3602(a). In such instances, worker’s compensation is generally the exclusive remedy.
Jones v. Regents of University of California (2023) 97 Ca1.App.5th 502, 507 [(Jones)].
Under the premises line rule, the employment relationship generally commences once the
employee enters the employer’s premises. Id. at 508. The same rule applies to determine
the end of the course of employment: generally, once employment has begun, it
continues, and injury is presumed to be compensable, until the employee leaves the
employer’s premises. Id.

3 According to Taco Bell Franchisor, LLC, plaintiffs erroneously sued “Taco Bell Corp.”

4
“In Jones, the plaintiff Rose Jones was an employee of the Regents of the
University of California. Id. at 505. Jones left at the end of her workday, exited her
office suite, walked her bike a short distance and then rode her bike for about 10 seconds
before she crashed and was injured. Id. at 505-06. The trial court found, and the
appellate court affirmed, that her tort claims against her employer for negligence and
premise liability were barred by the worker’s compensation exclusivity rule relying on
the premise line rule. Id. at 511.
“Here, Plaintiffs have brought causes of action for premise liability and negligence
as the heirs at law and successors in-interest to ... Wrenne. The Complaint alleges that
[Wrenne] was assaulted while on an uncompensated break while located on the premises
of the Defendants. [Wrenne] was seated on a curb outside the establishment, but on the
premises, when he was attacked and stabbed by a third party.
“The Court finds that the current situation is factually analogous to Jones.
[Wrenne] like Jones had started his employment for the day. [Wrenne] like Jones was on
the premises of his employer without having left the premises to end his employment.
Both were uncompensated at the time of the incident that gives rise to the claims. Based
on the foregoing, the Court finds that the worker’s compensation exclusivity rule bars the
Plaintiffs’ tort claims which are identical to the claims in Jones. The demurrer[s] [are]
sustained as to the entirety of the complaint based on the worker’s compensation
exclusivity rule.”
Appeal and Appellate Briefing
Plaintiffs timely appealed. The matter was fully briefed and assigned to this panel
in December 2025.

5
DISCUSSION
I
Standard of Review
A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the factual allegations in a complaint.
(SJJC Aviation Services, LLC v. City of San Jose (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1043, 1051-
1052.) On appeal from a judgment of dismissal based on an order sustaining a demurrer,
we apply a de novo standard of review; we exercise our independent judgment about
whether the pleading sufficiently states a viable cause of action under any legal theory.
(Loeffler v. Target Corp. (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1081, 1100; Committee for Green Foothills v.
Santa Clara County Bd. Of Supervisors (2010) 48 Cal.4th 32, 42; Dilbert v. Newsom
(2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 317, 322.)
In determining whether a demurrer was properly sustained, we accept as true “all
facts properly pleaded by the plaintiffs, as well as those that are judicially noticeable.”
(Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. City of La Habra (2001) 25 Cal.4th 809, 814.)
However, we do not assume the truth of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or
law. (Yvanova v. New Century Mortgage Corp. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 919, 924.) We read
the challenged pleading as a whole and its parts in their context to give the pleading a
reasonable interpretation. (Evans v. City of Berkeley (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1, 6.) The
plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the demurrer was sustained erroneously.
(Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52.) “ ‘ “We affirm [the
judgment] if any ground offered in support of the demurrer was well taken.... We are not
bound by the trial court’s stated reasons, if any, supporting its ruling; we review the
ruling, not its rationale.” ’ ” (Ramirez v. Tulare County Dist. Attorney’s Office (2017) 9
Cal.App.5th 911, 924.)
When a trial court has sustained a demurrer without leave to amend, we must
“decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by
amendment: if it can be, the trial court has abused its discretion and we reverse; if not,

6
there has been no abuse of discretion and we affirm.” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d
311, 318; see also Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081.) Such
a showing can be made for the first time on appeal. (Smith v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Ins. Co. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 700, 711.) “The plaintiff has the burden of
proving that an amendment would cure the defect.” (Schifando, at p. 1081; Blank, at p.
318.) To meet this burden, a plaintiff “must show in what manner he can amend his
complaint and how that amendment will change the legal effect of his pleading.”
(Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.)
II
Order Sustaining the Demurrers
Plaintiffs argue the trial court erred in concluding that their claims for premises
liability and negligence were barred as a matter of law under the workers’ compensation
exclusivity rule. Reversal is required, in plaintiffs’ view, because the trial court
misapplied the “premises line rule” in finding that Wrenne’s injuries were work-related
and therefore within the scope of the exclusive remedy provisions of the WCA. We
disagree.
A. Workers’ Compensation Exclusivity Rule
As previously indicated, the WCA (§ 3200, et seq.) provides a comprehensive
system of remedies for work-related injuries that are available only in proceedings before
the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board. (See §§ 3602, subd. (a), 5300; Kuciemba,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 1005-1006.) As a general rule, workers’ compensation is the sole
or exclusive remedy for injuries sustained by an employee “ ‘arising out of and in the
course of the employment.’ ” (King, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 1051; see also Jimenez v. Mrs.
Gooch’s Natural Food Markets, Inc. (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 645, 654; see Kuo v. Dublin
Unified School Dist. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 662, 669.)

7
In determining whether the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule bars a cause of
action against an employer, courts initially determine whether the alleged injury falls
within the scope of the exclusive remedy provisions of the WCA. (Vacanti, supra, 24
Cal.4th at p. 811.) “Subdivision (a) of section 3600 provides in relevant part: ‘Liability
for the compensation provided by this division, in lieu of any other liability whatsoever to
any person ... shall, without regard to negligence, exist against an employer for any injury
sustained by his or her employees arising out of and in the course of the employment and
for the death of any employee if the injury proximately causes death, in those cases where
the ... conditions of compensation concur.” (Id., at p. 812, italics added; see § 3600,
subd. (a) [listing various “conditions of compensation” (e.g., “at the time of the injury,
the employee [was] performing service growing out of and incidental to his or her
employment and is acting within the course of his or her employment”].) Thus, workers’
compensation is the sole remedy for an injured employee when the injury arose out of
and was in the course of their employment. (LaTourette v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd.
(1998) 17 Cal.4th 644, 650.)
The phrase “in the course of the employment,” ordinarily refers to the time, place,
and circumstances under which the injury occurred. (LaTourette v. Workers’ Comp.
Appeals Bd., supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 651.) “ ‘Thus “ ‘[a]n employee is in the “course of
his employment” when he does those reasonable things which his contract with his
employment expressly or impliedly permits him to do.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) The phrase “arising
out of the employment,” concerns whether the injury occurred by reason of a condition or
incident of the employment. (Id. at p. 651.) In other words, “ ‘the employment and the
injury must be linked in some causal fashion.’ ” (Ibid.)
The basis for the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule is a “compensation
bargain” whereby the employer assumes liability without regard to fault for workplace
injuries in exchange for limitations on the amount of that liability, and the employee
obtains relatively swift and certain payment of benefits without having to prove fault in

8
exchange for giving up the wider range of damages potentially available in tort.
(Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d 1, 16; see also King, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 1046-
1047; Kuciemba, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1006.)
“Because the workers’ compensation system has its theoretical basis in the
compensation bargain between employer and employee, a nuanced analysis is required
when [(as here)] third parties seek to sue the employer after an employee’s work-related
injury. In general, workers’ compensation benefits provide the exclusive remedy for
third party claims if the asserted claims are “collateral to or derivative of” the employee’s
workplace injury. [Citations.] This aspect of workers’ compensation law is sometimes
called the derivative injury doctrine.” (Kuciemba, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1006.) An
example of a third-party claim deemed “collateral” or “derivative” is an heir’s claim for
an employee’s wrongful death. (Ibid.; see id. at p. 1007 [noting that, as a general matter,
“a family member’s claim for an injury derived from an employee’s workplace injury is
barred by workers’ compensation exclusivity”].)
As our Supreme Court has explained: There are “unique causation principles”
underlying section 3600, which “provides a workers’ compensation remedy for an injury
linked ‘ “ ‘in some causal fashion’ ” ’ to employment. This causation requirement differs
markedly from ordinary tort principles, in that ‘ “ ‘ “[a]ll that is required is that the
employment be one of the contributing causes without which the injury would not have
occurred.” ’ ” ’ ” (King, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 1052; see Ross v. Workmen’s Comp.
Appeals Bd. (1971) 21 Cal.App.3d 949, 955 [“The proximate causation requirement is
fulfilled if the employment be a contributory cause of the injury; it need not be the sole
cause”].) “[A] sufficient causal connection between the injury and the employment is
shown where the employment was a contributory cause of the injury, that where the
injury occurs on the employer’s premises while the employee is in the course of his
employment the injury also arises out of the employment unless the connection is so
remote from the employment that it is not an incident thereof, and that an injury can arise

9
out of the employment even though the employer had no connection with or control over
the force which caused the injury.” (California Compensation & Fire Co. v. Workmen’s
Comp. App. Bd. (1968) 68 Cal.2d 157, 160.)
“The [workers’ compensation] exclusive remedy rule is an affirmative defense to
an action at law. [Citation.] ‘[W]here the complaint affirmatively alleges facts indicating
coverage by the workers’ compensation laws, if it fails to state additional facts negating
application of the exclusive remedy provision, no civil action will lie and the complaint is
subject to a general demurrer.’ ” (Vann v. City and County of San Francisco (2023) 97
Cal.App.5th 1013, 1021 [“ ‘If the injury falls within the scope of the [WCA], a
proceeding thereunder constitutes his exclusive remedy’ ”]; see Kuciemba, supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 1006 [when the “conditions of compensation” set forth in subdivision (a) of
section 3600 are met, the employer is immune from civil damages liability for work-
related injuries because workers’ compensation is the injured employee’s exclusive
remedy].)
The WCA “ ‘ “must be liberally construed in the employee’s favor,” ’ ” and
“ ‘ “all reasonable doubts as to whether an injury arose out of employment are to be
resolved in favor of the employee.” ’ ” (Department of Rehabilitation v. Workers’ Comp.
Appeals Bd. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1281, 1290.) The provisions of the WCA must be “
‘liberally construed by the courts with the purpose of extending their benefits for the
protection of persons injured in the course of their employment.’ [Citation.] This rule of
liberal construction applies even though a particular plaintiff might prefer to forgo a
workers’ compensation remedy in favor of a remedy at law: We construe the WCA ‘ “in
favor of awarding work[ers’] compensation, not in permitting civil litigation.” ’ ” (King,
supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 1051.)
B. The Coming and Going Rule
“As a general rule, injuries sustained by an employee while commuting to and
from work are not compensable under the workers’ compensation system. [Citation.]

10
This rule, known as the going and coming rule, bars workers’ compensation for injuries
that occur ‘during a local commute enroute to a fixed place of business at fixed hours in
the absence of special or extraordinary circumstances.’ ” (Wright v. State of California
(2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1230, italics added.)
The “ ‘going and coming rule’ is regularly applied to off-premises lunchtime
injuries.” “However, under the ... rule, compensation will be awarded if the employee
was being paid at the time he suffered the off-premises injury. [Citations.] Conversely,
off-premises lunchtime injuries are not compensable when the employee was not paid
during the lunch break.” (Duncan v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1983) 150
Cal.App.3d 117, 120; see also Wood Pontiac Cadillac v. Superior Court (1992) 5
Cal.App.4th 810, 812; McFadden v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d
279, 281-282.)
C. Personal Comfort Doctrine
“The personal comfort doctrine provides, generally, that compensation extends to
injuries suffered while the employee is engaged briefly and during work hours in a
personal act which is necessary or helpful to his comfort or convenience.” (Duncan v.
Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., supra, 150 Cal.App.3d at p. 120; see DeMirjian v. Ideal
Heating Corp. (1954) 129 Cal.App.2d 758, 765-767 [“Acts necessary to the comfort,
convenience, health, and welfare of the employee while at work, though strictly personal
to himself and not acts of service, do not take him outside the course of his
employment”].) “The personal comfort doctrine is not strictly limited to injuries suffered
on the employer’s premises [citations], and whether it applies will depend upon whether
the acts ‘are helpful to the employer in that they aid in efficient performance by the
employee.’ [Citation.] Its limit is reached when the acts ‘are found to be departures
effecting temporary abandonment of employment.’ ” (Duncan, at p. 120; see Western
Greyhound Lines v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1964) 225 Cal.App.2d 517, 520-521

11
[explaining that off-premises injuries suffered by an employee during a paid break can
fall within the personal comfort doctrine because of a benefit to the employer].)
“Acts of ‘personal convenience’ are within the course of employment if they are
‘ “reasonably contemplated by the employment.” ’ ” (Price v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals
Bd. (1984) 37 Cal.3d 559, 568.) “[E]mployees who, within the time and space limits of
their employment, engage in acts which minister to their personal comfort do not ...
ordinarily leave the course of their employment, and therefore injuries occurring on the
premises of the employer ... during a regular lunch break arise within the course of
employment, as being incidental to such employment [citation], even though the lunch is
technically outside the regular hours of employment, is uncompensated, and the
employees are not then, generally speaking, under the control of their employer.”
(Gutierrez v. Petoseed Co. (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 766, 768-769 (Gutierrez); see
DeMirjian v. Ideal Heating Corp., supra, 129 Cal.App.2d at p. 765 [cessation of work for
eating, drinking and similar necessities “are necessary incidents of employment”].)
D. The Premises Line Rule
Over time, the going and coming rule became the subject of significant criticism.
For example, the California Supreme Court described it as a “ ‘ “slippery
concept,’ ‘riddled with exceptions,” ’ and difficult to apply uniformly. [Citation.] Such
criticism led, among other things, to the premises line rule.” (Wright v. State of
California, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 1230; see also Jones, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p.
508.)
In an effort to create a “sharp line of demarcation” as to when the employee’s
commute terminates and the course of employment commences for purposes of
determining whether an injury occurred in the course of employment, “ ‘courts adopted
the premises line rule, which provides that the employment relationship generally
commences once the employee enters the employer’s premises.’ ” (Jones, supra, 97
Cal.App.5th at p. 508; see also Schultz v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (2015) 232

12
Cal.App.4th 1126, 1135 (Schultz).) “ ‘Prior to entry[,] the going and coming rule
ordinarily precludes recovery [of workers’ compensation benefits]; after entry, injury is
generally presumed compensable as arising in the course of employment.’ ” (Jones, at p.
508; see also Schultz, at p. 1135.) “The same rule applies to determine the end of the
course of employment: generally, once employment has begun, it continues, and injury is
presumed to be compensable, until the employee leaves the employer’s premises.”
(Jones, at p. 508.) The employer’s premises include its parking lot. (General Ins. Co. v.
Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1976) 16 Cal.3d 595, 598-599 (General Ins.); see also
Schultz, at p. 1135.)
“ ‘The liability of an employer for injuries sustained by [its] employees on the
employment premises is exceedingly broad. Extending [the employer’s] liability to the
total premises is somewhat arbitrary but as a practical measure is well established.’ ”
(Schultz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 1136.) Our Supreme Court has explained that the
“premises line rule” has the advantage of enabling courts to ascertain the point at which
employment begins and ends—objectively and fairly, and that any disadvantages of such
“ ‘a sharp, objective, and perhaps somewhat arbitrary line has been drawn,’ ” are
outweighed by “ attempting to formulate and apply a subjective rule justly.” (General
Ins., supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 599; see also Jones, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 509.)
Where, as here, there is no real dispute about facts that are material to the premises
line rule, the question of whether an injury was suffered in the course of employment is
one of law. (Schultz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at pp.1134-1135; see Wright v. Beverly
Fabrics, Inc. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 346, 353 [when the facts are undisputed, the
question of whether an employee’s injuries arose out of and in the course of his
employment is a question of law].) Because the workers’ compensation law is liberally
construed, any doubts as to whether the premises line rule applies are to be resolved in
favor of awarding workers’ compensation, not in permitting civil litigation. (See Schultz,
at p. 1135.)

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E. Analysis
As we next explain, because the complaint alleges injuries that are derivative of a
compensable workplace injury, plaintiffs’ claims for premises liability and negligence
fall within the scope of the workers’ compensation bargain and are therefore only
compensable within the workers’ compensation system. The exclusive remedy
provisions of the WCA apply here because Wrenne’s injuries arose out of and occurred in
the course of his employment with Taco Bell. Indeed, had Wrenne not been working a
shift at Taco Bell, he would not have been stabbed and killed in the restaurant’s parking
lot during his 30-minute unpaid meal break.
Here, the complaint alleged the fatal stabbing of Wrenne arose from unsafe work
conditions, which exposed him to violent and dangerous individuals that patronized the
Taco Bell and/or hung out in the surrounding area, including the restaurant’s parking lot.
According to plaintiffs, defendants knew the restaurant was in a high crime area but
failed to take adequate steps to protect Taco Bell employees, such as providing adequate
lighting (including in the parking lot), suitable resting facilities, and security guards.
Plaintiffs further alleged that, as a result of defendants’ negligence in failing to
implement reasonable security measures, Wrenne was fatally stabbed in the Taco Bell
parking lot while on an unpaid 30-minute meal break.
On this record, the trial court correctly determined that plaintiffs’ claims were
barred as a matter of law by the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule under the
premises line rule, as Wrenne suffered bodily injuries on his employer’s premises during
the course and scope of his employment. (See Jones, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at pp. 509
[workers’ compensation exclusivity rule barred professor’s tort claims where she suffered
injuries as the result of a bicycle accident that occurred on the university’s campus
shortly after she left her workstation]; Schultz, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1128, 1129,
1136-1138 [workers’ compensation was the exclusive remedy for injuries suffered by an
employee from a car accident on the employer’s premises (military base) prior to the

14
employee reaching his workstation]; Gutierrez, supra, 103 Cal.App.3d at p. 769
[explaining that injuries occurring on an employer’s premises during a regular lunch
break arise within the course of employment, as being incidental to the employment, and
are exclusively compensable through workers compensation, even though the lunch break
is technically outside the regular hours of employment, is uncompensated, and the
employee is not under the control of their employer].)
We reject the various arguments plaintiffs’ offer for a different result, including
their contention that the trial court misapplied the “premises line rule” because Wrenne
was neither entering nor exiting his employer’s premises at the time of the stabbing but
rather “off duty and engaged in a purely personal act” that was not providing any benefit
to his employer. As we have discussed, it is undisputed that Wrenne was fatally stabbed
in the Taco Bell parking lot during an authorized 30-minute unpaid meal break. Under
these circumstances, the objective standard embodied in the premises line rule brought
Wrenne’s injuries within the exclusive remedy provisions of the workers’ compensation
scheme. The fact that Wrenne was not commuting to or from work, was on an unpaid
meal break, and was engaged in a purely personal act at the time of the stabbing, does not
preclude application of the premises line rule.4 None of these factors, either individually
or collectively, avoid the conclusion that plaintiffs’ claims fall within the exclusive
remedy provisions of the WCA.

4 In their appellate briefing, plaintiffs characterize Wrenne’s conduct during his meal
break as “loitering” in the Taco Bell parking lot. However, the term “loiter” or
“loitering” does not appear anywhere in the complaint. And there are no allegations as to
what Wrenne was doing at the time of the fatal stabbing, aside from sitting on the curb in
the Taco Bell parking lot. In any event, even if Wrenne was scrolling on his cell phone
and smoking, as plaintiffs claim in their appellate briefing, we are unpersuaded that the
workers’ compensation exclusivity rule does not apply because Wrenne was
“unnecessary loitering” in the parking lot at the time of the stabbing, as we discuss in
more detail, post.

15
Plaintiffs, for their part, have not directed us to any authority that holds otherwise
or persuades us that a different outcome is warranted under the facts of this case. Citing
Makins v. Industrial Accident Com. (1926) 198 Cal. 698 and McIvor v. Savage (1963)
220 Cal.App.2d 128, plaintiffs argue the premises line rule is inapplicable when (as here)
an employee is off duty and engaged in a purely personal act that does not benefit his
employer and amounts to unnecessary loitering on the employer’s premises. We find
plaintiffs’ reliance on Makins and McIvor misplaced. As relevant here, the McIvor court
explained that “an injury sustained by an employee while on premises under the control
of his employer, such as a parking lot, although going to or coming from work, providing
he does not unreasonably delay his entry or departure, is sufficient to support a finding
that the injury in question not only occurred in the course of, but also arose out of the
employment.” (McIvor, at p. 135, italics added; see id. at p. 139-140 [reversing grant of
summary judgment because there was a triable issue of fact as to whether employees
were acting within scope of their employment when a car accident occurred while the
employees were leaving their employer’s parking lot on their way home from work];
Makins, at p. 701 [describing the going and coming rule as follows: “ ‘The rule is well
settled that an employee, in going to work, comes under the protection of the act when he
enters the employer’s premises or upon the means provided for access thereto, though the
premises and such means of access are not wholly under the employers control or
management’ ” “ ‘and the same rule applies when the employee is leaving such working
premises provided he does not unnecessarily loiter thereon’ ”].) Here, because it is
undisputed that Wrenne’s injuries were not sustained while he was commuting to or from
work, neither McIvor nor Makins is helpful to plaintiffs. The complaint does not allege
that Wrenne was injured after the completion of his shift while he was unreasonably
delaying his departure from his employer’s premises. Instead, it alleges that Wrenne was
fatally stabbed in the Taco Bell parking lot during an unpaid 30-minute meal break. Even
were we to assume that Wrenne’s conduct--sitting on the curb of the Taco Bell parking

16
lot during his meal break--was not expressly authorized by his employer, his conduct (as
we have explained) was an incidental event connected with his assigned work such that
his injuries arose within the course of his employment for purposes of workers’
compensation liability. (See Gutierrez, supra, 103 Cal.App.3d at p. 769 [“injuries
occurring on the premises of the employer ... during a regular lunch break arise within the
course of employment, as being incidental to such employment,” even if the break is
uncompensated].)
Having reviewed the other cases on which plaintiffs rely, we find them to be
materially distinguishable and therefore inapposite. (See, e.g., Mason v. Lake Dolores
Group (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 822, 834 [waterpark employee was injured after the park
was closed while using waterslides in violation of employer’s policy]; Todd v. Workers’
Comp. Appeals Bd. (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 757, 759-760 [employee injured on the
employer’s premises during unpaid lunch break while voluntarily playing basketball with
fellow employees (which was unrelated to his work duties)];5 Rogers v. Workers’ Comp.
Appeals Bd. (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 1195, 1197-1198 [employee was robbed and
assaulted in her employer’s parking lot after returning from personal trip to bank during
lunch hour to cash her check]; County of Los Angeles v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd.
(1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 418, 420, 422-423 [employee was injured during unpaid lunch
hour away from employer’s premises when car crashed into restaurant where she was

5 Among the various statutory “conditions of compensation” (or requirements for
workers’ compensation liability) include the following: “Where the injury does not arise
out of voluntary participation in any off-duty recreational, social, or athletic activity not
constituting part of the employee’s work-related duties, except where these activities are
a reasonable expectancy of, or are expressly or impliedly required by, the employment.”
(§ 3600, subd. (a)(9).) The Court of Appeal in Todd relied on this specific provision of
the WCA to find that the employee, who sustained an injury on his employer’s premises
while playing basketball during his lunch break, was not entitled to workers’
compensation. (Todd v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd., supra, 198 Cal.App.3d at pp. 759-
760.)

17
eating]; Mission Ins. Co. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (Fitzgerald) (1978) 84
Cal. App.3d 50, 56-57 [employee was injured in car accident over a mile away from the
employer’s premises while driving to a restaurant during an unpaid lunch break]; General
Ins., supra, 16 Cal.3d at pp. 597-600 [employee struck and killed by a passing motorist
prior to entering his employer’s premises]; State Department of Institutions v. Industrial
Accident Commission (1941) 46 Cal.App.2d 439 [hospital employee was injured while
reentering her employer’s building to search for a fellow employee after she had left the
hospital at the completion of her work shift, drove her car from the hospital parking to the
front entrance, and waited 10 minutes].)
III
Leave to Amend
As noted ante, when a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, we must
decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by
amendment. (Blank v. Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318; Schifando v. City of Los
Angeles, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 1081.) The plaintiff bears the burden to show that
reasonable possibility. (Blank, at p. 318; Schifando, at p. 1081.) That burden requires the
plaintiff to specifically show what facts he or she could plead to state viable causes of
action if allowed the opportunity to amend. (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4
Cal.App.4th 857, 890.) To meet that burden on appeal, the plaintiff must “enumerate the
facts and demonstrate how those facts establish a cause of action. [Citations.] Absent
such a showing, the appellate court cannot assess whether or not the trial court abused its
discretion by denying leave to amend.” (Ibid.)
Plaintiffs did not argue in the trial court that they should be granted leave to
amend their complaint. On appeal, they make no effort to demonstrate how the
complaint could be amended to allege sufficient facts to state a viable cause of action
against any defendant. As such, there is no basis for finding an abuse of discretion. (See
Rakestraw v. California Physicians’ Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 44 [“Where the

18
appellant offers no allegations to support the possibility of amendment and no legal
authority showing the viability of new causes of action, there is no basis for finding the
trial court abused its discretion when it sustained the demurrer without leave to amend”].)
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in sustaining the demurrers without leave to
amend.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are entitled to recover their costs on
appeal. (California Rule of Court, rule 8.278(a).)

/s/
DUARTE, J.

We concur:

/s/
EARL, P. J.

/s/
WISEMAN, J.†

 Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
† Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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