CourtListener 10865877•People v. Jones CA2/2
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 5/28/26 P. v. Jones CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B341069
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Los Angeles County
v. Super. Ct. No. XSCTA158511)
TREMONT NAVON JONES,
Defendant and Appellant.
THE PEOPLE, B342267
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
FREDDIE LEE TRONE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Connie R. Quinones, Judge. The judgment
as to Jones is affirmed as modified. The judgment as to Trone is
affirmed.
James Koester, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant Tremont Navon Jones.
Winston Kevin McKesson for Defendant and Appellant
Freddie Lee Trone.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Kathy S. Pomerantz, and
David F. Glassman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
_______________________
A jury convicted defendant Tremont Navon Jones of second
degree robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery, and convicted
defendant Freddie Lee Trone of first degree felony murder,
second degree robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery.
Defendants now appeal their convictions. The People concede,
and we agree, there are clerical errors in Jones’s abstract of
judgment that must be corrected. In all other respects, we affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On September 12, 2022, around 12:27 p.m.,1 Rakim Allen, a
rap artist who performed under the name PnB Rock, and his
fiancée Stephanie S.2 entered Roscoe’s Chicken and Waffles
restaurant (Roscoe’s) in South Los Angeles wearing jewelry worth
1 The investigating officers composed a timeline using
footage from multiple cameras. The record indicates certain
footage was four minutes fast while other footage ran four
minutes slow. We refer to the timeline presented by the People
for consistency. Defendants do not dispute any discrepancy in the
timeline.
2 We refer to the victim by her first name and last initial to
protect her privacy interests. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.90(b)(4).)
2
approximately $500,000. Jones, a former Roscoe’s employee who
frequently visited the location, was already inside eating a meal.
After seeing Allen, Jones fist bumped him and left Roscoe’s a few
minutes later.
Surveillance footage showed after Jones left, he waited
under a stairwell in the strip mall where Roscoe’s was located. At
1:06 p.m., a man later identified as Trone entered Roscoe’s
parking lot driving a Buick Enclave (Buick), got out of the car,
and met with Jones under the stairwell. After Defendants
finished their conversation, Jones walked to a car, ducked out of
view of the surveillance camera, reemerged, and walked back
toward Trone. While Defendants stood near each other with their
backs to the camera, Jones had an object and a towel in his right
hand. Trone then walked away with an object in his left hand
while Jones no longer carried the object. Trone returned to the
Buick and drove away.
A few minutes later, the Buick stopped alongside a
sidewalk near Roscoe’s to let an individual later identified as
Trone’s 17-year-old son, J.T.,3 out of the car. At 1:16 p.m., J.T.
walked past Jones and headed toward Roscoe’s. Immediately
thereafter, Jones made a one-second phone call to Trone and
drove away in his own car.
When J.T. entered Roscoe’s, he headed to Allen’s table
while wearing a ski mask and holding a gun. J.T. ordered Allen
and Stephanie to give him all their jewelry and threatened to kill
them if they did not comply. Immediately thereafter, J.T. shot
Allen several times, took Allen’s jewelry and ran out. At
3 Because J.T. was a minor when the incident occurred, we
refer to him by his initials. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(10).)
3
1:17 p.m., the Buick returned to Roscoe’s parking lot. A minute
later, J.T. got into the car, and the Buick drove away.
Surveillance footage near Trone’s apartment showed Trone and
J.T. arriving at the apartment in the Buick around 1:32 p.m.
Meanwhile, law enforcement arrived at Roscoe’s and
attempted to render aid to Allen, but he succumbed to his
wounds.
On September 13, 2022, around 2:45 a.m., police responded
to a car fire in Gardena. The car was the Buick, and Trone was
the arsonist. Later that morning at 10:47, Trone texted J.T.:
“Just hold tight. Everything coming together.” Two minutes later,
Trone texted J.T.: “Just stay calm and cool. No crazy talk. All
good vibes. I love you. Imma call you in a couple of hours.”
At 10:20 p.m., Trone texted J.T.: “[I]mma hit you when it’s
green.”
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The People filed charges against Jones and Trone. The first
amended information alleged two counts of second degree robbery
(Pen. Code,4 § 211; counts 2 & 3) and conspiracy to commit
robbery (§ 182, subd. (a)(1); count 6) against Jones. The
information alleged first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a);
count 1), two counts of second degree robbery (§ 211; counts 2 &
3), and conspiracy to commit robbery (§ 182, subd. (a)(1); count 4)
against Trone. As to the murder charge, the information also
alleged a principal was armed with a handgun during the
commission of the murder (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)). The information
also alleged both Defendants had suffered a prior “strike”
conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(j), 1170.12).
4 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
4
Defendants were tried together before a single jury. During
trial, Defendants waived their right to a jury trial on the prior
strike allegations. The jury ultimately found Defendants guilty as
charged and found the firearm allegation true against Trone.
Trone filed a motion for new trial based on insufficiency of the
evidence, which the trial court denied.
The trial court held a sentencing hearing on September 23,
2024. The court found Jones’s prior strike allegation true and
sentenced him to 12 years. The court struck Trone’s prior strike
allegation in the interests of justice and sentenced him to
31 years four months to life.
Defendants filed timely appeals, which we consolidated.
DISCUSSION
I. Jones’s Appeal (case No. B341069)
Jones makes three arguments on appeal. He argues the
trial court did not take a valid waiver of his right to a jury trial
on the prior strike allegation, the court’s reliance on his prior
conviction to impose an upper term sentence was
unconstitutional, and there are clerical errors in his abstract of
judgment. We reject the first two contentions but agree his
abstract of judgment must be corrected.
A. The Trial Court Took a Valid Waiver of Jones’s
Right to a Jury Trial on the Prior Strike
Allegation
1. Waiver of Jury Trial
Under the “Three Strikes” law, a prior conviction for a
“strike” offense subjects a defendant to increased punishment.
(§§ 667, subd. (b), 1170.12, subd. (a).) Section 1025,
subdivision (b) provides a defendant with the right to have the
5
jury decide the truth of a prior strike allegation unless the
defendant waives the right.
A waiver of jury trial must be “ ‘knowing and intelligent,
that is, “ ‘ “made with a full awareness both of the nature of the
right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to
abandon it,” ’ ” as well as voluntary “ ‘ “in the sense that it was
the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than
intimidation, coercion, or deception.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Sivongxxay
(2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 166 (Sivongxxay).) But trial judges need not
follow a rigid formula or use any particular words to ensure a
jury waiver is knowing and intelligent. (Id. at pp. 169–170.)
“The voluntariness of a waiver is a question of law which
[appellate courts] review de novo.” (People v. Vargas (1993)
13 Cal.App.4th 1653, 1660.) A jury waiver is valid only if the
record shows it is voluntary and intelligent under the totality of
the circumstances. (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 167.)
2. Analysis
As a preliminary matter, we note the People argue Jones
forfeited his claim that the trial court did not take a valid waiver
of his right to a jury trial on the prior strike allegation by failing
to raise it below. We disagree. The right to a jury trial is a
substantial right, and no objection is required to raise this type of
error on appeal. (§ 1259; see People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th
36, 48 [“Defendant did not forfeit his Sixth Amendment right by
failing to request a jury trial on the aggravating circumstances”].)
Turning to the record before us, we conclude it shows
Jones’s waiver of his right to a jury trial on the prior strike
allegation was knowing and intelligent.
Near the end of trial, the following exchange occurred
between the trial court, Jones’s counsel, and Jones:
6
“THE COURT: [¶] . . . [¶] . . . Mr. Jones has a prior
conviction for a 211. He has the right to have a jury trial,
same jury that decides this case, if they find him guilty to
decide whether or not the prior is a valid prior. [¶] Does he
want to have a jury trial, court trial, or stipulate to the
prior, Mr. Haas [Jones’s counsel]?
“MR. HAAS: Court trial.
“THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Jones, you have a right to
have the same jury that decides this matter, if they find
you guilty, to determine whether or not your prior is valid.
[¶] Do you understand your right to have a jury trial for
that prior?
“DEFENDANT JONES: Yes.
“THE COURT: Do you waive and give up that right
and accept a court trial, which is me, looking at prior
information they have on it to decide whether or not it’s a
valid prior?
“DEFENDANT JONES: Yes.
“THE COURT: You understand your right to a jury
but you’re waiving that?
“DEFENDANT JONES: Yes.
“THE COURT: Counsel, do you join?
“MR. HAAS: I do.”
As the record here shows, the trial court repeatedly
informed Jones he had a right to have the jury determine
whether his prior conviction was a valid strike. Jones was fully
aware of his right to have a jury decide the truth of the prior
strike allegation and was aware waiving the right meant the
court would decide the issue. Jones was also duly represented by
7
counsel, who joined in the waiver. We see no indication Jones’s
waiver was not “knowing” or “intelligent.”
Jones contends the waiver was invalid because the trial
court did not inform him all 12 jurors must agree to find the prior
strike allegation true. Although the court did not mention jury
unanimity, our Supreme Court has “never insisted that a jury
waiver colloquy invariably must discuss . . . the unanimity
requirement.” (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 168.) Indeed, a
valid waiver turns, not on whether the parties “ ‘ “ adhere[] to a
predetermined ritualistic form of making the record,” ’ ” but on
whether all relevant circumstances show the waiver “was
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” (Id. at p. 170.)
Courts may consider whether the defendant was
represented by counsel. “[T]he trial court in a criminal case is not
required to explain to a defendant the nature and consequences
of his action in waiving a jury trial where he is, as in the case at
bar, represented by counsel and fails to show that either he or his
counsel has been misled as to the result which might occur from
his waiving a jury trial . . . .” (People v. Lookadoo (1967) 66 Cal.2d
307, 311; see also People v. Langdon (1959) 52 Cal.2d 425, 432
[same].)
We find the California Supreme Court’s opinion in People v.
Tijerina (1969) 1 Cal.3d 41 directly on point. The circumstances
surrounding the waiver there are very similar to the one here:
“[DISTRICT ATTORNEY]: [Defendant] Tijerina, you
understand that in this case now before the Court,
No. A 220328, you’re entitled to a jury trial to determine
your guilt or innocence in this matter, and you’re also
entitled to a jury trial to determine whether the prior
8
felony convictions that have been alleged are true or false;
do you understand that?
“[DEFENDANT]: Yes.
“[DISTRICT ATTORNEY]: Do you know what a jury
trial is?
“[DEFENDANT]: Yes, ma’am.
“[DISTRICT ATTORNEY]: That is when twelve
people sit over here in the box and hear all the evidence. [¶]
You can give up your right to the jury trial and have the
judge sitting alone determine all the issues in this case.
What is your desire? Do you want a court trial or a jury
trial?
“[DEFENDANT]: Court trial.
“[DISTRICT ATTORNEY]: All right. You waive your
right to jury trial at this time on all the issues?
“[DEFENDANT]: Yes.
“[PUBLIC DEFENDER]: Join in the waiver.
“[DISTRICT ATTORNEY]: People join in the waiver.” (Id. at
p. 45, fn. 2.) There, as here, the defendant argued the waiver was
invalid because the trial court did not mention the unanimity
requirement. Rejecting that argument, the Supreme Court
explained the trial court was not required to further explain the
significance of the defendant’s waiver because he was
represented by counsel. (Id. at pp. 45–46.)
Because our de novo review is based on “all relevant
circumstances,” we also consider events “before and after
[Jones’s] waiver was entered” to confirm its “character and
scope.” (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 167, fn. 2, 173, fn. 8.)
The waiver occurred near the end of trial. By then, Jones was
well aware of the unanimity requirement; the trial court had
9
mentioned the rule in jury selection. And after the waiver, the
court instructed the jury on the requirement before the jury
deliberated. Jones, who was present during these proceedings
and represented by counsel, never indicated he wanted a jury
trial on the prior strike allegation.
Jones’s prior experience with the criminal justice system
further supports the conclusion he knowingly and intelligently
waived jury trial on the prior strike allegation. (Parke v. Raley
(1992) 506 U.S. 20, 37 [“evidence of a defendant’s prior experience
with the criminal justice system [is] relevant to the question
whether he knowingly waived constitutional rights”].) Five years
before trial, Jones had a conviction by plea for first degree
robbery. This conviction is particularly relevant because before
taking Jones’s plea, the court was required to apprise Jones of
the panoply of rights afforded by a jury trial. (See People v. Lytle
(1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1, 4 [“When a defendant pleads guilty or
nolo contendere, whether or not the plea is pursuant to a plea
bargain, he must be advised of and waive his rights of self-
incrimination, confrontation and jury trial [citations], and must
be advised of the direct consequences of the plea, including the
maximum possible penalty.”].)
On this record, we conclude the waiver was valid.
B. The Trial Court Appropriately Considered
Jones’s Prior Conviction to Select the Upper
Term Sentence for Robbery
1. Constitutional Limits on the Imposition of
an Upper Term Sentence
Under section 1170, subdivision (b)(2), the trial court “may
impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are
circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the
10
imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term
and the facts underlying those circumstances have been
stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a
reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court
trial.” (Ibid.) However, subdivision (b)(3) provides an exception:
“Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), the court may consider
the defendant's prior convictions in determining sentencing based
on a certified record of conviction without submitting the prior
convictions to a jury.”
In 2024, the United States Supreme Court decided Erlinger
v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821 (Erlinger), holding that
“[v]irtually ‘any fact’ that ‘ “increase[s] the prescribed range of
penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed” ’ must be
resolved by a unanimous jury beyond a reasonable doubt (or
freely admitted in a guilty plea).” (Id. at p. 834, first brackets
added.) Thus, in sentencing “a judge may ‘do no more, consistent
with the Sixth Amendment, than determine what crime, with
what elements, the defendant was convicted of.’ ” (Id. at p. 838.)
While this appeal was pending, the California Supreme
Court in People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069 (Wiley), followed
Erlinger and interpreted section 1170, subdivisions (b)(2) and
(b)(3) to comport with federal constitutional requirements as
clarified by Erlinger. (Wiley, at pp. 1085–1086.) Wiley concluded
“a defendant is entitled to a jury trial on all aggravating facts,
other than the bare fact of a prior conviction and its elements, that
expose the defendant to imposition of a sentence more serious
than the statutorily provided midterm.” (Id. at p. 1086,
fn. omitted, italics added.)
11
We review questions about whether a defendant’s
constitutional rights were violated de novo. (People v. Palmer
(2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 268, 280.)
2. Analysis
Here, we conclude the trial court appropriately imposed an
upper term sentence based on Jones’s prior conviction.
The trial court justified the upper term sentence as follows:
“So the jury heard the evidence. The jury found [you] guilty of
count[s] 2, 3, and [6]. The jury found that you had collaborated
and conspired with Mr. Trone to commit a robbery. They found
you guilty of count 2, the 211, count 3, the 211, count [6], the
182(a)(1) conspiracy. [¶] The court has found the prior conviction
for a robbery from 2019 true. [¶] The court’s going to impose the
maximum on count 2 on the robbery, five years.”
As the record reflects, the trial court only considered
Jones’s prior robbery for the “bare fact” of the conviction and thus
acted within section 1170, subdivision (b)(3)’s statutory
authorization and the constitutional limits set by Erlinger and
Wiley.
Jones argues the trial court’s consideration of the prior
conviction was unconstitutional because it had to determine
Jones was indeed the person who suffered the prior conviction.
According to Jones, the court should have submitted to the jury
the question of identity because it went beyond the bare fact of
the conviction itself. We are not persuaded.
Section 1170, subdivision (b)(3) authorized the trial court’s
actions, and the Supreme Court has interpreted this section as
coextensive with the limited exception that courts may decide the
issue of a bare fact of a prior conviction. (Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th
at p. 1086.) Further, determining the fact of a prior conviction
12
necessarily subsumes the question of the identity of the person
previously convicted. (See People v. Epps (2001) 25 Cal.4th 19,
28–30; see id. at p. 28 [“only the bare fact of the prior conviction
was at issue” where the defendant did not dispute someone was
convicted and only disputed he was the person identified in the
record of conviction].) It is apparent a court cannot determine a
prior conviction exists for the defendant without determining the
defendant was in fact the person identified in the record of
conviction. Were we to accept Jones’s argument, we would
effectively eliminate an exception that has been endorsed by the
United States and California Supreme Courts. We will not do so.
(See Rittiman v. Public Utilities Com. (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th
1018, 1033 [“We . . . are bound to follow Supreme Court
precedent.”].)
In short, we conclude the trial court’s consideration of
Jones’s prior conviction to select the upper term sentence did not
violate his constitutional rights.
C. Jones’s Abstract of Judgment Must be
Corrected
Finally, the parties agree Jones’s abstract of judgment
must be corrected in two respects.
First, the abstract of judgment states the trial court
imposed a five-year sentence for the section 12022,
subdivision (a)(1) firearm enhancement. But the jury was not
asked to, and did not, find Jones was armed with a firearm in the
commission of the robbery.
Second, the abstract of judgment states the trial court
imposed a five-year sentence for the count 2 robbery conviction.
But at the oral pronouncement of sentence, the court doubled
that term to 10 years because of the prior strike.
13
An appellate court has inherent power to correct clerical
errors in its records to reflect the true facts, including the oral
judgments of judicial officers. (People v. Mitchell (2001)
26 Cal.4th 181, 186–187.) We agree such correction of the record
is appropriate. The abstract of judgment must be amended to
reflect a firearm enhancement was never imposed on the count 2
robbery and the sentence on that count is 10 years.
II. Trone’s Appeal (case No. B342267)
Trone makes two arguments on appeal. He argues
substantial evidence does not support his conviction for felony
murder and the trial court erroneously denied his motion for new
trial based on insufficiency of the evidence. We reject both
contentions.
A. Additional Relevant Facts
As a teenager, J.T. had experienced several run-ins with
the law. By the time he was a 10th grader, he had been to
two different juvenile halls. In February 2022, J.T. was in a
suitable placement with a relative but ran away from home. As a
result, the juvenile delinquency court issued J.T. a bench warrant
for violating his probation. J.T. was also a minor in a case
pending in juvenile dependency court. Around May 2022, the
dependency court declared him a ward of the court and placed
him in Trone’s custody.
Between May and June 2022, Ebony Williams, a mental
health clinician at the Los Angeles County Department of Mental
Health, submitted several referrals for J.T. to Trone, including
substance abuse counseling, negative peer interaction counseling,
anger management, and assistance from an educational
specialist. Trone rejected all these services, except for assistance
with enrolling J.T. in school.
14
However, Williams had difficulty getting a school to accept
J.T. as he suffered from health and emotional disturbances,
which qualified him for an Individualized Education Plan (IEP).
J.T.’s IEP required him to attend a nonpublic “specialized school
for individuals who may have behavioral or mental health issues
that may not be easily contained . . . in a regular public school.”
But three nonpublic schools in which Williams attempted to
enroll J.T. rejected him. Williams eventually enrolled J.T. in
public school, which accepted J.T. only because it was required to
do so.
On September 3, 2022, a Los Angeles Police Department
(LAPD) officer arrested J.T. in a park and found a semiautomatic
gun inside J.T.’s backpack. The gun was loaded with 11 nine-
millimeter bullets, and one bullet was loaded in the chamber.
LAPD released J.T. to his stepmother to serve house arrest.
Trone testified at trial. He stated he did not give J.T. a gun
the day of the robbery because he was “afraid of [J.T.] having any
weapons around [him].” When asked why, Trone answered J.T.
was dangerous, was bipolar, and had been diagnosed with a mood
disorder. When further asked why Trone thought J.T. was
dangerous, Trone testified J.T. “take[s] meds,” “goes off and on,”
“can go from cool to upset in a matter of minutes,” and had
threatened his biological mother in the past. Moreover, Trone
testified he received a report every time J.T. got in legal trouble.
Thus, he knew J.T. had previously been charged with grand theft
auto and possession of a firearm and knew about the September
3, 2022 incident.
15
B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Felony
Murder Conviction
1. The Major Participant with Reckless
Disregard for Human Life Standard
Section 189, subdivision (e) provides: “A participant in the
perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony listed in
subdivision (a) in which a death occurs is liable for murder” if,
among other things, “[t]he person was a major participant in the
underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human
life, as described in subdivision (d) of [s]ection 190.2.”
(Id., subd. (e)(3).)
In People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and
People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark), the California
Supreme Court provided guidance on the meaning of the
two statutory phrases “major participant” and “reckless
indifference to human life.” (People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th
867, 883.)
In Banks, the court identified the following factors a court
should consider in determining whether an individual was a
major participant: “[(1)] What role did the defendant have in
planning the criminal enterprise that led to one or more deaths?
[(2)] What role did the defendant have in supplying or using
lethal weapons? [(3)] What awareness did the defendant have of
particular dangers posed by the nature of the crime, weapons
used, or past experience or conduct of the other participants?
[(4)] Was the defendant present at the scene of the killing, in a
position to facilitate or prevent the actual murder, and did his or
her own actions or inaction play a particular role in the death?
[and] [(5)] What did the defendant do after lethal force was
used?” (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803, fn. omitted.) The court
16
continued, “No one of these considerations is necessary, nor is
any one of them necessarily sufficient. All may be weighed in
determining the ultimate question, whether the defendant’s
participation ‘in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of
death’ [citation] was sufficiently significant to be considered
‘major.’ ” (Id. at p. 803.)
In Clark, the court noted there was both a subjective and
objective element to reckless indifference, quoting Model
Penal Code section 2.02, subdivision (2)(c): “ ‘A person acts
recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when
he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk
that the material element exists or will result from his conduct.
The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering
the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the
circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross
deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person
would observe in the actor’s situation.’ ” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th
at p. 617.)
The Clark court “set out a nonexhaustive list of
considerations relevant to [the reckless indifference standard],
including [(1)] use of or awareness of the presence of a weapon or
weapons, [(2)] physical presence at the scene and opportunity to
restrain confederates or aid victims, [(3)] the duration of the
crime, [(4)] knowledge of any threat the confederates might
represent, and [(5)] efforts taken to minimize risks.” (People v.
Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 706, citing Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th
at pp. 618–623.) The “major participant” and “reckless
indifference” elements significantly overlap. (Strong, at p. 706;
Clark, at p. 615.)
17
When assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, “we review
the whole record to determine whether any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime or special
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . [W]e review the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and
presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact
the jury could reasonably have deduced from the evidence. . . .
A reversal for insufficient evidence ‘is unwarranted unless it
appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient
substantial evidence to support” ’ the jury’s verdict.” (People v.
Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357, citations omitted; see also
People v. Gomez (2018) 6 Cal.5th 243, 278 [court does not “resolve
credibility issues or evidentiary conflicts”].)
2. Analysis
Applying the law from these decisions to the facts in this
case, we conclude there is substantial evidence to support the
jury’s conclusion that Trone was a major participant in the
robbery that led to Allen’s murder and acted with reckless
indifference to human life.
With respect to the major participant prong, there was
evidence for the jury to find against Trone on every factor. The
jury could have reasonably concluded Trone had a vital role in
planning the robbery during his meeting outside Roscoe’s with
Jones, which was shortly after Jones witnessed Allen and
Stephanie wearing half a million dollars’ worth of jewelry. The
jury could have reasonably concluded from the texts Trone sent
J.T. after the robbery that Trone controlled and directed J.T.’s
actions. The jury could have reasonably concluded the object
Jones gave to Trone was a gun that Trone later supplied to J.T.
As further explained in the reckless indifference analysis below,
18
the jury could have reasonably concluded Trone was aware of the
dangers posed by arming his mentally unstable son and directing
him to commit a robbery. Although Trone was not present at the
scene when the killing occurred, the jury could have reasonably
concluded Trone’s actions played a vital role in Allen’s death as
he supplied J.T. with the gun and dropped off J.T. near Roscoe’s
so J.T. could rob Allen. The jury could have also reasonably
concluded Trone played a vital role in covering up the crime:
evidence showed he returned to Roscoe’s to pick up J.T. as the
getaway driver and later burned the Buick.
As for the reckless indifference prong, two factors
indisputably weigh in Trone’s favor. He was not inside Roscoe’s
and the robbery murder transpired within seconds; thus there is
no evidence Trone could have intervened as J.T. held Allen at
gunpoint or could have aided Allen after J.T. shot him.
However, there was evidence for the jury to find against
Trone on every remaining factor. First, the jury could have
reasonably concluded Trone knew J.T. was going to use a gun to
commit the robbery because Trone supplied J.T. with the gun.
Second, the jury could have reasonably concluded Trone
knew J.T. had a propensity for violence and was likely to use the
gun in the commission of the robbery. Trone testified he knew
J.T. was dangerous because J.T. needed medication for his
mental illness, was bipolar, “can go from cool to upset in a matter
of minutes,” and had threatened his biological mother in the past.
Trone also admitted J.T. was so dangerous that he would never
give J.T. a gun. Trone was also aware of J.T.’s myriad of legal
troubles, including the arrest for gun possession on September 3,
2022. Trone also knew his son had been referred services for
anger management, peer intervention, and substance abuse.
19
Finally, there is no evidence Trone made efforts in advance
to minimize risks. “[T]he absence of such efforts does not
necessarily evince a subjective disregard for risk where the
objective circumstances of the planned crime suggest the risk of
violence posed is no more than that inherent in any violent
felony.” (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 888.) However, the
evidence shows Trone significantly increased the risks by arming
his mentally unstable son—who he admitted was dangerous and
should never be given a gun—and sending J.T. into Roscoe’s
alone to rob Allen. Under these circumstances, the jury could
have reasonably concluded from Trone’s failure to minimize risks
that he acted with reckless indifference to human life.
Trone’s briefing addresses only the reckless indifference
prong and the evidence favorable to his position. For example,
citing his own trial testimony, he asserts the item Jones gave him
was marijuana rather than a gun, he did not give J.T. the gun, he
did not know J.T. would use a gun in the robbery, and he had no
ability to minimize the risk of violence. But as detailed above,
there is ample evidence—much of which directly contradicts
Trone’s testimony—from which the jury could have reasonably
concluded Trone acted with reckless indifference. Trone’s failure
to acknowledge and address evidence favorable to the jury verdict
arguably constitutes forfeiture of his substantial evidence
challenge. (See E.I. v. El Segundo Unified School Dist. (2025)
111 Cal.App.5th 1267, 1285 [“ ‘A party who challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding must set forth,
discuss, and analyze all the evidence on that point, both favorable
and unfavorable.’ ”].) Even considering the argument on the
merits, we reject it, based on the ample evidence cited above.
20
In short, substantial evidence supports the felony murder
conviction.
C. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Denying Trone’s Motion for New Trial
1. Motions for New Trial
In considering a motion for new trial based on the ground
that the jury verdict is contrary to the law or evidence (§ 1181,
subd. (6)), the trial court, acting as a “ ‘13th juror,’ ” determines
whether the charges have been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. (Porter v. Superior Court (2009) 47 Cal.4th 125, 133.) In
making this determination “a trial court must review the
evidence independently, considering the proper weight to be
afforded to the evidence and then deciding whether there is
sufficient credible evidence to support the verdict.” (People v.
Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 364.)
When the issue involves sufficiency of the evidence, the
denial of a motion for new trial is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. (People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 730.) “The
court has broad discretion in ruling on a new trial motion, and
the court’s ruling will not be overturned absent a clear and
unmistakable abuse of that discretion. [Citation.] The court
abuses its discretion, however, where it misconceives its duty,
applies an incorrect legal standard, or fails to independently
consider the weight of the evidence.” (People v. Carter (2014)
227 Cal.App.4th 322, 328.)
2. Analysis
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting
Trone’s argument there was insufficient evidence to support his
felony murder conviction. As explained in part II.B., ante,
substantial evidence supports the jury verdict. Trone repeats the
21
arguments he made challenging the sufficiency of the evidence,
but these arguments do not compel a different result. Trone also
makes a passing assertion that the court’s denial of his new trial
motion deprived him of due process. This conclusory assertion,
without more, is insufficient to demonstrate error. (City of Santa
Maria v. Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266, 286–287 [bare
assertions of error are insufficient; “an appellant must supply the
reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal
analysis . . . .”].)
DISPOSITION
As to defendant Jones, the superior court is directed to
amend Jones’s abstract of judgment to reflect a firearm
enhancement was never imposed on count 2 and the sentence on
that count is 10 years. The superior court is further directed to
forward a certified copy of the amended abstract of judgment to
the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other
respects, the judgment is affirmed.
As to defendant Trone, the judgment is affirmed.
RICHARDSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
CHAVEZ, Acting P. J. HOFFSTADT, J.*
* Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate
District, Division Five assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
22
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