City of South Gate v. South Gate Investment Group CA2/2

CourtListener 10865085Calctapp27.05.2026

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Filed 5/27/26 City of South Gate v. South Gate Investment Group CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

CITY OF SOUTH GATE, B335997

Cross-complainant and Los Angeles County
Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 20NWCV00499

v.

SOUTH GATE INVESTMENT
GROUP, INC.,

Cross-defendant and
Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Brian F. Gasdia and Lee W. Tsao, Judges.
Affirmed.
Law Office of Adam Dolce and Adam Dolce for Cross-
defendant and Appellant.
FBT Gibbons, Raul F. Salinas, Rick D. Navarrette and
William M. Hensley for Cross-complainant and Respondent.
_______________________________
Cross-defendant South Gate Investment Group, Inc. (SGIG)
is the co-owner1 of a commercial property on Atlantic Avenue in
South Gate. In 2020, Cross-complainant City of South Gate (the
City) notified SGIG a fence, landscaping, lighting, and other
improvements SGIG’s predecessor had installed were
encroaching on the City’s Atlantic Avenue right of way. The City
planned to remove these improvements in order to widen the
adjoining sidewalk.
SGIG, which claimed the encroaching improvements were
installed at the City’s oral direction decades ago, brought suit
against the City for quiet title and a declaration that SGIG
owned the land under the improvements.
The City cross-complained against SGIG and also
demurred to SGIG’s causes of action. The City argued that any
alleged oral agreement could not bind the City. The trial court
sustained the City’s demurrer and later granted the City’s motion
for partial summary adjudication on two causes of action the City
asserted in its first amended cross-complaint (FAXC)—nuisance
and quiet title. It later entered judgment for the City on those
causes of action. It is from that judgment SGIG now appeals.
The only issues raised on appeal are whether the trial court
erred in summarily adjudicating the City’s nuisance and quiet
title causes of action. For the reasons that follow, we find no error
and affirm.

1 SGIG’s tenant in common, AJG Realty, Inc., is not a party
to this appeal.

2
BACKGROUND
I. Factual Background
The property at issue (the Property) is part of an
assemblage of commercial parcels originally delineated on a
1948 recorded tract map. Recorded with the map is a dedication
of the roads shown on it, which include Atlantic Avenue and
Chakemco Street. The Property lies at the northeast corner of
Atlantic and Chakemco. Per the map, its predominant western
boundary is 50 feet from the centerline of Atlantic. Its
predominant southern boundary is 20 feet from the centerline of
Chakemco.
SGIG’s predecessor, California Truck Sales (CTS)
purchased five lots, which include the land constituting the
Property, in 1995. At the time, the land was undeveloped, and
CTS set about developing it for commercial use—the purchase,
sale, and storage of semi-trucks. According to one of SGIG’s
principals, the City required CTS to “install a wrought-iron fence,
pole lines, greenery, curbs, and lights” along the Property’s
boundary with Atlantic Avenue (collectively, the Improvements)
as a condition of its development.
This requirement was communicated by Chon Cervantes,
who was the City’s Director of Building and Safety at the time.2
The SGIG principal testified CTS installed the Improvements
where DBS Cervantes directed it to, and DBS Cervantes took
measurements at the conclusion of the installation to confirm the

2 Because former Director of Building and Safety Chon
Cervantes has the same surname as the City’s current Director of
Public Works Arturo Cervantes, we refer to the former as “DBS
Cervantes” and the latter as “DPW Cervantes.”

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Improvements were in the right place. SGIG’s principal believed
installing these improvements cost CTS over $200,000.
At some point, a City sidewalk, about six feet wide, was
installed along Atlantic Avenue adjacent to the Improvements.
In 2010, a different SGIG predecessor obtained approval of
an adjustment to the internal lot lines of the assemblage CTS
purchased in 1995. No adjustment was made to the external lot
lines through this process. The current boundaries of the
Property are as shown on a map recorded as part of the lot line
adjustment process. The map does not show the location of the
Improvements.
Several years later, the City made plans to improve the
streets bordering the Property and informed SGIG the
Improvements were encroaching on the City’s right of way. The
City asserted the encroachment was approximately 100 feet long
and five feet wide—the area within SGIG’s wrought iron fence
along Atlantic Avenue. The City informed SGIG that the City
would remove the Improvements and SGIG would then be
responsible for reinstalling them behind the actual boundary line.
In August 2020, the City sent SGIG a letter advising that
work was about to commence, and removing the Improvements
would be “one of the first items.” In response, SGIG filed a
complaint against the City.
According to the City, the Improvements remain where
they were installed in the 1990’s and the City’s improvement
project remains on hold as a result.
II. Procedural Background
SGIG’s complaint did not dispute the Improvements
encroached on the boundary line described in property records.
Instead, SGIG alleged the Improvements reflected a different

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boundary “agreed” by the parties “over twenty years ago,” i.e.,
when the City directed the installation of the Improvements. It
further alleged the City was estopped to assert rights over the
area for the same reasons. By the complaint, SGIG sought a
determination that “the affected area claimed by the City . . . to
be encroached upon by [SGIG], belongs to [SGIG].” It complained
of the potential cost of reinstalling the Improvements “and the
loss of approximately 500 square feet” from the Property if its
requested relief were not granted.
The City responded with a demurrer and cross-complaint.
The trial court sustained the City’s demurrer with leave to
amend. SGIG waived its right to amend and stipulated to entry of
a judgment of dismissal with prejudice but purported to preserve
its right to appeal such dismissal. Judgment entered accordingly.
A few months later, the City filed the FAXC alleging
five causes of action: (1) public nuisance; (2) quiet title;
(3) interference with easement; (4) ejectment; and (5) declaratory
relief. SGIG unsuccessfully demurred and then answered.
In March 2023, the City filed a motion for summary
adjudication of its causes of action for nuisance and quiet title
(the Motion). SGIG opposed it.
In advance of the hearing on the Motion, the trial court
issued a tentative ruling. The tentative proposed to grant the
Motion as to the quiet title cause of action but deny it as to the
nuisance cause of action on the ground SGIG had shown a triable
issue of fact regarding encroachment. Per the tentative, the City
had met its burden of production to show the Improvements were
within its right of way, but SGIG had created a dispute through
evidence they were not. Specifically, the trial court pointed to a
document marked as exhibit 6 at SGIG’s deposition of DPW
Cervantes. As explained in the tentative: “Exhibit 6 is a site plan

5
and radius map (Site Map) . . . and [DPW] Cervantes stated in
his deposition that the Site Map showed that the property line
behind which the Improvements were installed does not encroach
on the City’s right of way easement.”
At the hearing, however, the trial court sustained the
foundation objection the City had made to exhibit 6 at DPW
Cervantes’s deposition. The hearing was not reported, but the
court’s order reflects SGIG argued exhibit 6 was automatically
admissible because the City had produced it to SGIG in
discovery. The court rejected that premise. Without exhibit 6 to
create a triable issue, the court concluded the City was entitled to
summary adjudication of its nuisance cause of action as well as
that for quiet title.
SGIG filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s
summary adjudication order, which the court denied.
The matter then proceeded to a court trial on the remedies
for the City’s nuisance and quiet title causes of action (the parties
stipulated to dismissal of the City’s other three causes of action).
The trial court entered a permanent injunction enjoining SGIG’s
obstruction of the City’s right of way and authorizing the City to
demolish and remove the encroaching Improvements. It also
entered judgment quieting title in favor of the City to the right of
way adjacent to the Property measuring 50 feet from the
centerline of Atlantic Avenue.
SGIG appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Summary Adjudication Standard and Standard of
Review
A plaintiff may move for summary adjudication on a cause
of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).) “ ‘A summary

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adjudication motion is subject to the same rules and procedures
as a summary judgment motion.’ ” (Butte Fire Cases (2018)
24 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1157.) Thus, the moving plaintiff bears the
initial burden of showing there is no defense to a cause of action
if it has proved each element of the cause of action entitling it to
judgment on the cause of action. (§ 437c, subd. (p)(1).) Once the
plaintiff has met that burden, the burden shifts to the defendant
to “set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of
material fact exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.”
(Ibid.) Summary adjudication of a cause of action is appropriate
only “if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to [adjudication] as a matter of law.” (Id., subd. (c); Butte Fire
Cases, at p. 1157.)
An issue of fact is “material” if that fact is essential to the
judgment (Riverside County Community Facilities Dist. v.
Bainbridge 17 (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 644, 652–653); evidence that
does not bear upon the legal issues in question is not material
(Monastra v. Konica Business Machines, U.S.A., Inc. (1996)
43 Cal.App.4th 1628, 1635). A material fact issue is triable if the
evidence and inferences therefrom would allow a reasonable juror
to find the underlying material fact in favor of the party opposing
summary judgment. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001)
25 Cal.4th 826, 850.)
“The standard of review that applies to an order granting
summary adjudication is . . . the same standard of review that
applies to an order granting a motion for summary judgment.”
(DiCarlo v. County of Monterey (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 468, 488.)
Our review is therefore independent. (See Scheer v. Regents of
University of California (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 904, 913.) “ ‘We
determine whether the court’s ruling was correct, not its reasons

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or rationale. . . . ’ In performing our de novo review, we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to [the opposing party].”
(Ibid., citations omitted.)
II. Analysis
A. Nuisance
Civil Code section 3479 provides, in relevant part:
“Anything which . . . unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use,
in the customary manner, of any . . . public . . . street . . . is a
nuisance.” For these purposes, “[t]he sidewalks of a public street
of a city are parts of the street.” (Marini v. Graham (1885)
67 Cal. 130, 132.)
Civil Code section 3480 defines a public nuisance as a
nuisance “which affects at the same time an entire community or
neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons, although
the extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted upon individuals
may be unequal.”
Civil Code section 3491 authorizes the abatement of a
public nuisance and section 3494 authorizes a public body, like
the City, to pursue abatement.
SGIG concedes obstruction of a sidewalk is “a nuisance per
se—meaning the fact of the obstruction is sufficient to establish
the claim as a matter of law.” (Citing Kempton v. City of
Los Angeles (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1344, 1348.)
SGIG argues summary adjudication of the City’s nuisance
cause of action was inappropriate for several reasons. We address
these in turn. All other issues raised below and not renewed on
appeal are waived. (Tiernan v. Trustees of Cal. State University &
Colleges (1982) 33 Cal.3d 211, 216, fn. 4.)

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1. The Berkeley Case
SGIG first argues that, setting aside any factual dispute
with the City, the Improvements cannot constitute a nuisance
because they do not block any existing sidewalk; just a proposed
sidewalk. SGIG relies exclusively on Berkeley v. Gordon (1968)
264 Cal.App.2d 461 (Berkeley) for support. We conclude Berkeley
is inapposite.
In that case, the defendants were the owners and lessees of
a commercial property which had a basement extending beneath
a city sidewalk. The city indisputably had superior rights to the
subsurface area beneath the sidewalk. When the city proposed to
renovate the sidewalk and add a streetlight and trees, which
would use some of that subsurface area, the city demanded the
defendants remove the encroaching portion of the basement.
They refused, but offered the city possession of the property to
undertake the work itself. The city sued, asserting the
encroachment was a nuisance. The trial court concluded “the
existence of the basement under the sidewalk did not constitute a
public nuisance within the meaning of Civil Code section 3479,”
but, in recognition of the city’s superior rights, authorized it to
proceed with its construction work at any time and recover its
abatement costs from the defendants. (Berkeley, supra,
264 Cal.App.2d at pp. 463–464.)
Addressing the nuisance issue, the Berkeley court framed
the relevant question as follows: “[W]hether the structure in
question unlawfully obstructs free passage of the public street or
use of the street in the customary manner.” (Berkeley, supra,
264 Cal.App.2d at p. 465.) The court recognized California
authorities holding that a nuisance arises from “actual
obstructions of traffic [citation]; surface or overhanging

9
structures on a public way [citations]; structures that are illegal
in that they encroach upon a street or road without required
permission [citation]; or other encroachments that actually
interfere with or obstruct traffic.” (Ibid.) It found none of those
authorities held a “subsurface structure that does not interfere
with the public’s use of the street is a nuisance.” (Id. at pp. 465–
466.)
To the contrary, California authorities recognized “the
abutting owner who owns to the center of the street may exercise
any and all rights of dominion over his interest as are not
inconsistent with the public easement in the street.” (Berkeley,
supra, 264 Cal.App.2d at p. 466.) Authorities from other
jurisdictions showed “an abutting owner generally has the right
to construct areaways, cellars, and vaults under the street
provided that he does not thereby interfere with the public
easement.” (Ibid.)
The Berkeley court noted the defendants’ “50 years’
possession” of the subsurface area “with the acquiescence of the
municipality [wa]s a strong basis for the inference that the City
consented to the basement’s presence”; and there was “no
evidence . . . the encroachment of the basement pose[d] any
danger to passers-by or users of the streets in general or that it
[wa]s illegal.” (Berkeley, supra, 264 Cal.App.2d at p. 466.)
Based on its reasoning, Berkeley is properly limited to cases
involving subsurface encroachments of public rights of way. In
contrast to surface encroachments, such encroachments do not
“obstruct[] free passage of the public street or use of the street in
the customary manner.” (Berkeley, supra, 264 Cal.App.2d at
p. 465.) This is a dispositive distinction under the statutory
definition of nuisance. (See Civ. Code, § 3479.)

10
More compelling is Scott v. City of Del Mar (1997)
58 Cal.App.4th 1296 (Scott). Scott, like the present case,
concerned an above-ground obstruction of an unimproved
sidewalk right of way. In Scott, a developer dedicated a strip of
land in a seaside subdivision in Del Mar for public use. Recorded
maps from 1912 identified the strip as “Public Sidewalk,” though
the city never built a sidewalk on it. (Id. at pp. 1303, 1304.) At
some point, private property owners erected seawalls to protect
their beachfront properties in the right of way. The property
owners repaired and expanded these encroaching structures in
1983, and the city gave notice to remove them within 10 days.
(Id. at p. 1300.) No further action was taken at that time and the
owners did not remove the structures.
Five years later, Del Mar adopted an ordinance to protect
public access to and along the shoreline. The ordinance
established a “shoreline protection area,” which included the
dedicated sidewalk right of way, and directed removal of all
preexisting nonconforming structures. (Scott, supra,
58 Cal.App.4th at p. 1300.) The city declared the improvements
encroachments and directed the property owners to remove them.
When they complied only in part, the city removed those that
remained. The property owners then sued the city. (Id. at
p. 1301.)
One of the issues on appeal was whether the encroaching
improvements were nuisances, as the government owes a
property owner no compensation for abating a nuisance. (Scott,
supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 1305.) The Scott court found them
nuisances per se. (Ibid.) Citing Civil Code sections 3479, 3480,
and 3491, it explained “[t]he Legislature has declared that the
obstruction of a public right-of-way is an abatable nuisance.”
(Scott, at p. 1306.) It was sufficient that “(1) the Public Sidewalk

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[right of way] was dedicated to public use in 1912, and (2) the
private [encroaching improvements] completely obstructed public
access to the Public Sidewalk area.” (Ibid.) This was so even
though the city had “never buil[t] a sidewalk on it,” had
“ignor[ed] the . . . improvements for decades” (id. at p. 1304), and
“appropriate permits were obtained for the original construction
of the improvements” (id. at p. 1306).
People v. Henderson (1948) 85 Cal.App.2d 653, 656
(Henderson) is in accord: “It is a well-settled principle of common
law, which has frequently been embodied in statutory form, that
a structure maintained upon a public roadway is unlawful
[citations], and is a nuisance per se subject to abatement at the
instance of proper authority. [Citations.] It is no defense to an
action based thereon that the structure is off the traveled part of
the highway or that sufficient areas remain to allow public use of
the right of way in the accustomed manner.”
We therefore reject SGIG’s arguments that, setting aside
any factual disputes, reversal is warranted under Berkeley.
2. SGIG Failed to Show a Disputed Issue of
Material Fact
a. The Site Plan Deposition Exhibits
In support of its Motion, the City submitted a professional
survey showing the Improvements encroach upon the City’s
Atlantic Avenue right of way by five to six feet. SGIG argues
two exhibits its counsel showed DPW Cervantes during his
deposition (identified as exhibit 6 and exhibit 7, respectively),
create a triable issue as to whether the Improvements are
encroaching. SGIG submitted these exhibits, as attachments to
excerpts of the deposition, as part of its opposition evidence.
SGIG contends the trial court erred in excluding exhibit 6 and, in

12
any event, exhibit 7 is adequate to create a factual issue. We
disagree.
i. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse
Its Discretion in Excluding
Exhibit 6
SGIG contended exhibit 6 was submitted in connection
with the lot line adjustment, and provided evidence that the
Improvements are beyond the 50-foot right-of-way easement
claimed by the City and thus do not encroach. The City objected
on foundation grounds as DPW Cervantes had not personally
reviewed the technical aspects of the plan.
In the absence of a more specific objection, the assertion
that a writing lacks foundation generally raises the threshold
question of authenticity. A party offering a writing as evidence
bears the burden of establishing it is authentic. (Evid. Code,
§ 403, subd. (a)(3), § 1401, subd. (a); People v. Goldsmith (2014)
59 Cal.4th 258, 266.) This requires proof “ ‘the writing was made
or signed by its purported maker.’ ” (Goldsmith, at p. 266.) The
proponent’s burden is met “when sufficient evidence has been
produced to sustain a finding that the document is what it
purports to be.” (Jazayeri v. Mao (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 301,
321.)
Again, the trial court’s ruling on the Motion suggests
SGIG’s sole response to the City’s foundation objection was that
the City produced exhibit 6 in discovery. There was evidence to
this effect. The court was correct that this was inadequate to
defeat the objection. “ ‘Not every document that comes out of an
opposing party’s files is automatically admissible[;]’ . . . more is
required to establish admissibility.” (Serri v. Santa Clara
University (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 830, 854.)

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On appeal, SGIG relies on Evidence Code section 1414 to
argue the trial court erred in refusing to admit exhibit 6. SGIG
forfeited this argument by failing to raise it below, citing
section 1414 only in a “see also” parenthetical divorced from any
reasoned argument. (Lorenzana v. Superior Court (1973) 9 Cal.3d
626, 640 [party may not raise for first time on appeal a new
theory to support or contest admissibility].)
Even if we were to consider it, SGIG’s argument would fail.
Evidence Code section 1414 provides a writing may be
authenticated by evidence it “has been acted upon as authentic
by the party against whom it is offered.” (Id., subd. (b).) SGIG
offers no such evidence here. It argues “the City relied on a
survey as a condition precedent to approving a lot line-
adjustment to the Property. The City produced the survey
leading to its approval of the lot line-adjustment.” Beyond a
rough temporal relationship and the fact that the City had
possession of exhibit 6, there is no evidence the City relied on
exhibit 6 in approving the lot line adjustment. In fact, the survey
the City identified as operative for purposes of the lot line
adjustment—a recorded document attached to the FAXC—is not
the same as exhibit 6. Moreover, DPW Cervantes testified
exhibit 6 “doesn’t look like a typical lot line adjustment
document” and he “d[id]n’t know that [it] was submitted as part
of the lot line adjustment process.” In short, the only evidence
SGIG offered to establish the City’s reliance on exhibit 6 was its
own speculation.
Perhaps recognizing this, SGIG offers its evidence was
“sufficient[]” to authenticate exhibit 6, “at least for purposes of
opposing the [Motion].” This misconstrues the law in two ways.
First, the Evidence Code is not relaxed in the summary judgment
context. (See Bozzi v. Nordstrom, Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th

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755, 761.) The rules of liberal construction at summary judgment
apply only to admissible evidence (ibid.), not admissibility.
Second, SGIG’s claim of a “sufficient[]” showing of admissibility
falls short of showing an abuse of discretion.
ii. Exhibit 7
SGIG cannot circumvent the trial court’s exclusion of
exhibit 6 by relying on the similar exhibit 7.
Initially, we note exhibit 7, as it appears in our record, is
blurry in places and not clearly legible. The only basis for us to
understand SGIG’s desired use of the document is the transcript
of DPW Cervantes’s deposition. The most illuminating portion is
as follows: “[SGIG’S COUNSEL]: . . . Just that according to this
survey map, the 50 feet to—from center line, it looks like it’s
holding down the current boundary to the property; right? [¶]
[DPW CERVANTES]: Yes.” We do not think this ambiguous
record is adequate to show a triable fact issue as to
encroachment.
Even if it were, we are unsatisfied that SGIG timely called
the trial court’s attention to exhibit 7. As the court in Meridian
Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 657, 698
explained, “ ‘[t]he parties must call the court’s attention to issues
they deem relevant. “ ‘In the hurry of trial many things may be,
and are, overlooked which could readily have been rectified had
attention been called to them. The law casts upon the party the
duty of looking after his legal rights and of calling the judge’s
attention to any infringement of them.’ ” ’ ” If parties were
allowed to raise points for the first time on appeal, those
“ ‘opposing and losing summary judgment motions could attempt
to embed grounds for reversal on appeal into every case by their
silence.’ ” (Ibid.)

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Here, SGIG urges the adequacy of exhibit 7 to create a
triable issue “was brought to the Trial Court’s attention on
reconsideration [citation], [but] neither the City nor the Trial
Court addressed it in their opposition papers or eventual ruling.”
SGIG fails to acknowledge that it only mentioned exhibit 7 in its
reply in support of its motion for reconsideration. It did not
mention it in the motion itself. (See Schram Construction, Inc. v.
Regents of University of California (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1040,
1052, fn. 7 [issue raised for first time in reply brief before trial
court waived on appeal].) And, based on the settled statement,
SGIG did not raise exhibit 7 at the hearing on the Motion,
arguing only that exhibit 6—the only one of the two produced by
the City—showed a factual dispute. Had SGIG clearly indicated
its intent to rely on exhibit 7 below,3 the City and the court could
have addressed the matter.4 SGIG did not; it cannot now rely on
exhibit 7 as grounds for reversal.

3 We note that, in support of its specific claim encroachment
was “[d]isputed” in its separate statement, SGIG did not cite
exhibit 7 (or exhibit 6, for that matter). Its mention of these
exhibits elsewhere in the separate statement did not alert the
trial court or the City of its intention to rely on these exhibits as
it does now on appeal to argue a factual dispute.
4 In any event, we doubt the trial court would have found a
triable issue based on exhibit 7, which the City did not produce
and DPW Cervantes did not recognize, given its ruling on
exhibit 6. Even though the City did not object to exhibit 7, the
court had authority to sustain its own objection as an obvious
corollary to its ruling on the City’s objection to exhibit 6. (See
Patrick v. Superior Court (1934) 139 Cal.App. 1, 4–5 [“ ‘[E]ven
where no objection is made, but the court excludes evidence of its
own motion, the ruling will be sustained, if the evidence was for

16
b. SGIG Did Not Raise a Triable Issue
as to Consent
SGIG asserts lack of consent is an element of public
nuisance, and that here, the City consented to the Improvements
by directing SGIG’s predecessor to install them. There is
authority to suggest otherwise where, as here, the only remedy
sought is abatement. (See Mangini v. Aerojet-General Corp.
(1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1125, 1139 [“we do not suggest that
consent of an owner/lessor can impede the abatement of a public
nuisance”].)
Further, as already mentioned, it is impossible to reconcile
SGIG’s assertion that consent is an element of the City’s
nuisance cause of action where SGIG conceded “[o]bstructing a
public right-of-way . . . is considered a nuisance per se—meaning
the fact of the obstruction is sufficient to establish the claim as a
matter of law.”5 Case law is in accord. (See Scott, supra,
58 Cal.App.4th at p. 1306 [obstructing public right of way
nuisance per se]; Henderson, supra, 85 Cal.App.2d at p. 656
[same]; City of Claremont v. Kruse (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1153,
1163–1164 [“ ‘[W]here the law expressly declares something to be
a nuisance, then no inquiry beyond its existence need be
made . . . .’ [Citation.] ‘ “Nuisances per se are so regarded because
no proof is required, beyond the actual fact of their existence, to

any reason inadmissible’ ”], quoting Davey v. Southern Pacific Co.
(1897) 116 Cal. 325, 330.)
5 SGIG notes the FAXC contains allegations the City did not
consent to SGIG’s encroachment and identified lack of consent as
an undisputed fact. This does not necessarily render the fact
material for purposes of summary adjudication. (Pereda v. Atos
Jiu Jitsu LLC (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 759, 773.)

17
establish the nuisance.’ ” ”]; cf. People ex rel. Dept. of
Transportation v. Outdoor Media Group (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th
1067, 1078 (Outdoor Media) [“[e]quitable defenses such as
estoppel do not apply [to a cause of action for] nuisance per se”].)
In a similar vein, even if lack of consent were an element of
the City’s nuisance cause of action, the City lacked authority to
give that consent. There can be no consent to an illegal activity.
Again, the Legislature has made unlawful the obstruction of
public rights of way. (Scott, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th at p. 1306,
citing Civ. Code, §§ 3479, 3480, 3491; see also Pen. Code, §§ 370–
372.) While municipalities have authority to legislatively legalize
obstruction of a right of way (see Ex parte Taylor (1890)
87 Cal. 91, 94, citing Marini v. Graham, supra, 67 Cal. 130),
SGIG points to no law authorizing the obstruction in this case. As
such, it remains unlawful and cannot be cured by any purported
consent. (See Hansen Brothers Enterprises, Inc. v. Board of
Supervisors (1996) 12 Cal.4th 533, 564 [“the county lacks the
power to waive or consent to violation of the zoning law”];
Western Surgical Supply Co. v. Affleck (1952) 110 Cal.App.2d
388, 392 [state officials lacked the power to consent to statutory
violations]; Fontana v. Atkinson (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 499, 507
[city officials lacked power to consent to violation of land use
ordinance].)
Finally, the facts SGIG offers to show consent do not
constitute consent by the City as a matter of law. SGIG’s
evidence that an individual City employee, DBS Cervantes,
directed and consented to the installation of the Improvements in
the City’s right of way does not amount to consent on the part of
the City. “ ‘ “No government, whether state or local, is bound to
any extent by an officer’s acts in excess of his . . . authority.” ’ ”
(Katsura v. City of San Buenaventura (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th

18
104, 109.) “ ‘ “One who deals with [a] public officer stands
presumptively charged with a full knowledge of that officer’s
powers, and is bound at his . . . peril to ascertain the extent of his
. . . powers to bind the government for which he . . . is an officer,
and any act of an officer to be valid must find express authority
in the law or be necessarily incidental to a power expressly
granted.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
SGIG points to no law giving a City employee authority to
consent to an encroachment in the City’s right of way. In a
separate section, SGIG argues the City’s municipal code
authorized the director of public works to “determine the public
right-of-way consistent with the City’s general plan, master plan
for streets and highways, or the subdivision code.” (Citing
So. Gate Mun. Code, § 5.32.030, subd. (A).) This is of no help to
SGIG for two reasons. First, SGIG fails to provide competent
evidence that DBS Cervantes was the director of public works.
The only evidence it offers to this effect are declarations by its
principals that DBS Cervantes was the “Director of Building and
Safety,” which they “believe, included Public Works.” This
conclusory statement of belief does not create a fact dispute.
Second, SGIG fails to show ceding a portion of the City’s right of
way to private use is “consistent with the City’s general plan,
master plan for streets and highways, or the subdivision code.”
For all these reasons, SGIG did not raise a triable issue
regarding the City’s consent.
c. Civil Code Section 3482
Section 3482 of the Civil Code provides: “Nothing which is
done or maintained under the express authority of a statute can
be deemed a nuisance.” This exception is given a “ ‘narrow
construction.’ ” (Chase v. Wizmann (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 244,

19
254.) “ ‘ “ ‘A statutory sanction cannot be pleaded in justification
of acts which by the general rules of law constitute a nuisance,
unless the acts complained of are authorized by the express terms
of the statute under which the justification is made, or by the
plainest and most necessary implication from the powers
expressly conferred, so that it can be fairly stated that the
legislature contemplated the doing of the very act which occasions
the injury.’ ” ’ [Citations.] ‘A requirement of “express”
authorization embodied in the statute itself [e]nsures that an
unequivocal legislative intent to sanction a nuisance will be
effectuated, while avoiding the uncertainty that would result
were every generally worded statute a source of undetermined
immunity from nuisance liability.’ ” (Id. at pp. 254–255.)
As the trial court found on SGIG’s motion for
reconsideration, SGIG fails to identify any statute or ordinance
that authorizes it to violate the express prohibition, contained in
Civil Code section 3479, on obstructing a public right of way. For
reasons already stated, none of the City’s municipal code
provisions SGIG cites do so, either directly or by implication.
d. Equitable Estoppel
SGIG argues the trial court erred in resolving its equitable
estoppel defense as a matter of law. As noted above, SGIG
conceded obstructing a public right of way is a nuisance per se.
“Equitable defenses such as estoppel do not apply [to a cause of
action for] nuisance per se.” (Outdoor Media, supra,
13 Cal.App.4th at p. 1078.)
While this should fully resolve the issue, SGIG cites one
case, Imperial Beach v. Algert (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 48 (Imperial
Beach), in which equitable estoppel applied to prevent a city from

20
reclaiming a parcel which had been dedicated for street use.
Imperial Beach does not compel reversal here.
As explained in Imperial Beach, estoppel may be applied
against a public agency “only in those special cases where the
interests of justice clearly require it.” (Imperial Beach, supra,
200 Cal.App.2d at p. 52.) “[T]he facts upon which such an
estoppel must rest go beyond the ordinary principles of estoppel
and each case must be examined carefully and rigidly to be sure
that a precedent is not established through which, by favoritism
or otherwise, the public interest may be mulcted or public policy
defeated.” (Ibid.) Estoppel can apply “ ‘in the land use context in
only “the most extraordinary case where the injustice is great
and the precedent set by the estoppel is narrow.” ’ ” (Schafer v.
City of Los Angeles (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1263.) “[T]he
existence of estoppel [against the government] is in part a legal
question to the extent it involves weighing policy concerns to
determine whether the avoidance of injustice in the particular
case justifies any adverse impact on public policy or the public
interest.” (Ibid.)
Surveying case law on the subject, the Imperial Beach court
recognized estoppel does not lie where a government made a
“ ‘bare promise to abandon’ ” public property, neglected to use
public property, allowed to ripen what would otherwise amount a
claim for adverse possession, omitted public property from an
official map, or levied taxes against an individual on public
property. (Imperial Beach, supra, 200 Cal.App.2d at p. 52.)
Government conduct in Imperial Beach went far beyond these
circumstances. Neither the city nor the county ever acted on the
dedication of the parcel at issue. They never used any part of it as
a street. The county allowed the developer to prevent traffic
access to the parcel. The city showed it as a private residential lot

21
on its official map. It zoned it residential. The county designated
it as a privately owned parcel for taxation purposes. It sold the
parcel to the defendant at a tax sale when the prior owner’s taxes
went unpaid. No one offered to refund the purchase price to the
defendant. (Id. at p. 53.) The court held that “the sum total of all
the facts . . . convinces us . . . this case presents one of those
exceptional conditions in which estoppel against a governmental
agency is justified and should be applied.” (Ibid.)
To the extent estoppel could be a defense to nuisance per
se, we find the facts presented in this case do not approach those
in Imperial Beach. The facts in that case—particularly that the
government sought to claw back a parcel it sold to the defendant
without refunding his money—are truly extraordinary. (Imperial
Beach, supra, 200 Cal.App.2d at p. 53.) By contrast, to hold that
the say-so of a city worker without authority to approve
encroachments is a defense to nuisance would undermine the
government’s ability to protect public rights of way. As this case
illustrates, the City has been delayed in proceeding with a
planned project for years because of SGIG’s intransigence.
Reducing the tools a municipality has to deal with encroachments
would only serve to extend such delays.
B. Quiet Title
SGIG last argues the trial court erred by entering
judgment for the City on its quiet title cause of action because
SGIG had abandoned its adverse claim against the City’s right-
of-way easement. SGIG admits it made an adverse claim when it
sued the City alleging the area of its encroachment belonged to
SGIG. But it contends such claim can no longer support the City’s
cause of action for quiet title because the trial court dismissed
SGIG’s cause of action with prejudice and SGIG admitted in its

22
opposition to the Motion that it conceded the City’s ownership of
the right-of-way easement.
In support of its position, SGIG cites Orcilla v. Big Sur, Inc.
(2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 982, 1010. In that case, the Court of
Appeal affirmed dismissal of the plaintiffs’ quiet title causes of
action against (i) a former lender and certain affiliated parties
who sold the plaintiffs’ former residence at a nonjudicial
foreclosure sale; and (ii) the purchaser of the property. The lender
parties argued they had no adverse claim to the property after
selling it, and the court concluded the purchaser’s interest had
already been adjudicated in an unlawful detainer action,
rendering the issue res judicata. (Id. at pp. 1010–1011.)
Here, no such facts are present. Although SGIG’s causes of
action claiming ownership of the property had been dismissed
with prejudice, SGIG stated its intent to maintain rights to
appeal that dismissal. Further, SGIG cites no authority that a
defendant’s concession in litigation can deprive a quiet title
plaintiff of a judgment. Our Supreme Court long ago held the rule
is to the contrary. As explained in Water for Citizens of Weed
California v. Churchwell White LLP (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 270,
281–282, “[a] property owner may bring a quiet title action ‘to
determine any adverse claim whatever. For if the defendant by
his answer disclaims all interest whatever, judgment may,
nevertheless, be entered against him, though in such case it must
be without costs.’ ” (Quoting Castro v. Barry (1889) 79 Cal. 443,
447.)

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The City is entitled to its costs
on appeal.

RICHARDSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.

HOFFSTADT, J.

 Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate
District, Division Five assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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