People v. Garcia CA6

CourtListener 10864347Calctapp26.05.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 5/22/26 P. v. Garcia CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE, H051911
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. B1899386)

v.

MAURICIO ERNESTO GARCIA,

Defendant and Appellant.

In 2023, a jury found defendant Mauricio Ernesto Garcia guilty of multiple counts
stemming from his sexual abuse of his stepdaughters, Jane Doe I1 and Jane Doe II, on
various occasions. The trial court sentenced Garcia to an indeterminate term of 15 years
to life in prison, with an additional determinate term of eight years in prison.
On appeal, Garcia claims there were numerous errors regarding his trial, including
errors in admissions of evidence, abuse of discretion in denying his request for mistrial,
and instructional error. With respect to his sentence, Garcia argues that the trial court
abused its discretion in imposing the upper term on one of the charged offenses and
imposing certain fines and fees without first assessing Garcia’s ability to pay. Garcia
finally claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The Attorney General
concedes that the matter should be remanded for the trial court to assess Garcia’s ability
to pay ancillary fees but otherwise opposes Garcia’s claims.

1 As both victims share the same first initials in their names, we refer to them as
Jane Doe I and Jane Doe II as designated in the second amended information filed in the
underlying matter.
For the reasons explained below, we reverse the sentence and remand for
resentencing. On remand, the trial court is also directed to reconsider Garcia’s ability to
pay in assessing fines and fees. In all other respects, we affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Charges, Trial, and Sentencing
On June 14, 2023, the Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office filed a
second amended information charging Garcia as follows: four counts of committing a
lewd act upon Doe I, a child under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (a); counts 1–4); one count
of committing a lewd act upon Doe II, a child under the age of 14 (§ 288, subd. (a); count
6), and one count of sexual penetration of Doe I, a child under the age of 14 and more
than 10 years younger than Garcia (§ 289, subd. (j); count 5). The information further
alleged that as to all counts, the victims were particularly vulnerable (§ 1170, subd. (b);
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(3)), and that as to counts 1 through 4 and count 6,
Garcia had committed offenses against more than one victim (§ 667.61, subds. (b) & (e)).
Following a first trial, the jury could not reach an agreement on all counts, and the
trial court declared a mistrial on June 24, 2023. After a second trial, on September 13,
2023, the jury found Garcia guilty on all six counts as charged, and found both
enhancements true.
On March 1, 2024, the trial court sentenced Garcia to the following: (1) an
indeterminate term of 15 years to life in prison on count 1 (§ 288, subd. (a)); (2) a
consecutive determinate upper term of eight years in prison on count 5 (§ 289, subd. (j));
and (3) four concurrent indeterminate terms of 15 years to life in prison on counts 2, 3, 4,
and 6 (§ 288, subd. (a)).
In addition, the trial court imposed a $2,000 restitution fine, an additional parole
revocation fund fine of $2,000, suspended pending successful completion of parole (§§
1202.4, subd. (b), 1202.45), a $240 court operations assessment (§ 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)),
and a $180 court facilities assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373).

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Garcia timely appealed.
B. Factual Background
1. Prosecution’s Case
a. Jane Doe I’s Testimony (counts 1–5)
Jane Doe I, who was 20 years old at the time of trial, testified that she was born in
Mexico. While Doe I was living in Mexico, she was introduced to Garcia over the phone
by her mother, who had been living in the United States since Doe I was approximately
five years old; her mother indicated that Garcia was her partner. When Doe I was
approximately 12 years old and her sister, Jane Doe II, was approximately 10 years old,
they moved from Mexico to Mountain View to live with Garcia and their mother. By this
time, Doe I and Doe II had already begun referring to Garcia as “Dad” and viewed him as
their father. Because their mother frequently worked nights, Garcia would often take
care of both girls while their mother was working.
While living in Mexico, Doe I had been diagnosed with a heart condition that
required her to check her blood pressure regularly at home. Doe I testified that within the
first year of her move to Mountain View, and while she was still 12 years old, Garcia
placed three fingers in between her hip and groin area, and told her this was in order to
measure her blood pressure in a different way than using a machine. On other occasions,
Garcia had Doe I take off her shirt and bra, and occasionally her pants, which he claimed
would assist with her circulation; he then placed his hand on her left breast to measure
her heart rate and told her that she had “good looking” breasts.
Doe I further testified that on multiple occasions while she, Doe II, and Garcia
were in their apartment watching TV, Garcia rubbed her vagina and breasts over her
clothes while she was laying down. Doe I indicated that while this was initially over her
clothes, Garcia later began going underneath her clothes and rubbing her vaginal area,
including making comments about her pubic hair.

3
Doe I also testified that Garcia would often tuck both sisters into bed at night,
which involved him lying down in between them in the middle of their bed and reading
them a story. On one occasion after the girls fell asleep, Doe I began feeling a “tickle” at
the top of her vagina, and was confused as to what was happening; she subsequently
realized that Garcia was touching her vaginal area. Doe I stated that she was too scared
to open her eyes and say anything, and was embarrassed that she could not say no to
Garcia. She was also afraid to say anything to her mother because she did not want to
ruin their family, and she still trusted and loved Garcia at the time.
Doe I also testified that Garcia occasionally slapped her butt if she was close to
him, but only when her mother was not around. In addition, because Doe I was not
allowed to lock the bathroom while showering for safety reasons (due to her health
condition), Garcia would often come into the bathroom while she was showering and
attempt to show her things on his phone. On one such occasion, Garcia tried to open the
shower door, but Doe I held the door and did not allow him to do so; Garcia then got
upset and asked her why she had held the door, stating that he would never look at her in
a bad way because she was his daughter. On another occasion, Garcia put his phone on
charge inside the bathroom while Doe I was showering, and told her he could not charge
his phone anywhere else, and she should not move it. However, Doe I discovered that
the phone camera was on and recording her, which caused her to become confused and
cry. When Doe I confronted Garcia about recording her, he told her that he would never
do that to her, and showed her that there was no video of her in his camera reel, but Doe I
noticed that Garcia was “acting weird” and seemed nervous.
Doe I recalled one final incident, which occurred shortly before or after she
turned 13, where she was lying on her stomach in her bedroom while Garcia was
massaging her back. Doe I began to fall asleep, then noticed Garcia’s hands slowly
moving downwards on her body and underneath her underwear. Doe I then felt two of
Garcia’s fingers inside her vagina. Although Doe I felt like Garcia’s behavior had now

4
“crossed the line” to the point that she should say something, she still did not want to tell
her mother because she did not want to break up their family. However, around this time,
Doe I asked her mother to be the person to check up on her if she felt sick, causing her
mother to become upset. Her mother then called Garcia and asked Doe I if something
else had happened with Garcia; however, Doe I still did not tell her mother about
Garcia’s behavior, as she did not want her mother to leave Garcia and wanted Doe II to
still have a dad.
After Doe I began high school, the dynamics of her relationship with Garcia began
to change. Garcia began to get upset if Doe I wanted to do any activities after school, and
accused her of hanging out with boys. On one occasion, Garcia saw Doe I out with her
boyfriend and became upset, telling her she was “lying” and doing “bad things.” Doe I
stated that Garcia’s behavior and comments made her feel like a “ho.”
Shortly before Doe I turned 15, she and Garcia got into an argument where he
accused her and her mother of “leaving him out” by not informing him that Doe I’s
friends were giving her a ride home from school. Later that night, Doe I woke up at
approximately 3:00 a.m. and saw Garcia standing in front of her bed watching her.
Garcia then sat on the bed and told Doe I that she didn’t love him and care about him,
which made Doe I scared. As Doe I went to wake up her mother, Garcia continued
following her and talking to her angrily. When Doe I’s mother told him to stop and leave
Doe I alone, Garcia began screaming and told her to leave; Doe I, Doe II, and their
mother then left the family’s apartment to stay with a friend. A few months after they
had left, Doe I finally revealed to her mother that Garcia had touched her inappropriately
in the past.
b. Jane Doe II’s Testimony (count 6)
Jane Doe II, who was 18 years old at the time of trial, testified that she was 10
years old when she and Doe I moved to the United States to live with their mother and
Garcia. When Doe II was approximately 12 years old in the beginning of 2018, she and

5
Garcia were sitting on their living room couch watching a movie and she fell asleep. She
woke up later and realized that Garcia’s right hand was under her shirt and touching her
breast. While Doe II initially thought she may be dreaming, she felt Garcia’s hand start
to squeeze her breast; Garcia then moved his hand down towards the elastic of her pants
and tried to put his hand inside. When Doe II moved to get up, Garcia removed his hand,
but when she told him she was going to bed, he appeared to get upset and asked her to
watch another movie. While this was the first time Doe II recalled Garcia touching her
inappropriately, she testified that she was worried that it may have happened previously
while she was sleeping on the same couch. Doe II did not tell her sister or mother what
had happened as she was embarrassed and afraid they would not believe her.
In June 2018, Doe II met with San Jose Police Detective Garcia, whom her mother
arranged for her to meet under the pretext of having a medical appointment. During her
interview, Detective Garcia asked her if Garcia (Doe II’s stepfather) had ever touched her
or acted in a way that made her feel uncomfortable, and Doe II said no because she was
scared of getting Garcia in trouble, even though she was no longer living with him. Later
in the same year, one of Doe II’s classmates was giving a presentation at school about
abuse, and made a statement that the abuse was not the victim’s fault – this affected Doe
II and caused her to become nervous and scared. Doe II went to the school counselor’s
office, where she finally spoke about the prior touching incident with Garcia. Doe II also
spoke with Detective Garcia again and told him about the touching, and explained why
she had felt scared to say anything in her previous interview.
c. School Counselor Testimony
School counselor Josune Sullivan testified that Doe I was first referred to her in
May 2018, and that during their sessions together, Doe I was very “shut down” and quiet
with low energy. Sullivan further testified that on September 24, 2018, Doe II came to
her office after having a panic attack in the classroom. When Doe II arrived in Sullivan’s
office, Doe II had shortness of breath, was very nervous and agitated, and was crying.

6
Sullivan asked her if she was fine, and Doe II responded she was not. After Doe II had
calmed down, she appeared very sad and seemed to be “holding a lot;” she started talking
about what had happened in the classroom. Doe II then told Sullivan that she had been
molested by Garcia as a child while at home. Doe II described the incident where she
had been lying on the couch, and Garcia had touched her from her breasts down.
Sullivan observed that Doe II was very agitated, uncomfortable, and crying while relating
the incident. Sullivan subsequently reported the information to Child Protective Services
(CPS).
While Sullivan met with Doe I and Doe II together at a later date, she did not
reveal to either sister what the other had previously discussed with her (Sullivan) in their
sessions for confidentiality reasons. Sullivan indicated that the primary reason for her
meeting with both sisters together was to work on their relationship with each other, and
she did not recall indicating to either of them that similar things had happened to them
involving Garcia.
d. CSAAS evidence
Dr. Blake Carmichael testified as an expert on child sexual abuse accommodation
syndrome (CSAAS). Dr. Carmichael defined CSAAS as an educational tool to assist
therapists in understanding why children may or may not behave in a certain manner
while they are being sexually abused or are discussing the abuse, including dispelling
common myths or misconceptions therapists may have about sexual abuse. He noted that
CSAAS was not used to diagnose or give an opinion on whether someone was the victim
of sexual abuse.
Dr. Carmichael indicated that the primary purpose of CSAAS is to better
understand why children who are victims of abuse may not act in a way that people
would hope for or expect, including explaining why: (1) children do not reveal the abuse
right away; (2) they may actually appear happy around their perpetrator; and (3) they may
or may not be consistent in the way they discuss their trauma or sexual abuse. He also

7
explained the variety of ways that child victims experience sexual abuse and their
subsequent ability to disclose, or not disclose the abuse. For example, Dr. Carmichael
indicated that in most cases, the perpetrator is someone whom the child knows, has an
ongoing relationship with, and may even be a caregiver who provides them with shelter
and care. As a result, the perpetrator is often able to convince the child that disclosing
would be negative or harmful, or forms a very close relationship with them prior to the
abuse that makes them very important to the child, thus making it even harder for the
child to disclose the abuse for fear of negative consequences. Dr. Carmichael also noted
that for many children, there is a significant delay in disclosure, with many children
choosing not to disclose the abuse until after they turn 18.
2. Defense’s Case
Garcia testified in his own defense. He stated that he met Doe I’s and Doe II’s
mother in 2010, and they began living together approximately six months later. They
were married in 2013, and Doe I and Doe II came to live with them in 2015. Garcia
indicated that over the three years that the family lived together, his relationship with the
girls’ mother began to change as he started to suspect she was cheating on him, leading to
arguments and distance between them. They finally broke up in the spring of 2018 after
she and the girls went on a ski trip with someone who Garcia believed she was cheating
on him with.
Garcia described his relationship with Doe I as “formal” where they mutually
respected each other, and stated that they were “fairly” close; he similarly described his
relationship with Doe II as respectful. While Garcia occasionally watched the girls alone
while their mother was working, this was on no more than 10 to 15 occasions, and his
only conflicts with them were over the “normal” stuff such as doing their homework,
going to bed, or cleaning up after themselves. Garcia denied ever lying down in the bed
with both girls or touching either of them inappropriately in the manner they had
described. Garcia did help with taking Doe I’s blood pressure due to her medical

8
condition, but denied ever doing so with her clothes off or without a blood pressure cuff.
Garcia further denied going into the bathroom while Doe I was showering or recording
her.
Garcia testified that he and Doe I began having conflicts during her freshman year
of high school when she began seeing her boyfriend and skipping school. On one
occasion, approximately a month and a half before the girls and their mother moved out,
he found Doe I with her boyfriend in a parking lot in downtown Mountain View during
school hours. He took Doe I home after informing her mother. When her mother came
home, she and Doe I got into an argument.
On cross-examination, Garcia confirmed that their mother had a rule that the girls
could not lock the bathroom while using it. Garcia also stated that he did take on a
fatherly role, embraced them as family members, and told them they could trust him.
II. DISCUSSION2
A. Admission of School Counselor’s Testimony Regarding Doe II’s Statements to
Her About Abuse
Garcia argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Sullivan’s
testimony regarding Doe II’s disclosures to her that Garcia had inappropriately touched
her. Garcia claims that the fact of this disclosure itself was irrelevant to the issue of
whether the alleged abuse had occurred and was more prejudicial than probative. Garcia
further contends that the testimony did not properly qualify as a prior consistent
statement and therefore constituted inadmissible hearsay. Garcia additionally claims that
such an error violated his due process rights by rendering his trial fundamentally unfair,

2 For many of his substantive claims, Garcia alternatively argues that to the extent
any claims were not preserved for appeal in the trial court, he received ineffective
assistance of counsel. However, based on our review of the record, we find that none of
his claims were forfeited as trial counsel either objected or otherwise preserved them for
appeal. We therefore will only address his substantive claims of ineffective assistance
that are not based on forfeiture.

9
and was prejudicial because it is reasonably likely that but for the admission of this
evidence, Garcia would have achieved a better outcome not only on count 6, which
specifically concerned Doe II, but on all counts.
1. Relevant Procedural Background
Sullivan was listed by the prosecution as a witness for the second trial. Prior to
trial, Garcia’s trial counsel moved to exclude to the admission of any testimony that Doe
I or Doe II told anyone, including Sullivan, about the alleged molestation, on the grounds
that such testimony was not “fresh,” as the reports were made many years after the
alleged incidents took place. Counsel also objected that such evidence was inadmissible
hearsay, irrelevant, and more prejudicial than probative as set forth under Evidence Code
section 352. Further, counsel requested that if the testimony was to be admitted, it should
be limited as required by People v. Brown (1993) 8 Cal.4th 746 (Brown), to the name of
the alleged perpetrator and the general nature of the allegations, and the jury should
receive a limiting instruction that the statements were not being offered for the truth of
the matter asserted. The People also filed a motion in limine requesting that the trial
court admit prior consistent statements by the victims pursuant to Evidence Code sections
1235, 791, and 1236.
The trial court stated that its “ruling on fresh complaint is that the testimony of the
fresh complaint witness would be permitted to testify that the victim disclosed. The
testimony cannot include the details of the alleged abuse, but it is limited to time, date --
the time and circumstances of the disclosure, the general nature of the disclosure; for
example, that it was a sexual abuse-type of thing and who did it. And I generally tell the
jury that this is not for the truth of the matter asserted but only to show that it was made
at this particular time and under these circumstances.” With respect to the People’s
motion regarding prior consistent statements, the trial court ruled that any statements
needed “to be in compliance with 791 of the Evidence Code. Either after an inconsistent
is made, a prior consistent statement can be produced. [¶] Obviously, I don’t believe that

10
just because they testified that there’s this aura of, you know, you are fabricating the
testimony; therefore, you get to bring in anything. I don’t think that’s how it works. So
if [Garcia’s] going to argue that there’s fabrication, if it’s not implied by his cross-
examination, then it—the prior inconsistent statement doesn’t come.”
During Sullivan’s testimony regarding the statements made to her by Doe II,
Garcia’s counsel objected several times on hearsay, relevance, and Evidence Code
section 352 grounds, and also objected that the statements did not satisfy the
requirements of Evidence Code section 791. The trial court overruled the initial hearsay
objections, noting that the statements Doe II made to Sullivan about who had molested
her were not being offered for hearsay purposes, and instructed the jury that “this is not
hearsay. You’re not offering it for the truth of what she said, just that this is disclosed to
this witness. It’s called fresh complaint.” Later during direct examination, when the
People indicated the questions about the specifics of what Doe II told Sullivan fell within
the prior consistent statement exception under Evidence Code section 791, the trial court
overruled Garcia’s counsel’s hearsay objections, and instructed the jury that “this, ladies
and gentlemen, is not fresh-complaint testimony. You’ll get an instruction later about
prior consistent and inconsistent statements. These are being offered as prior consistent
statements.”
At the conclusion of Sullivan’s testimony, and outside the presence of the jury,
Garcia’s counsel summarized two conversations the parties had in chambers as follows:
“I expressed the view that as to [Doe I], Ms. Sullivan was not a fresh-complaint
witness. [¶] My recollection is that the Court agreed with that view. And I think it's fair
to [say] that the end result of our discussion was that the Court limited what counsel was
able to elicit with respect to [Doe I]. And primarily counsel was linking up the fact of
Ms. Sullivan assisting with a CPS report as to [Doe I]. [¶] We then had more extensive
discussions about [Doe II] distinguishing between what was admissible as a fresh
complaint and what may be admissible as a prior consistent statement. [¶] With respect

11
to the prior consistent statements—or at least that is how counsel characterized them, I
objected, I think in chambers, on the record and the Court overruled those objection, and
certain testimony was allowed to be presented. [¶] And I think that’s why the Court
allowed some level of detail on direct of Ms. Sullivan with respect to exactly what the
nature of the touching was. [¶] Counsel’s view, as I remember it, is that the defense
opened the door to this issue by questioning [Doe II] about whether she was aware of
what [Doe I] had told Ms. Sullivan. [¶] So I think the take-away here is that I was
objecting to what counsel was saying under 791 with respect to fresh-complaint purposes,
the Court limited it quite a bit. And with respect to [Doe I] altogether, the Court limited
the testimony quite a bit [ ].”
The People generally agreed and added the following observation: “as to [Doe II],
I asked to admit first the general nature of the disclosure as a fresh-complaint witness as
the Court had stated previously. And argued that the additional information would come
in under 791(b). … [¶] Again, with it stating that an express or implied charge had been
made that [Doe II’s] testimony at the hearing—was recently fabricated or influenced by
bias or other improper motive and a statement was made before—a hearing is recently
fabricated or is influenced by bias or other improper motive and the statement was made
before the bias motive for fabrication or other improper motive is alleged to have arisen.
[¶] And I was noting the questioning of [Doe II] specifically as to the fact that her first
statement to officers was that there was no improper touching. After that, she met with
Ms. Sullivan and disclosed to Ms. Sullivan. After that she met with Ms. Sullivan and
[Doe I] at some point. And a second statement to the police was made by [Doe I]3 where
she admitted to the molestation. [¶] I’ll note that I don’t think it’s clear on the record
when this meeting between Ms. Sullivan, [Doe I], and [Doe II] happened in relation to

3 In light of the following sentence, we assume this was in fact a reference to Doe
II.

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whether it was before or after this second interview with the police by [Doe II]. But I
understand that it was regardless—happening this meeting of the three of them happened
after the initial disclosure of [Doe II] and after her initial statement to police officers
where she denied the molestation. And so it was that timeline of offense and the basis of
those questions that I brought forth to the Court the argument under 791.”
The trial court concluded the discussion by stating that: “you both have, you
know, summarized pretty accurately the discussions that we had. From my standpoint, I
was trying to walk the line between fresh complaint and the prior consistent-statement
argument. With regard to [Doe I], I think we did keep it within the fresh—or sorry. Not
fresh complaint, the attempt to keep her testimony dealing with a demeanor when she
discussed things with that we can say here related to allegations of abuse. [¶] We kept
that separate. I think we did it by talking about what was her demeanor when she was
discussing the things that were part of the CPS report. [¶] And then with regard to [Doe
II], I think that one can conclude either way that the discussions that—the discussion that
the witness Ms. Sullivan had with [Doe II] and [Doe I] together could have taken place
before the second meeting with Detective Garcia. And that’s why I let those statements
come in. And I think the jury was at least instructed on the difference between fresh
complaint, which is not offered for the truth, and the prior consistent statements, which
may be offered for the truth—or maybe considered for their truth depending on what the
jury finds.”
2. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
a. “Fresh Complaint” Doctrine
The parameters of the fresh complaint doctrine were set forth in Brown, supra, 8
Cal.4th 746, as follows: “[P]roof of an extrajudicial complaint, made by the victim of a
sexual offense, disclosing the alleged assault, may be admissible for a limited,
nonhearsay purpose—namely, to establish the fact of, and the circumstances surrounding,
the victim's disclosure of the assault to others—whenever the fact that the disclosure was

13
made and the circumstances under which it was made are relevant to the trier of fact’s
determination as to whether the offense occurred.” (Id. at pp. 749–750.)
“[S]o long as the evidence in question is admitted for the nonhearsay purpose of
establishing the circumstances under which the victim reported the offense to others, such
evidence ordinarily would be relevant under generally applicable rules of evidence, and
therefore admissible, so long as its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect.
(Evid. Code, § 352.)” (Brown, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 759–760, italics omitted.) The
evidence admitted should be “carefully limited to the fact that a complaint was made, and
to the circumstances surrounding the making of the complaint, thereby eliminating or at
least minimizing the risk that the jury will rely upon the evidence for an impermissible
hearsay purpose.” (Id. at p. 762.)
b. Prior Consistent Statements
Under the Evidence Code, hearsay is defined as “evidence of a statement that was
made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove
the truth of the matter stated.” (Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a).) Unless the hearsay
evidence falls within an exception to the hearsay rule, an out-of-court statement is
inadmissible for its truth. (Id., subd. (b).)
Under Evidence Code section 1236, “[e]vidence of a statement previously made
by a witness is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement is consistent
with his testimony at the hearing and is offered in compliance with Section 791.” In turn,
Evidence Code section 791 states: “Evidence of a statement previously made by a
witness that is consistent with his [or her] testimony at the hearing is inadmissible to
support his credibility unless it is offered after: (a) Evidence of a statement made by him
[or her] that is inconsistent with any part of his [or her] testimony at the hearing has been
admitted for the purpose of attacking his [or her] credibility, and the statement was made
before the alleged inconsistent statement; or (b) An express or implied charge has been
made that his [or her] testimony at the hearing is recently fabricated or is influenced by

14
bias or other improper motive, and the statement was made before the bias, motive for
fabrication, or other improper motive is alleged to have arisen.”
“The court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue
consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the
issues, or of misleading the jury.” (Evid. Code, § 352.) “The weighing process
under [Evidence Code] section 352 depends upon the trial court’s consideration of the
unique facts and issues of each case, rather than upon the mechanical application of
automatic rules.” (People v. Jennings (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1314–1315.)
We “appl[y] the abuse of discretion standard of review to any ruling by a trial
court on the admissibility of evidence.” (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 723.)
Under this standard, we will not disturb a trial court’s ruling “except on a showing the
trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner
that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20
Cal.4th 1, 9–10.)
3. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Admitting the Fact of Doe
II’s Disclosure of the Abuse to Sullivan
Garcia argues that Doe II’s disclosure of the alleged molestation to Sullivan had
“no relevance” because it did not have any tendency to disprove or prove the allegations
against Garcia. Garcia specifically notes that any relevance of Doe II’s disclosure was
“undermined” because it only took place after Detective Garcia had suggested the
possibility of abuse during his initial interview with her. Garcia further claims that any
nominal relevance of the disclosure was outweighed by its prejudicial nature, namely,
that it would be improperly considered by the jury for hearsay purposes.
In reviewing the record, we find no abuse of discretion. The testimony that the
trial court deemed as falling within the “fresh complaint” doctrine were limited to
Sullivan’s description of circumstances surrounding Doe II’s disclosure to Sullivan of the

15
alleged molestation, as well as her statement that Garcia had been the perpetrator of the
molestation. Accordingly, we find that the responses that the trial court deemed as
admissible under the “fresh complaint” doctrine met the requirements of that doctrine as
set forth under Brown, where “[t]he testimony was limited to the timing of [the]
complaint[s] and the circumstances under which [they were] made.” (Brown, supra, 8
Cal.4th at p. 764.)
Further, we find no merit to Garcia’s contention that the fact of the disclosure was
irrelevant and therefore inadmissible as substantially more prejudicial than probative
under Evidence Code section 352. “Prejudice for purposes of Evidence Code section 352
means evidence that tends to evoke an emotional bias against the defendant with very
little effect on issues, not evidence that is probative of a defendant's guilt.” (People v.
Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 822, 842.) Here, we find no basis to conclude that the fact of the
disclosure evoked a strong bias against Garcia with little effect on the issues. In fact, the
evidence of Doe II’s disclosure to Ms. Sullivan was directly relevant to the jury’s
determination of whether the alleged molestation did or did not occur. (See Brown,
supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 763.) Specifically, the circumstances under which Doe II made her
disclosure were probative of such a determination, as Doe II independently disclosed the
alleged molestation to a third party after being greatly affected by a classmate’s
presentation on abuse, even after first denying it when interviewed by Detective Garcia.
Accordingly, as noted in Brown, the circumstances of her disclosure helped “shed light”
on why Doe made the disclosures at that particular time, and were probative as to her
credibility. Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s admission of
Sullivan’s testimony regarding the fact of Doe II’s disclosure of the alleged molestation.
4. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Admitting Sullivan’s
Statements About Doe II’s Description of the Assault as Prior Consistent
Statements
Garcia next argues that Doe II’s statements to Sullivan about the specifics of the

16
alleged molestation did not meet the criteria for the prior consistent statement exception
as set forth in Evidence Code section 791, subdivision (b). Garcia claims that in order to
satisfy the statute, an express or implied charge of recent fabrication or bias or other
improper motive must have been made, and the statement must have been made before
the bias, motive for fabrication, or improper motive arose. Garcia argues that because his
trial counsel did not make any charges of fabrication, bias or improper motive, Doe II’s
statements did not fall within the exception.
We find no merit to this contention. In reviewing the record, defense counsel’s
cross-examination of Doe II included a series of questions about Doe II’s awareness that
Garcia had also allegedly touched Doe I inappropriately, and whether either Doe I or
Sullivan informed her about these allegations before she testified at trial. Defense
counsel asked similar questions of Doe I during cross-examination about whether she had
ever discussed the molestation with Doe II, to which Doe I responded that “[Doe II]
knows, but we have never discussed what happened,” and later stated that she could not
remember if she was the one who told Doe II. Further, as noted by the trial court,
Sullivan had been questioned by both the People and defense counsel as to whether she
had ever conveyed Doe I’s allegations to Doe II, or whether those allegations were
discussed during the joint meeting between Sullivan, Doe I, and Doe II. Accordingly, a
trial court could reasonably conclude that such questions, as a whole, reflected an implied
charge of an improper motive for Doe II to fabricate the alleged molestation only after
learning about Doe I’s experience, particularly when Doe II had previously denied any
inappropriate behavior. Therefore, because the statements Doe II made to Sullivan took
place before, as defense counsel implied, she allegedly became aware that Doe I had been
through something similar, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s finding that
the statements were admissible as prior consistent statements under Evidence Code
section 791, subdivision (b).

17
B. Denial of Motion for Mistrial
1. Relevant Procedural Background
During defense counsel’s cross-examination of Doe I, counsel provided her with a
page of prior testimony from the preliminary hearing in order to refresh her recollection.
Doe I then handed it back to him, indicating that it was not hers. Counsel then suggested
the parties take a short recess to give Doe I a break. As the jurors left the room, Doe I
began having a visible emotional reaction, which defense counsel later described as her
“sobbing loudly with her head on the witness stand and the witness advocate at her side
attempting to console her.” The parties then spoke in chambers about the incident, at
which time defense counsel informed the trial court that he intended to move for a
mistrial, but the court gave a tentative ruling denying the motion and permitted defense
counsel to ask certain questions to determine the cause of this reaction. The People also
spoke with Doe I during the break and confirmed with defense counsel and the trial court
that Doe I “explained her reaction by saying that she thought that the transcript meant
that her sister had seen Mr. Garcia abusing her, meaning [Doe I], and that that was a very
upsetting thing for [Doe I] to understand.” When cross-examination resumed, defense
counsel elicited Doe I’s testimony that he had accidentally given Doe I a page from Doe
II’s preliminary hearing testimony, and from reading it, Doe I became concerned that
Doe II may have witnessed some of the incidents between Garcia and Doe I.
At the conclusion of Doe I’s testimony, defense counsel moved for a mistrial
based on his error in giving Doe I the wrong page of testimony and Doe I’s strong
emotional reaction, which may have been witnessed by the jury. Counsel argued that he
was concerned the People would argue in their closing argument that Doe’s reaction
“tends to show that her testimony is credible. And I expect that the DA will say that a
person who was not abused in the way that’s alleged in this case would not have
responded with such a fulsome and overwhelming emotional reaction.” Counsel further
argued that because the current scenario and Doe I’s strong emotional reaction would not

18
have happened but for his error, he was “greatly concerned” that Garcia was being put in
a disadvantageous position, and the only way to protect Garcia’s rights would be by
declaring a mistrial.
In response, the People argued that they did not see “anything” to support the
mistrial motion. The People claimed that Doe I became emotional during direct
examination as well, and while it was not as heightened as the specific instance at issue, it
was not enough to suggest that the jury would be unable to provide Garcia with a fair
trial. The People also noted that Doe I’s initial response to seeing the wrong page, and
returning it to defense counsel, was “deadpan.” According to the People, Doe only began
crying after the court announced the break, “[a]nd as jurors stood and rose up and started
walking away, that’s when it started becoming more. And that was after -- I would say,
all the jurors had stood up. Most of them were already passed counsel’s table when she
was having the breathing issues or to that extent.”
In making its ruling, the trial court acknowledged that Doe I’s emotional reaction
was “substantial, significant” and close to hyperventilating, which was different from her
previous emotional responses to regular questioning. The trial court also did not agree
with the People that there was no support for defense counsel’s motion, and indicated it
“understood why” the motion was being made. However, the trial court confirmed that
following the discussion in chambers, where the parties all acknowledged that defense
counsel’s actions were purely by mistake, defense counsel was able to ask Doe I
questions that confirmed this mistake and identified the reason for Doe I’s reaction. The
trial court therefore believed that any undue prejudice had been diffused by defense
counsel’s “damage control” questions, and denied the motion for a mistrial. However,
the trial court informed defense counsel that if he felt further cross-examination was
needed on the issue, he would be permitted to do so.
2. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“To require the grant of a mistrial motion, the risk of prejudice must be incurable

19
by admonition or instruction.” (People v. Elliott (2012) 53 Cal.4th 535, 575 (Elliott).)
That is, “[a] trial court should grant a motion for mistrial ‘only when “ ‘a party’s chances
of receiving a fair trial have been irreparably damaged’ ” ’ [citation]. …” (People v.
Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 573.) “Because the trial court is generally better able than
an appellate court to make this determination, a ruling denying a motion for mistrial is
reviewed under the deferential abuse of discretion standard.” (Elliott, supra, at p. 575;
accord People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 128; People v. Montes (2014) 58 Cal.4th
809, 884.)
3. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying the Motion for
Mistrial
Garcia argues that trial counsel’s mistake in providing Doe I with the wrong page
from the preliminary hearing testimony, and her subsequent emotional reaction,
irreparably damaged his ability to receive a fair trial under both the state and federal
Constitution. Garcia claims that because the case “largely boiled down to a credibility
contest” due to the lack of forensic evidence or third party witnesses to corroborate the
allegations, Doe I’s substantial emotional reaction lent “a credibility to [her] testimony
that would otherwise not have existed.” Garcia therefore claims he was unduly
prejudiced as a result of counsel’s mistake and Doe I’s reaction, and the trial court
therefore abused its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial.
In reviewing the record, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision.
As noted above, the trial court acknowledged that Doe I’s reaction to reading the page of
testimony was significant and much greater than her emotional response to questioning,
yet permitted defense counsel to ask her additional questions to mitigate or explain the
reason for her reaction, including confirmation that it was not the testimony in the
transcript but her own concerns that Doe II may have witnessed Garcia’s molestation of

20
Doe I.4 Given Garcia’s concern that the jury would infer Doe I’s emotional reaction was
to “learning new information”, Doe I’s clarification that she was reacting to her own
apparently unfounded concern was sufficient to cure any potential risk of prejudice to
Garcia. We do not find that such events leading to Doe I’s response and subsequent
clarification in front of the jury created a circumstance where Garcia’s chances of
receiving a fair trial were irreparably damaged. We therefore conclude that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in denying Garcia’s motion for a mistrial.
4. Assuming Deficient Performance by Defense Counsel, Prejudice Has Not
Been Shown
Garcia alternatively argues that defense counsel’s mistake in providing Doe I with
the wrong page of testimony constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Garcia argues
that because counsel conceded he had made a mistake, there was no reasonable strategy
behind his actions, and such actions were prejudicial to Garcia because Doe I’s emotional
reaction lent credibility to her testimony and allegations of molestation.
The standard for evaluating claims that counsel provided constitutionally
ineffective assistance is set forth in Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687–
694 (Strickland).) This standard provides that: “[t]o secure reversal … upon the ground
of ineffective assistance of counsel under either the state or federal Constitution, [an
appellant] must establish (1) that … counsel’s performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness, i.e., that counsel’s performance did not meet the standard to
be expected of a reasonably competent attorney, and (2) that there is a reasonable
probability that [appellant] would have obtained a more favorable result absent counsel’s
shortcomings.” (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1003 (Cunningham).)
It appears implicit in Garcia’s argument that no reasonably competent attorney in

4 In his briefing, Garcia takes no issue with these additional questions or Doe I’s
answers.

21
the heat of trial would inadvertently turn to the wrong page of a transcript or would have
failed to exercise greater than usual caution here in anticipation of Doe I’s reaction. We
express no opinion on such premises and therefore assume without deciding that
counsel’s use of the wrong transcript constituted deficient performance. However,
Garcia fails to demonstrate that counsel’s mistake in showing Doe I the wrong page of
testimony was prejudicial. We first note that Doe’s reaction did not occur while she was
testifying but took place during a break in proceedings as the jurors were leaving the
courtroom, thus making it unclear if the jury actually witnessed anything. In addition, as
discussed, following Doe I’s significant reaction to seeing the transcript, the People
learned what had caused such a response and conveyed this information to the trial court
and defense counsel. In an abundance of caution (if the jury had in fact seen Doe I’s
reaction), defense counsel was then permitted to ask Doe I additional questions to clarify
the reason for her reacting so strongly, and Garcia takes no issue with Doe I’s
clarification. Further, neither party mentioned Doe I’s reaction during closing arguments
nor otherwise spoke of it later in the proceedings, including any argument by the People
that such a reaction bolstered Doe I’s credibility. Beyond unsupported speculation
regarding what the jury may have seen or considered from this momentary event during
trial, Garcia has failed to meet his burden demonstrating that but for counsel’s mistaken
actions, there was a reasonable probability he would have achieved a more favorable
result. We therefore do not find merit to Garcia’s claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel.
C. Admission of CSAAS Expert Testimony
Garcia argues that the trial court erred in allowing Dr. Carmichael to testify over
his objection. First, he argues that the CSAAS testimony should have been excluded
under Evidence Code section 352 as more prejudicial than probative because it
improperly bolstered the victims’ credibility and misled the jury on the presumption of
innocence. Second, he claims that the CSAAS testimony was irrelevant and inadmissible

22
under Evidence Code section 801 because the misconceptions it seeks to correct are no
longer prevalent in society and were not present among the jurors in the instant case.
Third, he argues that the prosecution failed to establish Dr. Carmichael’s opinions were
reliable amongst the scientific community. Lastly, Garcia therefore concludes that his
constitutional rights to due process were violated because the CSAAS evidence “allowed
the jury to infer that, because the complainants’ behavior was in some ways consistent
with CSAAS, the complainants had in fact been sexually abused.”
As we explain below, we conclude the trial court did not err in admitting the
CSAAS testimony and reject Garcia’s arguments in their entirety.
1. Procedural Background
Before trial, the defense filed a motion in limine to exclude any CSAAS evidence
in its entirety. Counsel claimed that such evidence was not generally accepted in the
scientific community and requested that the court hold a Kelly/Frye5 hearing before
admitting the evidence. Counsel also argued that such evidence was more prejudicial
than probative because “its admission will create substantial danger of undue prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or if it might mislead the jury.” Further, counsel asked that if the
court deemed the CSAAS evidence admissible to “dispel alleged myths, the court order
that the testimony to dispel a myth be limited to victims as a class.”
The trial court ruled that the CSAAS evidence was admissible so long as the
CSAAS expert did not render an opinion on the current case as to whether the
molestation occurred or not, and could not testify as to “whether or not things are true or
not true or whether testimony is truthful or not truthful in regarding the specifics.”
At trial, Dr. Carmichael testified as an expert in CSAAS. He testified that CSAAS
was developed in the early 1980s as an educational tool for therapists to address myths

5 This rule, now known as only the Kelly rule (see People v. Bolden (2002) 29
Cal.4th 515, 545 (Bolden)) refers to the test for admissibility of novel scientific evidence
as set out in People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24.

23
and misconceptions they may have about the behavior of child sexual abuse victims.
There are five general categories of CSAAS: secrecy, helplessness, entrapment or
accommodation, delayed, unconvincing, and conflicted disclosure, and recanting or
retraction. Dr. Carmichael added that CSAAS does not serve as a “checklist” that can be
used to determine if a child has been abused or not.
Dr. Carmichael explained that secrecy was foundational to understanding how a
child victim perceives the sexual activity in the context of the relationship they have with
the perpetrator, who is often a known or trusted person in their life. He described reasons
why child victims may keep abuse a secret as a result of this pre-existing relationship,
including fear that they may lose the care and shelter that person provides to them if they
disclose the abuse. Helplessness refers to the “power differential” between the child and
the perpetrator, which can be even greater if the perpetrator provides things to the child
that they value.
Entrapment and accommodation pertain to a child’s helplessness in stopping the
abuse and the ways children cope or deal with the abuse. Dr. Carmichael described
various behavioral, emotional, and cognitive mechanisms that children employ to cope
with their situation, such as making themselves less “available” (behavioral), numbing or
distancing themselves from reality as the abuse is taking place (cognitive), or appearing
stoic or unaffected by the abuse (emotional). Delayed, unconvincing, and conflicted
disclosure focus on belated, inconsistent, or incomplete disclosures that may not include
all details. Dr. Carmichael explained how language, memory, and development may
affect disclosure and stated that a child’s demeanor with respect to disclosure is
“incremental” and a “process”. Lastly, recantation and retraction refer to the
phenomenon in which a child victim discloses a valid claim of sexual abuse and then
repudiates it, particularly if they experience negative consequences from their disclosure
and just want “things to go away.”
Dr. Carmichael clarified that a child did not have to experience all five stages of

24
CSAAS to be classified as a victim. In addition, he testified that he was not familiar with
the facts of this case or any of the parties related to the case, and was not offering an
opinion as to whether either victim had been sexually abused. On cross-examination, Dr.
Carmichael again confirmed that CSAAS was not a diagnostic tool, and that he did not
know any details about the case, including the allegations or police reports.
2. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Expert opinion testimony is admissible when the subject matter is “beyond
common experience” and the opinion would assist the trier of fact. (Evid. Code, § 801,
subd. (a).) “ ‘When expert opinion is offered, much must be left to the trial court's
discretion.’ [Citation.] The trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to admit
or exclude expert testimony [citation], and its decision as to whether expert testimony
meets the standard for admissibility is subject to review for abuse of discretion.
[Citations.]” (People v. McDowell (2012) 54 Cal.4th 395, 426.)
“Trial courts may admit CSAAS evidence to disabuse jurors of five commonly
held ‘myths’ or misconceptions about child sexual abuse. [Citation.] While CSAAS
evidence is not relevant to prove the alleged sexual abuse occurred, it is well established
in California law CSAAS evidence is relevant for the limited purpose of evaluating the
credibility of an alleged child victim of sexual abuse. [Citations.]” (People v. Lapenias
(2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 162, 171 (Lapenias); see also In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th
396, 418; People v. Wells (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 179, 188; People v. Patino (1994) 26
Cal.App.4th 1737, 1744–1745 (Patino); People v. Housley (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 947,
955–956; People v. Harlan (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 439, 449–450 (Harlan); People v.
Stark (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 107, 116–117.) CSAAS evidence “is admissible solely for
the purpose of showing that the victim’s reactions as demonstrated by the evidence are
not inconsistent with having been molested.” (People v. Bowker (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d
385, 394 (Bowker).) “For instance, where a child delays a significant period of time
before reporting an incident or pattern of abuse, an expert could testify that such delayed

25
reporting is not inconsistent with the secretive environment often created by an abuser
who occupies a position of trust.” (Ibid.) CSAAS evidence “is not admissible to prove
that the complaining witness has in fact been sexually abused; it is admissible to
rehabilitate such witness’s credibility when the defendant suggests that the child’s
conduct after the incident—e.g., a delay in reporting—is inconsistent with his or her
testimony claiming molestation. [Citations.] ‘Such expert testimony is needed to
disabuse jurors of commonly held misconceptions about child sexual abuse, and to
explain the emotional antecedents of abused children’s seemingly self-impeaching
behavior.’ ” (People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1300–1301, fn. omitted
(McAlpin).)
3. Analysis
a. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Admitting the CSAAS
Evidence
Garcia argues that the trial court abused its discretion because CSAAS evidence
allows for “circular reasoning” by depending on the assumption that abuse already
occurred, thus making it more prejudicial than probative. Garcia further argues that there
was no evidence presented by the People that “the lack of awareness” that CSAAS
evidence had been designed to address still existed. In support of this argument, Garcia
largely cites scholarly articles and cases from other jurisdictions. We find both
arguments without merit.
As Garcia himself acknowledges, the California Supreme Court ruled in McAlpin
that CSAAS testimony is admissible to disabuse jurors of commonly held misconceptions
about child sexual abuse victims’ behavior and to explain seemingly contradictory
behavior of a child sexual abuse victim. (McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 1300–1302.)
As this court is bound by decisions of the California Supreme Court, Garcia’s references
to decisions from other jurisdictions that reached different decisions on the admissibility
of CSAAS testimony have no effect on the binding nature of McAlpin. (See People v.

26
Ramirez (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 175, 216. ) In addition, Garcia does not cite any new
studies or changes in scientific understanding that would justify our reconsidering the
long line of California decisions on this subject. Based on binding precedent, as well as
the substantial precedent set forth above regarding admissibility of CSAAS evidence, we
find nothing in the record to demonstrate the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that
the prosecution’s proposed expert testimony on CSAAS was relevant and admissible for
the limited purpose for which it was admitted in the instant case. (See Lapenias, supra,
67 Cal.App.5th at p. 172; Patino, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1744–1745; People v.
Perez (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 231, 245.)
Moreover, “ ‘[t]he jury need not be wholly ignorant of the subject matter of the
opinion’ ” for a trial court to reasonably conclude that Dr. Carmichael’s expert testimony
regarding delayed disclosure, victim demeanor, and inconsistencies in the victim's
testimony would still assist the jury in dispelling any common myths about the behavior
of victims, as Evidence Code section 801 contemplates. (McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p.
1299, italics added.) For example, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that,
in addition to the delay in both victims’ disclosures of the alleged molestation, Doe II’s
initial denial of any inappropriate behavior during her interview with Detective Garcia
before she ultimately disclosed the molestation to Sullivan was the type of seemingly
self-impeaching behavior for which the Supreme Court has recognized that CSAAS
evidence may be helpful. Therefore, we find no merit to Garcia’s contention that the
CSAAS evidence did not meet the requirements of Evidence Code section 801 of being
“beyond common experience.”
Further, we reject Garcia’s contentions that the trial court abused its discretion by
failing to exclude Dr. Carmichael’s testimony as substantially more prejudicial than
probative pursuant to Evidence Code section 352. “Evidence only creates ‘undue
prejudice’ if the evidence tends to evoke an emotional bias against the defendant, and the
evidence has relatively little importance based on the specific issues involved in the

27
particular case. [Citation.]” (Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 174.) In the instant
case, the possible prejudicial impact of the CSAAS testimony, none of which was related
to the facts of the charged case, was slight in comparison to the charged conduct which
involved two different child victims. Further, the trial court appropriately limited the
scope of the CSAAS testimony. Specifically, the trial court indicated that the CSAAS
evidence was admissible so long as the CSAAS expert did not render an opinion on the
current case as to whether the molestation occurred or not, and the expert could not
testify as to “whether or not things are true or not true or whether testimony is truthful or
not truthful in regarding the specifics.” We find no indication that such a decision was
arbitrary or capricious and therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting Dr. Carmichael’s testimony.
b. CSAAS Evidence is Not Subject to the Kelly Rule
Garcia next argues that because CSAAS evidence has never been evaluated by the
Kelly rule and its model has not been generally accepted in the scientific community, the
trial court abused its discretion in admitting the CSAAS testimony. We disagree.
Under the Kelly rule, “evidence obtained through a new scientific technique may
be admitted only after its reliability has been established under a three-pronged test. The
first prong requires proof that the technique is generally accepted as reliable in the
relevant scientific community.” 6 (Bolden, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 544.)
The California Supreme Court has explained that the “additional scrutiny” under
Kelly, which “imposes certain preconditions on the admission of evidence derived from a
novel scientific technique or procedure.” “ ‘is justified because “[l]ay jurors tend to give

6 Although the Kelly rule involves two more prongs regarding the qualifications of
the testifying witness and the procedure used to perform the technique at issue (see
Bolden, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 244–245), Garcia does not contend that Dr. Carmichael’s
testimony failed to satisfy these other two elements. Therefore, we do not discuss them
further.

28
considerable weight to ‘scientific’ evidence when presented by ‘experts’ with impressive
credentials. We have acknowledged the existence of a ‘. . . misleading aura of certainty
which often envelops a new scientific process, obscuring its currently experimental
nature.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Peterson (2020) 10 Cal.5th 409, 457 (Peterson).)
However, unlike evidence that is based on a new scientific technique or procedure,
expert opinion testimony is not necessarily subject to the Kelly test. The California
Supreme Court has explained as follows: “[I]n most cases no similar caution is required
before a jury considers expert opinion testimony. Unlike results ‘produced by a
machine,’ to which jurors may ‘ascribe an inordinately high degree of certainty,’ jurors
presented with the personal opinion of a witness, even an expert witness, ‘may temper
their acceptance of his [or her] testimony with a healthy skepticism born of their
knowledge that all human beings are fallible.’ [Citations.] For this reason, ‘ “[a]bsent
some special feature which effectively blindsides the jury, expert opinion testimony is not
subject to Kelly[].” ’ [Citations.] Of course, some expert testimony may be ‘based, in
whole or part, on a technique, process, or theory which is new to science and, even more
so, the law’ [citation]; where the novel technique ‘appears in both name and description
to provide some definitive truth which the expert need only accurately recognize and
relay to the jury,’ additional scrutiny under Kelly is warranted.” (Peterson, supra, 10
Cal.5th at pp. 457–458, some italics added.)
In the instant matter, Garcia contends that the California Supreme Court applied
Kelly to evidence regarding rape trauma syndrome in People v. Bledsoe (1984) 36 Cal.3d
236 (Bledsoe), and therefore, Kelly must be applied to CSAAS evidence as well. In
Bledsoe, “expert testimony describing the [rape trauma] syndrome and applying it to [the]
victim was used to prove that ‘a rape in the legal sense had, in fact, occurred.’ ” (People
v. Stoll (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1136, 1160 (Stoll), italics omitted.) However, “rape trauma
syndrome was not devised to determine … whether, in fact, a rape in the legal sense
occurred—but rather was developed by professional rape counselors as a therapeutic tool,

29
to help identify, predict and treat emotional problems experienced by the counselors’
clients or patients.” (Bledsoe, supra, at pp. 249–250.) In other words, the scientific
literature regarding rape trauma syndrome did “not … purport to claim that the syndrome
is a scientifically reliable means of proving that a rape occurred.” (Id. at p. 251.) The
court therefore found that the evidence was inadmissible as it did not meet the Kelly test.
(Stoll, supra, at p. 1161.)
The Third District Court of Appeal subsequently indicated in Bowker, supra, 203
Cal.App.3d at page 394, that Bledsoe created an exception allowing for the admissibility
of evidence related to rape trauma syndrome only for the limited purpose of
“ ‘[disabusing] the jury of some widely held misconceptions about rape and rape victims,
so that it may evaluate the evidence free of the constraints of popular myths.’ [Citation.]”
(Bowker, supra, at p. 391.) The court also found that notwithstanding Kelly, CSAAS
evidence may similarly be admissible for the limited purpose of “disabusing the jury of
misconceptions as to how child victims react to abuse.” (Bowker, at p. 392.)
The California Supreme Court later made clear that its opinion in “Bledsoe did not
hold that the [Kelly] test applied to the expert opinion in that case” and that Bledsoe did
not “discuss the test’s relationship to ‘syndrome’ or other expert psychological evidence
in general.” (Stoll, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 1161.) Significantly, subsequent to Bledsoe,
the California Supreme Court in Stoll concluded that where psychological testimony is
based on methods that “are not new to psychology or the law” and “carry no misleading
aura of scientific infallibility,” the testimony is not subject to the Kelly rule. (Stoll, supra,
at p. 1157.) Notably, Garcia does not address Stoll in his argument.
In the present case, Garcia fails to demonstrate that CSAAS evidence is based on
methods that are “new to psychology or the law” and that testimony about CSAAS
carries a “misleading aura of scientific infallibility.” (Stoll, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 1157;
accord, Peterson, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 458.) Indeed, the case of People v. Munch
(2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 464 (Munch), specifically found that with respect to CSAAS

30
evidence, “we are not dealing with new experimental scientific evidence ‘ “not
previously accepted in court.” ’ ” (Munch, at p. 472.)
In the instant case, Dr. Carmichael had been a licensed psychologist for 22 years
and was a supervisor and evaluation program manager at the U.C. Davis Care Center, a
child abuse treatment program. Over the course of his work at the Center, he had
personally treated over 180 children for sexual abuse, evaluated over 300 children for
abuse, and supervised and trained others their treatment of children in “the better part of
800 to 1,000 cases.” His expert testimony was therefore “ ‘based on [his] clinical
experience with child sexual abuse victims and on [his . . .] … familiarity with
professional literature in the area.’ [Citation.] … Such expert testimony meets
‘traditional standards for competent expert opinion, without need for additional screening
procedures’ ” under Kelly. (Munch, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 473.) In addition,
CSAAS evidence “has been ruled to be properly admitted by the courts of this state for
decades.” (Id. at pp. 468, 472.)
In addition, testimony about CSAAS does not purport to make any definitive
statements about whether a child has been abused and instead simply attempts to dispel
misconceptions about the conduct of child sexual abuse victims. (See Munch, supra, 52
Cal.App.5th at pp. 468, 473; Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 173.) Dr. Carmichael
specifically testified that he knew nothing about the case or the facts, and did not know
anyone related to the case. The California Supreme Court has also rejected the notion
that the “use of ‘syndrome’ … terminology by a mental health professional makes the
[testimony] seem ‘scientific’ to a jury, and thus invokes [Kelly].” (Stoll, supra, 49 Cal.3d
at p. 1161, fn. 22 [court was “not persuaded that juries are incapable of evaluating
properly presented references to psychological … ‘syndromes’ ”].)
Finally, due to Garcia’s failure to demonstrate the applicability of the Kelly rule to
the CSAAS evidence in this case, we find unpersuasive his reliance on out-of-state
authority regarding whether CSAAS evidence meets a Kelly (or Frye) requirement

31
regarding general acceptance within the scientific community. (See, e.g., State v. J.L.G.
(N.J. 2018) 234 N.J. 265, 301 [“we apply the Frye test and consider whether CSAAS has
achieved general acceptance in the scientific community”].)
In conclusion, because Garcia does not establish that CSAAS evidence is based on
methods that are “new to psychology or the law” and that the evidence carried a
“misleading aura of scientific infallibility” (see Stoll, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 1157; accord,
Peterson, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 457–458), we find that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting expert testimony about CSAAS without first conducting a Kelly
test. (See, e.g., Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 173 [“expert CSAAS testimony is
not ‘ “ ‘scientific’ ” evidence’ subject to the Kelly rule”]; Munch, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 472–473 [CSAAS evidence not subject to Kelly analysis]; Harlan, supra, 222
Cal.App.3d at p. 449 [Kelly rule does not apply to expert testimony about the reactions of
child molestation victims, where expert’s “opinion was based on her clinical experience
with child sexual abuse victims and on her familiarity with professional literature in the
area”].)
c. Admission of CSAAS Evidence Did Not Violate Due Process
Finally, Garcia contends that the admission of the CSAAS evidence violated his
due process rights to a fair trial because it was irrelevant, unreliable, and allowed the jury
to the jury to infer because Doe I and Doe II’s behavior was “in some ways consistent
with CSAAS,” they had in fact been sexually abused.
Generally, a court’s compliance with the rules of evidence does not violate a
defendant's right to due process. (Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 174, citing
People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 834–835.) Reviewing courts have also routinely
held the admission of CSAAS evidence does not violate due process. (See, e.g., Patino,
supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1744–1745 [trial court's admission of CSAAS evidence did
not violate due process].) For the same reasons, we conclude that Dr. Carmichael’s

32
testimony about CSAAS did not violate Garcia’s constitutional right to due process.
Further, we have already rejected Garcia’s contentions that (1) the evidence should
have been excluded as irrelevant; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting such
evidence pursuant to sections 352 and 801; and (3) CSAAS evidence is unreliable and
that the Kelly test must be applied. The “rejection of a claim on the merits necessarily
leads to rejection of any constitutional theory or ‘gloss’ raised” on appeal. (People v.
Scott (2011) 52 Cal.4th 452, 487, fn. 29.) Having rejected each of the underlying claims
of error in admitting the CSAAS evidence, we accordingly reject Garcia’s due process
claim.
D. Instructional Error
Garcia next argues that the court erred in instructing the jury with CALCRIM No.
1193 and erred in refusing defense counsel’s request to modify the instruction by
removing the final phrase. Garcia specifically argues that CALCRIM 1193 is defective
because it “allows the jury to find that because a complaining witness’s conduct after the
fact was consistent with having been sexually abused, the complaining witness is more
believable.” He therefore claims that the trial court’s use of CALCRIM 1193, and the
resulting confusion to the jury, reduced the prosecution’s burden to prove the charges
beyond a reasonable doubt, which prejudicially violated his right to due process and a fair
trial.
1. Trial Court Proceedings
When the trial court denied Garcia’s motion in limine to exclude CSAAS
testimony, it indicated that it would instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 1193 before the
testimony. Accordingly, before Dr. Carmichael’s testimony, the court instructed the jury
as follows: “Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome relates to a pattern of
behavior that may be present in child sexual abuse cases. Testimony as to the
Accommodation syndrome is offered only to explain certain behavior of an alleged
victim of child sexual abuse. [¶] The evidence said from Dr. Carmichael is not evidence

33
that the defendant committed any of the crimes charged against him or any crime – never
mind. [¶] You may consider the evidence only in deciding whether or not [Doe I’s] and
[Doe II’s] conduct was—was not inconsistent with the conduct of someone who has been
molested and in evaluating the believability of the alleged victims.”
At the conclusion of evidence, prior to instructing the jury and outside the jury’s
presence, the trial court reviewed the jury instructions with both counsel. At that time,
defense counsel asked that language from an older version of CALCRIM No. 1193,
which used the phrase “not inconsistent with” instead of “consistent with,” be used,
which the People agreed with. Defense counsel also requested that the final phrase of the
instruction, “and in evaluating the believability of their testimony,” be stricken on the
grounds that it was an inappropriate application of CSAAS testimony and “invite[d] the
jurors to judge the testimony of the complaining witnesses by a different standard than
other witnesses.” The People objected to the request, arguing that “the entire point of
that [phrase] is to understand whether or not how [the victims] acted that can be deemed
credible.” The trial court did not remove the phrase, finding that the alleged conduct
involved circumstantial evidence relating to credibility, and there had been questions
asked regarding the alleged victims’ prior inconsistent statements. As these subjects
were discussed as part of CSAAS, the trial court concluded that the CSAAS testimony
could be used to evaluate the believability of the alleged victims’ testimony.
At the conclusion of evidence, the court instructed the jury pursuant to CALCRIM
No. 1193 as follows: “You have heard testimony from Dr. Blake Carmichael regarding
[CSAAS]. [¶] [CSAAS] relates to a pattern of behavior that may be present in child
sexual abuse cases. The testimony as to the accommodation syndrome is offered only to
explain certain behavior of an alleged victim of child sexual abuse. [¶] Dr. Carmichael’s
testimony about [CSAAS] is not evidence that the defendant committed any of the crimes
charged against him. [¶] You may consider this evidence only in deciding whether or
not [Jane Doe I and Jane Doe I]'s conduct was not inconsistent with the conduct of

34
someone who has been molested, and in evaluating the believability of their testimony.”
2. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“We determine whether a jury instruction correctly states the law under the
independent or de novo standard of review.” (People v. Ramos (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th
1082, 1088.) When we review a purportedly erroneous instruction, we consider
“ ‘ “ ‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged
instruction in a way’ that violates the Constitution.” ’ ” (People v. Richardson (2008) 43
Cal.4th 959, 1028.) We consider the instructions as a whole and “ ‘assume that jurors are
intelligent persons and capable of understanding and correlating all jury instructions
which are given.’ ” (Ibid.)
3. No Error in Instructing with CALCRIM No. 1193
In making his argument, Garcia notes that while California courts have upheld
instructions that included the same sentence from CALCRIM 1193 that he now
challenges (see People v. Gonzales (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 494, 503–504 (Gonzales);
Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at pp. 175–176; Munch, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at pp.
473–474), such precedent was incorrectly decided because the instruction impermissibly
bolsters credibility and allows a reasonable juror to conclude from the expert’s testimony
that the alleged victim was sexually abused. Garcia therefore argues that usage of the
CSAAS evidence to evaluate believability exceeds the permissible scope of CSAAS
testimony as set forth in McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d 1289.
In reviewing the instruction in light of the entire record, we are not convinced that
the jurors understood the instruction as permitting the use of Dr. Carmichael’s testimony
for the improper purpose of proving that Garcia molested either victim. As Garcia
himself acknowledges, multiple courts have rejected similar challenges to the final phrase
of the instruction, and Garcia provides no basis for us to conclude those cases were
wrongly decided. Moreover, assuming without deciding that reference to believability as
a distinct purpose in the last sentence of the instruction may create some ambiguity, we

35
consider it unlikely that the jury here would have applied the instruction in an
impermissible manner. (People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 326.) Dr. Carmichael
stated both on direct and cross-examination he was not rendering an opinion on whether
the alleged molestation had actually taken place. The jurors were also instructed that
they were the sole judge of a witness’s credibility and were not required to accept an
expert’s opinion as true. The prosecutor also did not argue improper inferences from Dr.
Carmichael’s testimony. In fact, the People’s argument reiterated that CSAAS was a tool
to better understand the behavior of child sexual abuse victims as follows: “A CSAAS
expert -- it provides you two things generally. It helps you understand why children who
suffer from this type of trauma may act in ways that might seem unexpected and assists in
evaluating the believability of their testimony. [¶] I want you to remember, Dr.
Carmichael knows nothing of this [case]. He has been told nothing of this case. He is
not here to tell you what happened or who to believe. Right? He is limited, limited to
this to assist you. Right? To dispel those -- understand for us -- are there myths that
needed to be dispelled? Right? Myths of -- would somebody disclose immediately?
Right? Would a child remember everything? Would they be overly emotional? Would
they want to report? Would they want to protect their abuser? Would they disclose all
these details at once. These type of myths.” The People went on to discuss ways to
assess Doe I’s and Doe II’s credibility by looking at other factors separate from the
CSAAS testimony.
Finally, CALCRIM No. 1193 expressly informed the jurors that Dr. Carmichael’s
testimony could not be considered as evidence that Garcia “committed any of the crimes
charged against him.” Therefore, the instruction, which the trial court gave to the jury
both before and after Dr. Carmichael’s testimony, explicitly precluded the use of that
testimony to infer from Doe I’s and Doe II’s conduct that Garcia committed the charged
crimes. Accordingly, we conclude that Garcia’s claim that the trial court erred in failing
to modify CALCRIM No. 1193 pursuant to his request is without merit. (Gonzales,

36
supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at pp. 503–504 [rejecting contention that CALCRIM No.
1193 allows a jury to use CSAAS testimony as proof that the victim was molested];
accord, Munch, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at pp. 473–474; Lapenias, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 175–176.) Further, because we find that it is not reasonably likely that jurors
understood the instruction as permitting the use of CSAAS evidence for the improper
purpose of proving that Garcia molested either victim, we also reject Garcia’s claim that
the instruction impermissibly lowered the prosecutor’s burden of proof.
E. Refusal to Give Pinpoint Instruction
1. Relevant Procedural Background
Towards the conclusion of trial, defense counsel asked the trial court to provide
the jury with the following pinpoint instruction: “Evidence of Uncharged Sexual Offenses
[¶] In a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of a sexual offense, the law
permits the prosecution to present evidence of the defendant’s commission of an
uncharged sexual offense or offenses. If the prosecution has not presented evidence of the
commission of an uncharged sexual offense, you may conclude the defendant has not
committed a prior sexual offense. You may, but are not required to, consider the absence
of a prior sexual offense in deciding whether the prosecution has proved the allegations in
this case beyond a reasonable doubt. [¶] Evidence Code section 1108(a).”
When the parties discussed instructions with the trial court, defense counsel
argued that the pinpoint instruction stemmed from “basic principles of fairness and due
process.” Counsel contended that because the People are usually allowed to present
evidence of other uncharged sexual offenses to argue that the charges are true, the defense
should equally be able to argue that the lack of evidence of uncharged sexual offenses is
something that the jury should be allowed to consider in deciding whether the charges are
true. Counsel described the instruction as an “image” of the concept embodied in
Evidence Code section 1108. In response, the People argued that there was no case law to
support this type of pinpoint instruction, and the instruction went “completely against the

37
understanding that the jury is to only consider the evidence that is before them and
presented in trial. [Defense counsel] is trying to create is an instruction for the jury to
consider what is outside of trial, what has not been presented as evidence. … [¶] If a
district attorney decides not to put in certain acts because the victim is unavailable or they
don’t want the victim to have to come in to testify, albeit whatever the restrictions or
obligations are, then it is inviting the jury to evaluate the potential lack of evidence based
on the district attorney’s choice without even understanding if it is out there. It goes
against CALCRIM 300 stating that neither side is required to call all witnesses or provide
all evidence in a case. … [¶] I’m concerned that this would only invite the jury to
speculate and not abide by the court rules of merely making a determination based on the
evidence, the law, and their own common sense.”
The trial court denied the requested instruction, noting that “I don’t think it serves
any purpose for me to go into reasons, additional reasons as to why this would be
my ruling, but that is my ruling.”
2. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
A defendant “has a right to an instruction that pinpoints the theory of the defense.”
(People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 437, italics omitted.) The trial court may,
however, “properly refuse an instruction offered by the defendant if it incorrectly states
the law, is argumentative, duplicative, or potentially confusing [citation], or if it is not
supported by substantial evidence [citation].” (People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 30.)
We apply the de novo standard of review when determining whether the trial court
erred in refusing to give a requested pinpoint instruction. (People v. Johnson (2009) 180
Cal.App.4th 702, 707.)
3. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying the Requested Pinpoint Instruction
Garcia argues that the court erred in denying his trial counsel’s request for a
pinpoint instruction because he was entitled to point out the failure to call logical
witnesses. Garcia claims that the pinpoint instruction “sought only to inform the jury of

38
[the] ability of the prosecutor to present Evidence Code section 1108 evidence” so that
trial counsel would be able to comment on the failure to present any such evidence.
Garcia therefore argues that it was “patently unfair” for the People to have the ability to
present such evidence but the defense to be prohibited from commenting on the People’s
failure to do so. Garcia further claims that the failure to give the instruction violated his
due process rights for an opportunity to present a meaningful defense, and constituted
prejudicial error requiring reversal.
Evidence Code section 1108 provides, in relevant part, that: “In a criminal action
in which the defendant is accused of a sexual offense, evidence of the defendant’s
commission of another sexual offense or offenses is not made inadmissible by Section
1101, if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to [Evidence Code] Section 352.” (§
1108, subd. (a).)
In reviewing the pinpoint instruction proposed by defense counsel, we cannot
conclude that it constitutes a proper statement of the law. While Evidence Code section
1108 permits introduction of uncharged sexual offenses, there is no corresponding
statute, nor any case law cited by Garcia, supporting his claim that lack of such evidence
may be considered in determining his guilt. Indeed, Garcia does not provide any case
law supporting his claim that such an instruction—which highlights the lack of evidence
presented on a certain topic—has been found permissible when the People chose not to
present certain evidence. Further, as correctly noted by the Attorney General, the
requested pinpoint instruction would conflict with the instruction in CALCRIM No. 300,
which was given to the jury, indicating that neither side is required to call all witnesses or
produce all evidence that might be relevant. Moreover, we find no merit to Garcia’s
claim that the refusal to give the pinpoint instruction somehow prohibited his counsel
from commenting on the People’s alleged failure to call logical witnesses, as counsel still
retained the ability to make such an argument as it related to the elements of the offenses
charged.

39
In conclusion, we find no error in the trial court’s denial of Garcia’s requested
pinpoint instruction.
F. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel for Failing to Call Character Witnesses
Garcia claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s
failure to call three character witnesses who had testified on his behalf at the first trial.
Garcia argues that because the focus of the trial was witness credibility, counsel’s
decision not to call the witnesses that could vouch for him constituted deficient
performance because it allowed the jury to dismiss his testimony as self-serving, and
therefore convict him. Garcia further contends that such deficient performance was
prejudicial to him because his previous trial had ended in a hung jury, while the second
trial resulted in a conviction, thus reflecting a reasonable probability that he may not have
been convicted if the witnesses testified.
1. Relevant Procedural Background
During the first jury trial, the defense called three of Garcia’s relatives as character
witnesses. Garcia’s nephew, G.A.7, testified that he had been around Garcia regularly
while Doe I and Doe II were present, and never observed Garcia touching them
inappropriately or acting in a way that would cause concern; he also never observed the
girls acting uncomfortable around Garcia. Garcia’s sister, M.G., testified that she met
Garcia, Doe I and Doe II on multiple occasions, and thought Garcia was an “exemplary
man” who took care of the girls like a father. M.G. never observed Garcia acting or
touching Doe I or Doe II inappropriately, and never observed him acting inappropriately
around her own daughter. Lastly, Garcia’s sister-in-law, A.G., testified that she had a
close relationship with Garcia and had been around him in the presence of children,
including Doe I and Doe II and her own daughters, and never observed him touching Doe

7 We refer to the character witnesses by their initials only to protect their personal
privacy interests pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(10), (11).

40
I and Doe II in an inappropriate way, acting in a manner that would cause her concern, or
saw either girl act uncomfortable around him. A.G. also never observed Garcia acting
inappropriately around her daughters or any other children, and indicated that if she had
any concerns about him molesting them, her children would not be allowed around him.
Prior to the second trial and during the parties’ discussions of their motions in
limine, defense counsel indicated that he did not plan to call any character witnesses,
including the relatives who had previously testified, and noted that “the first jury didn’t
like it.”
2. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
As discussed above, the standard for evaluating claims that counsel provided
constitutionally ineffective assistance is set forth in Strickland, supra, 466 U.S.at pp.
687–694, and provides that: “[t]o secure reversal … upon the ground of ineffective
assistance of counsel under either the state or federal Constitution, [an appellant] must
establish (1) that … counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, i.e., that counsel’s performance did not meet the standard to be expected
of a reasonably competent attorney, and (2) that there is a reasonable probability that
[appellant] would have obtained a more favorable result absent counsel’s shortcomings.”
(Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1003 ) “On direct appeal, a conviction will be
reversed for ineffective assistance only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel
had no rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was asked
for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there simply could be no satisfactory
explanation. All other claims of ineffective assistance are more appropriately resolved in
a habeas corpus proceeding.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.)
It is the appellant’s burden to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that
his or her counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. (See
In re Thomas (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1249, 1257.) “Unless [an appellant] establishes the
contrary, we shall presume that ‘counsel’s performance fell within the wide range of

41
professional competence and that counsel’s actions and inactions can be explained as a
matter of sound trial strategy.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641,
746.)
“To sustain a claim of inadequate representation by reason of failure to call a
witness, there must be a showing from which it can be determined whether the testimony
of the alleged additional defense witness was material, necessary, or admissible, or
that defense counsel did not exercise proper judgment in failing to call him [or her].
[Citation.]” (People v. Hill (1969) 70 Cal.2d 678, 690–691.) “Although ‘… the choice
of which, and how many, of potential witnesses [to call at trial] is precisely the type of
choice which should not be subject to review by an appellate court,’ [citation] trial
counsel must accept the burden of investigating the facts surrounding criminal charges
sufficient to make an informed decision. While ‘… we cannot presume prejudice from the
mere fact of counsel’s alleged inaction,’ [citation] reversal is compelled where appellant
can demonstrate he was denied an adjudication on potentially meritorious issues due to
counsel’s inadequate preparation. [Citation.]” (People v. Bess (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d
1053, 1060.)
3. Analysis
As to deficient performance, Garcia’s primary contention is that because the
previous trial, where the witnesses testified, resulted in a hung jury, there was no rational
basis for counsel’s decision not to call them in the instant trial to bolster his defense.
However, defense counsel specifically explained why he chose not to call them in the
instant trial, namely, that the first jury “didn’t like that.” Such a statement suggests that
counsel may have reasonably concluded that the evidence of Garcia’s good character at
the first trial was weakened by the close familial relationship between the witnesses and
Garcia. In addition, such witnesses are always subject to cross-examination, and counsel
could have reasonably determined that any benefits in calling these witnesses were
outweighed by the risks inherent in calling lay witnesses who could only provide limited

42
testimony on behalf of Garcia. Accordingly, we find that Garcia has not met his burden
of proof demonstrating there was no rational tactical purpose behind defense counsel’s
decision to not call the three character witnesses in the second trial.
Similarly, with regard to prejudice, as the Attorney General correctly notes, there
were other differences in the testimony between the two trials, apart from the character
witness testimony, that could have reasonably impacted the jury’s final decision in each
trial. For example, in the first trial, the alleged victims’ mother testified for the People,
and her testimony demonstrated a possibility that Doe II may have overheard Doe I
disclosing some of the alleged molestation incidents to their mother. Defense counsel
emphasized this point during his closing argument in claiming that Doe II’s allegations
were false and unreliable. Further, Sullivan did not testify in the first trial about Doe II’s
disclosure of the alleged molestation to her, which may have resulted in some of the jury
agreeing with defense counsel’s arguments about Doe II’s credibility and the subsequent
hung jury result. We therefore conclude that Garcia fails to affirmatively demonstrate
that but for defense counsel’s failure to call the character witnesses, he would have
achieved a more favorable result.
In conclusion, we find no merit to Garcia’s claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel.
G. Cumulative Error
Garcia argues that even if any errors identified in this case were individually
harmless, the cumulative prejudicial effect of all the errors rendered the trial so
fundamentally unfair as to deny his right to due process. “In theory, the aggregate
prejudice from several different errors occurring at trial could require reversal even if no
single error was prejudicial by itself.” (In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 483.) Here, we
have found no errors, and where we assumed error, we also found no prejudice.
Consequently, we reject Garcia’s cumulative error argument.

43
H. Imposition of Upper Term Sentence on Count 5
Garcia argues that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing an upper term
sentence on count 5. Garcia claims that the trial court mistakenly stated that all of the
aggravating factors supporting imposition of the upper term had been found true by the
jury, when only one such factor had been found true. While the Attorney General agrees
that not all of the aggravating factors had been found true, the Attorney General contends
the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
1. Relevant Procedural Background
At Garcia’s sentencing hearing on February 28, 2024, the court made the
following comments with respect to its sentence:
“Additional allegations and aggravators of more than one victim, taking advantage
of a position of trust, that the crimes involved sophistication and planning, and the
victims were particularly vulnerable, were all found to be true by the jury. The Court did
note that the defendant has no other criminal history, which is a factor in
mitigation. [¶] … [¶] The nature and circumstances of Count 5 is involving penetration,
and the fact that the defendant committed the act against a second victim, took advantage
of a position of trust, used sophistication and planning, and perpetrated the offenses
against a particularly vulnerable victim, justifies imposition of the upper term for Count
5, in my opinion.” The trial court therefore imposed the upper term of eight years on
count 5 (§ 289, subd. (j)).
2. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) states that when imposing a sentence under a
statute that allows for a low, middle, and high term, the court shall impose the middle
term unless “there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the
imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts underlying
those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true
beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.”

44
“A Sixth Amendment violation occurs when the trial court relies on unproven
aggravating facts to impose an upper term sentence, even if some other aggravating facts
relied on have been properly established. The violation is prejudicial unless an appellate
court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true all of the
aggravating facts relied upon by the trial court to justify an upper term sentence, or that
those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the current statutory
requirements. If the reviewing court cannot so determine, applying
the Chapman[8] standard of review, the defendant is entitled to a remand for
resentencing.” (People v. Lynch (2024)16 Cal.5th 730, 768 (Lynch).)
3. The Trial Court Erred in Stating that All of the Aggravating Factors Had
Been Found True by A Jury, Thus Requiring Reversal
Garcia contends, and the Attorney General concedes, that the trial court
erroneously stated that all of the aggravating factors had been found true by the jury. Our
review of the record confirms that this was indeed error, as the only aggravating factor
alleged, and found true by the jury, with respect to count 5 was that the victims were
particularly vulnerable. Although the jury did find the multiple victim allegation true, it
was as to the counts for lewd and lascivious conduct only. Accordingly, the aggravating
factors that the crimes involved sophistication and planning (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
4.421(a)(8)) and taking advantage of a position of trust (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
4.421(a)(11)) were not found true by the jury, and therefore were unproven.
The Attorney General argues that such an error was harmless because the jury
would have found both factors true beyond a reasonable doubt, based on the testimony
presented at trial. The Attorney General contends that Doe I’s testimony demonstrated
she loved and trusted Garcia, and considered him to be a father figure in her life who took
care of her; he therefore took advantage of this position of trust by digitally penetrating

8 See Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18.

45
her after putting her to bed. The Attorney General similarly argues that the testimony
indicated Garcia waited until the victims’ mother had left, and he was alone with Doe I,
to engage in the offense, thus demonstrating advance planning.
While we would tend to agree that the testimony established Garcia took
advantage of a position of trust, we cannot make the same conclusion regarding the
degree of sophistication and planning. As cautioned by the California Supreme Court in
Lynch, “ ‘ “[t]o the extent a potential aggravating circumstance at issue in a particular
case rests on a somewhat vague or subjective standard, it may be difficult for a reviewing
court to conclude with confidence that, had the issue been submitted to the jury, the jury
would have assessed the facts in the same manner as did the trial court.” ’ ” (Lynch,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 775.) We find that to be applicable here, as the determination of
whether the crime involved sophistication and planning rests on a vague and subjective
standard. Accordingly, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury
would have found true the two remaining aggravating factors upon which the court relied
to conclude the upper term was justified. We therefore reverse the sentence on count 5
and remand for the trial court to hold a new sentencing hearing during which it shall only
consider aggravating factors that were found true by the jury as part of its analysis of
whether to impose an upper term sentence.
I. Imposition of Restitution Fine
Garcia finally claims that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a
$20,000 restitution fine and additional court fees without first assessing his ability to
those fees, despite his request at sentencing that the court stay such fines and fees based
on his inability to pay. In initial briefing, the Attorney General opposed the request.
After the parties submitted their initial briefing, the California Supreme Court
issued its decision in People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1 (Kopp). The decision in Kopp
held, among other things, that: (1) where a trial court imposes fines exceeding the
statutory minimum of $300 under section 1202.4, subdivision (b), and section 1202.45, it

46
must consider the defendant’s ability to pay; and (2) before imposing ancillary costs
pursuant to section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1) and Government Code section 70373, equal
protection principles require the trial court to, on defendant’s request, consider a
defendant’s inability to pay such costs. (Kopp, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 30.) We therefore
requested supplemental briefing from the parties on whether the matter should be
remanded to address fines and fees in light of Kopp. In their supplemental briefing
letters, both parties agreed that remand was appropriate to address Garcia’s ability to pay
the ancillary costs, but differed as to whether the court should readdress the restitution
fine on remand.
As we are remanding for resentencing on count 5, we also direct the court to
reassess the restitution fines and ancillary fees in accordance with the holding in Kopp.
We express no opinion on whether Garcia is entitled to a reduction in fines and fees.
III. DISPOSITION
Garcia’s sentence is vacated, and the matter is remanded for resentencing. On
remand, the trial court may also determine the applicable fines and fees based on Garcia’s
ability to pay, as set forth in Kopp, supra, 19 Cal.5th 1, and if necessary, reduce the fines
in accordance with the governing statutes. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

47
___________________________________
Wilson, J.

WE CONCUR:

__________________________________________
Grover, Acting P. J.

__________________________________________
Lie, J.

People v. Garcia
H051911

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