CourtListener 10863531•People v. Wright CA1/3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 5/22/26 P. v. Wright CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A173343
v.
VINCENT RASHAD LAMAR (San Mateo County
WRIGHT, Super. Ct. No. 21-SF-004342-A)
Defendant and Appellant.
Vincent Rashad Lamar Wright pled no contest to driving under the
influence of a drug causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (f)) and
admitted a great bodily injury (GBI) enhancement and a prior strike
pursuant to a plea agreement with a maximum seven-year prison sentence.
The court announced it was imposing a seven-year total sentence. In so
doing, the court referred to the base term as the “low term” of two years,
when two years was the middle term.
On appeal, Wright asserts the trial court erred by denying his motion
under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero) to
dismiss the prior strike. We disagree and conclude the court did not abuse its
discretion in denying the Romero motion.
Wright further contends the court erred when pronouncing the “low”
term sentence as two years. As it is unclear whether the court intended to
1
impose as the base term the low term of 16 months or the middle term of two
years, we remand for the court to clarify its intended sentence, as well as to
correct a clerical error in the abstract of judgment. In all other respects, the
judgment is affirmed.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In July 2020 in Redwood City, Wright was driving a commercial truck
that belonged to his employer. He was driving in the wrong direction and at
a high rate of speed when he collided head-on with a vehicle driven by Karen
S. 1 Karen sustained numerous injuries and was transported to the hospital.
Wright admitted to responding police officers that he had taken
methamphetamine just hours before the collision, and he later tested positive
for methamphetamine.
Charges and No Contest Plea
In 2021, Wright was charged by felony information with one count of
driving under the influence of a drug causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153,
subd. (f); count 1), one count of driving and taking a vehicle without consent
(id., § 10851, subd. (a); count 2), and one count of reckless driving causing
injury (id., § 23105, subd. (a); count 3). The information alleged as to count 1
that Wright personally inflicted GBI on Karen (Pen. Code, § 12022.7,
subd. (a); statutory references are to this code unless otherwise indicated),
had two or more prior serious and/or violent felony strike convictions (§ 667,
subd. (a)(1)), had three prior convictions (§ 1203, subd. (e)(4)), and that
count 1 was itself a serious and/or violent felony.
1 To protect personal privacy interests, we refer to the victim in this
case by first name and last initial, and thereafter by first name only. No
disrespect is intended. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4).)
2
On November 8, 2024, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement,
Wright pled no contest to count 1 (driving under the influence of a drug
causing injury), admitted the GBI enhancement, and admitted one prior
serious felony strike conviction. In exchange, the plea agreement provided
for the dismissal of the other two counts, a stay of the five-year enhancement
under section 667, subdivision (a)(1) for the prior serious felony conviction,
and a total sentence of up to seven years in prison. The plea agreement also
provided the court would consider a Romero motion—but the court “ma[d]e no
promises” as to how it would rule on the motion.
Sentencing Hearing
At the March 24, 2025 sentencing hearing, Karen read a detailed
victim impact statement to the court. Karen described her terrifying
experience of seeing Wright barreling toward her head-on in a large
commercial truck and violently crashing into her, as well as facing “the most
terrible moments” of her life when she came to after the crash and was
trapped in her car with broken bones. Karen detailed the resulting
permanent and life-changing injuries throughout her body, the numerous
surgeries and recoveries she underwent and would continue to require, as
well as the chronic pain, limited mobility, traumatic brain injury, and post-
traumatic stress disorder she expected to experience for the rest of her life.
The crash also negatively affected her family in multiple ways and caused
significant financial difficulties.
The court considered Wright’s actions, his history, and what he had
done since the incident when deciding the sentence and whether to grant the
Romero motion to dismiss his prior strike. The court pronounced the
sentence as follows: “[P]robation is denied based on those factors. It’s the low
term, two years, in the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. I am
3
denying the Romero. That sentence is doubled to a total of four years . . . . [¶]
I’m adding three years for the [section] 12022.7 [GBI enhancement], for a
total of seven years commitment . . . .”
The abstract of judgment reflects the court’s oral pronouncement,
indicating the total term is seven years, 2 comprised of a base term of two
years—which it refers to as the low term—doubled to four years (§ 667,
subd. (e)(1)), plus three years for the GBI enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)),
with the five-year enhancement for the prior serious felony conviction (§ 667,
subd. (a)) stayed.
Wright filed a notice of appeal, checking the box on the Judicial Council
form stating: “This appeal is based on the sentence or other matters occurring
after the plea that do not affect the validity of the plea.” No certificate of
probable cause was requested or issued in this case.
DISCUSSION
Wright argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying his
Romero motion and erred when imposing the sentence of “the low term, two
years” as the low term for the offense is 16 months. The Attorney General
contends Wright cannot raise those issues on appeal because he did not
obtain a certificate of probable cause and that they fail on the merits.
For the reasons we explain, we conclude a certificate of probable cause
is not required and the trial court did not err in denying the Romero motion.
However, as the record is unclear as to what base term the court intended to
impose, we remand for clarification of the sentence.
2 The abstract of judgment mistakenly refers to the total term as an
indeterminate term of “7 YTL”; the court did not impose an indeterminate
term, and the maximum term permitted by the agreement was a determinate
term of seven years. We address this clerical error in part III, post.
4
I. No Certificate of Probable Cause Is Required
Section 1237.5 provides a defendant may not appeal from a guilty or no
contest plea without a certificate of probable cause for an appeal based on
reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds going to the
legality of the proceedings. Even without a certificate of probable cause, a
defendant may nonetheless appeal issues related to post-plea matters, such
as the sentence, that do not challenge the plea’s validity. (People v. Stamps
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 685, 694; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(2)(B).)
However, “ ‘[e]ven when a defendant purports to challenge only the
sentence imposed, a certificate . . . is required if the challenge goes to an
aspect of the sentence to which the defendant agreed as an integral part of a
plea agreement,’ ” as such a claim is, “ ‘in substance[,] a challenge to the
validity of the plea.’ ” (People v. Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 694, italics
omitted.) Thus, where a defendant enters a negotiated plea in which the
parties agree the court will impose a specific, agreed-upon sentence, any
challenge to that sentence is a challenge to the validity of the plea and
requires a certificate of probable cause. (People v. Hurlic (2018) 25
Cal.App.5th 50, 55; accord, People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 79.)
By contrast, “a certificate of probable cause is not required to challenge
the exercise of individualized sentencing discretion within an agreed
maximum sentence,” absent contrary provisions in the plea agreement
(People v. Buttram (2003) 30 Cal.4th 773, 790), as long as the defendant is
not challenging the trial court’s authority to impose a sentence within a
negotiated “lid” or maximum (People v. Shelton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 759, 763).
In this case, no certificate of probable cause is required because the
issues Wright seeks to raise concern the court’s denial of his Romero motion
and the court’s choice “from among a range of permissible sentences within
5
the maximum” of seven years that was agreed upon, both of which are
challenges to the court’s post-plea exercise of its sentencing discretion
reserved under the plea agreement. (People v. Buttram, supra, 30 Cal.4th at
pp. 790–791, 777, 786–787; People v. Cole (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 850, 872 [no
certificate of probable cause needed to challenge failure to strike prior
strike].) We therefore turn to the merits of each claim.
II. Denial of Romero Motion Was Not Abuse of Discretion
We review the court’s refusal to dismiss a prior strike under the
deferential abuse of discretion standard. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33
Cal.4th 367, 374 (Carmony).) Under that standard, a defendant must show
the trial court’s decision was “so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable
person could agree with it.” (Id. at pp. 376–377.) We find no such abuse of
discretion here.
The “three strikes” law is intended “to ensure longer prison sentences
and greater punishment for those who commit a felony and have been
previously convicted of one or more serious or violent felony offenses.” (§ 667,
subd. (b).) Although a trial court may dismiss a prior felony strike when
dismissal is “in furtherance of justice,” its discretion to do so is limited.
(§ 1385, subd. (a); Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 529–530.)
The standard for dismissing a prior strike under section 1385 is
“stringent” and the circumstances must be “ ‘extraordinary . . . by which a
career criminal can be deemed to fall outside the spirit of’ ” the law.
(Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 377–378.) This is because the three
strikes law “establishes a sentencing norm” and “carefully circumscribes the
trial court’s power to depart from this norm.” (Id. at p. 378.) A court must
explicitly justify any decision to depart from the norm, thereby creating “a
6
strong presumption that any sentence that conforms to these sentencing
norms is both rational and proper.” (Ibid.)
When determining whether to dismiss a prior strike, the court must
consider the constitutional rights of the defendant, including guarantees
against disproportionate punishment, as well as the interests of society,
which include the fair prosecution of properly charged crimes. (People v.
Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 160 (Williams).) The court “must consider
whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies and
prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his
background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside
the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as
though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or
violent felonies.” (Id. at p. 161.)
A. Additional Relevant Facts
At sentencing, Wright’s counsel asked the court to suspend any
sentence imposed to allow Wright to continue with a residential addiction
treatment program he had begun 60 days earlier. Counsel acknowledged
Wright’s getting treatment was “late in coming” but argued he was
committed to completing the residential program in six months and then
spending two years in a sober living environment. Counsel asserted Wright
had gained insight into the damage he had caused and that it would be easier
to monitor Wright’s progress and keep him accountable outside of prison.
The prosecution requested the court impose the seven-year maximum
sentence under the plea agreement. The prosecution cited Wright’s criminal
history, his use of alcohol and marijuana as recently as 2024, his failure to
attend rehabilitation until just before sentencing, and the impact on Karen.
7
It further argued any mitigation had been accounted for by the agreement to
stay the five-year section 667, subdivision (a) enhancement.
The court considered numerous factors related to the offense and
Wright’s history when deciding to deny the Romero motion. The court
highlighted the seriousness of the offense conduct, which resulted in the
“worst-case scenario . . . but for [Karen] dying” as her life would never be the
same and she was going to be in pain for the rest of her life. Meanwhile,
Wright was going to be able to walk normally and be pain-free. Though
Wright was aware he had “ruined” Karen’s life and the court believed he was
sorry, that was not enough.
Wright’s prior history showed a pattern of reckless and violent behavior
that he minimized. For example, Wright took part in a violent robbery in
2005 during which the victim was brought to the ground, punched, and
kicked while Wright covered her mouth as she was screaming for help and
stole money from her. Wright claimed he did not do anything and was
merely there for the robbery after hanging out with friends and drinking.
Two years later, Wright committed grand theft and was sentenced to three
years in prison. He was paroled on that offense and then was convicted of
robbery, for which he received a 13-year prison sentence. Also, Wright was
on parole when he committed the offense conduct in this case.
Regarding Wright’s conduct since the incident, Wright had the
opportunity to show how much he had realized and done “to truly be sorry”
for his actions because he spent only one day in custody and had otherwise
been out of custody since 2020, but in all that time he “did absolutely
nothing.” Though he had entered a residential treatment program recently,
he waited until he was “facing down the barrel of seven years” in prison to
start the program despite having had almost five years to do so. The court
8
could not say the timing was not suspicious and did not know if it was for the
right reasons.
The court was “willing to take a look at [Wright’s] history and what [he
had] done” but found it disappointing, particularly because Wright lacked
accountability for his actions. The court then denied the Romero motion. 3
B. Analysis
The trial court acted within its discretion when denying the Romero
motion. The court described why dismissal of the prior strike was not
warranted after detailing numerous proper considerations relevant to
whether Wright may be deemed outside the spirit of the three strikes law.
(See Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 161.)
Specifically, the court explained that the nature of the present felony
involved ruining the life of a blameless person, who would have to endure
lifelong complications because of Wright’s actions. The court also described
Wright’s violent criminal history, including the nature of the robbery in
which he covered the victim’s mouth while she cried out, his subsequent
grand theft and robbery violations, and his repeated commission of offenses
while on parole. The court found Wright downplayed his history and failed to
take accountability for his past conduct. After considering these
circumstances, the court was well within its discretion to conclude Wright did
3 The Attorney General contends Wright forfeited his challenge to the
denial of the Romero motion by failing to object after the court denied it. We
are not convinced that, even after expressly reserving the right to seek
dismissal of his prior strike under the negotiated plea agreement, and after
the court laid out its reasons for declining to do so, Wright was required to
expressly object to preserve the issue for appeal. (Cf. Carmony, supra, 33
Cal.4th at pp. 375–376 [failure to seek dismissal of prior strike before trial
court forfeits right to raise the issue on appeal].)
9
not meet the “stringent” standard for dismissing the prior strike. (Carmony,
supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377.)
Wright nonetheless asserts the court abused its discretion by failing to
consider that: the instant offense was precipitated by his untreated addiction
and depression; Karen took no position on a sentence; he experienced
significant hardship growing up; his prior offenses did not show he was a
“ ‘revolving door’ criminal” and did not involve weapons, sexual misconduct,
serious assault, or repeated domestic violence; all of his prior offense conduct
occurred over 15 years before sentencing, when he was between the ages of 18
and 21; and he had made progress since his youth, including accepting
responsibility for the instant offense and entering rehabilitation.
Nothing in the record demonstrates the court improperly failed to
account for the mitigating circumstances in this case. It was not improper for
the court to conclude that, when weighed against the other factors already
discussed, these mitigating factors did not rise to the “ ‘extraordinary’ ” level
under which Wright could be deemed to fall outside the spirit of the law.
(Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.)
Wright further argues the court erroneously considered his delay in
entering rehabilitation and speculated as to his motivations for doing so to
justify disregarding his participation in treatment. We find no abuse of
discretion in the court’s references to Wright’s recent engagement with
rehabilitation, which it discussed in the context of analyzing whether Wright
had taken advantage of the many years he had been out of custody since the
offense conduct to demonstrate remorse for his actions and his ability to
rehabilitate successfully. (See Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 161 [court
must consider circumstances of present offense and particulars of defendant’s
prospects in deciding Romero motion].)
10
Finally, we are unpersuaded by Wright’s assertion that the court
“improperly relied on the irrelevant factor of its own decision to deny
probation” when denying the Romero motion. Wright relies on the court’s
statement that it considered various factors when deciding “whether or not to
strike your strike and give you a sentence that you want which is a
residential treatment program” to argue the court failed to recognize it could
grant the Romero motion and still deny his requested sentence. The record
does not show the court failed to recognize its discretion to do so, but rather
that it found neither dismissal of the prior strike nor a grant of probation was
warranted here.
In sum, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Romero
motion.
III. Remand for Clarification of Sentence Imposed Is Warranted
Wright contends the court’s pronouncement of sentence was erroneous
because the court stated it was imposing “the low term, two years,” which is
also reflected in the abstract of judgment, but the low term for his offense is
16 months. He avers we should correct the judgment to reflect the low base
term of 16 months or remand for the court to clarify its intended sentence.
The applicable sentencing triad for a first offense of driving under the
influence of a drug causing injury is 16 months for the low term, two years for
the middle term, and three years for the upper term. (See § 1170, subd. (h)(1)
[standard triad is 16 months, two years, or three years]; Veh. Code, § 23554
[first offense punishable by standard triad]; see also Veh. Code, § 23153
[stating no otherwise applicable triad].)
We are not persuaded by the Attorney General’s argument that the
court “made abundantly clear that it intended to impose the maximum
sentence permissible” of seven years. Although the court stated it was
11
imposing a seven-year sentence, it is also possible such a sentence was
premised on a misinterpretation of the applicable low term. And, contrary to
the Attorney General’s contention, we are not convinced that the court merely
“mislabeled” the base term as the low term or that it was only a “misnomer.”
Rather, the sentencing transcript and the abstract of judgment both contain
contradictory references to both the low term and two years; both cannot be
true at the same time.
While the Attorney General contends this issue is forfeited, we decline
to find forfeiture where it is not clear what sentence the court intended to
impose. In the interests of justice, we remand solely for the court to specify
its intended sentence. On remand, the trial court is instructed to modify the
abstract of judgment to reflect the sentence it intended to impose at
sentencing and refer to either the low base term of 16 months, or the middle
base term of two years. If the court intended to impose the low term of 16
months, it must modify the total sentence imposed accordingly. Finally, in
either case, the court must modify the abstract of judgment to remove the
clerical error referring to “YTL” under the “TOTAL TIME” as we agree with
the parties that the court did not, and could not, impose an indeterminate
term of seven years to life under the terms of the plea agreement.
However, we stress that, if the court indeed intended to impose the
seven-year total sentence based on the middle term of two years, doing so was
not an abuse of the court’s discretion considering the relevant sentencing
factors considered by the court and discussed in part II, ante. (See People v.
Sarmiento-Zuniga (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 1216, 1226 [trial court does not
abuse its discretion by imposing the presumptive middle term rather than
the low term where the court sets forth on the record the facts and reasons
for choosing the sentence imposed at time of sentencing, and that decision
12
does not fall outside the bounds of reason under applicable law and relevant
facts].) 4 A sentence based on the low term of 16 months would also not be an
abuse of the court’s sentencing discretion.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the trial court’s denial of the Romero motion. We remand for
the court to clarify whether it intended to impose the low term of 16 months
or the middle term of two years, and to modify the abstract of judgment
accordingly, as well as to remove any reference to “YTL.” In all other
respects, the judgment is affirmed.
4 To the extent Wright argues the court “impliedly found” the
presumption for a low term applied in this case under section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6), we disagree given the ambiguity surrounding the court’s
imposition of sentence. Further, any argument that the court erred by failing
to expressly address the applicability of that statute is forfeited by Wright’s
failure to raise it in his briefs or to request remand on that basis. (See Allen
v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52 [issues not supported by
reasoned legal argument and citation to authority may be treated as
forfeited]; People v. Nielsen (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 816, 828 [declining to find
that “a trial court’s failure to make express findings under section 1170[,
subdivision ](b)(6) requires remand regardless of whether the record
affirmatively demonstrates that the trial court misunderstood the scope of its
sentencing discretion” under that statute where appellant “has not squarely
asked” the appellate court to do so].)
13
PETROU, J.
WE CONCUR:
TUCHER, P. J.
FUJISAKI, J.
A173343 / People v. Wright
14
Was bedeutet dieser Text für Ihre Situation?
Kostenlose und unverbindliche Beratung
Schildern Sie uns Ihre Situation. Unser Team meldet sich per E-Mail bei Ihnen für Ihre Beratung.
Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort
Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.