CourtListener 10863458•People v. Garcia CA2/5
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 5/22/26 P. v. Garcia CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B340824
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA028283)
v.
RICHARD ANTHONY
GARCIA,
Defendant and
Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Jacqueline Lewis, Judge. Affirmed with
modifications.
Joanna Rehm, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Jason Tran, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Blake R. Armstrong and Taylor T.
Nguyen, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
******
Richard Garcia (defendant) received a full resentencing in
September 2024 pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.75. 1 On
appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred (1) in not
dismissing any of his prior “strike” convictions or a five-year
enhancement for having a prior serious felony conviction, and (2)
in imposing certain fines, fees and assessments. Although we
agree with defendant and the People that the court erred in
imposing the fines, fees and assessments, the trial court did not
otherwise abuse its discretion during the resentencing. We
accordingly affirm with directions.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
A. Underlying crime
While in a courthouse holding cell in May of 1994 awaiting
a court appearance on robbery and attempted robbery charges,
defendant and another inmate beat up a fellow inmate and took
his shoes.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
2
B. Charges, conviction and sentence
The People charged defendant with robbery (§ 211). The
People also alleged that each of defendant’s two 1990 convictions
for robbery constituted a “strike” within the meaning of our
Three Strikes Law (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667, subds. (b)-(j)),
that one of those robbery convictions constituted a prior serious
felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and that defendant had
served a prior prison term for a 1992 felony conviction for petty
theft with a prior (§ 666, 667.5, subd. (b)).
A jury convicted defendant of the robbery count, and the
trial court found true the allegations regarding defendant’s prior
convictions.
In 1996, the trial court sentenced defendant to a prison
term of 31 years, comprised of a base sentence of 25 years to life
(as a third strike), plus five years for the prior serious felony
enhancement, plus one year for the prior prison term
enhancement.
We affirmed the judgment and sentence in an unpublished
opinion, rejecting defendant’s argument that his two 1990
robbery convictions constituted a single strike because they had
been charged together in a single case. (People v. Garcia et al.
(July 10, 1997, B105618) [nonpub. opn.].)
II. Procedural Background
In December 2023, defendant filed a petition pursuant to
Senate Bill No. 483 (Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3; Stats. 2022, ch. 58,
§ 12)—which is now codified at section 1172.75—seeking a full
resentencing, and asking the trial court to dismiss the (1) one-
year prior prison term enhancement, and (2) five-year serious
felony enhancement; defendant did not request that any of his
prior “strike” convictions be dismissed. To his petition, defendant
3
attached documentation in support of his argument that he had
“made a concerted effort to rehabilitate himself.”
The People filed two responses. In its initial response, the
People agreed that the trial court should resentence defendant
and dismiss the one-year prior prison term enhancement, but
opposed dismissal of the five-year serious felony enhancement.
Attached to that response was documentation detailing
defendant’s 25 prison rule violations while in custody for this
offense. Those infractions included: (1) a 2023 rule violation for
possessing a deadly weapon (namely, a sharpened piece of metal);
(2) a 2022 rule violation for fighting; (3) a 2019 rule violation for
assaulting a peace officer; (4) a 2018 rule violation for fighting;
(5) a 2016 rule violation for participating in a riot; (6) a 2012 rule
violation for fighting resulting in the use of force; (7) a 2010 rule
violation for fighting resulting in the use of force; (8) a 2009 rule
violation for fighting resulting in the use of force; and (9) a 2008
rule violation for fighting. In its supplemental response, the
People argued that defendant was ineligible to have his third-
strike base sentence reconsidered under the Three Strikes
Reform Act (§ 1170.126) due to the then-recent decision in People
v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 978, review
granted Mar. 12, 2024, S283305 (Guevara I).
The trial court convened a hearing over two days in
September 2024 to consider defendant’s petition for resentencing
under section 1172.75. 2
Defendant called two witnesses—himself and another
inmate—to testify that defendant’s 2023 rule violation for
possessing a deadly weapon was unjustified because the other
2 The court also convened a Franklin hearing, but that is not
at issue in this appeal.
4
inmate had merely tossed the sharpened metal object into
defendant’s cell.
In making its oral ruling, the court started by remarking
that defendant was “entitled to a full resentencing.” Although
defendant did not in his petition challenge the 25-year base
sentence under the Three Strikes Law, the court reaffirmed that
base sentence. The court explained that, in light of Guevara I,
defendant was “legally ineligible” for resentencing under the
Three Strikes Reform Act. The court further explained that, even
if Guevara I “didn’t exist,” it would still not dismiss any of
defendant’s prior strike convictions because “this case falls
squarely within the spirit of the Three Strikes Law” and that
“nothing [defendant] has done subsequent to [his conviction]—in
fact, just the opposite—would indicate that those strikes should
be stricken.” The court then turned to assessing whether to
dismiss the five-year prior serious felony enhancement. The
court noted that defendant had “done a few [positive] things
while he [was] incarcerated,” “[b]ut” that those positives did not
“begin[] to weigh against what has otherwise happened while he
was incarcerated” (and, more specifically, defendant’s many
prison rule violations involving violence). The court rejected as
not credible the testimony defendant and his fellow inmate
offered downplaying defendant’s guilt of the 2023 deadly weapon
possession violation, finding it to be wholly inconsistent with
defendant’s plea to that very same rule violation. The court
accordingly found that it was not “in the interest of justice” to
dismiss the five-year enhancement. The court then dismissed the
one-year prior prison term enhancement, and resentenced
defendant to a prison term of 30 years. The court also imposed a
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$200 restitution fine, a $40 court operation assessment, and a
$30 criminal conviction fee.
Defendant timely filed this appeal.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in
imposing a 30-year prison sentence during the resentencing
hearing and in imposing the $200 restitution fine, the $40 court
operation assessment, and the $30 criminal conviction fee. The
People concede—and we accept the concession—that the court’s
imposition of the fine, assessment and fee was error because a
restitution fine cannot be re-imposed more than 10 years after
initially imposed (§ 1465.9, subd. (d) [setting a 10-year limit as to
“the date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to Section
1202.4”]; accord, People v. Salstrom (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 596,
601, review granted Mar. 11, 2026, S295038), and because the
assessment and fee did not become law until after defendant’s
1996 sentencing (People v. Alford (2007) 42 Cal.4th 749, 754
[applying section 1465.8 only to convictions imposed “after its
operative date”]; Stats. 2003, ch. 159, § 25 [Section 1465.8 became
effective on August 17, 2003]; People v. Davis (2010) 185
Cal.App.4th 998, 1000-1001 [applying Government Code section
70373 only to convictions after its effective date]; Stats. 2008, ch.
311, § 6.5 [Government Code section 70373 became effective on
January 1, 2009]). We accordingly turn to defendant’s challenges
to the newly imposed sentence—namely, that the court erred in
not dismissing any of his strike convictions and in re-imposing
the prior felony conviction enhancement.
Where, as here, a defendant was originally sentenced for a
prior prison term enhancement that arose from a conviction that
was not a “sexually violent offense,” that defendant is entitled to
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a “full resentencing” where that enhancement is to be stricken
and where the trial court is to “apply any other changes in law
that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to
eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of
sentencing.” (§§ 1172.75, subds. (c), (d)(1)-(2), 667.5, subd. (b);
People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025) 18 Cal.5th 838, 875
(Guevara II) [“section 1172.75 by its express terms . . . provide[s]
for a full resentencing”].)
I. Error Not to Dismiss Prior “Strike” Allegations 3
Defendant appears to argue that the trial court erred in not
considering whether to dismiss any of his prior “strike”
convictions when imposing his 25-year base sentence under the
Three Strikes Law.
As a threshold matter, defendant has forfeited this
argument because, as he acknowledges on appeal, he never asked
the trial court to dismiss any of his prior “strike” convictions.
This constitutes a forfeiture. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33
Cal.4th 367, 375-376 (Carmony) [“any failure on the part of a
defendant to invite the court to dismiss [strike allegations] under
3 In this appeal, we consider only the arguments defendant
presents in his opening brief. In his reply brief, he argues that
People v. Shaw (2025) 18 Cal.5th 1089, which was issued after
his opening brief, entitles him to have his two prior “strike”
convictions treated as a single “strike” (rather than as two
“strikes”). Because defendant, as noted in the text, never asked
the trial court to dismiss any of his “strike” offenses and because
defendant has filed a habeas petition addressing this issue and
relying on documents outside the record in this appeal, we
confine our analysis to the issues properly in this appeal and
without prejudice to litigation of the Shaw issue in the separate
habeas proceedings. For the same reasons, we have declined to
consolidate this appeal with the pending habeas petition.
7
section 1385 . . . waives or forfeits his or her right to raise the
issue on appeal”].) Recognizing the forfeiture, defendant implies
that his trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective
assistance by failing to ask for the dismissal of his strike
convictions. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must show that counsel’s performance was both (1)
deficient and (2) prejudicial. (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th
986, 1009.) Even if we assume for the sake of argument that
counsel’s failure to ask was deficient, we know that this failure
was not prejudicial because the trial court on its own determined
that it would not dismiss any of defendant’s “strike” allegations
because he “falls squarely within the spirit of the Three Strikes
Law.” That is precisely the test a trial court is to apply in
exercising its discretion whether to dismiss a “strike” conviction.
(Carmony, at p. 377; People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148,
161.) Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in determining
that defendant fell within the spirit of the Three Strikes Law.
(Carmony, at p. 374.) This determination is made after
examining the “nature and circumstances of [the defendant’s]
present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony
convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and
prospects.” (Id. at p. 377.) Here, the trial court noted that
defendant was “out on parole” when he robbed the inmate, that
his “prior robber[y convictions] were committed within a short
period of time” before that offense, and that defendant’s modest
rehabilitative efforts were outweighed by his extensive record of
violent and disobedient behavior while incarcerated.
Defendant makes what boil down to two arguments in
response.
8
First, he asserts that the trial court’s reference to his
“legal[] ineligib[ility]” to being resentenced meant that the court
did not actually exercise its discretion whether to dismiss his
strike convictions. We reject this assertion because it ignores the
context in which the court found defendant “legally ineligible” for
resentencing—namely, legally ineligible under the Three Strikes
Reform Act. (Tellingly, that is a contention defendant does not
dispute on appeal.) We also reject this assertion because the trial
court went on to hold, in the alternative, that defendant fell
within the spirit of the Three Strikes Law. Defendant urges that
a trial court’s findings in any alternative holding reflect a
“unintentional psychological bias[] and pitfall[]” that entitle those
alternative findings to no weight. This argument is silly, as
courts routinely make findings in the alternative, and we decline
to hold that, in so doing, any alternative holding is implicitly
tainted.
Second, defendant argues that the trial court did not
explicitly consider his youth at the time of the crime (he was 19).
While youth can be a relevant factor in assessing whether to
dismiss a strike conviction (as part of the defendant’s
“background”) (e.g., People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1134,
1141-1142), defendant argued that he was a “youthful offender”
at the time of his underlying conviction and the trial court in no
way indicated that it was not considering his youth—and, indeed,
the court was simultaneously holding a Franklin hearing that is
premised on his relative youth. In the absence of any evidence
that the court was not applying the law correctly, we must
assume from the court’s silence that the court understood and
applied the correct law. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2
Cal.3d 557, 564; Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378; People v.
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Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310; see generally People v.
Large (2007) 41 Cal.4th 538, 550 [a trial court is not required to
“explain its reasons” for “declin[ing] to strike” a “strike”
conviction].) We decline defendant’s invitation to presume error
from silence.
II. Error Not to Strike Five-Year Serious Felony
Enhancement
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in not
dismissing the five-year serious felony enhancement.
As in effect in 2024, section 1385 granted trial courts “the
authority” and a simultaneous duty “to strike or dismiss [a
sentencing] enhancement” (or, if they prefer, the “additional
punishment for th[e] enhancement”) if doing so is “in the
furtherance of justice.” (§ 1385, subds. (b) & (c)(1).) Although
this provision makes clear that whether a dismissal of an
enhancement is “in the furtherance of justice” is a
“discretion[ary]” call for the trial court to make (id., subd. (c)(1)-
(3)), the provision also directs that the existence of any of nine
enumerated “mitigating circumstances” “weighs greatly in favor
of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that [the]
dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety” (id.,
subd. (c)(2)). In People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, our
Supreme Court rejected the notion that the presence of an
enumerated mitigating circumstance erects a rebuttable
presumption in favor of dismissing an enhancement that can be
rebutted only by a showing that dismissal would endanger public
safety. (Walker, at pp. 1028-1029.) Instead, Walker held that,
even when a court determines that dismissing an enhancement
will not endanger public safety, the court retains discretion not to
dismiss or strike that enhancement. In exercising that
10
discretion, the court is to “assign[] significant value” to any
mitigating circumstance(s), which “strongly favor[s]” and “will
generally result in the dismissal of an enhancement”—except
when the “court finds substantial, credible evidence of
countervailing factors that ‘may nonetheless neutralize even the
great weight of the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal
of the enhancement is not in [the] furtherance of justice.’” (Id. at
pp. 1029, 1036.) We review the exercise of discretion under
section 1385, subdivision (c) for an abuse of discretion. (People v.
Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 225.)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to
strike the five-year prior serious felony enhancement. To be sure,
one of section 1385’s “mitigating circumstances” is present here—
namely, that the “enhancement is based on a prior conviction
that is over five years old” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(H)) because the
robbery conviction supporting the enhancement at issue was
sustained in 1990. 4 Even though this mitigating circumstance
“weighs greatly in favor of dismiss[al]” of the enhancement (id.,
subd. (c)(2)), the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
declining to dismiss the enhancement here because the court
explicitly found that it would not be in the “interest of justice” to
dismiss the enhancement given defendant’s demonstrated,
4 Defendant argues that a second mitigating circumstance is
present—namely, that “[t]he application of [the] enhancement
could result in a sentence of over 20 years.” (§ 1385, subd.
(c)(2)(C).) Because defendant’s sentence exceeds 20 years by
virtue of the 25-year, third strike base sentence alone, however,
the five year prior serious felony enhancement would not be what
causes his sentence to exceed 25 years. In such a context, this
mitigating circumstance does not apply. (People v. Torres (2025)
113 Cal.App.5th 88, 93.)
11
longstanding, persistent and recent record of violent and rule-
breaking conduct while in custody. Whether the court’s ruling
constitutes an implicit finding that releasing defendant would
endanger public safety or instead a finding, in the exercise of the
court’s residual discretion, that dismissal would not be in the
furtherance of justice, the court did not abuse its discretion in
making that finding.
Defendant resists this conclusion with two arguments.
First, defendant argues that the court did not explicitly
indicate that it was giving “great weight” to the age of his prior
serious felony conviction. This is true, but, as noted above, there
is nothing to indicate that the trial court misunderstood or
misapplied the framework for evaluating requests to dismiss
enhancements under section 1385, subdivision (c). Contrary to
what defendant suggests, we must presume competence, not
incompetence, from a court’s silence. For much the same reason,
we reject defendant’s related contention that the court did not
consider his relative youth in exercising its discretion. (Cf.
Guevara II, supra, 115 Cal.App.5th at p. 930 [ruling that “youth”
is relevant to the exercise of discretion under section 1385].)
Second, defendant complains that the trial court
undervalued his rehabilitative efforts and overvalued the
evidence of his continued violent conduct while in custody, and
urges us to treat his rule violations as less concerning because
most of them did not involve weapons or injury. These
arguments essentially ask us to weigh the evidence differently
and to substitute our evaluation for the trial court’s, but that is
beyond our purview when evaluating a ruling for an abuse of
discretion. (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377.)
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DISPOSITION
The trial court is directed to strike the $200 restitution
fine, the $40 court operation assessment, and the $30 criminal
conviction fee. The trial court shall then forward a certified copy
of the amended abstract of judgment to the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other respects, the
judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
______________________, P.J.
HOFFSTADT
We concur:
_________________________, J.
MOOR
_________________________, J.
KIM (D.)
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