CourtListener 10863051•People v. Angle CA4
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 5/21/26 P. v. Angle CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D085018
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. INF1900061)
JAMES JOHN ANGLE III,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Rene Navarro, Judge. Affirmed.
Jennifer A. Gambale, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Stephanie
H. Chow and Seth M. Friedman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
A jury rejected James John Angle’s claim of self-defense and convicted
him of first degree murder (Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a)) and being a felon in
possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)). As to the murder count, it
found true that Angle personally discharged a firearm causing death (§
12022.53, subd. (d)). The trial court sentenced him to 50 years to life in
prison.
Angle contends the trial court erred by not sua sponte instructing the
jury on the lesser-included defense of involuntary manslaughter, effectively
forcing an all-or-nothing verdict. We reject this contention. Angle also asks
us to independently review sealed police personnel records under Pitchess v.
Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess) to determine if the trial court
abused its discretion in denying his motion for additional material. We have
done so, find no error, and affirm.
BACKGROUND
In 2018, Brian G. sold a generator to Angle. Angle later claimed the
generator was originally his and accused Brian of stealing it and selling it
back to him. When Brian refused Angle’s demand for a refund, Angle began
harassing him. He repeatedly appeared at the same locations as Brian, drove
by Brian’s home, and threatened to enlist a motorcycle gang to recover his
money. Fearing for his safety, Brian began carrying a gun.
On December 11, 2018, Angle was agitated and upset about the
dispute. He told a friend that he knew where Brian was and stated, “I’m
going to handle this right now.” Angle retrieved a duffel bag containing a
long gun, and he and a female friend left in a Jeep. That night, Brian was
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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inside an illegal gambling establishment when a security camera recorded
Angle puncturing the tires on Brian’s car. Brian went outside to confront
Angle.
Once outside, Brian drew his gun and confronted Angle, who was
holding a knife. Angle’s friend then pulled up in the Jeep. Angle opened the
door, retrieved a 12-gauge shotgun, and aimed it at Brian. Brian had
lowered his gun and taken a few steps backward when Angle shot him.
Angle fired from approximately five feet away, causing a large gunshot
wound to Brian’s right arm. When Brian fell to the ground, a man ran over,
took Brian’s gun, and got into the Jeep, which then drove away. Brian later
died from hemorrhagic shock.
At trial, Angle admitted he shot Brian but claimed he did not intend to
kill him. He asserted he aimed at Brian’s gun, fearing Brian was about to
shoot him first. Angle further claimed Brian fired his pistol twice before
Angle discharged the shotgun. Police, however, recovered no spent cartridges
at the scene other than the 12-gauge slug fired by Angle. In addition, two
witnesses testified that they heard only a single gunshot.
DISCUSSION
I.
No Error in Failing to Instruct on Involuntary Manslaughter
The trial court instructed the jury on murder, first and second degree
murder, voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense, and imperfect
self-defense. The court did not instruct on involuntary manslaughter as a
lesser included offense and Angle did not request such an instruction. Angle
contends the trial court prejudicially erred by failing to sua sponte instruct on
involuntary manslaughter because substantial evidence existed from which
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the jury could have concluded that he lacked the intent to kill. We are not
persuaded.
“Voluntary and involuntary manslaughter are lesser included offenses
of murder.” (People v. Thomas (2012) 53 Cal.4th 771, 813 (Thomas).) A
homicide carried out with malice is reduced to voluntary manslaughter when
it is perpetrated either in the heat of passion or in the honest yet
unreasonable belief that deadly force was required for self-defense. (People v.
Brothers (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 24, 30 (Brothers).) By contrast, involuntary
manslaughter is an unlawful homicide committed without malice while
engaging in an unlawful act not rising to the level of a felony, or during the
performance of a lawful act that could result in death but is carried out in an
unlawful manner or without due caution and circumspection. (§ 192, subd.
(b); People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1227.)
The mental state required for involuntary manslaughter is criminal
negligence. (People v. Mohamed (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 152, 161.) Criminal
negligence consists of conduct that represents such a deviation from the
behavior of an ordinarily prudent person under similar circumstances that it
demonstrates an indifference to human life. (Ibid.) Under this standard,
awareness of risk is assessed objectively—if a reasonable person in the
defendant’s position would have recognized the danger, the law presumes the
defendant did as well. (Ibid.) “Malice is implied when an unlawful killing
results from a willful act, the natural and probable consequences of which are
dangerous to human life, performed with conscious disregard for that
danger.” (People v. Elmore (2014) 59 Cal.4th 121, 133.)
A trial court must instruct on lesser included offenses whenever the
evidence is sufficient to create a genuine issue as to the existence of one or
more elements of the charged crime. (People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610,
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645.) This duty arises sua sponte and does not depend on a defense request.
(Ibid.) Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable jury could find
persuasive. (Ibid.) The “substantial evidence requirement is not satisfied by
‘ “any evidence . . . no matter how weak,” ’ but rather by evidence from which
a jury composed of reasonable persons could conclude ‘that the lesser offense,
but not the greater, was committed.’ ” (People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680,
705.) We independently review an alleged failure to instruct on a lesser
included offense, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the
defendant. (Brothers, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 30.)
Here, Angle intentionally fired a 12-gauge shotgun at Brian from about
five feet away, claiming to be aiming for the gun in Brian’s hand to disarm
him. He did not intend to kill Brian, explaining he fired “one shot” and “was
shooting at [Brian’s] gun as best I could with [a shotgun].” However, an
involuntary manslaughter instruction is required only when substantial
evidence supports a finding that the defendant acted without malice—that is,
without both a conscious disregard for human life and an intent to kill.
(People v. Vasquez (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 786, 794.)
Assuming the truth of Angle’s testimony that he did not intend to kill
Brian; the natural and probable consequences of his actions were inherently
dangerous to human life. As a matter of law, this conduct satisfied the
objective component of implied malice. (Brothers, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at
p. 35.) A lack of malice is a prerequisite for an involuntary manslaughter
verdict. (§ 192, subd. (b).) No rational trier of fact could conclude that Angle
was unaware of the lethal danger posed by firing a 12-gauge shotgun at
another person from close range. Because the evidence supported the jury’s
finding that Angle acted with malice, the trial court had no duty to instruct,
sua sponte, on involuntary manslaughter.
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Even if we assume the evidence was sufficient to require an instruction
on involuntary manslaughter, any error in failing to give that instruction was
harmless. Failing to instruct on a lesser included offense in a noncapital case
generally does not require reversal unless the entire record “ ‘establishes a
reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome.’ ” (Thomas, supra,
53 Cal.4th at p. 814.) No such reasonable probability exists when the jury’s
findings under other correct instructions necessarily resolved the factual
question implicated by the missing instruction adversely to the defendant.
(People v. Beames (2007) 40 Cal.4th 907, 928 (Beames).)
Here, the trial court instructed the jury that a conviction for first
degree murder requires a determination “the People have proved that [the
defendant] acted willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation. The
defendant acted willfully if he intended to kill. The defendant acted
deliberately if he carefully weighed the considerations for and against his
choice and, knowing the consequences, decided to kill. The defendant acted
with premeditation if he decided to kill before completing the acts that caused
death.” (CALCRIM No. 521.) By finding Angle guilty of first degree murder,
the jury necessarily found he intended to kill Brian. “[I]n finding the killing
was intentional, the jury necessarily found express, not implied, malice.”
(Beames, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 928.) Accordingly, any assumed
instructional error was harmless, because it is not reasonably probable that
the jury—having expressly found intent to kill—would have reached a
different verdict had it been instructed on involuntary manslaughter.
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II.
No Abuse of Discretion in Denying Pitchess Motion
Law enforcement personnel records are presumptively confidential
(§ 832.7); however, under some circumstances, the privacy interests
supporting confidentiality conflict with a criminal defendant's equally
compelling due process interest in obtaining evidence necessary to his
defense. (Fletcher v. Superior Court (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 386, 400.) To
obtain discovery of these records, a defendant must file a written motion
accompanied by an affidavit showing good cause for the discovery, explaining
the materiality of the requested documents and stating “upon reasonable
belief” that the governmental agency has them. (Evid. Code, § 1043,
subds. (a), (b)(3).)
“A showing of ‘good cause’ requires defendant to demonstrate the
relevance of the requested information by providing a ‘specific factual
scenario’ which establishes a ‘plausible factual foundation’ for the allegations
of officer misconduct committed in connection with defendant.” (Cal.
Highway Patrol v. Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1020.) The
allegations may be based on information and belief rather than personal
knowledge; however, they must be stated with adequate specificity to
preclude the possibility that the defendant is merely engaging in a fishing
expedition. (City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74,
85; People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1226.) We review a trial
court’s Pitchess ruling under an abuse of discretion standard. (Mooc, at
p. 1228.)
Angle asks us to independently review the materials the trial court
reviewed during the in camera hearing to determine if additional material
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should have been provided to his trial counsel. The People agree that such
review is appropriate.
On appeal, we are required to review the record of the documents
examined by the trial court and determine whether the trial court abused its
discretion by refusing to disclose the contents of the officer’s personnel
records pursuant to Pitchess.2 (People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 330.)
“A witness may be impeached with any prior conduct involving moral
turpitude whether or not it resulted in a felony conviction, subject to the trial
court’s exercise of discretion under Evidence Code section 352.” (People v.
Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 931.) The admissibility of prior misconduct for
impeachment purposes is initially limited by the requirement that the
conduct involves moral turpitude. (People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284,
296.) Even then, Evidence Code section 352 grants courts broad discretion to
exclude such evidence in a particular case. (Ibid.)
The transcript of the trial court’s confidential in camera hearing and
the confidential materials reviewed by the court have been transmitted to
this court under seal. We have reviewed the entirety of the record under seal
and independently conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when
it denied Angle’s Pitchess motion.
2 On our own motion, we augmented the record with the confidential
documents reviewed at the April 30, 2024 in camera hearing.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
DO, J.
WE CONCUR:
MCCONNELL, P. J.
CASTILLO, J.
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