People v. Harris CA6

CourtListener 10863046Calctapp21.05.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 5/21/26 P. v. Harris CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE, H053358
(Monterey County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 23CR005441)

v.

TRAVIS HARRIS,

Defendant and Appellant.

A jury convicted defendant Travis Harris of 23 counts listing various offenses
against two minors. The trial court sentenced Harris to prison for 15 years to life plus a
determinate term of 25 years eight months.
Harris asserts substantial evidence does not support his conviction on one count of
violating Penal Code section 288.2, subdivision (a)(2)1 (hereafter section 288.2(a)(2))
because the prosecution did not prove the video Harris showed to a 15-year-old girl
constituted “harmful matter.” We agree. Therefore, we will reverse the judgment and
remand for resentencing.

1
Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Harris met Jane Doe 12 through a Reddit discussion group. Doe 1 was 15 years
old, while Harris was 38 years old. Soon thereafter, the two met in person at Harris’s
residence. There, Harris spanked Doe 1 and then had sexual intercourse with her.
After that, Doe 1 testified that she continued to meet Harris “two times a week at
least” and they would “[m]ostly just have sex.” At one point in the relationship, Harris
moved out of his residence and went on a trip. Once Harris returned, Doe 1 continued to
have sex with him at various locations, including at motels in Watsonville, Greenfield,
and Salinas, and at her family’s home when she was left there once by herself. On
various occasions, Harris would exchange messages with Doe 1 about their planned
sexual acts and video record them engaging in sexual activity. Harris’s messages
included sending sexually explicit images and referring to Doe 1 and a friend of hers as
“jail bait.”
Harris purchased gifts for Doe 1 including lingerie, “choker” necklaces, clothes,
and sex toys, and he instructed her to wear and use them. He also supplied her with
cannabis gummies and alcohol, and on one occasion he discussed giving her money to
buy “Molly,” though she did not actually purchase it.
Relevant to this appeal, the prosecutor asked Doe 1 if Harris ever showed her
“pornography,” and she replied affirmatively, testifying: “I think it was only once. It
was, like, some BDSM and some stuff he had saved on his computer.” Doe 1 agreed
with the prosecutor’s question that BDSM referred to “bondage, tying people up and
spanking,” and she testified that she and Harris “probably had sex before and during and
after” watching this video. Doe 1 testified that Harris used a “riding crop” on her,
leaving bruises on her lower back. She also testified that Harris would sometimes

2
The victims were referred to as Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2 in the trial court
proceedings. We maintain those designations to protect their privacy interests. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4).)

2
“choke” her during sex, and that at one point she had “little red dots over [her] face or
neck” after Harris choked her. In messages with Doe 1 regarding this discoloration,
Harris stated that he “was perhaps too aggressive” in choking her.
Doe 1 also testified that at one point during their relationship, Harris told her that
he had dated a woman with a nine-year-old daughter, that the woman’s daughter was
“attracted to him,” and that “one day he woke up next to [the woman’s daughter] in his
bed naked.” Doe 1 testified that Harris seemed sexually aroused by this and he said “[h]e
would have done something to her” if the girl were older.
Harris’s relationship with Doe 1 came to light when Doe 1 was hospitalized for a
suicide attempt. Doe 1’s mother found items such as edibles, pregnancy tests, lingerie,
and sex toys in Doe 1’s room, along with packaging containing Harris’s name. Police
recovered messages between Harris and Doe 1 from Doe 1’s phone, including sexually
explicit videos Harris sent her and photos the two exchanged. A search of Harris’s
vehicle found a duffle bag containing “whips and different types of leather type sex
toys . . . .”
Harris’s ex-girlfriend saw an article about Harris’s arrest and forwarded it to her
daughter, Jane Doe 2. Doe 2 then reported that at one point in 2013 or 2014 during
Harris’s relationship with Doe 2’s mother when Doe 2 was eight or nine years old, Harris
showed her a pornographic video and then performed oral sex on her and guided her hand
to touch his penis. Doe 2 testified that Harris touched her inappropriately on other
occasions, including repeatedly touching her chest with his hands and mouth while her
shirt was off.
The prosecution charged Harris by second amended information with 23 counts of
various offenses, the first 16 involving Doe 1 and the last seven involving Doe 2.
Relevant to this appeal, count 14 alleged Harris violated section 288.2(a)(2) by showing
harmful matter (pornography) to Doe 1 in the city of Salinas. At trial, the prosecutor

3
specified that this count involved Harris showing Doe 1 “BDSM pornography” at the
Salinas hotel.
Harris testified at trial. He testified that Doe 1’s testimony was “[l]argely”
accurate, and that while he initially believed she was 18 years old, he and Doe 1 engaged
in sexual intercourse after he learned her true age. Regarding count 14, he stated he and
Doe 1 watched a “BDSM film” together on one occasion. He testified that BDSM means
“[b]ondage, dominance, and sadomasochism, otherwise sometimes called just kink,” and
that it was possible he had sex with Doe 1 while the video played and spanked her with a
riding crop. In response to defense counsel’s question whether he was “denying doing
any of the things that [Doe 1] has accused you of doing,” Harris replied: “Absolutely
not.” However, he denied saying anything to Doe 1 indicating a sexual interest in his ex-
girlfriend’s daughter, and he denied committing the acts Doe 2 alleged.
A jury convicted Harris of all 23 counts listed in the amended information:
(1) eight counts of lewd acts upon Doe 1, a child 14 or 15 years old (§ 288, subd. (c)(1);
counts 1, 2, 5, 9, 10, 11, 15, and 16); (2) contacting a minor with intent to commit a
sexual offense (§ 288.3, subd. (a); count 3); (3) two counts of exhibiting harmful matter
to Doe 1, a minor (§ 288.2(a)(2); counts 4 and 14); (4) two counts of unlawful sexual
intercourse with Doe 1, a minor more than three years younger than Harris (§ 261.5,
subd. (c); counts 6 and 7); (5) two counts of furnishing cannabis to a minor 14 years of
age or older (Health & Saf. Code, § 11361, subd. (b); counts 8 and 13); (6) using Doe 1, a
minor, to perform posing or modeling of sexual conduct (§ 311.4, subd. (c); count 12);
(7) oral copulation with Doe 2, a child 10 years of age or younger (§ 288.7, subd. (b);
count 17); and (8) six counts of lewd acts upon Doe 2, a child under the age of 14 (§ 288,
subd. (a); counts 18-23). The trial court sentenced Harris to prison for 15 years to life
plus a determinate term of 25 years eight months, a sentence that included a consecutive
term of eight months for count 14.
Harris timely appealed.

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II. DISCUSSION
Harris argues substantial evidence does not support his conviction in count 14 for
violating section 288.2(a)(2). He contends the prosecution presented “no evidence
regarding the actual content of the video in count 14 and therefore no evidence from
which the jurors could have found the video contained harmful material,” and that there
was no basis for the jury to conclude that the video depicted “ ‘hardcore pornography,’ ”
as required for the matter to be harmful under section 288.2(a)(2). The Attorney General
asserts that viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, the content of the video
and the context in which Harris showed it to Doe 1 provided a basis for the jury to
conclude the matter was harmful.
We conclude substantial evidence does not support Harris’s conviction for
exhibiting harmful matter to Doe 1. While substantial evidence review is deferential and
we draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the judgment, the prosecution presented no
evidence about the content of the video that would enable the jury to reasonably conclude
the video was “harmful,” as that term is defined. Accordingly, we will reverse the
conviction for violating section 288.2(a)(2) and remand for resentencing. Additionally,
we will order one correction to the abstract of judgment.

A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
“The law governing sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges is well
established . . . . [Citations.] In reviewing a claim for sufficiency of the evidence, we
must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime . . . beyond a reasonable doubt. We review the entire record in the light most
favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses sufficient evidence—
that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—supporting the decision,
and not whether the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] We
neither reweigh the evidence nor reevaluate the credibility of witnesses. [Citation.] We

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presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury reasonably could
deduce from the evidence. [Citation.] If the circumstances reasonably justify the
findings made by the trier of fact, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply
because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.
[Citation.]” (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 638-639.) “A reversal for
insufficient evidence ‘is unwarranted unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever
is there sufficient substantial evidence to support” ’ the jury’s verdict. [Citation.]”
(People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.)
Section 288.2(a)(2) states that an offense occurs when a person knowingly
distributes, sends, causes to be sent, exhibits, or offers to distribute or exhibit by any
means “harmful matter” to a person the defendant knows, should have known, or believes
to be a minor. Under section 288.2, subdivision (c), “harmful matter” is defined in
section 313. Section 313, subdivision (a) states: “ ‘Harmful matter’ means matter, taken
as a whole, which to the average person, applying contemporary statewide standards,
appeals to the prurient interest, and is matter which, taken as a whole, depicts or describes
in a patently offensive way sexual conduct and which, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors.” This definition is “virtually
identical” to the constitutional standard of obscenity set forth in Miller v. California
(1973) 413 U.S. 15, 24. (People v. Dyke (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1377, 1383 (Dyke).)

B. Analysis
We conclude the record does not contain evidence from which a jury could
reasonably find the BDSM video Harris showed Doe 1 was “harmful matter” within the
meaning of section 288.2(a)(2) and section 313. Therefore, substantial evidence does not
support Harris’s conviction in count 14, and we will reverse the judgment and remand for
resentencing.
Doe 1’s testimony about the video was “only a bare-bones recital” of what she
saw. (Dyke, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1385.) The prosecution did not produce the

6
video itself, and Doe 1 did not provide any information about the video other than stating
it contained BDSM content and agreeing with the prosecutor’s characterization that the
video constituted “pornography.” The cross-examination of Harris produced no
additional information about the video’s content. “Without more, neither we nor the jury
are permitted to presume that such content is patently offensive to the average adult,
applying statewide community standards.” (Dyke, supra, at p. 1385.)
The court in Dyke held that a minor’s testimony about television images the
defendant showed her did not prove exhibition of harmful matter under section 288.2(a).
(Dyke, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1384.) The reviewing court noted that the “sole
evidence that the television programming [the minor] viewed met the test for harmful
matter was the testimony of [the minor] herself,” and “[t]here was no tangible evidence
introduced at trial of precisely what [the minor] saw.” (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal
summarized that testimony as follows: “[The minor] testified that while appellant was
‘flipping’ through the channels of the television, she recalls seeing a naked female
dancing, and a man and woman, from the waist up, ‘having sex.’ The camera angle was
such that the lower portion of the couple could not be seen. The upper bodies of the two
people were unclothed, and the woman was ‘on top.’ [The minor] observed the female
dancing for ‘[p]robably like eight minutes,’ and the couple apparently having sex for
‘maybe like 45 seconds.’ ” (Ibid.) The court held that “applying a contemporary adult
standard, nudity alone is not per se obscene,” and similarly, “portrayals of sexual activity
are not ipso facto obscene [citation], even if they may be characterized as ‘dismally
unpleasant, uncouth, and tawdry’ [citation].” (Id. at p. 1385.) Noting that “ ‘sex and
obscenity are not synonymous,’ the court held the jury could not presume that the content
of the programming was patently offensive or that it lacked serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value for minors based on the minor’s limited testimony. (Id. at
pp. 1385-1387.)

7
Similarly here, Doe 1’s limited testimony provided no basis to reasonably find the
video described sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, or that it lacked serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors. The evidence concerning the
content of the video here is even more limited than that in Dyke, where the minor testified
that nudity was involved and she provided some description of sex acts depicted in the
programming. Here, the sole testimony about the video’s content was that it involved
“BDSM and some stuff [Harris] had saved on his computer.” Doe 1 provided no
indication that any nudity was involved, or what sex acts—if any—the video depicted.
The Attorney General cites no authority, and we find none, to support the proposition that
matter is per se harmful within the meaning of sections 288.2(a)(2) and 313 simply
because it contains some unspecified form of “BDSM” content.
People v. Powell (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1268 (Powell) likewise demonstrates
that substantial evidence does not prove the video at issue here is harmful. In Powell, the
defendant was convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse with his daughter who was
10 years old or younger, and of exhibiting harmful matter to his daughter. (Id. at
p. 1274.) The defendant’s daughter told a detective that the defendant showed her a
movie that depicted penises, vaginas, and breasts. (Id. at p. 1285.) The daughter stated
that the actors “ ‘did it’ ” in the movie (explaining that this meant sexual activity), and
she described the movie as a “ ‘nasty’ ” movie. (Ibid.) At trial, the minor testified that
“the movies contained ‘[s]ex,’ ” women were unclothed and men revealed their penises,
“an actor would ‘put his penis in the vagina,’ but the penises were obscured on screen by
pixelization,” and “[t]he man and woman would have sex and she could hear and see
them perform it.” (Id. at p. 1286.) The minor testified that “defendant had sex with her
up to 10 times and it was always preceded by the showing of pornographic movies.”
(Ibid.)
The Court of Appeal provided an extensive discussion of the meaning of harmful
matter under sections 288.2(a) and 313, stating that “nudity or depictions of sexual

8
intercourse or other sexual activity do not, by themselves, make a movie obscene.”
(Powell, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 1291; see id. at pp. 1287-1291.) Noting that
award-winning movies depicted frank sexual activity (id. at pp. 1291-1293), the Powell
court held that the minor’s description did not demonstrate a section 288.2(a) violation,
with one exception: her statement to the detective that in one movie, “[p]enises, breasts,
and vaginas featured in lewd displays as the actors ‘did it,’ i.e., engaged in sexual activity
and not just kissing.” (Powell, supra, at p. 1295.) Otherwise, the court held, the minor’s
“vague descriptions . . . could apply to First Amendment-protected softcore pornography
that lies outside the ambit of section 313, subdivision (a),” not the “hardcore, and hence
constitutionally unprotected, pornography of the type that forms the basis for the offense
described in” section 288.2(a) and section 313, subdivision (a). (Powell, supra, at
pp. 1295, 1293.)
Here, Doe 1’s description of the BDSM video falls fall short of the level of detail
provided by the minor in Powell. The minor in Powell described body parts that were
visible and sexual acts that were performed in the movies. Even then, the court held that
only one aspect of the minor’s testimony provided a basis for the jury to conclude that the
movie constituted the sort of “hardcore” pornography that falls within the ambit of
sections 288.2(a) and 313, and the Court of Appeal acknowledged that even this
description was “not rich in detail . . . .” (Powell, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 1295.)
The Attorney General argues that the context in which Harris showed the video
supports Harris’s conviction in count 14. As the court in Dyke observed, “ ‘[a] reviewing
court must, of necessity, look at the context of the material, as well as its content.’
[Citation.]” (Dyke, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1385.) The Attorney General correctly
observes that Harris showed the BDSM video in the context of a relationship in which he
sent the 15-year-old Doe 1 gifts including sex toys and lingerie, choked her to the point
of causing facial discoloration, and used a riding crop on her, causing bruises. On cross-

9
examination, Harris agreed with the prosecutor’s statement that during the relationship,
he was “training [Doe 1] to be [his] ideal sex partner . . . .”
Recognizing that “the purpose of section 288.2 is to prohibit using harmful matter
“ ‘to groom young victims for acts of molestation,’ ” (Powell, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1287), we nonetheless hold that the context in which Harris showed the video does not
provide substantial evidence to support the conviction in count 14. The context of
showing the BDSM video could not fill the gap in testimony about the content of the
video. Dyke and Powell support this conclusion. In Dyke, the defendant showed
“pornographic material” to a 16-year-old friend of his daughter who was spending the
night at the defendant’s house, and later entered the room where the victim slept and
touched her sexually. (Dyke, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1380-1381.) In Powell, the
defendant showed pornographic movies each time before engaging in sex with his young
daughter and told her he used them to teach her “ ‘about the birds and the bees.’ ” (Id. at
p. 1286.) In neither case did the context of showing harmful matter close in time to
sexually abusing a victim make up for a lack of specificity as to what the matter depicted.
The same holds true here. Without any detail as to what the BDSM video depicted, the
context in which the video was shown does not provide sufficient evidence to reasonably
find that the video contained harmful matter.
The Attorney General also notes that both Doe 1 and Harris referred to the video
as “pornography” in their testimony. However, this does not constitute substantial
evidence that the video contained “hardcore” pornography that equates to harmful matter
as defined in section 313, subdivision (a). (See Dyke, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1384,
fn. 5 [“While [the minor] referred to what she saw as ‘pornography,’ there was no
testimony as to what she meant by that term, or how broadly it may have been
intended”]; Powell, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 1291 [this statement in Dyke “is true of
most of the testimony here too”].)

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The prosecution was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the video
Harris showed Doe 1 contained harmful matter as that term is defined in the Penal Code.
The failure to present evidence of the video’s content prevented the prosecution from
meeting this burden. Accordingly, Harris’s conviction for violating section 288.2 in
count 14 must be reversed.3 Harris may not be retried on this count. (See United States
v. DiFrancesco (1980) 449 U.S. 117, 131.) We remand for full resentencing. (See
People v. Burbine (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1258-1259.)
Additionally, we order one correction regarding the abstract of judgment. The
second amended information alleged in count 19 that Harris committed a forcible lewd
act upon Doe 2, a child under the age of 14, in violation of section 288,
subdivision (b)(1). However, at trial, the court granted the prosecution’s motion to
amend count 19 to allege a lewd act under section 288, subdivision (a), removing the
element of force. Thus, the jury convicted Harris in count 19 of the lesser offense of
lewd act upon a child. However, the abstract of judgment lists Harris’s conviction in
count 19 as the greater offense, forcible lewd act upon a child in violation of section 288,
subdivision (b)(1). We order the abstract amended to reflect Harris’s correct conviction
in count 19.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed as to count 14. The abstract of judgment is ordered
corrected to reflect that Harris was convicted in count 19 of lewd act upon a child in
violation of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a). The matter is remanded for full
resentencing under current law.

3
Harris raises no challenge to the other section 288.2(a)(2) conviction in count 4.
The prosecution presented evidence of the substance of the messages that formed the
basis for this count.

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_______________________________
Greenwood, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

______________________________________
Danner, J.

______________________________________
Bromberg, J.

H053358 People v. Harris

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