People v. Hughes CA4/3

CourtListener 10863044Calctapp21.05.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 5/21/26 P. v. Hughes CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE

Plaintiff and Respondent, G063726

v. (Super. Ct. No. FBA700552)

LAWRENCE PARKER HUGHES II, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of San
Bernardino County, Joseph B. Widman, Judge. Dismissed.
Jean Matulis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and Charles C.
Ragland, Assistant Attorneys General, Melissa Mandel and Seth M.
Friedman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
A jury convicted defendant Lawrence Parker Hughes II of two
counts of first degree murder. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a).)1 The jury also
found true lying-in-wait (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)) and multiple-murder special
circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)) allegations as to each count. The trial
court sentenced defendant to two consecutive sentences of life without the
possibility of parole. Another panel of this court affirmed the judgment.
(People v. Ige et al. (May 28, 2015, G050722) [nonpub. opn.].)
In July 2020, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under
former section 1170.95 (now § 1172.6).2 The trial court denied the petition at
the prima facie stage in November 2021.
In August 2023, defendant filed another petition for resentencing,
which cited new law. Two days later, the trial court summarily denied the
petition because it “was previously denied” in November 2021. Defendant
then filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court also denied.
Defendant raises four arguments on appeal. First, he contends he
could not have been found guilty of first degree murder due to inadequate
jury instructions on uncharged conspiracy. Second, he argues “[a] finding of
first degree murder under [the CALCRIM No. 521] instruction would not
have rehabilitated a murder conviction based on the uncharged conspiracy
premise as instructed.” Third, he claims the lying-in-wait and multiple
murder special circumstance findings do not preclude resentencing relief.
Finally, he argues his due process rights were violated because the trial court
did not issue an order to show cause.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless

otherwise stated.

2 Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered

section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10).

2
As explained post, defendant’s appeal is untimely. Even
assuming it is timely, defendant’s arguments exceed the scope of his second
petition for rehearing. The second petition was predicated on intervening
case law. The arguments he raises in this appeal do not concern the same
intervening case law. Instead, the arguments could have been asserted in an
appeal from the denial of his first petition. We accordingly dismiss the
appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
I.
THE UNDERLYING OFFENSES3
Around 2003, defendant was 19 years old and was a “semi-
permanent house guest” at the home of co-defendant Garrett Kazuo Ige.
(People v. Ige et al. (May 28, 2015, G050722) [nonpub. opn.].) Defendant, co-
defendant, co-defendant’s brother, and others spent almost every day
drinking and doing drugs in co-defendant’s garage. (Ibid.)
Around the same time, co-defendant owed money to a drug dealer
for a failed venture to grow psychedelic mushrooms. (People v. Ige et al. (May
28, 2015, G050722) [nonpub. opn.].) In October 2003, the drug dealer and his
friend were last seen at co-defendant’s home where they were killed. (Ibid.)
Defendant was present at the house on that day. (Ibid.) Defendant testified
that he, co-defendant, and co-defendant’s brother put the victims’ bodies in
the back of a car and drove to a campsite. (Ibid.) A witness later found the
victims’ bodies, which were charred, in a flood control channel. (Ibid.)

3 We provide a factual summary from the prior appellate decision

affirming the judgment. (People v. Ige et al. (May 28, 2015, G050722)
[nonpub. opn.].) The summary is provided solely for context. (People v. Love
(2025) 107 Cal.App.5th 1280, 1283, fn. 2.)

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A friend who regularly did drugs with defendant and co-
defendant testified that co-defendant reported his brother killed one victim
while defendant bludgeoned the other with an axe handle. (People v. Ige et al.
(May 28, 2015, G050722) [nonpub. opn.].) The friend recalled defendant
“saying something like they had to ‘take those fools out.’” (Ibid.)
A jury convicted defendant and co-defendant of first degree
murder of the drug dealer and his friend. (People v. Ige et al. (May 28, 2015,
G050722) [nonpub. opn.].) As noted ante, the jury also found true lying-in-
wait and multiple-murder special circumstance allegations.
In affirming the judgment, another panel of this court noted:
“The prosecution pursued two theories of first degree murder: (1) murder
with premeditation and deliberation; and (2) special circumstances lying-in-
wait and multiple murders . . . . The jury was instructed on the natural and
probable consequences doctrine as it related to a conspiracy, but not aiding
and abetting.” (People v. Ige et al. (May 28, 2015, G050722) [nonpub. opn.].)
The court further explained: “[T]he prosecution could not specify what roles
each defendant played in the murders. Consequently, the prosecution alleged,
and the instructions explained, defendants’ culpability could be based on
their personal participation in the murders, participation as direct aiders and
abettors to murder, or as members of an uncharged conspiracy . . . to commit
murder.” (Ibid.)
II.
DEFENDANT’S FIRST PETITION FOR RESENTENCING
In his initial petition for resentencing, defendant averred: “1. An
indictment was issued against [me] which allowed the prosecution to proceed
under a theory of murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. [¶] 2. At trial, the prosecution pursued theories of guilt as

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participants, direct aiders and abettors, and under the natural and probable
consequence doctrine. [Citation.] [¶] 3. The prosecution could not specifically
allege what role [I] played in the murder. [Citation.] [¶] 4. On March 12,
2013, [I] was found guilty of multiple counts of murder. The jury also found
allegations of special circumstance and lying-in-wait to be true. [¶] 5. The
jury did not specify under which theory [I] was found guilty. [¶] 6. [I] could
not now be convicted of 1st degree murder because of the changes made to
Penal Code Section 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019 . . . .”
On November 5, 2021, the court summarily denied the petition
after a hearing. The court’s minute order indicated findings were stated on
the record, but the record on appeal does not include a reporter’s transcript of
the hearing.
III.
DEFENDANT’S SECOND PETITION FOR RESENTENCING
In his second petition for resentencing filed in August 2023,
defendant averred: “1. An indictment was issued against [me] which allowed
the prosecution to proceed under a theory of murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine. [¶] 2. At trial, the prosecution pursued
theories of guilt as participants, direct aiders and abettors, and under the
natural and probable consequence doctrine. [Citation.] [¶] 3. The prosecution
could not specifically allege what role [I] played in the murder. [Citation.] [¶]
4. On March 12, 2013, [I] was found guilty of multiple counts of murder. The
jury also found allegations of special circumstance and lying-in-wait to be
true. [¶] 5. The jury did not specify under which theory [I] was found guilty.
[¶] 6. The Supreme Court of California has held that these findings by the jury
are not sufficient to justify the sentence imposed upon [me] because [my] case
was decided prior to People v. Banks. (People v. Strong, 46 Cal 302) [¶] 7. [I]

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could not now be convicted of 1st degree murder because of the changes made
to Penal Code Section 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019 . . . .” (Italics
added.)
A few days later, the court clerk issued a “Response to Request,”
which noted defendant’s “correspondence” was forwarded to a different judge
and was denied because “[t]his was previously denied on 11/05/21.”
IV.
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
In September 2023, defendant filed a motion for reconsideration.
The motion suggested the trial court had denied defendant’s initial petition
at the prima facie stage because the jury found true the lying-in-wait
allegation. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15)). Relying on People v. Strong (2022) 13
Cal.5th 698 (Strong), which was decided after the trial court’s decision,
defendant argued our Supreme Court essentially held “the trial court’s
analysis in the first petition was erroneous.”
At the hearing on the motion for reconsideration, the trial court
noted its tentative decision was to deny the motion because there had not
been any new change in the law favorable to defendant. The court noted
Strong “could [not] possibly assist . . . defendant because this is not a felony
murder case.” In response, defense counsel argued: “[W]hat Strong says is
that any jury finding[s] that occur before [People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th
788 (Banks)] were not sufficient to be a prima facie bar to [defendant’s]
resentencing.” He added: “The jury was never told that in order to find . . .
[defendant] committed premeditated murder they had to be able to identify
his specific . . . actions within the crimes themselves. The jury was told that
they could find based on pre-Banks rulings that . . . if they believed the
prosecution’s case and believed what the evidence was presented to them, it

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was sufficient that they just would believe he was a part of it. The law has
become much more stringent now in that they have to identify specific actions
that were made by [defendant] in furtherance of that crime. If they can’t do
that, . . . then [defendant] couldn’t have been convicted of first-degree
murder. He couldn’t be convicted of . . . the lying in weight portion of his
sentence.” The prosecutor disagreed, arguing Banks was inapplicable because
it involved felony murder unlike the instant case.
After hearing argument from both parties, the court denied the
motion and found Banks was a felony murder case that “involved the scope of
liability under the natural and probable consequences theory.” The court
noted defendant’s case was “not a situation involving any sort of similar
vicarious theory of liability.” Instead, defendant was convicted of first degree
murder based on three possible theories: (1) he was the direct perpetrator; (2)
he aided and abetted the actual killer with the intent to assist, encourage, or
facilitate the murder; or (3) he was a member of a conspiracy to commit
murder. The court concluded “the reasoning underlying the original denial of
the prima facie . . . is still correct and is not disturbed by the legal authorities
. . . defendant is advancing.”
Defendant appealed from the denial of his motion for
reconsideration.
DISCUSSION
The Attorney General contends the instant appeal should be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. According to the Attorney General,
defendant did not timely appeal from the August 2023 denial of his second
petition, and the subsequent order denying his motion for reconsideration is
not appealable. We agree.

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Here, defendant’s notice of appeal was untimely. The court
denied defendant’s second petition on August 30, 2023. Defendant insists the
August 2023 denial “was not a decision on the contents of [the] new petition,
but a mere iteration that an original petition had previously been denied.”
Not so. The document clearly states: “Request Denied.” Although the court’s
reasoning for the denial may have been incorrect, the denial was still a
decision on the petition. The denial was therefore an appealable
postjudgment order, and defendant had 60 days from August 30, 2023 to file
his notice of appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.308(a).) Defendant did not
file a notice of appeal until January 2024, which was well past the 60-day
deadline.
To the extent defendant suggests he can appeal from the denial of
his motion for reconsideration, an order denying a motion for reconsideration
is generally not appealable. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (g).) Although a
party may appeal “[f]rom any order made after judgment, affecting the
substantial rights of the party” (§ 1237, subd. (b)), “an order ordinarily is not
appealable when the appeal would merely bypass or duplicate appeal from
the judgment itself.” (People v. Gallardo (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 971, 980–981.)
Here, allowing an appeal from the order denying reconsideration would
improperly extend the time for an appeal, and defendant’s motion for
reconsideration was based on the same facts and law as his petition.
For these reasons, we dismiss the appeal. “‘An untimely notice of
appeal is “wholly ineffectual: The delay cannot be waived, it cannot be cured
by nunc pro tunc order, and the appellate court has no power to give relief,
but must dismiss the appeal on motion of a party or on its own motion.”’” (In
re Chavez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 643, 650.)

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Even assuming the appeal was timely, we could not address the
merits of defendant’s arguments. Defendant does not address Strong or any
intervening change in the law that was the basis of the second petition.
Instead, defendant argues: (1) inadequate jury instructions on uncharged
conspiracy (CALCRIM No. 417) undermined the validity of his murder
convictions; (2) the CALCRIM No. 521 (first degree murder) instructions do
not make him ineligible for relief; and (3) the special circumstance findings do
not preclude resentencing relief. As to the second argument above, defendant
appears to suggest he could have been convicted as an aider and abettor
without an actus reus finding or based on aiding and abetting a lying-in-wait
murder without a finding that he harbored malice.
A successive petition may properly rely on an intervening change
in the law, but it does not reopen issues that could have been raised in an
earlier petition or on appeal from its denial. (People v. Harden (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 45, 52 [second petition was not barred where it was based on
new law that did not exist at the time of the first petition]; People v. Farfan
(2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 951 [successive petition was appropriate where it
was “based on new authority which challenged the primary ground for the
superior court’s summary denial” of the first petition].) Nor does it permit a
defendant to relitigate every conceivable theory untethered to the change in
law that justified the successive filing. Defendant’s current appellate
arguments could have been raised in connection with his first petition.
Indeed, in providing its reasoning, the trial court noted: “My recollection is
that this was, essentially, the same reasoning that I applied the last time
that I considered this.” Defendant did not appeal from the denial of his first
petition, and his second petition does not expand the permissible scope of

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review. We therefore would not reach the merits of defendant’s arguments in
this appeal.4
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.

SANCHEZ, J.

WE CONCUR:

MOTOIKE, ACTING P. J.

SCOTT, J.

4 Defendant has filed a request for judicial notice asking that we

take judicial notice of the verdicts used by the jury in his trial. We deny
defendant’s request because the documents are not necessary to the
resolution of this appeal.

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