People v. Perez

CourtListener 10863038Calctapp21.05.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 5/21/26 P. v. Perez
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D084834

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. SCD273809)

v.

DANIEL RYAN PEREZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Howard H. Shore, Judge. Conditionally reversed and remanded with
directions.
Janice R. Mazur, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Arlyn
Escalante, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
This matter is before us for a second time. In April 2018, Daniel Ryan

Perez pled guilty to four counts of carjacking while on parole (Pen. Code, 1
§§ 215, subd. (a), 1203.085, subd. (b)) and was sentenced to a 28-year prison
term. Perez appealed from the judgment, and we remanded with directions
for the trial court to determine whether to grant mental health diversion to
Perez under section 1001.36, which took effect approximately two weeks
before Perez’s sentencing. (People v. Perez (Jan. 6, 2020, D074332) 2020 WL
57274 [nonpub. opn.] (Perez I).)
On remand, the trial court considered and denied Perez’s motion for
mental health diversion. The trial court then conducted a resentencing
hearing consistent with the directions in our previous opinion. (Perez I,
supra, D074332.) Perez was sentenced to a 25-year prison term.
In this appeal, Perez contends that the trial court erred in denying his
motion for mental health diversion. As we will explain, Perez’s argument has
merit. The trial court applied an improper legal standard when determining
whether Perez was eligible for mental health diversion, made findings
regarding Perez’s eligibility that were not supported by the evidence, and
failed to provide a basis for the exercise of its residual discretion to deny
Perez’s motion. We accordingly conditionally reverse the judgment and
remand for further proceedings on Perez’s motion for mental health
diversion.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The relevant factual background is set forth in our previous opinion,
which we restate here.

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the
Penal Code.

2
“According to the probation officer’s report, on September 21, 2017,
J. Campos and B. Pena were parked at a trolley station. Campos stood at the
open hood of the Volkswagen Jetta while Pena sat in the passenger seat. The
car key was in the ignition. Campos closed the hood and moved to the
driver’s side door when Perez grabbed him and pushed him away from the
car. Perez put a hand in his waistband as if to draw a weapon. Campos
feared for himself and for Pena. After a struggle for the car keys, Pena exited
the car while Perez accelerated away.” (Perez I, supra, D074332.)
“Perez drove to another parking lot where E. Bermea and C. Ramirez
were exiting a taco shop. Perez parked the Volkswagen nearby Bermea’s
Hyundai Genesis. While Ramirez sat in the passenger seat, Bermea got into
the driver’s seat and started the engine. Perez approached Bermea and
pulled him out of the vehicle. Perez told Bermea, ‘ “get out,” ’ and asked him,
‘ “Are you trying to die tonight?” ’ Perez told Ramirez, ‘ “Get the fuck out,” ’
and asked him, ‘ “Are you trying to die tonight?” ’ When Perez put the vehicle
in reverse, Ramirez jumped out.” (Perez I, supra, D074332.)
“Perez drove the Hyundai over 110 miles an hour on the interstate
highway before crashing into another vehicle. Pena’s purse and personal
belongings were recovered from the Hyundai, which was totaled. Perez was
arrested at the scene before being taken to a hospital for treatment of his
injuries from the collision. Perez told police that things were ‘ “kind of a
blur” ’ and that he was just released from a Mexican jail where he was
incarcerated for being under the influence. He claimed to have walked across
the border and said he took the Volkswagen to get back home. He hoped he
had not injured anyone. He stated he was driving away when he saw a
Maserati[, referring to the Hyundai]. He parked the first car, went to the
second, and drove off without a plan. He stated he was fumbling with the

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radio and ‘ “jamming through the gears” ’ and was unable to stop in time to
avoid the collision. He claimed he committed the crimes because of
‘ “temptation,” ’ explaining that he saw a car he liked and had to have it, but
he admitted ‘ “[i]t was wrong.” ’ ” (Perez I, supra, D074332.)
“An investigation revealed Perez had just been released from a local
detention facility; he later agreed he had not been in a Mexican jail as he
previously thought.” (Perez I, supra, D074332.)
Perez pled guilty, on April 18, 2018, to four counts of carjacking while
on parole (§§ 215, subd. (a), 1203.085, subd. (b)) and admitted five prison
priors (§§ 667.5, subd. (b), 668), one serious felony prior (§§ 667, subd. (a)(1),
668, 1192.7, subd. (c)), and one strike prior (§§ 667, subd. (b)–(i), 1170.12,
668).
The trial court held a sentencing hearing on July 10, 2018. As we
explained in our previous opinion, “Perez filed a statement in mitigation and
requested that the trial court dismiss his prior strike pursuant to People v.
Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 . . . . He argued his ‘mental
state at the time of the offense significantly reduces his culpability’ because
he suffered from a mental disorder and drug addiction. In an attached
exhibit, a forensic psychologist described Perez as ‘delusional’ and diagnosed
him with ‘unspecified schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic disorder’
and severe substance abuse disorders. The psychologist opined that Perez’s
‘mental health and/or substance abuse problems’ contributed to his
commission of the crimes and recommended treatment.” (Perez I, supra,
D074332.) As we elaborated in a footnote, “Specifically, the psychologist
explained: ‘There is no question that [Perez] has had serious substance use
problems over the years. In fact, because of the severity of his substance use,
it is difficult to determine whether or not he should be diagnosed with a

4
primary or secondary psychotic disorder. However, regardless of the etiology
of his symptoms, he presents with a number of delusions that interfere with
his ability to appropriately interact with his environment. . . . Given that he
continues to present with delusional thinking, the undersigned strongly
suspects that these symptoms were present at the time of the offense and
contributed to his decision to steal the cars.’ The psychologist further
explained that ‘[s]pecific treatment interventions will depend on whether
[Perez] presents with primary or secondary psychosis (schizophrenia versus
substance use),’ and that ‘more time is needed in order to make the
distinction between primary and secondary psychosis.’ ” (Ibid.)
The trial court denied the motion to strike Perez’s prior strike, and it
sentenced Perez to prison for a term of 28 years.
Perez appealed, and on January 6, 2020, we issued an opinion
conditionally reversing the judgment. (Perez I, supra, D074332.) As we
explained, effective immediately on June 27, 2018 (Stats. 2018, ch. 34, § 37),
which was 13 days before Perez’s sentencing, the Legislature enacted sections
1001.35 and 1001.36 to create a pretrial diversion program for defendants
with certain mental health disorders. We concluded that because Perez’s
conviction was not yet final, he was retroactively entitled to a hearing to
determine whether he should be granted mental health diversion. We

remanded with directions for the trial court to hold such a hearing.2 (Perez I,

2 In our previous opinion, we observed that there was “a split of
authority concerning the retroactivity of section 1001.36.” (Perez I, supra,
D074332.) Subsequently, in People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 640
(Frahs), our Supreme Court confirmed that the mental health diversion
statute should be applied retroactively to cases, like Perez’s, that were
adjudicated but not yet final when section 1001.36 became effective. Our
Supreme Court stated that “[a]lthough applying section 1001.36 retroactively
5
supra, D074332.) As we explained, if the trial court did not grant mental
health diversion it should resentence Perez, taking into account subsequent
developments in sentencing law that we addressed in our opinion. (Ibid.)
In deciding to remand for a consideration of mental health diversion,
we “reject[ed] the Attorney General’s argument that Perez has not made a
sufficient showing on all the factors required to seek diversion under section
1001.36.” (Perez I, supra, D074332.) We explained that the record indicated
that Perez “ ‘appears to meet at least one of the threshold requirements’ of
section 1001.36.” (Ibid.) Specifically, we observed that the Attorney General
“appear[ed] to acknowledge” there was evidence that (1) Perez suffered from
a qualifying mental disorder; (2) the mental disorder was a significant factor
in the commission of the charged offenses; and (3) in the opinion of a qualified
medical expert, Perez’s symptoms of the mental disorder motivating the
criminal behavior would respond to mental health treatment. (Ibid.) In
explaining the Attorney General’s apparent acknowledgment, we cited the
forensic psychologist’s report, which “diagnosed Perez with ‘unspecified
schizophrenia spectrum’ and severe substance abuse disorders, opined that
Perez’s delusional ideations contributed to his commission of the crimes, and
recommended treatment.” (Ibid.) Nevertheless, we explained that “[o]f

may be somewhat challenging, we remain optimistic that ‘the courts involved
can implement [it] without undue difficulty’ and that “[t]he potential
logistical problems identified by the People in providing defendants with a
diversion eligibility hearing after conviction, however, do not provide a
sufficient basis to deny defendants the benefit of a hearing altogether.”
(Frahs, at pp. 636–637.)

6
course, the trial court will ultimately have the opportunity to consider the
sufficiency of Perez’s request on remand.” (Perez I, supra, D074332.)
After remand, defense counsel filed a motion for mental health
diversion on October 4, 2022. Among other exhibits, the motion relied on

reports from two psychologists who had evaluated Perez.3 The first report
was prepared on December 11, 2017, by Dr. Kristina Malek, Ph.D., and is the
report that we discussed in our previous opinion. (Perez I, supra, D074332.)
The second report was prepared on August 6, 2022, by Dr. Nicole Friedman,
Ph.D. After holding a hearing on February 15, 2023, the trial court took the
matter under submission and issued a written order on February 17, 2023,
which denied Perez’s motion for mental health diversion.
On June 5, 2024, the trial court sentenced Perez to a 25-year prison
term.

3 On appeal, both Perez and the People moved to file appellate briefs that
redacted all of the discussion related to the two psychologists’ reports, and to
file the unredacted briefs under seal. We conditionally granted those motions
as to all three of the parties’ briefs, but we deferred final consideration to be
decided together with the appeal. We hereby deny Perez’s motion to seal as
to his opening and reply briefs, and the People’s motion to seal as to their
respondent’s brief. The parties’ motions to seal appear to be premised on the
alleged “confidential” nature of the documents and the fact that Perez sought
an order sealing the psychologists’ reports in the trial court. However, we see
no indication that the trial court granted the motion to seal. Further, the
parties have not moved in this court to have the psychologists’ reports filed
under seal and have not provided any legal basis that would require us to
treat them as confidential documents. Moreover, we note that a significant
portion of Dr. Malek’s report is already in the public record, as we quoted
from it extensively in our previous opinion. Accordingly, we conclude that
there is no overriding public interest to support an order sealing the
unredacted appellate briefs that refer to the content of the two psychologists’
reports. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 2.550(d), 8.46(d)(6).)

7
On appeal from the judgment, Perez contends that the trial court erred
in denying his motion for mental health diversion.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Legal Standards
We begin by setting forth the legal standards that apply in a motion for
mental health diversion.
Section 1001.36 states that a trial court “may, in its discretion, and
after considering the positions of the defense and prosecution, grant pretrial
diversion to a defendant pursuant to this section if the defendant satisfies the
eligibility requirements for pretrial diversion set forth in subdivision (b) and
the court determines that the defendant is suitable for that diversion under

the factors set forth in subdivision (c).” (§ 1001.36, subd. (a).)4
The statute identifies two eligibility requirements: (1) in the last five
years the defendant has been diagnosed with or treated for “a mental
disorder as identified in the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders [(DSM)], including, but not limited to,
bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, or post-traumatic
stress disorder, but excluding antisocial personality disorder and pedophilia”
(§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1)); and (2) “the defendant’s mental disorder was a
significant factor in the commission of the charged offense” (§ 1001.36,
subd. (b)(2)).
Next, the statute identifies four suitability criteria: (1) a qualified
mental health expert has opined that “the defendant’s symptoms of the
mental disorder causing, contributing to, or motivating the criminal behavior

4 Defendants charged with certain crimes, such as murder and various
sex crimes, are not eligible for mental health diversion. (§ 1001.36, subd. (d).)

8
would respond to mental health treatment” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(1)); (2) the
defendant (if mentally competent) consents to diversion and waives the right
to a speedy trial (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(2)); (3) the defendant (if mentally
competent) agrees to comply with treatment as a condition of diversion
(§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(2)); and (4) “[t]he defendant will not pose an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in Section 1170.18, if
treated in the community” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4)).
If the defendant is both eligible and suitable, the trial court must also
be satisfied “that the recommended inpatient or outpatient program of
mental health treatment will meet the specialized mental health treatment
needs of the defendant.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (f)(1)(A)(i).) “This is not an
additional eligibility or suitability requirement the defendant must meet.
Rather, subdivision (f)(1) of section 1001.36 read as a whole appears to
contemplate an ongoing assessment to assure that defendants will receive
appropriate treatment for their particular conditions as part of the diversion
program.” (Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 892
(Sarmiento).)
“Even where defendants make a prima facie showing that they meet all
the express statutory requirements, the court may still exercise its discretion
to deny diversion. [Citation] But this ‘residual’ discretion must be exercised
“ ‘consistent with the principles and purpose of the governing law.’ ”
[Citations.] That purpose includes a strong legislative preference for
treatment of mental health disorders because of the benefits of such
treatment to both the offending individual and the community. Where the
court chooses to exercise this residual discretion to deny diversion, its
statement of reasons should reflect consideration of the underlying purposes

9
of the statute and explain why diversion would not meet those goals.”
(Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at pp. 892–893.)
We review a trial court’s ruling on mental health diversion for abuse of
discretion. (People v. Graham (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 787, 795 (Graham).)
“ ‘A court abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary or capricious
decision by applying the wrong legal standard [citations], or bases its decision
on express or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial
evidence.’ ” (Ibid.)
B. The Trial Court’s Ruling
The trial court’s written ruling explained that three of the suitability
requirements were not at issue. Specifically, the trial court stated, “[I]t
appears after hearing oral argument, that certain requirements are not at
issue here: [¶] a. Defendant will consent to diversion and waive his right to a
speedy trial. [¶] b. Defendant agrees to comply with treatment. [¶] c.
Qualified mental health experts opine that defendant will respond to
treatment.”
However, as the trial court explained, “the People argue that the
following statutory requirements have not been met: [¶] a. Defendant does
not presently have a qualifying mental illness. [¶] b. Defendant’s alleged
mental disorder was not a significant factor in the commission of the offense.
[¶] c. Defendant poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if
treated in the community. [¶] d. Defendant has not proposed an adequate
treatment plan.” The trial court proceeded to discuss those disputed issues:
“The statutory provisions for mental health diversion
presume a defendant is currently suffering from a mental
disorder that played a significant role in the underlying offense.
Otherwise, the provisions relating to treatment and successful
completion of a program would be irrelevant. In this case, as the

10
People have pointed out, CDCR records indicate [Perez] has not
required mental health treatment while in prison; he failed to
meet the criteria for inclusion in the Mental Health Services
Delivery System; and there was no exclusionary condition that
would prohibit Pelican Bay State Prison-SHU placement. Thus,
any possible symptoms he displayed at the time of the offense
have abated.
“With regard to the requirement that the diagnosed
disorder play a significant role in the commission of the offense,
subdivision (b)(2) creates a presumption, based on the diagnosis,
that the disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the
offense unless there is clear and convincing evidence that it was
not a motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing factor to the
defendant’s involvement in the alleged offense.
“The Court of Appeal opinion in this case, D074332, sets
forth the underlying facts of [Perez’s] offenses. This court
incorporates those facts, at pp. 3–5, into this decision. [Perez]
pled guilty to four counts of carjacking while on parole. He
described his drug use to a probation officer, but claimed to have
no mental health issues. The underlying crimes were violent and
potentially life-threatening.
“Based on the facts of the case and a review of Dr. Malek’s
report of December 11, 2017, this court finds clear and convincing
evidence that any mental health disorder was not a significant
factor in the commission of the alleged offense.
“Because [Perez] currently does not demonstrate the
mental health issues alleged to have existed at the time of the
offenses, there is no reason to address the nature of any proposed
treatment plan. [Perez] has a lengthy violent criminal history,
but it is not clear what his current level of dangerousness is, so
this court will not speculate. In any event, because of this court’s
other conclusions, such speculation is unnecessary. (Paragraph
numbering omitted)

Finally the trial court delivered its ruling. “Accordingly, this court
finds [Perez] is both ineligible and unsuitable for mental health diversion
and, in any event, does not believe granting mental health diversion at this

11
time fulfills the legislative goals described above. The court will therefore
exercise its discretion and deny [Perez’s] motion.”
As we understand the trial court’s ruling, although it only discussed
eligibility factors, it concluded that Perez failed to meet both of the eligibility
requirements and failed to satisfy at least one (unspecified) suitability
criterion. The trial court also exercised its residual discretion to deny mental
health diversion.
C. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Ruling That Perez Did Not
Meet the Eligibility Requirements For Mental Health Diversion
We first examine the trial court’s ruling that Perez failed to meet the
two eligibility requirements.
1. The Trial Court’s Ruling on the First Eligibility Requirement
As we have explained, the first eligibility requirement involves a
finding that the defendant received a diagnosis of, or treatment for, a
qualifying mental disorder in the last five years. Specifically, the statute
describes the requirement as follows: “The defendant has been diagnosed
with a mental disorder as identified in the most recent edition of the [DSM],
including, but not limited to, bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, schizoaffective
disorder, or post-traumatic stress disorder, but excluding antisocial
personality disorder and pedophilia. Evidence of the defendant’s mental
disorder shall be provided by the defense and shall include a diagnosis or
treatment for a diagnosed mental disorder within the last five years by a
qualified mental health expert. In opining that a defendant suffers from a
qualifying disorder, the qualified mental health expert may rely on an
examination of the defendant, the defendant’s medical records, arrest reports,
or any other relevant evidence.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1).)

12
As Perez points out, in discussing the first eligibility requirement, the
trial court failed to focus on whether Perez received a diagnosis of, or
treatment for, a qualifying mental disorder within the last five years.
Instead, the trial court reframed the inquiry as whether Perez was “currently
suffering from a mental disorder that played a significant role in the
underlying offense.” (Italics added.) Conducting that inquiry, the trial court
concluded that because “any possible symptoms [Perez] displayed at the time
of the offense have abated,” Perez did not satisfy the first eligibility
requirement.
The trial court’s reframing of the first eligibility requirement was error.
Until December 31, 2022, a trial court could grant mental health diversion
only if it was “satisfied that the defendant suffers from a [qualifying] mental
disorder.” (Stats. 2022, ch. 47, § 38, italics added.) However, effective
January 1, 2023, the statute was amended to reflect a focus on whether the
defendant was diagnosed with, or treated for, a qualifying mental health

disorder in the last five years.5 (Stats. 2022, ch. 735 § 1; § 1001.36,
subd. (b)(1).) The record establishes that the trial court was aware of the
amended statutory language, as it stated at the diversion hearing that it
would be applying the amended statute. Moreover, the People submitted a
supplemental opposition memorandum prior to the hearing that specifically
discussed the amended statutory requirements. Nevertheless, the trial court
failed to apply the provisions of the amended statute. Instead, it examined
whether Perez was “currently suffering” from a mental disorder. By applying

5 Perez has requested that we take judicial notice of certain legislative
history documents for the statutory amendments that took effect in January
1, 2023. We hereby grant the request.

13
an improper legal standard, the trial court abused its discretion. (Graham,
supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 795.)
Next, even if the trial court had applied the correct standard, its
decision on the first eligibility factor would not have been supported by
substantial evidence. The undisputed evidence shows that Perez was
diagnosed with, and treated for, a qualifying mental health disorder within
the last five years. Either circumstance is sufficient to satisfy the first
eligibility requirement. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1).)
Dr. Friedman’s report, dated August 6, 2022, provides the following
diagnoses: “His current DSM-5 Diagnostic Impression: Substance-Induced
Psychotic Disorder, remission, in a controlled setting, Stimulant Use disorder
(amphetamine), severe, in a controlled environment, Alcohol Use Disorder,
severe, in a controlled environment, Opioid Use Disorder, severe, in early
remission, in a controlled environment (on maintenance therapy), Antisocial
Personality Disorder.” The People do not dispute that Substance-Induced
Psychotic Disorder, Stimulant Use Disorder, Alcohol Use Disorder, and
Opioid Disorder are all qualifying mental disorders recognized in the current
edition of the DSM. Dr. Malek’s diagnosis substantially overlapped with Dr.
Friedman’s, although Dr. Malek was unable to determine if Perez’s psychosis

was caused by substance use or by schizophrenia. 6

6 Dr. Malek’s diagnosis on December 11, 2017, was more than five years
prior to the February 15, 2023 hearing, although within five years of when
Perez filed his motion for mental health diversion on October 4, 2022.
Because Dr. Friedman’s diagnosis indisputably came within five years of the
trial court’s ruling, we need not, and do not, decide whether Dr. Malek’s
diagnosis also falls within the required time period.

14
With regard to treatment in the last five years, even though the trial
court stated that “CDCR records indicate the defendant has not required
mental health treatment while in prison” (italics added), that statement is
misleading, if not inaccurate. Dr. Friedman’s report contains excerpts from
Perez’s medical records from Pelican Bay State Prison that show that, in
2021, to treat his “Opiate Use [D]isorder, severe” and “[M]ethamphetamine
[U]se [D]is order, severe,” Perez was in a medically assisted treatment
program, in which he received buprenorphine-naloxone (otherwise known as
suboxone) and clonidine. Further, as defense counsel explained in the trial
court (and supported with documentation), after Perez transferred to George
Bailey Detention Facility from Pelican Bay State Prison, he continued on a
medication regimen, and he obtained a transfer to San Diego Central Jail in
2022 so that he could participate in a new mental health program “designed
to provide [cognitive behavioral therapy] based programming to high level
incarcerated people while receiving intensive case manager services and
other incentives.”
Thus, the court abused its discretion in concluding that Perez failed to
satisfy the first eligibility requirement.
2. The Trial Court’s Ruling on the Second Eligibility Requirement
The second eligibility requirement requires a finding that “the
defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in the commission of the
charged offense.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).) With respect to this factor, the
statute includes a presumption that can only be overcome by clear and
convincing evidence. “If the defendant has been diagnosed with a mental
disorder, the court shall find that the defendant’s mental disorder was a
significant factor in the commission of the offense unless there is clear and
convincing evidence that it was not a motivating factor, causal factor, or

15
contributing factor to the defendant’s involvement in the alleged offense. A
court may consider any relevant and credible evidence, including, but not
limited to, police reports, preliminary hearing transcripts, witness
statements, statements by the defendant’s mental health treatment provider,
medical records, records or reports by qualified medical experts, or evidence
that the defendant displayed symptoms consistent with the relevant mental
disorder at or near the time of the offense.” (Ibid.)
“When reviewing a finding that a fact has been proved by clear and
convincing evidence, the question before the appellate court is whether the
record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact
finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true.”
(Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011.) Accordingly, in
reviewing the trial court’s ruling on the second eligibility requirement, “the
issue before us is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence
from which a reasonable factfinder could have found it highly probable that
[Perez’s] mental disorder ‘was not a motivating factor, causal factor, or
contributing factor to [Perez’s] involvement in the alleged offense.’
(§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).)” (Lacour v. Superior Court (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th
391, 402 (Lacour).)
In support of its conclusion that “any mental health disorder was not a
significant factor in the commission of the alleged offense,” the trial court
stated it was relying upon Dr. Malek’s 2017 report and the underlying facts
set forth in our previous opinion (Perez I, supra, D074332). The trial court
also referred to Perez’s statements in a May 2018 interview with a probation
officer prior to his first sentencing. As we will explain, none of the items that
the trial court relied upon provide substantial evidence from which a
reasonable factfinder could have found it highly probable that Perez’s mental

16
disorder “was not a motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing factor to
[Perez’s] involvement in the alleged offense.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).)
First, instead of providing support for a finding that Perez’s actions
were not influenced by his mental disorder, Dr. Malek’s report states that the
contrary is true. Dr. Malek concluded that Perez was suffering from
psychotic symptoms and delusions that were either due to a primary
psychosis based on schizophrenia or a secondary psychosis induced by his use
of substances. Dr. Malek explained, “regardless of the etiology of his
symptoms, he presents with a number of delusions that interfere with his
ability to appropriately interact with his environment. . . . In Mr. Perez’s
particular case, he strongly believes that he was given a card that allowed
him to take the vehicles and that he is currently being tested by God.
Furthermore, he does not respond to any reality testing. Given that he
continues to present with delusional thinking, the undersigned strongly
suspects that these symptoms were present at the time of the offense and
contributed to his decision to steal the cars.” (Italics added.)
The details set forth in Dr. Malek’s report are fully consistent with her
opinion that Perez’s psychosis and delusions contributed to his commission of
the carjackings. During Dr. Malek’s interview with Perez almost two months

after the carjackings, he was still delusional.7 According to Dr. Malek, Perez

7 As Dr. Malek explained, “Despite Mr. Perez’s assertion that he does not
have any mental health problems, he presented with a number of
persecutory, referential, grandiose, and religious delusions (fixed false
beliefs). For example, he believed that he was gassed at the jail, that he is
not actually in San Diego, that the people in jail are ‘just actors,’ that the
televisions in jail are broadcasting signs and propaganda, and that God has
put him in jail and is giving him tests that he must complete. He also
discussed how people in jail and in the hospital were actually family
members and friends who were somehow able to ‘morph’ into different people
17
provided her with the following description of the carjackings: “[H]e stated
that it was the ‘perfect setup.’ He explained that the police left a card in his
wallet that allowed him to take cars and other items. Specifically, he needed
to tap the card twice on whatever he wanted to take. In this particular case,
he needed to tap the card on the cars. When describing the first carjacking,
he explained that both of the car doors were open at the time. . . . He stated,
‘It was all a setup.’ In order to take the car, he tapped the roof of the car and
got in. He explained, ‘The people let me leave.’ He later stated that he
‘pushed the guy out.’ Mr. Perez then began to discuss the car accident that
occurred after the second carjacking. He stated, ‘It was fake. It looked like a
play. All of a sudden, the police and ambulance were there.’ He further went
on to report that the paramedics who arrived on scene were actually his
brother’s friends.” Perez then described numerous delusions during his stay
in the hospital after the carjacking.
Based on the above, we find no substantial evidence in Dr. Malek’s
report that Perez’s mental disorder played no motivating, causal or
contributing role in the carjackings.
Next, the facts set forth in our previous opinion (Perez I, supra,
D074332) also provide no support the trial court’s conclusion that Perez’s

(e.g., his girlfriend morphed into the hospital nurse). He also spent a great
deal of time describing how places seemed empty. For example, stores in San
Diego seemed to be closed and people were not out on the streets. He
explained that San Diego looked like a ghost town. Moreover, he repeatedly
described how he was taken to the El Cajon Courthouse but that it looked
nothing like El Cajon or the courthouse. He believed that there was no way
he ever went to that courthouse. Unfortunately, similar to many other
individuals who present with delusional thinking, he did not respond to
reality testing.”

18
crimes were unrelated to his mental disorder. Our opinion described Perez’s
delusional thinking while committing the crimes, including that he had just
been released from a Mexican jail and that the Hyundai was a Maserati.
(Ibid.) More importantly, we described Dr. Malek’s opinion that “Perez’s
delusional ideations contributed to his commission of the crimes,” and we
observed that, based on Dr. Malek’s report, the Attorney General “appear[ed]
to acknowledge” that Perez’s mental disorder was a significant factor in the

commission of the charged offenses. (Ibid.)8
Finally, Perez’s statements to the probation officer in May 2018 do not
provide substantial evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that
Perez’s mental health disorder played no role in his crimes. As the trial court
summarized Perez’s statements to the probation officer, Perez “described his
drug use . . . , but claimed to have no mental health issues.” That is not an
accurate summary. In fact, when speaking to the probation officer in May
2018, Perez described at length the mental health problems he was having
during the carjackings. As the probation officer stated, “The defendant said
he was ‘hallucinating and delusional’ and he was ‘totally out of (his) mind’
when he committed these crimes. . . . [¶] . . . The defendant said he ‘did not
know what was going on’ and he was ‘completely delusional.’ The defendant
thought he had been in jail in Mexico. [¶] The defendant said the carjackings

8 While discussing whether Perez’s mental disorder was a significant
factor in his commission of the crimes, the trial court stated that “[t]he
underlying crimes were violent and potentially life-threatening,” which the
trial court apparently concluded based on the facts set forth in our prior
opinion. But the description of Perez’s conduct as violent has no logical
connection to whether Perez’s conduct was influenced by his mental disorder,
as a person suffering from psychosis is fully capable of violent conduct.

19
were so odd, he ‘felt like (he) was in a video game.’ He was ‘completely out of
(his) mind.’ . . . [¶] The defendant said he was so delusional that he can only
remember ‘bits and pieces’ of the incident. He read the discovery, and he had
talked ‘crazy’ to the detective. He said he was ‘working for God’ and he had
been jailed in Mexico. The ‘whole thing was bizarre.’ [¶] The defendant said
it took ‘over a month’ for the hallucinating and the delusions to stop. At the
time of the carjackings, he ‘felt like (he) was in a dream state’ and it ‘seemed
fake’ to him. He was ‘so delusional’ he had a trolley pass and he thought he
could tap it on the roof of a car and take the car. [¶] The defendant had ‘no
idea’ where he was driving. He had ‘no idea’ where he was at. The defendant
said he had ‘no reason’ to take someone’s vehicle. He had a place to stay,
work and a license, there was ‘no reason’ for him to do these crimes. [¶] The
defendant wants the Court to take into consideration that he was delusional
from withdrawing from methadone. The hallucinations were ‘scary’ for him.
His family was concerned because he was ‘talking crazy’ to them in jail. It
took a month for him to start talking normal. It took him two months to stop
hallucinating that he saw people, could talk to people who were not there,
and stop[ped] seeing ‘trails’ that were not there.”
In sum, none of the evidence that the trial court purported to rely upon
for its analysis of the second eligibility factor provides substantial evidence
that Perez’s mental disorder ‘was not a motivating factor, causal factor, or
contributing factor to [Perez’s] involvement in the alleged offense.’
(§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).)”
Focusing on evidence that the trial court did not specifically identify in
its order, the People argue that although Perez “made delusional statements
after committing the carjacking, there was substantial evidence that [Perez]
was merely acting in conformance to his prior behaviors and prior crimes,

20
and that his behavior was primarily caused by his heavy drug use.”
According to the People, Perez’s “actions the night of the carjackings were in
conformance with his long criminal history and were not out of the ordinary
given his past crimes and conduct.”
The People’s reference to Perez’s heavy drug use is not persuasive to
show that Perez’s mental disorder played no role in the carjackings, as the
mental disorder at issue here is psychosis induced by substance use.
The People’s reliance on Perez’s criminal history is also not persuasive.
As we understand the People’s argument, they contend that because Perez
committed a long list of crimes in the past, when he was apparently not
experiencing psychosis, he would have committed the carjackings regardless
of his substance-induced psychosis, and thus his psychosis was not a
contributing factor. The inference that the People urge us to make is far too
speculative to provide substantial evidence for any type of finding, let alone a
finding that it is “highly probable that [Perez’s] mental disorder ‘was not a
motivating factor, causal factor, or contributing factor to [Perez’s]
involvement in the alleged offense.’ (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).)” (Lacour, supra,
110 Cal.App.5th at p. 402, italics added.)
The People also argue that “[t]his court’s recitation of the underlying
facts of the carjacking show that appellant acted with purpose when he
threatened and pushed the victims out of their cars.” (Italics added.)
However, the People provide no basis to conclude that purposeful conduct is
incompatible with conduct motivated by delusions and hallucinations brought
about by psychosis.
Finally, the People point to a statement that Perez made to a detective
who interviewed him in the hospital on the night of the carjacking.
Specifically, near the end of the interview the detective asked, “So, okay, um,

21
anything else to explain your actions tonight?” Perez replied, “Just
temptation man.” The detective asked, “Temptation of what?” Perez stated,
“I seen a car I liked and I just had to have it. It was wrong.” The People
point to this statement as substantial evidence that Perez’s mental disorder
did not motivate, cause or contribute to his crimes.
The argument is unpersuasive because it ignores the entire context in
which Perez made those statements. During Perez’s interview with the
detective, he made numerous statements that showed he was delusional and
had no rational explanation for his actions. Early in the interview, the
detective asked him, “Why would you do something like that?” Perez stated,
“I don’t know,” and “[m]y mind was just in the wrong place I guess.” The
detective followed up, referencing Perez’s delusional statement that he had
just been released from a Mexican jail, and asking, “And then you just decide
to steal somebody’s car?” Perez replied, “I’m in jail in Mexico, probably on
some weird, I don’t even know what you want to call it -- something with
God.” He said, “God was calling for me” and described himself as “[o]ne of
God’s soldiers.” When trying to understand why Perez took the second car
(the Hyundai), the detective inquired, “Alright, so you took the car[,] and then
why did you then park that car and take another car?” Referring to the
Hyundai, Perez answered “[t]emptation” because “[a] Maserati came up.”
When asked how he took the second car, Perez referenced his delusional
belief that he could tap on a car to take it, by answering, “Two taps, tossed
him out.” Accordingly, because Perez made delusional statements
throughout the interview, the People are not persuasive in arguing that
Perez’s statement to the detective that he acted out of “temptation” and “it
was wrong” provides substantial evidence that Perez’s mental disorder
played no role in his commission of the offenses.

22
In sum, none of the People’s arguments point to substantial evidence
from which a reasonable factfinder could have found it highly probable that
Perez’s mental disorder “was not a motivating factor, causal factor, or
contributing factor to [Perez’s] involvement in the alleged offense.”
(§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).)
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion in ruling that Perez failed to satisfy both of the eligibility
requirements for mental health diversion.
D. Based on Its Analysis, the Trial Court Erroneously Concluded That
Perez Was Not Suitable for Mental Health Diversion
We next consider the trial court’s ruling that Perez was unsuitable for
mental health diversion.
According to the trial court, the only one of the four suitability criteria
disputed by the People was whether Perez would “pose an unreasonable risk
of danger to public safety, as defined in Section 1170.18, if treated in the
community.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4)). In addressing that issue, the trial
court stated, “[Perez] has a lengthy violent criminal history, but it is not clear
what his current level of dangerousness is, so this court will not speculate. In
any event, because of this court’s other conclusions, such speculation is
unnecessary.” The only reasonable way to understand that statement is that
because the court had found Perez ineligible, it elected not to make a finding
on suitability, i.e., whether Perez would pose a danger to public safety if he
was treated in the community under mental health diversion. The People do
not attempt to argue otherwise.
Nevertheless, in summing up its analysis at the end of its order, the
trial court stated that Perez was “both ineligible and unsuitable for mental
health diversion.” Seizing on this statement, the People contend that the

23
trial court found Perez to be unsuitable for mental health diversion based on
the failure of a different suitability criterion, and not based on the criterion
involving public safety. Specifically, the People contend that the trial court
concluded Perez failed to show that a mental health expert had opined that
“the defendant’s symptoms of the mental disorder causing, contributing to, or
motivating the criminal behavior would respond to mental health treatment.”
(§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(1).) The People explain that because the trial court
stated Perez was no longer showing symptoms of a mental health disorder,
the trial court must have decided that a mental health expert could not opine
that Perez’s symptoms would respond to mental health treatment. We find
no support for the People’s contention in the text of the trial court’s order. On
the contrary, the trial court stated that “certain requirements are not at issue
here,” including that “[q]ualified mental health experts opine that defendant
will respond to treatment.” (Italics added.)
Moreover, even if the trial court had made the ruling that the People
ascribe to it (i.e., that an expert had not opined Perez’s symptoms would
respond to treatment), such a ruling would have been contrary to
Dr. Friedman’s report. According to Dr. Friedman, Perez’s mental health
disorders include “Opioid Use Disorder, severe, in early remission, in a
controlled environment (on maintenance therapy),” which is causally related
to the “Substance-Induced Psychotic Disorder” that motivated the
carjackings. Dr. Friedman stated that “Mr. Perez’s symptoms would respond
to substance use treatment.” (Italics added.) Specifically, Dr. Friedman
recommended “Mr. Perez enter a dual-diagnosis treatment program,” and
“[o]nce in the appropriate program, [Perez] will be evaluated for medication
and monitored by a psychiatrist.” Dr. Friedman recommended that Perez
“enter and complete a thirty to forty-five-day inpatient program, with

24
stepdown to a three-to-six-months in an IOP (dependent upon how he does)
and continue outpatient treatment with Dialectical Behavioral Therapy
(DBT) for six to nine months, if not longer, contingent upon his successful
completion of the therapy program.”
In sum, as to the issue of Perez’s suitability for mental health
diversion, the trial court’s own discussion establishes that it abused its
discretion by concluding that Perez was “unsuitable for mental health
diversion.” The trial court recognized that the only suitability criterion in
dispute was whether Perez would “pose an unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety, as defined in Section 1170.18, if treated in the community”
(§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4)), but it expressly declined to rule on that issue.
E. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Exercising Its Residual
Discretion Because It Provided No Substantive Explanation
In addition to stating that Perez was not eligible or suitable for mental
health diversion, the trial court stated that it would also exercise its residual
discretion to deny the motion.
In exercising that discretion, the trial court provided only a conclusory
statement unsupported by explanation. The trial court stated, “[T]his
court . . . does not believe granting mental health diversion at this time
fulfills the legislative goals described above. The court will therefore exercise

its discretion and deny defendant’s motion.”9

9 Earlier in its order, the trial court identified the legislative goals of the
mental health diversion statute as “promoting increased diversion of
individuals with mental disorders to mitigate their entry and reentry into the
criminal justice system while protecting public safety, as well as providing
diversion that meets the unique mental health treatment and support needs
of individuals with mental disorders.” That description largely tracks the
statutory purpose explicitly set forth in section 1001.35

25
As we have explained, the trial court has residual discretion to deny
diversion, even where a defendant meets the eligibility and suitability
requirements. (Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 892.) However, if the
trial court decides to exercise its residual discretion, “ ‘its statement of
reasons should reflect consideration of the underlying purposes of the statute
and explain why diversion would not meet those goals.’ ” (Id. at p. 893, italics
added; see also Flareau v. Superior Court of Riverside County (2026)
118 Cal.App.5th 681, 691 [noting that the trial court improperly failed to
explain why diversion would not meet the goals of the diversion program].)
Here, the trial court failed to provide any explanation of why granting mental
health diversion to Perez would not meet the statutory goals. Moreover,
because the trial court failed to explain the basis for its ruling, it is possible
that the trial court’s decision to exercise its residual discretion was
incorrectly influenced by its erroneous conclusions and findings regarding the
first and second eligibility requirements.
“[R]eviewing courts have consistently made clear that the legislation’s
aim is for diversion to apply as broadly as possible so as to increase the
provision of mental health treatment for the betterment of individuals and
society as a whole.” (People v. Cabalar (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 41, 58.) “A
trial court’s denial of mental health diversion using its residual discretion
should be limited to those situations where the purposes of the statute would
not be achieved.” (Vaughn v. Superior Court (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 124,
138.) Here, because the trial court failed to provide any explanation of why
granting diversion to Perez would not meet the legislative goals, the trial
court abused its discretion in exercising its residual discretion.

26
F. The Appropriate Remedy Is a Remand For Further Proceedings on
Perez’s Motion For Mental Health Diversion
As discussed above, the record establishes that Perez is eligible for
mental health diversion because he meets both eligibility requirements.
However, the trial court expressly did not consider the suitability criterion of
whether Perez would “pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety,
as defined in Section 1170.18, if treated in the community.” (§ 1001.36,
subd. (c)(4).) Further, to the extent it intended to exercise its residual
discretion, the trial court abused its discretion in failing to explain its reasons
for doing so.
Under those circumstances, the appropriate remedy is to conditionally
reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings on Perez’s motion
for mental health diversion. We express no opinion as to whether the trial
court should determine that Perez is suitable for diversion or as to how the
trial court should exercise its residual discretion. If the trial court grants the
motion, and Perez successfully completes diversion, then the trial court shall
dismiss the charges. (§ 1001.36, subd. (h).) However, if the court denies the
motion for mental health diversion, or if Perez does not successfully complete
diversion, then Perez’s guilty plea and sentence shall be reinstated. (See
Frahs, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 640–641 [setting forth the appropriate
appellate disposition when remanding for a retroactive consideration of
mental health diversion].)

27
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is conditionally reversed, and this matter is remanded
for further proceedings on Perez’s motion for mental health diversion. If the
trial court denies the motion for mental health diversion, or if it grants the
motion but Perez does not successfully complete diversion, Perez’s guilty plea
and sentence shall be reinstated.

KELETY, J.

WE CONCUR:

DO, Acting P. J.

CASTILLO, J.

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