Hoffman v. Fossa CA2/3

CourtListener 10862474Calctapp20.05.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 5/20/26 Hoffman v. Fossa CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

ISAIAH HOFFMAN, B347878

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24STCV29811)
v.

TRICIA FOSSA,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Jon Takasugi, Judge. Reversed in part,
affirmed in part, and remanded with directions.
PLC Law Group, Na’shaun L. Neal, Peter L. Carr, and
Lauren K. McRaae for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Law Office of Cleidin Z. Atanous, Cleidin Z. Atanous;
Bretoi, Lutz & Stele and Brian S. Dewey for Defendant and
Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

Plaintiff and appellant Isaiah Hoffman filed a complaint
against defendant and respondent Tricia Fossa on the final day of
the two-year limitations period for his personal injury claim. A
clerk of the trial court rejected the complaint the following day
because of a mistake on an addendum to the complaint’s cover
sheet. Hoffman refiled the complaint that same day and the
clerk accepted it the next day.
The trial court sustained demurrers to Hoffman’s original
and amended complaints on the ground that the applicable
limitations period had expired. We conclude the amended
complaint sufficiently alleged that the statute of limitations was
tolled pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1010.6,
subdivision (e)(4)(E) (section 1010.6(e)(4)(E)), and Hoffman filed
the complaint within the limitations period as tolled.1 The trial
court also sustained the demurrer to a bad faith insurance cause
of action against Fossa, on independent grounds. Hoffman does
not challenge this aspect of the trial court’s ruling on appeal.
We reverse in part, affirm in part, and remand with
instructions.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 12, 2022, Fossa’s car allegedly rear-ended
Hoffman’s car on the 110 freeway. On November 12, 2024,
Hoffman filed a complaint against Fossa, which asserted a cause
of action of general negligence and alleged that Hoffman
sustained injuries as a result of the car accident. Hoffman also

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Code of
Civil Procedure.

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asserted a cause of action against Mercury Insurance Company
(Mercury), which he later dismissed as a defendant.
The following day, the clerk of court rejected the complaint.
The “Notice of Court Rejection of Electronic Filing” (notice of
rejection) stated that the complaint had been electronically
submitted on November 12, 2024, and that the notice of rejection
was generated on November 13. The notice provided the
following reason for the rejection: “Per Cover Sheet Addendum
Step 4, case is a Class Action suit. If so, please resubmit and
select Spring Street Courthouse to ensure docs are routed to
proper workflow for timely processing.” Hoffman refiled the
complaint on November 13, 2024.
Fossa demurred to the complaint on the ground that it was
filed two years and one day after the accident occurred. Under
section 335.1, an action for injury caused by the neglect of
another must be brought within two years. The trial court
sustained the demurrer on the ground that it was bound by the
pleadings when ruling on a demurrer, and the complaint did not
allege any facts to support tolling the statute of limitations. The
court granted Hoffman leave to amend.
In the first amended complaint, under a heading titled
“TOLLING STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DUE TO COURT’S
ADMINISTRATIVE REJECTION,” Hoffman alleged he filed his
complaint on November 12, 2024; the clerk rejected it on
November 13; Hoffman refiled it on November 13; and the clerk
accepted it on November 14. He further alleged: “Therefore,
Plaintiff’s complaint was timely filed. See CCP § 1016(e)(4)(E).”2

2 Section 1016 has no subdivisions and states: “The foregoing
provisions of this Chapter do not apply to the service of a

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In addition to general negligence and motor vehicle personal
injury causes of action, the amended complaint asserted a cause
of action for bad faith insurance practices, nominally against
Fossa.
Fossa demurred to all causes of action on the ground that
the applicable statute of limitations had expired. Fossa argued
that section 1016 “has nothing to do with the issues at hand” and
did not establish the statute of limitations should be tolled.
Fossa also demurred to the bad faith insurance cause of action on
the ground that she is not an insurer.
Hoffman submitted a declaration attaching the notice of
rejection with his opposition. His opposition memorandum did
not cite section 1010.6(e)(4)(E) or address the bad faith insurance
cause of action. At the hearing on the demurrer, Hoffman’s
attorney argued the statute of limitations should be tolled
pursuant to section 1010.6(e)(4)(E), the text of which he quoted,
although he referred to it as “California Civil Procedure 1010.6,
. . . subsection 4(C).” Fossa’s attorney argued the trial court could
not consider the statute because Hoffman had not raised it in his
opposition papers.
In its order sustaining the demurrer, the trial court
observed that Hoffman had presumably intended to assert the
bad faith insurance cause of action against Mercury, rather than
Fossa, and concluded that Hoffman lacked standing to assert the
cause of action against Mercury. The court also sustained the
demurrer as to all causes of action without leave to amend on
statute of limitations grounds. It concluded that Hoffman “did

summons or other process, or of any paper to bring a party into
contempt.” Hoffman presumably intended to cite
section 1010.6(e)(4)(E).

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not allege any facts which could show the statute of limitations
was tolled for any reason.” The order did not address
section 1010.6(e)(4)(E).
The court dismissed the action and Hoffman timely
appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
“Because the function of a demurrer is to test the
sufficiency of a pleading as a matter of law, we apply the de novo
standard of review in an appeal following the sustaining of a
demurrer without leave to amend. [Citation.] We assume the
truth of the allegations in the complaint, but do not assume the
truth of contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law. [Citation.]
It is error for the trial court to sustain a demurrer if the plaintiff
has stated a cause of action under any possible legal theory . . . .”
(California Logistics, Inc. v. State of California (2008) 161
Cal.App.4th 242, 247.)
“ ‘ “Moreover, the allegations must be liberally construed
with a view to attaining substantial justice among the parties,” ’
and ‘ “[o]ur primary task is to determine whether the facts
alleged provide the basis for a cause of action . . . under any
theory.” ’ [Citation.]” (Packard v. Packard (2025) 108
Cal.App.5th 1284, 1290–1291.) “[T]he ‘any possible legal theory’
standard encompasses a legal theory presented for the first time
in an opening appellant’s brief” and “also includes legal theories
first raised by the reviewing court.” (Gutierrez v. Carmax Auto
Superstores California (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1234, 1244, 1245
(Gutierrez).)
In ruling on a demurrer, “[r]elevant matters that are
properly the subject of judicial notice may be treated as having

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been pled.” (Ross v. Creel Printing & Publishing Co. (2002) 100
Cal.App.4th 736, 742; § 430.30, subd. (a).) On our own motion,
we take judicial notice of the notice of rejection. (Evid. Code,
§§ 452, subd. (d), 455, subd. (a), 459, subds. (a), (b); Bai v. Yip
(2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 188, 194 [taking judicial notice of trial
court clerk’s rejection message as record of the court]).)
II. The Amended Complaint Sufficiently Pled The
Statute of Limitations Was Tolled
Hoffman contends that section 1010.6(e)(4)(E) applies to
toll the statute of limitations under the facts alleged in the
amended complaint.3 Although Hoffman failed to timely raise
this argument below, we may consider it. (Gutierrez, supra, 19
Cal.App.5th at p. 1244.) We conclude that the amended
complaint sufficiently pleads that the statute of limitations was
tolled. Accordingly, we do not reach Hoffman’s arguments that
the clerk of court erred in rejecting the original complaint and the
trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the original
complaint.
Section 1010.6, subdivision (e), states that “[a] trial court
may adopt local rules permitting electronic filing of documents,”
subject to enumerated conditions. Section 1010.6(e)(4)(E)
provides: “If the clerk of the court does not file a complaint or
cross complaint because the complaint or cross complaint does
not comply with applicable filing requirements or the required
filing fee has not been paid, any statute of limitations applicable
to the causes of action alleged in the complaint or cross complaint

3 Hoffman quotes the text of section 1010.6(e)(4)(E), but both
parties miscite the pertinent provision as “section 1010.6(i)(4)(E)”
in their appellate briefing. Despite the incorrect citation, the
arguments clearly pertain to section 1010.6(e)(4)(E).

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shall be tolled for the period beginning on the date on which the
court received the document and as shown on the confirmation of
receipt . . . , through the later of either the date on which the
clerk of the court sent the notice of rejection . . . or the date on
which the electronic filing service provider or electronic filing
manager sent the notice of rejection . . . , plus one additional day
if the complaint or cross complaint is subsequently submitted in a
form that corrects the errors which caused the document to be
rejected. The party filing the complaint or cross complaint shall
not make any change to the complaint or cross complaint other
than those required to correct the errors which caused the
document to be rejected.”
Here, the notice of rejection stated that the trial court clerk
rejected the complaint due to an error in the addendum to the
complaint’s cover sheet, which suggested that the action was a
class action, in which case Hoffman should have filed the
complaint at another courthouse pursuant to local filing
requirements. This is sufficient to establish that the trial court
clerk did not file the complaint because it did “not comply with
applicable filing requirements” for purposes of
section 1010.6(e)(4)(E).
The amended complaint alleged that Hoffman filed the
original complaint on November 12, 2024, the clerk rejected it on
November 13, Hoffman refiled it on November 13, and the clerk
accepted it on November 14. The notice of rejection likewise
states that the trial court received the complaint on November 12
and rejected it on November 13. Under section 1010.6(e)(4)(E),
the statute of limitations was tolled from November 12, “the date
on which the court received the document,” through November
13, “the date on which the clerk of the court sent the notice of

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rejection,” plus one additional day in light of Hoffman’s
submission of a corrected complaint—that is, until November 14.
Because the amended complaint alleges that the court accepted
the refiled complaint on November 14, and the complaint itself
shows that it was file-stamped November 13, the amended
complaint, together with the judicially noticeable notice of
rejection, sufficiently pleads that Hoffman filed the complaint
within the limitations period, as tolled by section 1010.6(e)(4)(E).
Fossa contends that, “[e]ven assuming Code of Civil
Procedure section 1010.6(i)(4)(E) [sic] can apply to the filing of an
initial complaint, the statute affords tolling only where the
operative pleading itself alleges facts showing that the court
received the document within the limitations period and that the
subsequent resubmission corrected the specific defect that caused
the rejection, allegations the First Amended Complaint does not
contain.” Because section 1010.6(e)(4)(E) expressly applies to “a
complaint,” without limitation, a plain reading of the statute
indicates that it applies to the filing of an initial complaint.
(People v. Toney (2004) 32 Cal.4th 228, 232 [where “statutory
language is unambiguous, ‘we presume the Legislature meant
what it said, and the plain meaning of the statute governs’ ”].)
Further, liberally construed, the allegation that the clerk
accepted the refiled complaint is sufficient to plead that Hoffman
“correct[ed] the errors which caused the document to be rejected,”
such that the statute of limitations was tolled until November 14,
2024. (§ 1010.6(e)(4)(E).) Even if it were not, the statute of
limitations was, at the very least, tolled until November 13, “the
date on which the clerk of the court sent the notice of rejection.”
(Ibid.) The original complaint was refiled on November 13.
Regardless of whether the statute of limitations was tolled until

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November 13 or 14, 2024, the complaint was timely filed. It was
therefore error to sustain the demurrer to the general negligence
and motor vehicle personal injury causes of action in the
amended complaint without leave to amend.
Hoffman does not challenge the trial court’s order
sustaining the demurrer to the bad faith insurance cause of
action against Fossa without leave to amend. We therefore
affirm that portion of the court’s order. (In re Marriage of
Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133; Shaw v. Los Angeles
Unified School Dist. (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 740, 754.)

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded to
the trial court with directions to vacate its order sustaining the
demurrer to the amended complaint. The court is directed to
enter a new order overruling the demurrer to the general
negligence and motor vehicle personal injury causes of action and
sustaining the demurrer to the bad faith insurance cause of
action without leave to amend. Hoffman shall recover his costs
on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

ADAMS, J.

We concur:

EGERTON, Acting P. J.

HANASONO, J.

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