CourtListener 10862465•Netes v. CHA Hollywood Medical Center CA2/3
Netes v. CHA Hollywood Medical Center CA2/3
CourtListener 10862465Calctapp20.05.2026
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 5/20/26 Netes v. CHA Hollywood Medical Center CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
ELLA NETES, B346636
Plaintiff and Appellant, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23CHCV00861
v.
ORDER MODIFYING OPINION
CHA HOLLYWOOD MEDICAL AND DENYING PETITION
CENTER, L.P., FOR REHEARING
[NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT]
Defendant and Respondent.
THE COURT:
It is ordered that the opinion filed on May 4, 2026, be
modified as follows:
1. On page 2, the second sentence of the first paragraph
is deleted, and the following is inserted in its place:
“Netes alleged a doctor at the hospital misdiagnosed her with
terminal kidney disease and she was improperly referred to
hospice care.”
2. On page 10, the second sentence of footnote 3 is
deleted, and the following is inserted in its place:
“The TAC alleges one of the signatories purported to be Netes’s
‘guardian and caregiver.’ Presumably, a guardian and caregiver
would have had authority to authorize disclosure. (See Civ. Code,
§ 56.11, subd. (b)(3)(B).)”
Appellant’s petition for rehearing, filed on May 14, 2026, is
denied.
There is no change in the judgment.
____________________________________________________________
EGERTON, J. EDMON, P. J. HANASONO, J.
2
Filed 5/4/26 Netes v. CHA Hollywood Medical Center CA2/3 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
ELLA NETES, B346636
Plaintiff and Appellant, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 23CHCV00861
CHA HOLLYWOOD MEDICAL
CENTER, L.P.,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEALS from a judgment and order of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, Andrew E. Cooper, Judge. Dismissed
in part and affirmed.
Ella Netes, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
La Follette Johnson Dehaas Fesler & Ames, Arthur A.
Zitsow, Mark B. Guterman and Jeffrey A. Rector for Defendant
and Respondent.
_________________________
Ella Netes filed a complaint against CHA Hollywood
Medical Center, L.P. (HMC) related to care she received
at HMC’s hospital. Netes alleged a doctor at the hospital
misdiagnosed her with terminal kidney disease and improperly
referred her to hospice care. Netes asserted HMC was directly
liable because it was responsible for the blood test result upon
which the doctor relied to make the misdiagnosis. Netes also
alleged HMC unlawfully disclosed her medical information to
the hospice provider. The trial court sustained HMC’s demurrer
to Netes’s third amended complaint without leave to amend and
dismissed the action. Netes filed a motion for reconsideration,
which the trial court denied. Netes appealed the judgment
and order denying her motion for reconsideration. We affirm
the judgment and dismiss Netes’s appeal of the order denying
her motion for reconsideration.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Netes’s claims
Netes filed the original complaint in this action in March
2023. She named as defendants HMC, three doctors, and a nurse
practitioner. Netes eventually dismissed all the defendants
except HMC. Netes voluntarily filed a first amended complaint,
and she filed two more amended complaints in response to
HMC’s demurrers.
Netes’s operative third amended complaint (TAC) alleges
the following: Netes was transferred from a skilled nursing
facility (SNF) to HMC’s emergency department on December 28,
2021. Netes was suffering severe lower abdominal pain in her
bladder area, an underactive bladder, and anemia. Nurses
in the emergency department told Netes her anemia was life
threatening and required a blood transfusion. The nurses
2
said patients with urinary retention often end up with severe
kidney diseases that require dialysis.
On December 28, 2021, Netes’s treating physician—
Dr. Imad El Asmar1—misdiagnosed her with “chronic kidney
disease stage 5.” Dr. El Asmar relied solely on a blood test report
showing “critical values” related to Netes’s kidneys. The blood
test results were not consistent with Netes’s “symptoms, signs,
and medical history,” and a urinalysis performed around the
same time showed her kidneys were functioning normally.
Dr. El Asmar also misdiagnosed Netes with early dementia
with psychotic features. Netes remained hospitalized for
several weeks and received two blood transfusions.
Netes was discharged from the hospital and released to
a board and care (B&C) facility on January 18, 2022. Netes’s
discharge documents “were signed by [an] unidentified guardian
and caregiver.” The discharge instructions recommended
“driving limitations,” which “triggered” a “car sale.”
Three days after Netes was discharged from HMC—on
January 21, 2022—a hospice nurse visited her at the B&C facility
and “communicated that H[ ]MC as ‘caregiver’ referred her to
hospice.” The referral was based on Dr. El Asmar’s “misdiagnosis
[of] chronic kidney disease stage 5” and medical records provided
by HMC. Netes became “functional” in March 2022 and
“initiated hospice discharge in May 2022.” Netes was discharged
from hospice two months later, in July 2022.
Netes asserted three causes of action against HMC.
In support of her first cause of action—“breach of duties;
1 Netes alleged Dr. El Asmar “was her [primary care
physician] prior to admission” to HMC.
3
misrepresentation of Plaintiff’s state of health”—Netes alleged
Dr. El Asmar misdiagnosed her with “chronic kidney disease
stage 5,” severe cardiac conditions, and several other diseases.
In support of her second cause of action—“improper referrals”—
Netes alleged Dr. El Asmar’s misdiagnosis caused a referral
to hospice and restrictions on her driving privileges. She also
alleged her request for a referral to an SNF covered by her
insurance “was denied.” In support of her third cause of action
—“violation of privacy right, and . . . unauthorized disclosure
of identifiable medical information”—Netes alleged an HMC
associate released her medical information to the hospice
provider without authorization. According to Netes, the
unauthorized disclosure violated the Confidentiality of Medical
Information Act (Civ. Code, § 56 et seq.). Netes sought $467,600
in compensatory damages.
2. HMC’s demurrer
HMC filed a demurrer to the TAC for failure to state a
cause of action and uncertainty. HMC argued Netes’s first cause
of action arose out of Dr. El Asmar’s alleged negligence, but Netes
failed to plead a viable theory of vicarious liability. According to
HMC, hospitals and physicians generally do not have an agency
relationship. HMC also argued Netes failed to allege causation,
because the TAC is “completely vague and uncertain regarding
what injury” HMC caused Netes to suffer.
HMC argued Netes’s second cause of action failed because
she did not allege HMC was responsible for the transfer to
hospice care. HMC noted physicians—not hospitals—decide
whether to transfer patients. HMC also noted Netes alleged she
was discharged from the hospital three days before she was
transferred to hospice care.
4
As to Netes’s third cause of action, HMC argued she failed
to allege facts showing its disclosure of medical information
to hospice was improper. HMC argued the disclosure fell within
the scope of Civil Code section 56.10, subdivision (c)(1), which
authorizes the disclosure of medical information “to providers
of health care . . . or other health care professionals or facilities
for purposes of diagnosis or treatment of the patient.”
In opposition to the demurrer, Netes argued she did not
seek to hold HMC vicariously liable for Dr. El Asmar’s actions.
Instead, she alleged HMC is directly liable for the blood test
results that Dr. El Asmar relied on for his misdiagnosis. Netes
suggested she also alleged “theft at H[ ]MC” as well as “damages
caused by release of records and discharge arrangements.”
The trial court considered the demurrer at a hearing on
March 14, 2025. Before the hearing, the court gave the parties a
tentative ruling sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend.
At the hearing, the court repeatedly asked Netes if she wanted
to address any issues raised by the demurrer or the tentative
ruling. Netes told the court she had new “facts to allege and
evidence to present” showing her causes of action are viable.
However, she did not want to present them to the court orally.
Instead, she would “put everything in writing” and present
her information in a “concise and clear fashion” in a motion
for reconsideration. The court adopted its tentative ruling
and sustained the demurrer without leave to amend.
3. Netes’s motion for reconsideration
A few days after the court sustained HMC’s demurrer to
the TAC, Netes filed a motion for reconsideration of the order.
Netes suggested reconsideration was warranted because she
5
discovered new evidence after filing her opposition to the
demurrer.
Netes stated her fourth amended complaint would “focus
on breach of fiduciary duties of confidentiality, loyalty, good faith,
actual fraud.” She asserted she would add new allegations that
HMC improperly rewarded Dr. El Asmar for referring her to
HMC, failed to inform her about the lack of insurance coverage,
required her to sign a release of information as a condition of
admission, made a “de-facto referral to hospice,” and “enabled
improper induction to hospice.” Netes asserted her damages
“were caused by discharge arrangements with unauthorized
release of identifiable medical information to hospice; theft
at H[ ]MC when Plaintiff’s condition was severe after [second]
blood transfusion, not having Plaintiff sign Admission
Assessment Inquiry.”
The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration.
The court stated Netes identified newly discovered evidence,
but she failed to explain why she did not present it earlier or
how it impacts the merits of her claims. The court noted it
gave Netes the opportunity to present her arguments at the
demurrer hearing in March 2025, but Netes insisted on filing
a motion for reconsideration instead.
The court entered judgment of dismissal for HMC.
Netes filed a timely notice of appeal. Netes’s notice states she
appeals both the judgment of dismissal and the “Motion for
Reconsideration, filed before judgment was entered.”
6
DISCUSSION
1. We dismiss Netes’s appeal of the motion for
reconsideration
Netes purports to appeal both the judgment of dismissal
and the trial court’s post-judgment order denying her motion for
reconsideration. An order denying a motion for reconsideration is
“not an appealable order under any circumstances.” (Association
for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (2008)
166 Cal.App.4th 1625, 1633; see Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (g)
[an “order denying a motion for reconsideration . . . is not
separately appealable”].) Therefore, we dismiss that portion of
Netes’s appeal. (See Association, at p. 1633.) However, we will
consider the arguments in Netes’s motion for reconsideration
to the extent they are relevant to her appeal of the judgment,
including whether she should be granted leave to file an amended
complaint. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (g) [the denial of
a motion for reconsideration is reviewable as part of an appeal
from an appealable order].)
2. The trial court properly sustained the demurrer
without leave to amend
We are mindful Netes represents herself on appeal, as
she did in the trial court. Nevertheless, she “ ‘is to be treated
like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater
consideration than other litigants and attorneys.’ ” (First
American Title Co. v. Mirzaian (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 956, 958,
fn. 1; see Simms v. Bear Valley Community Healthcare Dist.
(2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 391, 406, fn. 5 [self-represented party is
“held to the same standard of knowledge of law and procedure
as an attorney”].) Thus, she is bound by the fundamental rule of
appellate review that an appealed judgment or order is presumed
7
correct, and error must be affirmatively shown. (Jameson v.
Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609; Denham v. Superior Court
of Los Angeles County (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) The party
asserting trial court error may not rest on the bare assertion
of error but must present argument and legal authority on
each point raised. (Hernandez v. First Student, Inc. (2019) 37
Cal.App.5th 270, 277; Lee v. Kim (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 705, 721.)
Accordingly, “[w]hen an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts
it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations
to authority, we treat the point as forfeited.” (Delta Stewardship
Council Cases (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 1014, 1075 (Delta); WFG
National Title Ins. Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2020) 51
Cal.App.5th 881, 894; see also Flores v. Department of Corrections
& Rehabilitation (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 199, 205 [explaining
these “same rules apply to a party appearing in propria persona
as to any other party”].)
In reviewing a judgment of dismissal after a trial court
has sustained a demurrer, “we examine the operative complaint
de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state
a cause of action under any legal theory.” (T.H. v. Novartis
Pharmaceuticals Corp. (2017) 4 Cal.5th 145, 162.) “We ‘assume
the truth of all facts properly pleaded by the plaintiffs, as well
as those that are judicially noticeable.’ ” (Hanouchian v. Steele
(2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 99, 106.) Even though the trial court’s
order sustaining the demurrer is subject to this court’s de novo
review, the standard of review does not relieve Netes of her
burden to demonstrate error. (See Bains v. Moores (2009)
172 Cal.App.4th 445, 455 (Bains).)
Netes has not met her burden here. As best we can tell,
Netes’s first and second causes of action—for “misrepresentation
8
of Plaintiff’s state of health” and “improper referrals”—are
premised on the allegation that Dr. El Asmar misdiagnosed
Netes with “chronic kidney disease stage 5.” That misdiagnosis
allegedly led to an unnecessary referral to a B&C facility
and then to Samaritan Hospice Care—rather than to Netes’s
preferred SNF—which caused Netes to suffer damages.2 These
are essentially medical negligence claims. The elements of a
medical negligence claim are “(1) the duty of the professional
to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as other members
of his profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a breach
of that duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the
negligent conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual
loss or damage resulting from the professional’s negligence.”
(Turpin v. Sortini (1982) 31 Cal.3d 220, 229–230.)
Although not clear from the TAC itself, Netes clarified
in opposition to HMC’s demurrer that she did not seek to hold
HMC vicariously liable for Dr. El Asmar’s conduct. Instead, she
claimed HMC is directly liable for the misdiagnosis and referrals
because its staff and laboratory were responsible for the blood
test report upon which Dr. El Asmar relied.
Contrary to Netes’s contentions, the fact that Dr. El Asmar
relied on the blood test report is not sufficient to establish HMC’s
liability. To state a cause of action against HMC, Netes must
allege all the elements of a medical negligence claim as to HMC
specifically. The TAC does not allege HMC or its agents breached
a duty while performing the blood test or generating the report.
2 The TAC also alleges violations of regulations related to
patient rights, admissions, transfers, and discharges. Netes does
not meaningfully address those allegations on appeal, so we do
not consider them. (See Delta, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 1075.)
9
Because breach of duty is a required element of a negligence
claim, Netes’s first two causes of action fail.
Netes’s third cause of action—for “violation of privacy
right, and . . . unauthorized disclosure of identifiable medical
information”—also fails. The TAC alleges HMC violated
the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act by disclosing
Netes’s medical information to Samaritan Hospice Care without
authorization.3 The Confidentiality of Medical Information Act
generally prohibits medical providers from disclosing a patient’s
medical information “without first obtaining an authorization.”
(Civ. Code, § 56.10, subd. (a).) However, there are exceptions
to the general rule. For example, a medical provider need not
obtain authorization to disclose medical information to “providers
of health care, health care service plans, contractors, or other
health care professionals or facilities for purposes of diagnosis
or treatment of the patient.” (Id., subd. (c)(1).)
In its demurrer, HMC asserted the TAC alleges its
disclosure to Samaritan Hospice Care was for the purpose of
providing medical care. Therefore, HMC argued, it did not need
authorization to disclose Netes’s information and did not violate
the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act. The trial court
agreed, noting Netes did not address HMC’s argument in
opposition to the demurrer. Netes does not meaningfully address
3 The TAC also alleges HMC improperly disclosed Netes’s
medical information to “unidentified signatories” of her discharge
documents. The TAC alleges one of the signatories was Netes’s
legal guardian, who would have had authority to authorize
disclosure. (See Civ. Code, § 56.11, subd. (b)(3)(B).) Although
not entirely clear, Netes seems to concede the only other
signatory was an HMC nurse. Netes does not explain how
this violated the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act.
10
the issue on appeal, either. Accordingly, she has not shown
the trial court erred by sustaining the demurrer on this ground.
(See Delta, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 1075; Bains, supra, 172
Cal.App.4th at p. 455.)
Nor has Netes shown the trial court abused its discretion
when it sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. When
a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, “we decide
whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be
cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial court has abused
its discretion and we reverse; if not, there has been no abuse
of discretion and we affirm. [Citations.] The burden of proving
such reasonable possibility is squarely on the plaintiff.” (Blank
v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The plaintiff can make
the requisite showing for the first time on appeal. (City of
Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 746.)
Netes does not meaningfully explain how she could
amend her complaint to resolve the issues discussed above.
Instead, she suggests she would add new allegations that HMC
committed fraud—rather than negligence—by falsifying the
blood test report, presenting a “false record of Acknowledgment
for receipt of information for hospice treatment authorization
. . . dated 1/20/2022,” and “falsely claim[ing] legitimate records
disclosure to non-existent hospice facility.” Netes’s conclusory
allegations do not meet the particularity requirement for
fraud claims. (See Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana Corp.
(2004) 34 Cal.4th 979, 993 [fraud claims must be pleaded with
particularity].) Accordingly, they do not warrant granting
her leave to amend her complaint.
The same is true of the various other theories of liability
Netes has raised. Netes has suggested HMC is liable for
11
rewarding Dr. El Asmar for referring her to HMC, failing to
inform her that insurance would not cover her care, the theft of
her property while hospitalized, requiring her to sign a release
of information as a condition of admission, making a “de-facto
referral to hospice,” and enabling “improper induction to hospice.”
Netes does not clearly set out the factual and legal support
for any of these theories. While we are mindful that Netes
is representing herself, it is not our role to serve as “ ‘backup
appellate counsel’ ” and make Netes’s arguments for her. (Inyo
Citizens for Better Planning v. Inyo County Bd. of Supervisors
(2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1, 14; see Mansell v. Board of
Administration (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 539, 546.)
12
DISPOSITION
We dismiss Ella Netes’s appeal of the order denying her
motion for reconsideration. We affirm the judgment. HMC shall
recover its costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
EGERTON, J.
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
HANASONO, J.
13
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