People v. Quintana CA2/8

CourtListener 10862460Calctapp20.05.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 5/20/26 P. v. Quintana CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE, B337724

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA357016)
v.

DAVID QUINTANA,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Kevin Stennis, Judge. Affirmed.

George Gascón and Nathan J. Hochman, District
Attorneys, Tracey Whitney, Jeffrey Herring, and Byron Beck,
Deputy District Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Ricardo D. Garcia, Public Defender, Albert J. Menaster and
Lydia Marquez, Deputy Public Defenders, for Defendant and
Respondent.
_______________________
Pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1172.6, the trial court
resentenced David Quintana. The People appeal. We affirm.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2011, a jury found Quintana not guilty of first degree
murder but guilty of second degree murder in the death of Brian
Maciel. Additionally, the jury found true special allegations that
the crime was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)) and that a principal personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm causing death. (§ 12022.53,
subd. (d).) The trial court sentenced Quintana to 15 years to life
on the second degree murder conviction, imposed a consecutive
term of 25 years to life on the firearm enhancement, and stayed
the gang enhancement. In a prior consolidated appeal, we
affirmed the judgment of conviction. (People v. Frias (Jan. 8,
2013, B233209, B232987) [nonpub. opn.].)
In 2019, Quintana filed a petition for resentencing
pursuant to newly enacted section 1170.95 (now § 1172.6). The
petition was denied, and we affirmed the court’s order. (People v.
Quintana (Aug. 11, 2020, B299286) [nonpub. opn.].)
In June 2022, after the resentencing statute was amended,
Quintana filed a new resentencing petition. The trial court
received briefing from the parties and held a prima facie hearing
on October 19, 2023. The court concluded Quintana had made a
prima facie case of eligibility for relief and set an evidentiary
hearing.

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
The evidentiary hearing took place on February 13, 2024.
The People did not present new evidence at the evidentiary
hearing, relying on the transcripts of the jury trial. Quintana
presented a recorded interview by police.
After argument, the court stated it had read the record of
the trial, including sidebar conferences, opening statements and
closing arguments, with knowledge of what evidence it could
consider in its review. The court found the People had not met
their burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Quintana
was guilty of Maciel’s murder as an aider and abettor and found
Quintana eligible for resentencing relief under section 1172.6.
The court amended the information by interlineation,
imposed the high term sentence of three years in state prison for
a felony violation of section 32, and dismissed the two sentence
enhancements pursuant to section 1385. Quintana’s actual
custody credits far exceeded his new sentence and he was
released from prison. The People appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Applicable Law
“The Legislature enacted Senate Bill 1437 ‘to more
equitably sentence offenders in accordance with their
involvement in homicides.’ (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1(b).) The
Legislature recognized, ‘It is a bedrock principle of the law and of
equity that a person should be punished for his or her actions
according to his or her own level of individual culpability.’ (Id.,
§ 1(d).) With this purpose in mind, Senate Bill 1437 ‘amend[ed]
the felony murder rule and the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that
murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual

3
killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major
participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless
indifference to human life.’ (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1(f).)
Outside of the felony-murder rule, ‘a conviction for murder
requires that a person act with malice aforethought. A person’s
culpability for murder must be premised upon that person’s own
actions and subjective mens rea.’ (Id., § 1(g).)
“Senate Bill 1437 altered the substantive law of murder in
two areas. First, with certain exceptions, it narrowed the
application of the felony-murder rule by adding section 189,
subdivision (e) to the Penal Code. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 3.)
Under that provision, ‘A participant in the perpetration or
attempted perpetration of a [specified felony] in which a death
occurs is liable for murder only if one of the following is proven:
[¶] (1) The person was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was
not the actual killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted,
counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted
the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree.
[¶] (3) The person was a major participant in the underlying
felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as
described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.’ (§ 189, subd. (e).)
“Second, Senate Bill 1437 imposed a new requirement that,
except in cases of felony murder, ‘a principal in a crime shall act
with malice aforethought’ to be convicted of murder. (§ 188, subd.
(a)(3).) ‘Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on
his or her participation in a crime.’ (Ibid.) One effect of this
requirement was to eliminate liability for murder as an aider and
abettor under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.”
(People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448–449 (Curiel).)

4
“Senate Bill 1437 also enacted former section 1170.95,
which created a procedural mechanism ‘for those convicted of
felony murder or murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine to seek relief’ where the two substantive
changes described above affect a defendant’s conviction. . . . Two
years later, the Legislature amended the statute to expand the
population of eligible offenders, codify certain aspects of [the
Supreme Court’s] decision in [People v.] Lewis [(2021) 11 Cal.5th
952 (Lewis)], and clarify the procedure and burden of proof at the
evidentiary hearing stage of proceedings. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551,
§ 1.) One year after that, former section 1170.95 was
renumbered as section 1172.6 without substantive change.”
(Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 449.)
Under section 1172.6, a “person convicted of felony murder
or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine
or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based
solely on that person’s participation in a crime, attempted
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or
manslaughter may file a petition with the court that sentenced
the petitioner to have the petitioner’s murder, attempted murder,
or manslaughter conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any
remaining counts.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) “[T]he process begins
with the filing of a petition containing a declaration that all
requirements for eligibility are met (id., subd. (b)(1)(A)),
including that ‘[t]he petitioner could not presently be convicted of
murder or attempted murder because of changes to [Penal Code]
Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019,’ the effective
date of Senate Bill 1437.” (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th
698, 708 (Strong).)

5
“ ‘When the trial court receives a petition containing the
necessary declaration and other required information, the court
must evaluate the petition “to determine whether the petitioner
has made a prima facie case for relief.” ’ ” (Curiel, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 450.) At the prima facie stage, the trial court is
permitted to examine the record of conviction to assess whether it
refutes the petitioner’s claim of eligibility. (Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at pp. 970–972.) Although the court must generally
take the petitioner’s factual allegations as true, it is not required
to accept factual allegations that are conclusively refuted by the
record of conviction, including the court’s own documents. (Id. at
p. 971.) The court, however, may not engage in “ ‘factfinding
involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ ”
(Id. at p. 972.) “[T]he ‘prima facie bar was intentionally and
correctly set very low’ ” (ibid.), and the court “may deny the
petition at the prima facie stage only if the record of conviction
conclusively establishes that the petitioner is ineligible for relief
as a matter of law.” (People v. Gaillard (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th
1206, 1211 (Gaillard); see Lewis, at pp. 971–972.) “ ‘If, instead,
the defendant has made a prima facie showing of entitlement to
relief, “the court shall issue an order to show cause.” ’ ” (Curiel,
at p. 450; see § 1172.6, subd. (c).)
If an order to show cause issues, “the court shall hold a
hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder, attempted
murder, or manslaughter conviction and to recall the sentence
and resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts in the
same manner as if the petitioner had not previously been
sentenced, provided that the new sentence, if any, is not greater
than the initial sentence.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(1).)

6
At the evidentiary hearing, the prosecution must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner is “guilty of murder
or attempted murder under California law as amended by the
changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) “The admission of evidence in the hearing
shall be governed by the Evidence Code, except that the court
may consider evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing
or trial that is admissible under current law, including witness
testimony, stipulated evidence, and matters judicially noticed.
The court may also consider the procedural history of the case
recited in any prior appellate opinion. However, hearsay
evidence that was admitted in a preliminary hearing pursuant to
subdivision (b) of Section 872 shall be excluded from the hearing
as hearsay, unless the evidence is admissible pursuant to another
exception to the hearsay rule. The prosecutor and the petitioner
may also offer new or additional evidence to meet their respective
burdens. A finding that there is substantial evidence to support
a conviction for murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter is
insufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
petitioner is ineligible for resentencing. If the prosecution fails to
sustain its burden of proof, the prior conviction, and any
allegations and enhancements attached to the conviction, shall be
vacated and the petitioner shall be resentenced on the remaining
charges.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
II. Prima Facie Stage
We are greatly hampered in addressing the People’s
arguments on appeal by deficiencies in their briefing. Although
the People state this case presents three issues on appeal, their
opening brief includes only two arguments. It appears their first
argument is meant to encompass two alleged trial court errors,

7
one pertaining to the court’s ruling that Quintana had made a
prima facie case under section 1172.6, subdivision (c) and the
other concerning the ruling made after the evidentiary hearing
held pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3). This violates
the People’s duty to separately identify each assertion of error
under an appropriate heading (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.204(a)(1)(B)) and undermines our review. (Martine v. Heavenly
Valley Limited Partnership (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 715, 728;
People v. Roscoe (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 829, 840 [rule
8.204(a)(1)(B) is a matter of fairness to the respondent and the
court].) “When a potential issue or argument is not presented to
an appellate court in a separate heading or subheading, that
issue or argument is deemed forfeited.” (Phillips v. Honeywell
Internat. Inc. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1061, 1077; Foster v. Britton
(2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 920, 928, fn. 6.)
In the interest of justice, we address the People’s
arguments to the extent they are identifiable and include
“ ‘meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority
and citations to facts in the record that support the claim of
error.’ ” (In re M.V. (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 486, 518.) To the
extent we fail to address a point made in the opening brief, the
issue is treated as forfeited.
The People challenge the judgment by arguing the trial
court erred in finding Quintana made a prima facie showing
entitling him to an evidentiary hearing. In response to
Quintana’s argument that the People forfeited their challenge to
the prima facie determination by not seeking writ review of that
ruling, the People assert if they had sought writ review, they
“undoubtedly” would have encountered a “ ‘two-step’ ” problem of
the kind described in People v. Montellano (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th

8
148. In Montellano, which considered the appealability of an
initial order in an analogous Three Strikes resentencing scheme
under section 1170.126, the Court of Appeal determined the first
hearing in that two-step process is not separately appealable.
(Montellano, at p. 157.) From this, the People conclude that if
they had appealed the order to show cause, it would have been
deemed not directly appealable. This is likely true, but it does
not mean they could not seek writ review. Indeed, in the section
1170.126 context to which the People analogize, it is established
that a writ petition is the preferred method for the People to
challenge the first-step order that a defendant is eligible for
resentencing. (People v. Superior Court (Martinez) (2014)
225 Cal.App.4th 979, 988 (Martinez); see also Couzens & Bigelow,
Cal. Three Strikes Sentencing (The Rutter Group 2024) § 14:13
[“If the prosecution disagrees with a trial court’s determination of
eligibility for resentencing, the proper remedy is to pursue a writ
of mandate in the appellate court”].)
The People describe the argument that writ review is the
appropriate vehicle for seeking review of the order finding a
prima facie case and setting an evidentiary hearing as a “novel
view” that is “inconsistent with the basic tenet of appellate
practice,” to wit, that writ review is available only when a party
demonstrates the inadequacy of the appellate remedy. But again
looking at the section 1170.126 context, the Court of Appeal
explained the first-step order there is best challenged by writ
because, “[s]ignificantly, an appeal is not a plain, speedy, or
adequate remedy under the circumstances” for an erroneous first-
step ruling. (Martinez, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at p. 988.) We see
no reason, and the People provide none, why the same analysis
would not apply here. Just as with section 1170.126

9
resentencing, under section 1172.6 resentencing the People and
the petitioner “both have a substantial interest in prompt
resolution of the matter” (Martinez, at p. 988), and attempting to
undo a post-evidentiary hearing resentencing order by
challenging an earlier ruling ordering the hearing does not
promote prompt resolution or efficient use of resources. The
People should have sought writ review of the order to show cause
rather than belatedly seeking to overturn the court’s ruling at the
evidentiary hearing by arguing an earlier ruling was incorrect.
But even if the prima facie finding and order to show cause
are reviewable on appeal from the ultimate resentencing order,
the People have not established error here. The People do not
discuss the record of conviction or demonstrate that the materials
properly considered at the prima facie hearing “establish
conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief.” (Strong,
supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.) Instead they present a series of
contentions that switch between the prima facie hearing and the
evidentiary hearing without explanation.
The People argue the trial court misread Curiel, supra,
15 Cal.5th 433, and assert this case is unlike Curiel because the
jury here was not instructed on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, the felony murder doctrine, or an imputed
malice theory. The People fail to include any citation to the trial
court’s discussion of Curiel, much less a particularized argument
explaining how the court’s references to Curiel at the evidentiary
hearing show that it “misread” that opinion or made any
analytical error. It is the duty of counsel to refer the reviewing
court to the portion of the record which supports appellant’s
contentions on appeal, and the failure to do so allows us to treat

10
the points as waived. (People v. Wong (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th
1433, 1446, fn. 9.)
The People’s attempt to distinguish Curiel does not
establish error here. In his petition, Quintana challenged the
jury instruction read to the jury that “[u]nder the circumstances,
if the evidence establishes aiding and abetting one crime, a
person may also be found guilty of other crimes that occurred
during the commission of the first crime.” He argued this
instruction allowed the jury to find him guilty of murder by
imputing malice if the jury found he intended to aid and abet an
assault. The People do not address this argument or
demonstrate it was foreclosed by Curiel. The People’s argument
fails to show the record of conviction conclusively established
Quintana was ineligible for relief as a matter of law. (See
Gaillard, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 1211; Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at pp. 971–972.)
The People quote from the trial court’s 2019 ruling and the
Court of Appeal’s 2020 opinion finding Quintana failed to make a
prima facie case in his first petition for resentencing. Both
courts, however, were applying an earlier version of the
resentencing statute that limited eligibility for resentencing to
convictions for felony murder or murder on a natural and
probable consequences theory. (People v. Quintana, supra,
B299286; former § 1170.95, subd. (a).) The statute has since been
amended by Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats.
2021, ch. 551) to expand eligibility for resentencing to convictions
based on any “other theory under which malice is imputed to a
person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) The People fail to acknowledge this
intervening change in the law or to present argument and

11
authority showing how these opinions demonstrate the trial court
erred.
The People next assert the court’s prima facie finding was
in error because Quintana “failed to articulate any theory of
murder liability that was impacted by recent changes in the law.”
We disagree. Quintana argued in the trial court that the gang
evidence and jury instructions allowed the jury to convict him of
murder by imputing malice to him based on his intent to aid and
abet an assault. The People correctly observe a “petitioner is
ineligible for relief as a matter of law if the record of conviction
shows that a defendant was not convicted under any theory of
liability affected by the statutory amendments,” but they neither
address Quintana’s argument that his murder conviction may
have been based on imputed malice nor show how the record of
conviction conclusively demonstrates he was not convicted of
murder based on a now-invalid theory.
The People continue, “[I]f the jury instructions show—as
they did in this case—that the jury was not instructed on either
the natural and probable consequences or felony murder
doctrines—then the petition should be denied without issuance of
an order to show cause,” citing People v. Daniel (2020)
57 Cal.App.5th 666, 677. However, this is no longer an accurate
statement of the law because the statute was amended in 2021 by
Senate Bill No. 775.
The People accurately state that a court is justified in
making credibility determinations adverse to the petitioner at the
prima facie review when the court’s own documents include facts
that refute the petition’s allegations, citing Lewis, but they fail to
explain how that general principle applies here or to demonstrate
the record of conviction conclusively refuted Quintana’s

12
allegations. An appellant must offer argument as to how the
court erred, rather than citing general principles of law without
applying them to the circumstances before the court. (Landry v.
Berryessa Union School Dist. (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 691, 699.)
The People conclude their argument by stating, “In
granting the petition, the trial court in this case appeared to
believe that the Defendant could not be convicted of murder as
the law stands today. In reaching that conclusion, however, the
court identified no disqualified theory of liability used to reach
the verdict. The court accordingly erred in finding that the
Petitioner had made a prima facie showing entitling him to an
evidentiary hearing.” (Fn. omitted.)
These three sentences contain multiple misconceptions.
First, in granting the petition, the trial court expressly found the
People failed to carry their burden of proof at the evidentiary
hearing, and the People have not directed us to anywhere in the
record where the court stated Quintana could not be convicted of
murder as the law stands today. Second, the People offer no
argument or citation to authority to support the view that the
court was required to identify a “disqualified theory of liability
used to reach the verdict,” nor are we aware of any. Rather,
section 1172.6 obligates the trial court to make a preliminary
assessment of the petitioner’s prima facie showing and determine
whether, if true, it would entitle the petitioner to relief. Then, at
the evidentiary hearing, the trial court must decide whether the
People have carried their burden to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the petitioner is guilty of murder under present law.
(§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d)(3).) Third, the People do not explain, and
we cannot imagine, how an alleged error in granting the petition

13
after an evidentiary hearing logically could have any bearing on
the correctness of its earlier ruling at the prima facie stage.
III. The Evidentiary Hearing
The People begin their discussion of the evidentiary
hearing by asserting, without citation to authority, that at a
“properly granted” evidentiary hearing, the trial court may
“evaluate the evidence supporting a conviction, the jury
instructions and findings of fact to determine whether the
conviction resulted from reliance on an invalidated theory.” This
is not what the trial court does at the evidentiary hearing.
“Senate Bill No. 775 . . . clarified that the trial court’s role in a
section 1172.6 [evidentiary hearing] is to act as an independent
fact finder and determine, in the first instance, whether the
petitioner committed murder under the law as amended by
Senate Bill No. 1437.” (People v. Trent (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th
251, 258 (Trent); see § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3) [the prosecution must
“prove[] beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of
murder or attempted murder under California law as amended
by the changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1,
2019”].)
The People’s remaining arguments fail because they flow
from this misconception of the court’s task at the evidentiary
hearing. The People assert the trial court exceeded its “mandate”
to determine whether the conviction resulted from reliance on an
invalidated theory, but as discussed above, that is not the court’s
function at the evidentiary hearing. They argue the court erred
by reweighing the evidence “despite a Court of Appeal opinion
that previously affirmed the verdict and found the evidence to be
sufficient,” but section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) permits the trial
court to consider only the procedural history of a case from a

14
prior appellate opinion; the Court of Appeal’s 2013 opinion on
Quintana’s direct appeal predated by many years the major
changes to California homicide law and the creation of the
resentencing process; and whether there was substantial
evidence to support Quintana’s conviction is not the inquiry at
the evidentiary hearing: “A finding that there is substantial
evidence to support a conviction for murder . . . is insufficient to
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is ineligible
for resentencing.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
Finally, the People fault the trial court for “overr[iding] the
trier of fact,” “relitigat[ing] the evidence,” “adopt[ing] a set of
inferences that differed from those drawn by the jury,” and
accepting Quintana’s statement to detectives as true when the
jury evidently did not. They argue the trial court “erred
egregiously” when it “reached its own de novo ‘reasonable doubt’
determination” and granted the petition. However, at the
evidentiary hearing “the People are required to establish the
defendant is guilty under current law as a matter of fact and
beyond a reasonable doubt” (People v. Clements (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 276, 296), and the trial court must “act as an
independent fact finder and determine, in the first instance,
whether the petitioner committed murder under the law as
amended by Senate Bill No. 1437.” (Trent, supra,
112 Cal.App.5th at p. 258; see § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) The People
have not established error.

15
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

WILEY, J.

VIRAMONTES, J.

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