CourtListener 10862459•People v. Ramirez CA2/8
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 5/20/26 P. v. Ramirez CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B340027
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. LA099565)
v.
GIOVANNI RAMIREZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Joseph A. Brandolino, Judge. Affirmed.
Patricia S. Lai, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Chung L. Mar, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
The trial court revoked Giovanni Ramirez’s probation after
finding he failed to report to the probation department and failed
to participate in a required drug treatment program. Ramirez
contends the court’s findings improperly relied on hearsay,
namely facts recounted in a probation report and a letter from
the drug treatment program. We conclude the court reasonably
considered this hearsay and affirm.
BACKGROUND
On December 14, 2023, Ramirez pleaded no contest to
second degree burglary of a vehicle (Pen. Code, § 459) and
admitted several potentially sentence-enhancing allegations. The
trial court imposed an upper term sentence of three years, but
suspended execution of that sentence and placed Ramirez on
formal probation for two years.
As conditions of probation, Ramirez had to report to the
probation department within 48 hours of release from custody
and cooperate in a plan for drug treatment, including 12 months
at a Salvation Army residential program. Ramirez was to be
released only for transportation to the residential program or to a
representative of Recovery Network Resource (RNR) for such
transportation.
Several months later, in July 2024, the probation
department recommended revocation of Ramirez’s probation and
execution of the previously pronounced sentence. According to
probation officer Helen Pagan’s written report, which she filed
with the trial court, Ramirez failed to report to the department
within 48 hours of release and failed to cooperate in the plan for
drug treatment through the Salvation Army residential program.
As to the treatment program, Ramirez had refused to attend
intake. When interviewing Ramirez, the probation officer asked
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Ramirez why he refused to enroll. Ramirez stated he had
resumed using narcotics following his mother’s recent death but
was now willing to enroll and complete the program. The
probation report cited a letter from Perry Zimmerman of RNR
that he had previously prepared for, and filed with, the trial
court. The letter stated when Ramirez was released to RNR, he
informed RNR’s driver he did not intend to go to the program.
Despite the driver’s attempt to persuade Ramirez to enroll,
Ramirez refused and walked away. The probation report
referenced other alleged violations, but they are not at issue.
The trial court held a probation violation hearing on July
23, 2024. Probation officer Lauro Mendoza, who did not author
Ramirez’s probation report, testified regarding the two alleged
violations that are at issue. Mendoza stated that Ramirez did not
complete the Salvation Army residential treatment program.
Mendoza referenced probation officer Pagan’s report and an
electronic entry in a Justice Department portal indicating
Ramirez had not completed the program. Defense counsel then
objected on hearsay grounds and moved to strike. The court
thought “it [was] hearsay” but believed it was “allowable” and
overruled the objection. The court also noted it had the
underlying probation report and letter from RNR. Mendoza then
testified, based on the documents he had reviewed, that Ramirez
had not reported to the probation department within 48 hours
upon release from custody, and in fact had never reported to the
probation department for this case. Defense counsel did not raise
any further objection.
The court found Ramirez had violated both asserted
conditions of probation. It then revoked probation and imposed
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the previously suspended three-year prison sentence. Ramirez
timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Ramirez seeks reversal because the only evidence of his
probation violations, he argues, was inadmissible hearsay. The
evidence he challenges, however, is the sort of hearsay arising
from documentary evidence that courts admit, consistent with
due process, at probation revocation proceedings.
“Although probation violation hearings involve the criminal
justice system, they are not governed by all the procedural
safeguards of a criminal trial.” (People v. Abrams (2007) 158
Cal.App.4th 396, 400 (Abrams).) The right to confront witnesses
is “ ‘not absolute’ ” (People v. Arreola (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1144, 1156
(Arreola).) Where “ ‘ “appropriate,” witnesses may give evidence
by document, affidavit or deposition.’ ” (People v. Maki (1985) 39
Cal.3d 707, 710 (Maki).) “ ‘[D]ocumentary hearsay evidence
which does not fall within an exception to the hearsay rule may
be admitted if there are sufficient indicia of reliability regarding
the proffered material,’ even if the trial court makes no finding of
good cause to deny the right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses.” (People v. Gray (2023) 15 Cal.5th 152, 165 (Gray).)
The cases draw a distinction between testimonial hearsay
and routine documentary evidence. Where evidence consists of a
witness’s account of disputed events — turning on perception,
memory, and credibility — cross-examination can “ ‘ “ensur[e] the
integrity of the factfinding process.” ’ ” (Arreola, supra, 7 Cal.4th
at pp. 1157–1159; People v. Winson (1981) 29 Cal.3d 711, 717
(Winson).) By contrast, where testimony is based on routine
records, the witness “ordinarily would be unable to recall from
actual memory” the underlying events and would “rely instead
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upon the record,” making demeanor not a significant factor in
assessing reliability. (Arreola, at p. 1157.)
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Winson, supra, 29 Cal.3d
711 and Maki, supra, 39 Cal.3d 707 are illustrative. In Winson,
the court held a preliminary hearing transcript is “not a proper
substitute for the live testimony of the witness at defendant’s
probation revocation hearing in the absence of the declarant’s
unavailability or other good cause.” (Winson, supra, 29 Cal.3d at
pp. 713–714.) The hearsay in that report was a witness’s account
of an attack giving rise to the alleged probation violation. The
witness had testified that the defendant “grabbed him from
behind, shoved him against a wall, and demanded money . . .
then drew a knife . . . [and] cut the victim along the jaw and
stabbed him in the back of the head.” (Id. at p. 714.) The
witness’s perception and credibility were at issue and thus,
absent good cause, defendant could not be denied cross-
examination. (Id. at p. 719.)
Maki evaluated a different type of evidence. (Maki, supra,
39 Cal.3d 707 at p. 709.) The prosecution introduced a rental car
invoice bearing the defendant’s signature and a corroborating
hotel receipt, which together purportedly showed the defendant
had traveled out of state in violation of a probation condition.
(Ibid.) Although the documents did not fall within a traditional
hearsay exception, the court held they were nonetheless
admissible because they bore “sufficient indicia of reliability” and
were uncontradicted, making them a proper basis for finding a
violation even in the absence of live testimony. (Id. at pp. 709,
717.) The court recognized that revocation proceedings permit
proof of noncompliance through documentary evidence that
provides a “substantial guarantee of trustworthiness.” (Id. at p.
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715.) In reaching that conclusion, the court explained that
reliable documentary evidence may establish a violation without
the testimony of a percipient witness, because such evidence
reflects objective facts rather than disputed observations. (Id. at
pp. 715–717.)
In Arreola, supra, 7 Cal.4th 1144, the court clarified that
Winson and Maki illuminate the “evident distinction between a
transcript of former live testimony and the type of traditional
‘documentary’ evidence involved in Maki that does not have, as
its source, live testimony.” (Arreola, at p. 1157; Gray, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 167 [reiterating this distinction].)
We find Abrams, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th 396 particularly
helpful in addressing the evidence Ramirez challenges. There, as
here, a probation officer testified based on another officer’s report
and probation department records that the defendant had not
reported to probation within 48 hours of release. (Id. at p. 404.)
The court deemed this hearsay admissible because it concerned
“routine matters such as the making and keeping of probation
appointments, restitution and other payments, and similar
records of events of which the probation officer is not likely to
have personal recollection and as to which the officer ‘would rely
instead upon the record of his or her own action.’ ” (Id. at p. 405.)
The court further explained that requiring the absent officer to
testify “likely would not have added anything to the truth-
furthering process, because he would be testifying to a negative”
— that the defendant had not complied with the required
probation conditions. (Id. at pp. 404–405.) In reaching this
result, Abrams noted how Maki had approvingly cited United
States v. McCallum (4th Cir. 1982) 677 F.2d 1024, 1026, in which
a probation officer was permitted to “testif[y] to the receipt of a
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letter from the Salvation Army explaining that the defendant had
been expelled from its program.” (Abrams, at p. 402, fn. 3.)
Abrams also relied on People v. O’Connell (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th
1062, in which “the Third District affirmed the admission into
evidence of a report from a drug treatment program recounting
the defendant’s absences from counseling sessions.” (Abrams, at
p. 403.)
This case is like Abrams. There, as here, the alleged
violations consisted of failures to report to the probation
department and to the designated treatment facility. The
evidence of these lapses, in both instances, was a probation
officer’s presentation of probation records and related reliable
documentation. As in Abrams, the inquiry does not turn on a
witness’s recollection of events, but on whether records reflect
compliance when records are the typical way of recording
compliance. Even if the reporting officer, Pagan, or the RNR
representative, Zimmerman, had been called into court, their
testimony would have been based on the same records and would
not have added materially to the court’s assessment. (Abrams,
supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 404.) The trial court was well within
its discretion to admit the evidence Ramirez challenges and no
due process violation is apparent. (See id. at p. 400.)
Ramirez argues Abrams is factually distinguishable and
People v. Shepherd (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1193 (Shepherd)
better matches the facts of his case. We view the Shepherd facts
differently. In Shepherd, the alleged probation violation was
alcohol consumption, and the challenged hearsay consisted of a
probation officer relaying a program administrator’s report that
the defendant smelled of, and tested positive for, alcohol. (Id. at
pp. 1198.) The court determined this testimony improperly
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conveyed hearsay about defendant’s conduct without good cause.
(Id. at pp. 1201–1202.) The reliability of the report of
consumption, the court noted, depended on the observer’s
perception and credibility. And it was unclear whether the
program administrator had even witnessed the alleged violation.
(Id. at p. 1202.)
By contrast, the relevant evidence here consisted of
probation records and related documentation showing Ramirez
failed to report to the department and failed to enroll in a drug
treatment program — routine administrative facts reflecting the
nonperformance of required acts. (People v. Gomez (2010) 181
Cal.App.4th 1028, 1039 [documentary evidence of failure to
report is sufficiently reliable for probation revocation hearings
under the due process standard].)
Additionally, unlike in Shepherd, the evidence of Ramirez’s
violations was not uncorroborated. (Cf. Shepherd, supra, 151
Cal.App.4th at p. 1202.) Indeed, Ramirez’s statements against
interest to the probation department acknowledged his failure to
report to the drug treatment program and sought, rather, to be
given another chance to comply.
Ramirez asserts the “good cause” test applicable to former
live testimony should govern here. But other than attempting to
align the facts of his case with Shepherd, which we find
distinguishable, Ramirez makes no argument and cites no
authority for why the more lenient rule of the documentary
evidence cases, including cases decided by our Supreme Court,
should not govern instead. Ramirez ignores the People’s
contention that reliable documentary evidence is treated
differently, never citing or discussing, for instance, Maki. We
have addressed the arguments Ramirez has properly made and
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supported (People v. Dunn (2025) 18 Cal.5th 129, 181 [we
consider only those claims a defendant supports with reasoned
argument]) and they do not warrant reversal.
Because we conclude the evidence Ramirez challenges was
properly admitted, we bypass the People’s argument that
Ramirez forfeited review by failing to object to admissibility in
the trial court and Ramirez’s counterargument that any failure to
object would have been ineffective assistance of counsel. Counsel
is not ineffective for failing to raise a meritless issue. (In re A.A.
(2018) 30 Cal.App.5th, 596, 600.)
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment.
SCHERB. J.
We concur:
WILEY, Acting P. J. VIRAMONTES, J.
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