CourtListener 10862356•People v. Martin CA1/2
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Filed 5/20/26 P. v. Martin CA1/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A171794
v.
MARK SPENCER MARTIN, (Sonoma County Super. Ct.
No. 24CR00460)
Defendant and Appellant.
A jury found defendant Mark Spencer Martin guilty of felony domestic
violence, and the trial court placed him on formal probation with various
conditions. On appeal, Martin raises claims of instructional error and
judicial misconduct, and he challenges one of the conditions of probation.
We agree with Martin that the probation condition ordering treatment
but permitting the probation officer to decide whether such treatment would
be residential is improper, and we will remand to allow the trial court to
determine whether to require residential treatment or to delete reference to
residential treatment. In all other respects, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Background
Martin and Jane Doe have known each other since they were teenagers
and have lived together off and on. Most recently, they began living together
in 2020. They were engaged to be married, and they have a son, who was
1
born in 2022. Around the end of November 2023, Doe moved out of their
apartment, and they initially shared custody of their son.1
Incident Leading to Arrest and Charge
On the evening of December 5, 2023, Santa Rosa police officer Mike
Paetzold responded to Martin’s apartment (previously the shared apartment
of Doe and Martin) after both Martin and Doe called 911.2 Officer Paetzold
spoke with Martin and Doe separately. Doe told the officer about a
previously unreported incident of domestic violence that occurred around
Thanksgiving. According to Paetzold, Doe “was visibly upset, shaking and
crying throughout the interview.” Doe showed the officer bruises on her
shoulder and showed him photos she had taken that documented bruises on
her legs and torso. After talking with Doe and Martin, Paetzold arrested
Martin.3
1 At trial, Doe testified she had primary custody of their son as a result
of a family law case initiated in January or February 2024.
2 The incident on December 5 that prompted Martin and Doe to call 911
is not the charged incident. The police response is relevant to this case
because this was when Doe first reported a prior incident of domestic violence
that is the charged offense.
3 Although the events of December 5 are not the basis of Martin’s
conviction of domestic violence, Martin argued to the jury that Doe falsely
accused Martin of prior abuse to “divert” the officer’s focus from what he
called Doe’s “criminal act” on December 5. We briefly describe the events
that led Martin and Doe to call the police that evening.
Doe and Martin were not living together and were sharing custody of
their son. The child was at Martin’s that day, and Martin and Doe had
agreed that Doe would pick him up in the evening. According to Martin, after
Doe arrived at his apartment, he and Doe had an argument that “ventured
pretty quickly from mental health concerns to parental authority.” Martin
testified that whenever he thought Doe was “playing victim,” he “would film,
pull out [his] phone and film.” So he recorded their interaction as Doe left the
apartment with their son. He thought Doe was “acting belligerent” and
2
The Sonoma County District Attorney filed a one-count information
against Martin alleging that, on or about November 24, 2023, he willfully
inflicted corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition upon Jane Doe,
who had been his cohabitant and was the mother of his child and with whom
he had been in a dating relationship. (Pen. Code,4 § 273.5.) It was further
alleged that Martin personally inflicted great bodily injury upon Doe in the
commission of the offense. (§ 12022.7, subd. (e).)
decided to take his son out of her car; Martin “felt like [he] was protecting
[his son].” Doe “started her car and she drove away with [Martin] half in the
car holding [his] son.” The car door frame knocked Martin and his son to the
ground; he fell on his back, so the child would land on his chest. Martin said,
“ ‘I can’t believe you just said [sic] that. You’re going to jail.’ ” He got up,
went into his apartment, and called 911. When the officer arrived, Martin
described what happened and showed the officer the phone recording.
According to Martin, the video ended one to three seconds before he was
struck by the car door frame. The video was also played for the jury at trial.
According to Doe, the child was in her car with his seatbelt on and she
was in the driver’s seat with the engine running when Martin said he wanted
to say goodbye to his son. Then Martin said, “ ‘On second thought, I changed
my mind,’ and opened the [car] door again and grabbed the baby out.” Doe
“thought the baby was strapped in and . . . started to move” the car. Martin
“and the baby fell and [Martin] was screaming ‘You’re going to jail now. Now
you’ve done it. You’ve assaulted me,’ screaming ‘Assault, you tried to kill
us.’ ” Doe kept asking if their child was okay, but Martin “didn’t stop and see
if everything was okay” and “just ran screaming, ‘You’re going to jail. I am
calling your mother.’ ” Doe testified she would not have moved her car had
she known their child was not secured in his seatbelt, and she would not have
moved her car at all, “if [she] was not afraid” of Martin. (Around this time,
Doe was generally afraid of Martin and “was very on edge.”) When the officer
arrived, Doe told him about the prior incident of domestic abuse because she
“felt like it was important that the police officer knew that [she] was afraid.”
4 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3
Martin Represents Himself at Trial
In August 2024, Martin filed a motion for self-representation, which
the trial court granted. Martin represented himself during the jury trial,
which was conducted the following month.
The Prosecution’s Case
Doe testified that, around April or May 2023, Martin started accusing
her of “do[ing] things to his personal belongings,” such as touching his
computer, keys and wallet, moving objects, and “[a]llowing people access to
his things in our place.” His accusations made Doe feel “[u]pset,” “[s]cared”
and “desperate to convince him constantly that [she] wasn’t doing these
things.” Martin began “recording [her] all the time” in their apartment. This
made her very uncomfortable, and she asked him “many times daily to please
stop recording [her].” She did not always know when she was being recorded,
and she felt like she “had to constantly be on guard.”
Doe testified about the charged incident, which occurred on November
24 or 25, 2023.5 Doe was still living with Martin and their child, who was
around 20 months old at the time. Doe and Martin argued over their son,
who had not been feeling well. Doe could hear their child crying, and she
thought he wanted to go to sleep in his bedroom. Martin had the TV and all
the lights on and the windows open, and he would not take the child to his
room. Finally, Martin took him to his room but would not close the bedroom
door. Doe “got really upset” that Martin would not close the door. She
“grabbed one of the recording devices that he had in the home, because he
was recording, there were a lot of them and . . . there was one on the counter
of the kitchen.” The recording device was Doe’s own cell phone.
5 Doe recalled that it was either the Friday or Saturday after
Thanksgiving but could not recall the exact day.
4
Martin “got really angry.” He tried to grab the phone from Doe and
“pushed [her] up against the washing machine and held [her] with his arm.”
Then “he was pushing himself against [her] as hard as he could and banging
[her] arm.” Martin had their son in his other arm, and he used his body to
push up against her. He ‘threw [Doe] down on the ground, trying to get [her]
to drop the phone.” She landed on her knees. Martin put their child down,
and Doe crawled to the child’s room and went in the closet. Martin started
hitting her on her side, back, and upper arms. He was yelling the whole
time, but Doe did not remember what he said. He grabbed her by the neck
and “he was pulling pretty hard.” Doe testified, “[Martin] got in front of my
mouth and my nose and I couldn’t breathe, so I bit him.” When she bit him,
he stopped and “said, ‘I got you now. You’re going to jail.’ ”
Doe had “really deep bruising,” and her neck, knees, arms, and ribs
were sore. The next morning, she took photographs of her injuries because
she “wanted to show him that it really happened.” The photos Doe took
documenting bruising on her knees, ribs, back, and arm were received into
evidence.
Doe did not report the incident to the police when it happened “because
[she] didn’t want [Martin] to go to jail.” She still loved him “[v]ery much.”
Doe moved out of the apartment shortly after the incident because Martin
“threatened to buy a gun to protect himself from [her].”
Doe also testified about three other uncharged incidents of domestic
violence.6
6 In 2018, Doe was dating Martin. He accused her of stealing his
wallet. She locked herself in her room, and he broke in through a window
and attacked her. Doe “ended up in the closet screaming for help and he
choked” her. Neighbors called the police, and Martin was arrested. Doe
recalled two additional incidents in 2023. In April or May 2023, Martin was
5
Officer Paetzold, who responded to Martin’s apartment on December 5,
testified about his contact with Doe and Martin that evening. He testified
that late reporting of domestic violence (that is, days, weeks, or months after
the incident) is “fairly common.”
The Defense
Martin testified in his own defense. He described his relationship with
Doe as “somewhat contentious . . ., volatile, and just verbally and just two
strong personalities, two different—just a lot of codependent dynamics.”
Regarding “the events of 11/25” (that is, the charged incident), Martin
testified: “I didn’t consider there to be an incident. It wasn’t anything of note.
The only noteworthy aspect of it was being bitten. [¶] And the fact that she—
it was the first time that things had escalated between us in a physical way
even in the minimally physical way which amounted to a very simple was
[sic] that she grabbed my phone. [¶] And then at one point, I grabbed it back
out of her hand. That’s really—it was the physical nature of that incident
was over in less than one second.”
Martin believed Doe was “baiting” him “to attempt to provoke an
incident.” He felt Doe “was acting belligerent” and “was making false
accusations,” and he thought “it was appropriate to video.” Martin played
two video clips that appeared to show him and Doe arguing in their
upset about something, and he grabbed Doe by the back of the hair and
pulled her head back and screamed in her face. He apologized later. Doe did
not report this incident to the police because Martin “hadn’t done anything
like that in a really long time and [Doe] was making a lot of excuses because
he had been sick for so long and he just wasn’t himself.” In another incident,
Martin started accusing Doe of taking things. He grabbed her neck and
dragged her to the bathroom and pinned her against the bathroom sink. He
put his weight on her and held her by the neck. Doe did not report this
incident because she “didn’t think anybody would believe” her and “he didn’t
leave any bruises.”
6
apartment with their son present. Martin described the clips as showing the
“dynamic that was created towards the end of [their] relationship” and
testified of the first clip, “[S]omething that the video depicts is just where
that dynamic was forced on me and I was an unwilling participant.” In the
second video clip, Doe can be heard saying, “Do not physically touch me or
hurt me anymore.” Martin explained, “[O]ne of the reasons that I would film
is because she would say those things when it wasn’t happening and that was
one of the big reasons that I would take my phone out because I would be
concerned over, over who, we lived in an apartment complex, who might hear
that.” At one point, he was “physically pushed” by Doe and his reaction “was
to go to the other direction.”
Martin testified that he did not “respond aggressively” and denied that
he was abusive or volatile. He said, “I believe it’s quite the opposite. I am
very stoic. I am very calm in the face of stress and 99 times out of a hundred,
and if anything, my voice is, can get a little authoritative perhaps.” Martin
believed the video showed that, contrary to her testimony, Doe was not
“exhibiting fear” during their interaction.
Verdict and Sentence
The jury found Martin guilty of injuring a cohabitant or child’s parent
in violation of section 273.5. It found not true the enhancement allegation
that he personally inflicted great bodily injury.
The probation officer recommended formal probation and 12 months in
jail. At the sentencing hearing, Martin was represented by an attorney.7
Martin told the court, “I’m open to mental health treatment, therapy, any—
any restrictions or conditions that the Court may impose.”
7 Before the sentencing hearing, Martin wrote a note to the trial court
requesting counsel, and counsel was appointed.
7
The trial court agreed that probation was appropriate and suspended
imposition of sentence. Martin was placed on 36 months of formal probation
and ordered to serve nine months in the Sonoma County Jail. The court
imposed various probation conditions including that Martin was “to
commence and continue education, counseling, and rehabilitation programs
as directed, including residential treatment if they deem that appropriate for
[him].”
Defense counsel made no objection, and Martin accepted the terms and
conditions of probation.
DISCUSSION
Martin contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury, first,
by failing to modify the instruction on domestic violence sua sponte and,
second, by failing to instruct on the lesser included offense of misdemeanor
domestic battery. He also claims the trial court made numerous improper
comments that amounted to reversible judicial misconduct. Martin further
challenges a probation condition that authorizes the probation officer to
determine whether to require residential treatment on the ground the
condition improperly delegates judicial authority.
A. Claims of Instructional Error
1. Section 273.5 and the Jury Instruction Given
Section 273.5 defines felony domestic violence as “willfully inflict[ing]
corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition upon a victim” where the
victim is “[t]he offender’s spouse or former spouse,” “cohabitant or former
cohabitant,” “fiance, or someone with whom the offender has, or previously
had, an engagement or dating relationship,” or “[t]he mother or father of the
offender’s child.” (§ 273.5, subds. (a), (b).) A “traumatic condition” for
purposes of section 273.5 is “a condition of the body, such as a wound, or
8
external or internal injury, including, but not limited to, injury as a result of
strangulation or suffocation, whether of a minor or serious nature, caused by
a physical force.” (§ 273.5, subd. (d).)
The jury in this case was instructed on the charged offense with
CALCRIM No. 840, which provided, in relevant part:
“The defendant is charged with domestic battery which is inflicting
injury on his cohabitant and the mother of his child that resulted in a
traumatic condition in violation of Penal Code section 273.5(a).
“To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must
prove that: [¶] 1. The defendant willfully inflicted physical injury on the
mother of his child; [¶] AND [¶] 2. The injury inflicted by the defendant
resulted in a traumatic condition.
“Someone commits an act willfully when he or she does it willingly or
on purpose. [¶] A traumatic condition is a wound or other bodily injury,
whether minor or serious, caused by the direct application of physical force.”
2. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“In criminal cases, a trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct
regarding the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the
evidence and necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case [citation],
including the elements of a charged offense.” (People v. Singh (2019) 42
Cal.App.5th 175, 181 (Singh).)
“ ‘Generally, a party may not complain on appeal that an instruction
correct in law and responsive to the evidence was too general or incomplete
unless the party has requested appropriate clarifying or amplifying
language,’ ” although forfeiture does not apply when “the trial court gives an
instruction that is an incorrect statement of the law.” (People v. Hudson
(2006) 38 Cal.4th 1002, 1011–1012.)
9
“ ‘When we review challenges to a jury instruction as being incorrect or
incomplete, we evaluate the instructions given as a whole, not in isolation.
[Citation.] “For ambiguous instructions, the test is whether there is a
reasonable likelihood that the jury misunderstood and misapplied the
instruction.” ’ ” (People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1104, 1140 (Moore).)
3. Whether the Trial Court Had a Sua Sponte Duty to Amend
the Instruction on Felony Domestic Violence
Martin argues the trial court prejudicially erred by failing to instruct
the jury sua sponte that a conviction under section 273.5 requires proof
beyond a reasonable doubt that the relevant injury “ ‘resulted from a direct
application of force on the victim by the defendant.’ ” (Italics added.)8 This
argument fails.
“ ‘ “[T]he language of a statute defining a crime or defense is generally
an appropriate and desirable basis for an instruction, and is ordinarily
sufficient when the defendant fails to request amplification. If the jury would
have no difficulty in understanding the statute without guidance, the court
need do no more than instruct in statutory language.” ’ [Citation.] . . . ‘When
a word or phrase “ ‘is commonly understood by those familiar with the
English language and is not used in a technical sense peculiar to the law, the
court is not required to give an instruction as to its meaning in the absence of
8 For his argument, Martin relies on People v. Jackson (2000) 77
Cal.App.4th 574. In that case, the evidence showed defendant pushed his
girlfriend against a car, and she turned and tripped. (Id. at p. 576.) The
Court of Appeal found insufficient evidence to prove the defendant “ ‘inflicted’
corporal injury on his girlfriend” within the meaning of section 273.5 because
the statute “is not violated unless the corporal injury results from a direct
application of force on the victim by the defendant.” (Id. at p. 580.) The
Jackson court relied on the observation that “ ‘[t]o “personally inflict” an
injury is to directly cause an injury, not just to proximately cause it.’ ” (Id. at
p. 579, quoting People v. Rodriguez (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 341, 347.)
10
a request.’ ” [Citations.] A word or phrase having a technical, legal meaning
requiring clarification by the court is one that has a definition that differs
from its nonlegal meaning.’ ” (Singh, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 181, some
original italics omitted.)
Here, the trial court gave a jury instruction on felony domestic violence
that generally tracked the language of section 273.5 and, thus, sufficiently
explained the offense. (See Singh, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 181.)
(CALCRIM No. 840 uses the phrase “physical injury” in place of section
273.5’s “corporal injury,” but this is not a meaningful difference, and Martin
does not claim otherwise.)9 Consequently, Martin has forfeited his appellate
claim of instructional error because he did not request an amplifying
instruction. (Ibid; see Moore, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1139–1140 [defendant
forfeited claim of instructional error “because he failed to raise it at trial”].)
Martin’s claim also fails on the merits. He acknowledges that the jury
in this case was instructed that, to be a “traumatic condition” willfully
inflicted by the defendant, the condition must be “caused by the direct
application of physical force.” He argues this language is incomplete,
however, because a jury could understand the requirement to be met when
“the physical force was directly applied by someone or something other than
defendant.” We are not persuaded. The jury was instructed that it must find
9 In his reply brief, Martin tries to avoid this result by arguing “inflicts”
as used in section 273.5 has a technical, legal meaning that is narrower than
its ordinary, legal meaning. We need not consider this argument raised for
the first time in his reply brief. (People v. Newton (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th
1000, 1005 [“we do not consider an argument first raised in a reply brief,
absent a showing why the argument could not have been made earlier”].)
But, in any event, Martin has not shown that the meaning of “inflicts” as
used in section 273.5 is materially different from the word’s commonly
understood, nonlegal meaning.
11
“[t]he defendant willfully inflicted physical injury” and “[t]he injury inflicted
by the defendant resulted in a traumatic condition.” (CALCRIM No. 840.)
The jury was further instructed that a traumatic condition must be “caused
by the direct application of physical force.” (Ibid.) We do not believe it is
reasonably likely that a jury would mistakenly convict a defendant of felony
domestic violence based on findings that the defendant willfully inflicted an
injury, that the injury defendant willfully inflicted resulted in a traumatic
condition, that traumatic condition was caused by the direct application of
physical force, but that the physical force was directly applied by someone or
something other than the defendant.
4. Whether the Trial Court Had a Sua Sponte Duty to Instruct on
the Lesser Included Offense of Misdemeanor Battery
Martin next argues the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury
sua sponte on misdemeanor domestic battery (§ 243, subd. (e)(1)), a lesser
included offense of felony domestic violence. (See People v. Hamlin (2009)
170 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1457 [spousal battery in violation of section 243,
subdivision (e)(1), is a lesser included offense of inflicting corporal injury on a
spouse in violation of section 273.5].)
The trial court’s duty to instruct on general principles of law raised by
the evidence includes “ ‘ “ ‘giving instructions on lesser included offenses
when the evidence raises a question as to whether all of the elements of the
charged offense were present [citation], but not when there is no evidence
that the offense was less than that charged. [Citations.]’ ” [Citation.] “[T]he
existence of ‘any evidence, no matter how weak’ will not justify instructions
on a lesser included offense, but such instructions are required whenever
evidence that the defendant is guilty only of the lesser offense is ‘substantial
enough to merit consideration’ by the jury.” ’ ” (People v. Wyatt (2012) 55
Cal.4th 694, 698 (Wyatt).)
12
Misdemeanor domestic battery is “any willful and unlawful use of force
or violence upon the person of” “a spouse, a person with whom the defendant
is cohabiting, a person who is the parent of the defendant's child, former
spouse, fiancé, or fiancée, or a person with whom the defendant currently
has, or has previously had, a dating or engagement relationship.” (§§ 242
[definition of battery]; 243, subd. (e).) “ ‘Even a slight touching may
constitute a battery, “if it is done in a rude or angry way.” ’ ” (People v.
Francis A. (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 399, 406.)
Doe testified that Martin became angry and pushed his body against
her, “bang[ed]” her arm, and “threw [her] down on the ground trying to get
[her] to drop the phone”; Martin hit her on her side, back and, upper arms
and then grabbed her by the neck so that she could not breathe; and Martin
only stopped physically attacking her when she bit him. According to Doe, as
a result of Martin’s attack, she had “really deep bruising,” and her neck,
knees, arms, and ribs were sore. The jury saw photographs of bruises on her
knees, ribs, back, and arm that Doe testified were caused by Martin. Officer
Paetzold testified he saw bruising on Doe’s shoulder about 10 days after the
alleged incident.
Martin testified that he “didn’t consider there to be an incident” on
November 24 or 25, 2023. He testified the “minimally physical” aspect of his
interaction with Doe was that “she grabbed [his] phone,” and Martin
“grabbed it back out of her hand.” He denied being abusive, violent, or
volatile and testified that he was generally “very stoic” and “very calm.”
Martin testified that Doe “lied” that he abused her “to avoid accountability”
for the incident on December 5.
After Martin’s direct testimony (during which he made the foregoing
statements), there was a discussion outside the presence of the jury about
13
jury instructions. The prosecutor argued there was no substantial evidence
to support instructing the jury on the lesser included offense of domestic
battery because there was no evidence that Doe’s bruises were faked. The
trial court stated that it understood that Martin testified he “denied touching
her at all” and asked whether this was correct. Martin agreed that no
instructions on lesser included offenses were needed and recapitulated his
testimony as, “[Doe] grabbed my phone and I grabbed it out of her hand. I
testified I didn’t touch her . . . . I just grabbed the phone.”
On appeal, however, Martin argues the trial court was required to
instruct on the lesser included offense of domestic battery because the jury
could have found either (1) the only physical contact that occurred was
Martin grabbing the phone and that was a battery (but not felony domestic
violence) or (2) Martin committed batteries upon Doe but these batteries did
not result in a traumatic condition. We are not persuaded.
“[T]he trial court is not required to ‘instruct sua sponte on the panoply
of all possible lesser included offenses.’ [Citation.] Such instructions are
required only when there is substantial evidence that, if the defendant is
guilty at all, he is guilty of the lesser offense, but not the greater. [Citations.]
‘ “ ‘ “Substantial evidence” in this context is “ ‘evidence from which a jury
composed of reasonable [persons] could . . . conclude[ ]’ ” that the lesser
offense, but not the greater, was committed.’ ” ’ ” (Wyatt, supra, 55 Cal.4th at
p. 704.)
On this record, we do not see substantial evidence to support a finding
that Martin willfully touched Doe in a rude or angry manner (as required for
misdemeanor domestic battery) but did not inflict an injury that resulted in a
traumatic condition (as required for felony domestic violence). If the jury did
not believe Doe’s testimony about Martin physically attacking her, then it
14
would have no basis for finding that a battery occurred because Martin never
testified that he touched Doe. But if the jury believed any part of Doe’s
testimony about Martin physically attacking her, it is difficult to reconcile
such a credibility finding with the jury then rejecting the evidence of the
resulting bruising.10 A jury could speculate that Doe faked her bruises or
that the bruises had some other cause, but we do not think such speculation
amounts to substantial evidence that the lesser offense, but not the greater,
was committed.
In short, “it would be speculative at best to construe the trial evidence
in this case as supporting a verdict of only” misdemeanor domestic battery
and not felony domestic violence. (Wyatt, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 704.)
Accordingly, we conclude the trial court had no sua sponte duty to instruct on
the lesser included offense.
B. Claim of Judicial Misconduct
Martin contends the trial judge made numerous improper comments
that constituted prejudicial judicial misconduct.11
Martin’s claim fails at the outset because he failed to object to the
comments he now complains about. “As a general rule, a specific and timely
objection to judicial misconduct is required to preserve the claim for appellate
review.” (People v. Seumanu (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1293, 1320; see People v.
Sturm (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1218, 1237 (Sturm) [generally, “judicial misconduct
10 Recall that a traumatic condition requires no more than a wound or
injury “whether of a minor or serious nature, caused by a physical force”
(§ 273.5, subd. (d)).
11 In his opening appellate brief, Martin recounts several exchanges
between the trial judge and himself and comments the judge made both
outside and within the jury’s presence, and we do not repeat them here.
15
claims are not preserved for appellate review if no objections were made on
those grounds at trial”].)
Martin acknowledges that he “did not object on judicial misconduct
grounds to each of the judge’s comments” he raises in his opening appellate
brief, but he suggests forfeiture should not apply because he “complained
about the judge’s comments on multiple occasions.” He refers to three cites to
the reporter’s transcript. We have read the cited pages of the transcript, and
they do not demonstrate that he preserved his current appellate claim of
judicial misconduct.
Martin also argues that any attempt by him to object would have been
futile and counterproductive to his defense. He relies on Sturm, supra, 37
Cal.4th at page 1237, in which the California Supreme Court concluded,
“Given the evident hostility between the trial judge and defense counsel
during the [death] penalty phase, it would also be unfair to require defense
counsel to choose between repeatedly provoking the trial judge into making
further negative statements about defense counsel and therefore poisoning
the jury against his client or, alternatively, giving up his client’s ability to
argue misconduct on appeal. On this record, we are convinced that any
attempt by defense counsel to object to the trial court’s numerous sua sponte
objections and derogatory comments ‘would have been futile and
counterproductive to his client.’ ”
In the present case, however, we do not see evident hostility between
the trial judge and Martin. The trial judge was at times frustrated with
Martin as when she said to him, outside the presence of the jury, “I am doing
the best I can in a very difficult situation. You don’t understand the
Evidence Code. You don’t understand the big picture here either. And I am
trying to keep it within a range that it’s not unduly prejudicial to you or to
16
[the prosecution].” But the judge’s comments do not demonstrate hostility
toward Martin.
Our high court has observed, “A trial court’s ‘frustration and irritation
at counsel’s repeated efforts’ to violate evidentiary rules can be viewed as
‘ “friction between court and counsel, [that] while not desirable, [is] virtually
inevitable in a long trial.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] Furthermore, ‘isolated
comments in a lengthy trial in which the court exhibited some impatience
with counsel’s argumentative comments and questions do not demonstrate
misconduct or bias.’ ” (People v. Nieves (2021) 11 Cal.5th 404, 482–483
(Nieves).)
Here, Martin represented himself at trial. At one point in a pretrial
discussion, the trial court reminded Martin that “one witness worthy of belief
is sufficient to prove any fact,” and he responded that he would object to a
jury instruction that stated that rule. Martin argued that a 140-minute-long
video from the officer’s body-worn camera recorded on December 5, 2023,
should be admitted because it would demonstrate “it’s clear that [Doe]’s lying.
It’s clear that they’re [that is, Doe and Officer Paetzold] somehow in some
sort of cahoots.” He accused the prosecutor of “endorsing the practice of
gaslighting” and “harassment.” In a discussion of a prosecution motion in
limine, the trial court asked Martin his position, and he responded, “I don’t
know why reading comprehension is such an issue.” Outside the presence of
the jury, the trial court observed to Martin, “You keep violating the order I’ve
made” (regarding exclusion of an irrelevant topic of questioning). Martin
continued to violate the court’s order. At one point he said, “I am trying to
find a creative way to get effectively into the truth without violating your
orders, Your Honor.” Later, during questioning of Officer Paetzold, Martin
said, “I am trying to get around your order. I am going to stop.”
17
That the judge was at times frustrated by Martin’s repeated efforts to
violate her evidentiary rulings does not demonstrate misconduct or bias. “We
do not fault the trial judge here for the brief admonitions [s]he gave to enforce
court rules and procedures.” (Nieves, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 483.) On this
record, we cannot say objections to the trial judge’s comments would have
been futile and counterproductive, and Martin’s claim of judicial misconduct
is forfeited.
We also reject Martin’s claim that the trial court’s conduct
demonstrates bias and constitutes structural error. “ ‘ “A criminal defendant
has due process rights under both the state and federal Constitutions to be
tried by an impartial judge.” ’ [Citation.] Establishing a violation of this
right requires ‘an objective assessment of the circumstances in the particular
case’ and ‘ “ ‘the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or
decisionmaker [that] is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.’ ” ’
[Citations.] ‘[I]t is the exceptional case presenting extreme facts where a due
process violation will be found.’ ” (Nieves, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 498.)
We have reviewed the record, and we do not find “ ‘extreme facts’ that
would raise an objective likelihood that the trial judge here was actually
biased against the defendant.” (Nieves, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 499.)
C. Claim of Improper Probation Condition
Finally, Martin challenges the probation condition ordering treatment
but permitting the probation officer to decide whether such treatment should
be residential. He argues the condition is an impermissible delegation of
judicial authority to the probation officer. (See People v. Smith (2022) 79
Cal.App.5th 897, 902 (Smith) [under the state constitution, “judicial powers
may not be delegated to nonjudicial officers”].)
18
Martin did not object to this probation condition with the trial court,
but his appellate claim is not forfeited because he claims a facial
constitutional violation. (See In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 888–889
[appellate claim that a probation condition was unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad was not forfeited by failure to object below where the facial
challenge was “a pure question of law”].)
In Smith, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at page 899, a probationer challenged
a probation condition requiring her to “participate in any treatment program,
including residential treatment, as directed by her probation officer.”
Division Five of our court held that allowing the probation officer discretion
to decide whether the probationer had to attend a residential program, as
opposed to outpatient treatment, improperly delegated judicial authority in
violation of the separation of powers doctrine. (Id. at p. 903.)
The probation condition in this case likewise improperly delegates
judicial authority to the probation officer to decide whether treatment will be
residential or outpatient. As the appellate court did in Smith, we will
remand “for the trial court to decide if it wishes to mandate residential
treatment.” (Smith, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 903.)
Martin also argues the requirement that he participate in “education,
counseling, and rehabilitation programs” is improper because the “nature of
the programs” is not specified. (See Smith, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 902
[“While the probation officer may properly specify the details necessary to
effectuate the court’s probation conditions, it is the court’s duty to determine
the nature of the requirements imposed on the probationer”].) Given the trial
court’s comments at sentencing, we believe it is reasonably clear that the
court intended the probation condition to require treatment programs
addressing mental health, substance abuse, anger management, and
19
parenting issues. (See id. at pp. 902–903 [“in context,” including the trial
court’s “oral comments that [probationer] needed treatment for her substance
abuse problem,” the probation condition requiring participation in “ ‘any
[unspecified] treatment/therapy/counseling program’ ” referred to substance
abuse].) At any rate, Martin may ask for clarification on the nature of the
probation condition on remand.
DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded with directions that the trial court determine
whether to require residential treatment. In all other respects, the judgment
is affirmed.
_________________________
Miller, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Stewart, P. J.
_________________________
Richman, J.
A171794, People v. Martin
20
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