CourtListener 10862353•SoberLife Recovery Solutions v. C-4 Consulting CA4/1
SoberLife Recovery Solutions v. C-4 Consulting CA4/1
CourtListener 10862353Calctapp20.05.2026
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 5/20/26 SoberLife Recovery Solutions v. C-4 Consulting CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SOBERLIFE RECOVERY SOLUTIONS D085152
et al.,
(Super. Ct. No. 37-2023-
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 00052416-CU-BT-CTL)
v.
C-4 CONSULTING, INC. et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Loren G. Freestone, Judge. Affirmed.
Ruddell, Bixler, Mauritson, Evans, Fox & Buss, and Josh T. Fox for
Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker, David J. Aveni and Natalie
F. Lakosil for Defendant and Respondent C-4 Consulting, Inc.
Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, Debra E. Meppen, Rebecca Marsden,
Ramon Flores and Don Willenburg for Defendant and Respondent
Christopher Bennett.
SoberLife Recovery Solutions (SoberLife), and principals Bryan Amaro1
and Deomel Soriano (collectively, Plaintiffs) appeal from an order of the trial
court granting a motion to dismiss their complaint against C-4 Consulting
Group, Inc. (C-4), Christopher Bennett, and the Opportunity Collective
(collectively, Defendants) based on forum non conveniens, pursuant to Code
of Civil Procedure section 418.10, subdivision (a)(2). Appellants assert the
trial court erred in expanding the scope of a mandatory forum selection
clause in a mutual nondisclosure agreement and failing to enforce a
permissive forum selection clause in a subsequent consulting agreement.
Finding no error, we affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The relationship between the parties arose in January 2023, when
Bennett, the chief marketing officer for C-4, contacted Amaro, a principal of
SoberLife, to offer consulting services. Less than six months later, in June
2023, Bennett proposed a deal in which he would purchase Amaro’s and
Soriano’s interest in SoberLife.
A. The Complaint
In December 2023, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendants
alleging causes of action for breach of contract (SoberLife against C-4), breach
of confidential relationship (SoberLife against C-4), constructive fraud
(SoberLife against Defendants), and intentional interference with contractual
relations (Amaro and Soriano against Defendants).
In the first cause of action, for breach of contract by SoberLife against
C-4, Plaintiffs asserted SoberLife “was governed by an operating agreement
1 On October 30, 2025, counsel notified this court that Appellant Bryan
Amaro died on or about October 8, 2025. Thomas Amaro and Marcos Amaro,
as administrators of his estate, have been substituted as parties in this
action.
2
[(the ‘Operating Agreement’)] between Amaro, Soriano, and another member,
J.M. Evosevich.” “In January of 2023, C-4 acting by and through Bennett,
offered to serve as a consultant to SoberLife.” That same month, SoberLife
and C-4 “entered into a Confidentiality Agreement,” (the Confidentiality
Agreement), which was attached as exhibit A to the complaint.
“In February of 2023, C-4 and SoberLife entered into a consultation
agreement [(the Consultation Agreement)], under which C-4 agreed to
perform consultation services for SoberLife.” The Consultation Agreement
was attached as exhibit B to the complaint. “The ultimate purpose of the
Consultation Agreement, as articulated in Paragraph 2 thereof, was ‘to
increase [earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization, or]
EBITDA[,] and market position for a potential sale of the business and
acquisition at the highest possible EBITDA multiple while continuing to
improve upon the already best-in-class clinical care they provide to their
clients.’ ”
The complaint further alleged that in late March or early April 2023,
Defendants instead entered into a conspiracy “to engage in a course of
conduct specifically designed to (1) destroy the contractual relationship
between the Plaintiffs and Evosevich, and (2) purchase the interests in
SoberLife held by Amaro and Soriano.” In doing so, “C-4 violated both the
Confidentiality Agreement and the Consultation Agreement.”
The remaining causes of action realleged and incorporated by reference
each of the foregoing allegations.
In the second cause of action, for breach of confidential relationship, by
SoberLife against C-4, Plaintiffs alleged further: “Through both the
Confidentiality Agreement and the Consultation Agreement, C-4 undertook
to act in the interests of SoberLife and to refrain from using the information
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gained and persons met by C-4 during the consultation process for C-4’s own
interests or for the interests of third parties other than SoberLife. [¶] C-4
intentionally breached the terms of its confidential relationship with
SoberLife, with the intent of destroying SoberLife, for the benefit of the
Defendants,” thereby causing financial harm to SoberLife.
In the third cause of action, for constructive fraud, by SoberLife against
Defendants, Plaintiffs alleged Defendants took advantage of the trust created
by the Confidentiality Agreement and the Consultation Agreement, and
“relied upon the Plaintiffs’ trust, concealing the [c]onspiracy and their
activities in furtherance thereof, resulting in damages to SoberLife.”
Finally, in the fourth cause of action, for intentional interference with
contractual relations, by Amaro and Soriano against Defendants, Plaintiffs
alleged, “Defendants, and each of them, knew of the Operating Agreement
between Amaro, Soriano, and Evosevich, and acted with the intent to destroy
the contractual relationship created by the Operating Agreement.”
B. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
C-4, later joined by Bennett, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
based on forum non conveniens. They relied on the following forum selection
clauses in the Confidentiality Agreement and the Consultation Agreement,
attached to the complaint as exhibits A and B, and asserted that the clauses
precluded jurisdiction in California.
1. The Confidentiality Agreement
Paragraph 9 of the Confidentiality Agreement includes the following
integration, choice of law, and forum selection clauses:
“This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement of the
Parties with respect to the Confidential Information
disclosed hereunder and supersedes all prior or
contemporaneous oral or written agreements concerning
such Confidential Information. This Agreement may not be
4
amended except by a written agreement signed by
authorized representatives of both Parties. This
Agreement shall be governed by and construed in
accordance with the laws of the State of Delaware,
excluding its conflict-of-laws principles. The exclusive
venue for any dispute relating to this agreement shall be in
the courts of the State of Illinois in McHenry County,
Illinois. . . . This Agreement shall be binding on the Parties
and their respective successors, assigns, employees, agents,
officers, directors and shareholders, and the Parties shall
use their respective best efforts to bind same to this
Agreement.” (Italics added.)
2. The Consultation Agreement
Paragraph 9 of the Consultation Agreement includes the following
integration clause:
“This Agreement constitutes the entire agreement of the
parties hereto, and will supersede any and all other
statements, representations, and agreements between the
parties regarding the subject matter of this Agreement.
Each party acknowledges that it has relied on its own
judgment in entering into this Agreement.”
Paragraph 11 of the Consultation Agreement includes the following
choice of law and forum clause:
“This Agreement will be construed, administered and
enforced in accordance with the laws of the State of
Delaware and venue for any legal proceeding shall be
proper in a court of competent jurisdiction [in] Sussex
County, Delaware.”
Defendants asserted that each of the causes of action in the complaint
relied on the contractual obligations in both agreements, and were therefore
governed by the foregoing forum selection clauses.
C. Plaintiffs’ Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs opposed the motion to dismiss. They conceded that the forum
selection clause in the Confidentiality Agreement was mandatory. However,
5
they asserted the forum selection clause in the Consultation Agreement—
which was signed after the Confidentiality Agreement—was permissive,
therefore the trial court had to conduct a traditional forum non conveniens
analysis, and that Defendants had not met their burden to establish
California was not a convenient forum.2
In addition, Plaintiffs asserted the fourth cause of action for intentional
interference with contractual relations was outside the scope of either the
Confidentiality Agreement or the Consultation Agreement. They argued the
claim was not based on any relationship between C-4 and SoberLife, and
instead that the Operating Agreement for SoberLife was the only potentially
relevant contract. Thus, the claim did not arise and was not related to the
Confidentiality Agreement or the Consultation Agreement.
D. The Trial Court’s Ruling
After requesting additional briefing on the issue of the potential impact
of the choice-of-law provision, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss
the complaint on grounds of forum non conveniens.
The trial court noted that the parties agreed that Delaware law applies,
per the relevant agreements, and that “the venue-selection provisions of the
[Consultation Agreement] are permissive while those in the [Confidentiality
Agreement] are mandatory.” The court explained, under Delaware law,
forum selection clauses are enforced “unless enforcement would be
‘unreasonable and unjust,’ ” or the clause is rendered invalid. In addition,
“under both California and Delaware law, a forum selection clause may apply
to non-contract claims when those claims require interpretation of the
contract or depend on the same factual allegations underlying a breach of
2 Plaintiffs also pointed out that the parties executed a second
Confidentiality Agreement in connection with Bennett’s purchase offer, with
its own forum clause setting Arizona as the exclusive venue.
6
contract claim.” The court concluded, “Because the tortious inference cause of
action is based on Plaintiffs’ allegations of breach, it cannot be decided
without deciding the issue of breach and are therefore encompassed by the
forum selection clauses. As such, all of Plaintiffs’ clauses of actions may be
tried together in Illinois.”
The court then addressed additional arguments Plaintiffs had raised
regarding the ability of Illinois to assert jurisdiction over Bennett and
Opportunity Collective. The court concluded Illinois would have jurisdiction
over Bennett, but that it was unclear whether Opportunity Collective entered
into any agreements with Plaintiffs and whether and to what extent the
claims against Opportunity Collective were intertwined with those of the
other defendants.3
The court dismissed the complaint “to allow refiling in the state courts
of Illinois in McHenry County.”
Plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs assert the trial court erred by effectively rewriting the
Confidentiality Agreement and the Consultation Agreement. They argue
their second and third causes of action survive insofar as they are based on
breaches of the Consultation Agreement, which contains only a permissive
venue selection clause, and that the Confidentiality Agreement does not
apply to non-signatories Amaro and Soriano.
A. Relevant Legal Principles
“When a contract contains a forum selection clause, this court will
interpret the forum selection clause in accordance with the law chosen to
govern the contract.” (Ashall Homes Ltd. v. ROK Entertainment Group, Inc.
3 These issues are not raised by the parties in the present appeal.
7
(Del. Ch. 2010) 992 A.2d 1239, 1245 (Ashall); see also Schmidt v. Trinut
Farm Management, Inc. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 997, 1010–1011 [California
courts generally enforce choice of law and forum selection clauses].) The
parties agree that Delaware law governs in this case.
Under Delaware law, “ ‘[f]orum selection clauses are presumptively
valid and should be specifically enforced.’ ” (National Industries Group
v. Carlyle Inv. Management LLC (Del. 2013) 67 A.3d 373, 383.) “The courts of
Delaware defer to forum selection clauses and routinely ‘give effect to the
terms of private agreements to resolve disputes in a designated judicial
forum out of respect for the parties’ contractual designation.’ ” (Ashall,
supra, 992 A.2d at p. 1245.) “Under Court of Chancery Rule 12(b)(3), a court
will grant a motion to dismiss based upon a forum selection clause where the
parties ‘use express language clearly indicating that the forum selection
clause excludes all other courts before which those parties could otherwise
properly bring an action.’ ” (Ibid.) “Forum selection clauses can be applied
not only to contract-based claims but also tort claims arising out of, or
depending upon, the contractual relationship in question.” (Ibid.)
Under both Delaware and California law, in situations in which there
is no conflicting extrinsic evidence, the interpretation of a contractual forum
selection clause is a matter of law that we review de novo. (See
Germaninvestments AG v. Allomet Corp. (2020) 225 A.3d 316, 330; Animal
Film, LLC v. D.E.J. Productions, Inc. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 466, 471.)
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Dismissing the Complaint
The parties agree that the forum selection clause in the Confidentiality
Agreement is mandatory and that the forum selection clause in the
Consultation Agreement is permissive. (See Ashall, supra, 992 A.2d at p.
1250 [explaining that a provision stating that a specific court shall have
8
jurisdiction over any dispute is mandatory, rather than permissive].)
Plaintiffs assert, however, that the trial court erred in applying the
mandatory forum selection clause in the Confidentiality Agreement to each of
their causes of action, and to non-signatories Amaro and Soriano. For the
reasons we explain, we are not persuaded and, instead, based on our own
independent review, agree that the forum selection clause in the
Confidentiality Agreement governs all asserted causes of action.
Before addressing Plaintiffs’ individual assertions, we note that the
mandatory forum selection clause in the Confidentiality Agreement is quite
broad. It provides: “The exclusive venue for any dispute relating to this
agreement shall be in the courts of the State of Illinois in McHenry County,
Illinois.” Delaware courts have explained: “The phrase ‘relating to’ is broader
than the phrase ‘arising out of.’ Black’s Law Dictionary defines ‘relating to’
to mean ‘to have some relation to’ or ‘to have bearing or concern [on]; [to]
pertain.’ [Citation.] ‘[Delaware] courts have considered the connector
“relating to” to be “paradigmatically broad.” ’ ” (Florida Chemical Company,
LLC v. Flotek Industries, Inc. (Del. Ch., 2021) 262 A.3d 1066, 1083 (Florida
Chemical).) “The use of the phrase ‘related to’ thus expands the scope of the
Delaware Forum Provision beyond the universe of claims ‘based on the rights
and obligations created by the underlying agreement.’ ” (Ibid.)
Here, Plaintiffs’ primary assertion is that the trial court erred by
applying the forum selection clause in the Confidentiality Agreement to
claims that arose under the Consultation Agreement. More specifically, they
argue that the trial court effectively reformed both agreements and
disregarded the forum selection clause in the Consultation Agreement. We
disagree.
9
The trial court did not disregard the forum selection clause in the
Consultation Agreement. Rather, after setting forth both forum selection
clauses, the court concluded that the mandatory clause in the Confidentiality
Agreement controlled the claims at issue here. The trial court noted that all
four causes of action arose from “Plaintiffs’ allegations of breach,” could not
be decided without deciding the issue of breach, and were therefore
encompassed by the forum selection clause in the Confidentiality Agreement.
Although the trial court did not expressly state which contract it was
referring to, there is no dispute here that Plaintiffs alleged, for each asserted
cause of action, that “C-4 violated both the Confidentiality Agreement and
the Consultation Agreement.” (Italics added.) Construing the term “relating
to” broadly, as we must under Delaware law, we agree with the trial court,
and independently conclude that all of Plaintiffs’ asserted causes of action are
properly characterized as “dispute[s] relating to” the Confidentiality
Agreement. Accordingly, they are governed by the broad, mandatory forum
selection clause in the Confidentiality Agreement.
Contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertions, the mere fact that their claims also
relate to an alleged breach of the Consultation Agreement does not render
the mandatory forum selection clause in the Confidentiality Agreement
inapplicable. Nor does the permissive forum selection clause in the
Consultation Agreement somehow negate the mandatory clause in the
Confidentiality Agreement. If Plaintiffs had sued under claims that did not
relate to the Confidentiality Agreement, and instead required the courts to
construe, administer and/or enforce only the Consultation Agreement, then
perhaps the permissive forum selection clause would apply, and the cause
could be tried in Delaware or somewhere else. But that is not the case here.
As we have explained, the claims here all relate to the Confidentiality
10
Agreement; that fact does not change just because Plaintiffs also allege a
breach of the Consultation Agreement.
Next, Plaintiffs point to the integration clause in the Consultation
Agreement, and argue that, since the parties executed the Consultation
Agreement several weeks after the Confidentiality Agreement, the
Consultation Agreement should control.
Paragraph 9 of the Consultation Agreement states that it “constitutes
the entire agreement of the parties hereto, and will supersede any and all
other statements, representations, and agreements between the parties
regarding the subject matter of this Agreement.” By its plain language, the
integration clause is limited to the subject matter of the Consultation
Agreement, which sets forth the parties’ mutual expectations for the
consulting arrangement. The Confidentiality Agreement was executed before
the parties determined what the scope would be, if any, for the consulting
work, and is, on its face, broader in terms of the confidential information
covered. In other words, to the extent the parties exchanged confidential
information that ended up being outside the scope of the Consultation
Agreement, the Confidentiality Agreement would still apply.
Although they are related in some ways, the two contracts are
independent, and thus, the integration clause in the Consultation Agreement
does not negate the terms of the Confidentiality Agreement. (See, e.g.,
Florida Chemical, supra, 262 A.3d at p. 1082 [integration clause interpreted
based on plain language of the provision]; CA, Inc. v. Ingres Corp. (Del. Ch.
Dec. 7, 2009, No. 4300-VCS) 2009 WL 4575009 at *46–48 [a forum selection
provision in the more “fundamental” agreement applied to an ancillary
agreement that did not contain a forum selection provision, despite an
integration clause in the ancillary agreement]; Jenks v. DLA Piper Rudnick
11
Gray Cary US LLP (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 1, 18–20 [integration clause
expressly limited to subject matter of termination agreement in which it was
contained did not negate terms of prior arbitration agreement].)
Finally, Plaintiffs assert that Delaware law precludes application of the
forum selection clause in the Confidentiality Agreement to non-signatories
Amaro and Soriano. They argue that the only claim brought by Amaro and
Soriano is the intentional interference with contractual relations claim, and
that claim is tied specifically to the SoberLife Operating Agreement between
them and nonparty Evosevich. But again, that claim incorporates and
realleges that C-4 breached both the Confidentiality Agreement and the
Consultation Agreement.
When read in conjunction with the rest of the complaint, it appears the
crux of Plaintiffs’ claims is that Defendants utilized confidential information
obtained under both agreements to undermine the relationship between
Amaro, Soriano, and Evosevich. Notably, there are no factual allegations in
the complaint establishing a cause of action for intentional interference with
a contractual relationship4 beyond the allegation Defendants intentionally
breached the two agreements by using confidential information to benefit
their own interests.
Moreover, Amaro signed the Confidentiality Agreement as the chief
operating officer of SoberLife, and was also the individual designated to
4 The elements of a claim for tortious interference with contractual
relations are “ ‘ “(1) a valid contract between plaintiff and a third party;
(2) defendant’s knowledge of this contract; (3) defendant’s intentional acts
designed to induce a breach or disruption of the contractual relationship;
(4) actual breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; and
(5) resulting damage.” ’ ” (Hahn v. Diaz-Barba (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1177,
1196; see also Lipson v. Anesthesia Services, P.A. (Del. Ch. 2001) 790 A.2d
1261, 1284 [setting forth analogous elements under Delaware law].)
12
receive notices, demands, and communication under the agreement. The
agreement itself only identified SoberLife and C-4, specifically, as the
contracting parties, but stated further that it, “shall be binding on the Parties
and their respective successors, assigns, employees, agents, officers, directors
and shareholders, and the Parties shall use their respective best efforts to
bind [the] same to this Agreement.” There is no dispute that Amaro and
Soriano, as two of the three principals that constituted the SoberLife entity,
were included as “employees, agents, officers, directors and shareholders.”
If Amaro and Soriano were not to receive any direct benefit under the
Confidentiality Agreement, they likewise would have no legally cognizable
claim, insofar as the asserted claims are based on improper use of
confidential information in breach of the Confidentiality and Consultation
Agreements. (See, e.g., Ashall, supra, 992 A.2d at p. 1249 [forum selection
clauses enforceable where such enforcement “ ‘is foreseeable by virtue of the
relationship between the signatory and the party sought to be bound’ ”];
McWane, Inc. v. Lanier (Del. Ch., Jan. 30, 2015, No. CV 9488–VCP) 2015 WL
399582, at *7 [“The doctrine of equitable estoppel prevents a non-signatory to
a contract from embracing the contract, and then turning her back on the
portions of the contract, such as a forum selection clause, that she finds
distasteful.”].) Here, although Amaro and Soriano did not receive a direct
monetary benefit from the Confidentiality Agreement, they did receive a
benefit as principals of SoberLife and it was foreseeable based on the plain
language of the contract itself that the forum selection clause would be
enforced against them.
In sum, the trial court did not err by concluding the mandatory forum
selection clause applied to each of the four asserted causes of action.
13
III. DISPOSITION
The order dismissing the complaint is affirmed. Respondents are
awarded costs on appeal.
KELETY, J.
WE CONCUR:
DO, Acting P. J.
CASTILLO, J.
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