People v. Fjeld CA2/5

CourtListener 10861416Calctapp19.05.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 5/19/26 P. v. Fjeld CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B347828

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 24AVCF00099)

BLYTHE FJELD,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Robert G. Chu and Scott A. Yang, Judges.
Affirmed.

Margaret Manning, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Thomas C. Hsieh, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

******
Blythe Fjeld (defendant) appeals from the judgment of
conviction by plea, arguing that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying her pre-plea motion for mental health
diversion (Pen. Code, § 1001.36).1 We conclude there was no
abuse of discretion and affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Underlying Offenses2
On the morning of January 17, 2024, defendant quickly
pulled her car alongside her cousin Courtney Adams, who was in
the parking lot of the business complex where Adams worked in
Lancaster, California. Adams got out of her car to talk to
defendant, as defendant “looked distraught”; defendant proceeded
to complain that she “couldn’t do this anymore,” and warned that
“she was going to run [Adams] over.” Defendant ignored Adams’s
entreaties to turn off her car; instead, defendant backed up the
car, turned the car to face Adams, and accelerated the car
forward toward Adams at approximately five miles an hour.
Adams stepped out of the way.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.

2 Our factual summary is taken from the preliminary
hearing transcript.

2
When one of Adams’s coworkers approached to try to help
calm down defendant, defendant drove off. Adams got back into
her car to follow. Defendant drove to a market and, after boxing
in Adams’s car, accused Adams of abandoning her because
Adams had ceased checking in on defendant and bringing her
money and food. When Adams responded that she could no
longer provide that assistance to defendant, defendant again
drove off. Adams once again followed and called 911 because
defendant “jerked around” as she drove and was “d[oing] loops
around town.” Defendant’s unsafe driving escalated—she did
“some donuts . . . in a little dirt parking lot” and then “ran
multiple red lights.” At one point, defendant flipped her car
around and “directed her vehicle in [Adam’s] direction”; Adams
had to “immediately swerve” to avoid the collision.3
Defendant suffers from schizoaffective disorder, bipolar
type, and had stopped taking her prescribed medications by the
time of the incident.

3 This characterization of defendant’s conduct comes from
Adams’s statements to law enforcement immediately after the
incident. In her later preliminary hearing testimony, Adams
provided a different account; she testified that it did not “look like
[defendant] was . . . making an effort to hit [Adams],” that she did
not “believe that [defendant] was trying to hurt [her],” and that
she did not want defendant prosecuted. Because, as noted below,
we employ substantial evidence review of subsidiary factual
findings as part of our abuse of discretion review, we must defer
to the trial court’s resolution of the conflict between Adams’s
statements.

3
II. Procedural Background
A. Initial charges
On February 6, 2024, the People charged defendant in an
information with two counts of assault with a deadly weapon, an
automobile (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)). The People further alleged two
aggravating factors—namely, that (1) defendant was armed with
or used a weapon (namely, her car) during the offense (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 4.421(a)(2)); and (2) defendant had engaged
in violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to society (id.,
rule 4.421(b)(1)).
B. Mental health diversion
1. Rapid diversion program
On March 11, 2024, the trial court conducted a hearing on
whether defendant was eligible to participate in a “rapid
diversion” program due to her mental health issues. When
defendant entered the courtroom, she “flipped off” her family,
including Adams, who were in the gallery. After entertaining
argument, the court declined to place defendant in that program
and articulated two “concerns.” Citing defendant’s in-court
conduct toward the family just as defendant was being “given the
chance of possibly getting” rapid diversion, the court had
“concern[s] whether, perhaps, [defendant] needs a stricter” and
“more structured” “type of program” than rapid diversion offered.
Citing the charged criminal conduct of “try[ing] to run over”
Adams, defendant’s statements that “she was going to run the
victim over with her vehicle” as well as that “she didn’t care who
she hurts,” and defendant’s continued “ill feelings and flipping off
the victim,” the court also “ha[d] public safety concerns.”

4
2. Mental health diversion under section 1001.36
On August 21, 2024, defendant filed a motion for mental
health diversion under section 1001.36.4 In support of her
motion, she attached a report from Dr. Sarah Erdelyan. Dr.
Erdelyan reiterated defendant’s mental health diagnoses,
recounted defendant’s documented history of suicide attempts as
well as a 2023 incident in which defendant became combative
with theater employees as well as hospital staff, and ultimately
opined that, because defendant had not been “taking
antipsychotic or other psychiatric medications on the date of her
arrest,” her mental illness had been a significant factor in the
commission of the charged offenses. Dr. Erdelyan noted that
defendant had stopped taking her prescribed medications in late
2023 as well as before the charged offenses. Dr. Erdelyan
recounted that defendant did not return for a psychologist’s
appointment eight or nine years ago, and refused to participate in
a mental health evaluation in 2022. Dr. Erdelyan further opined
that defendant would not “pose an unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety” within the meaning of section 1170.18, but only “if
[she] receives outpatient mental health treatment.” (Italics
added.) Dr. Erdelyan further recommended that defendant “will
require . . . inpatient” treatment to ensure “regular oversight of
her medication compliance,” and noted the potential need for “a
court order for involuntary medications” if she refuses.
On September 26, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on
defendant’s motion. After recounting the facts of the charged
offenses (including that defendant “was driving recklessly and

4 Just a few days earlier, the trial court found defendant to
be mentally competent to stand trial following a doctor’s
evaluation.

5
driving through solid red traffic lights” and then “directed her
vehicle in the direction of the victim [and] the victim had to
immediately swerve her car . . . to avoid a collision with the
defendant”), noting that defendant’s acts occurred in conjunction
with her saying that “she was going to run the victim over with
her vehicle” and “did not care who she hurts,” and citing
defendant’s in-court conduct at the prior hearing on rapid
diversion and how that conduct was “very disrespectful to the
court,” the court denied the motion, citing its “strong public
safety concerns” and its determination that defendant’s mental
health needs and risk of recidivism would not be better addressed
through mental health treatment than through the criminal
justice system.
C. Plea deal and sentencing
Following denial of the mental health diversion,5 defendant
entered a negotiated no contest plea to a single count of assault
by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245,
subd. (a)(4)); the People dismissed the original counts of assault
with a deadly weapon; and the trial court imposed the agreed-
upon low-end, two-year sentence, which amounted to “time
served.”
D. Appeal
Defendant filed this timely appeal. The trial court granted
a certificate of probable cause authorizing an appeal from its
denial of mental health diversion. (§ 1237.5; see People v.
Robinson (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 133, 136.)

5 Defendant petitioned this court for a writ of mandate to
overturn the trial court’s order denying diversion. We declined to
grant relief, in part because the trial court had not “abuse[d its]
discretion.”

6
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying her
motion for mental health diversion.
Section 1001.36 “authorizes pretrial diversion for
defendants with qualifying mental disorders.” (People v.
Braden (2023) 14 Cal.5th 791, 799.) As applicable here, a
trial court tasked with deciding whether mental health diversion
is appropriate under section 1001.36 must engage in a three-step
analysis, first asking whether a defendant is “eligible for pretrial
diversion,” and if so, whether they are “suitable for pretrial
diversion,” and if so, whether to nevertheless exercise the court’s
‘“residual’ discretion” to deny pretrial diversion. (§ 1001.36,
subds. (b) & (c), italics added; Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024)
98 Cal.App.5th 882, 891-893 (Sarmiento); People v. Brown (2024)
101 Cal.App.5th 113, 121 (Brown).)6 There is no dispute that
defendant is eligible for mental health diversion because it is
undisputed that she suffers from a qualifying mental health
disorder and that the disorder was a significant factor in the
commission of the charged offense. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).)
There is also no dispute that defendant satisfies three of the four
statutory suitability factors—namely, that (1) a qualified mental
health expert has found that defendant’s condition would respond
to treatment; (2) defendant has consented to participate in
diversion and waived her right to a speedy trial; and (3)

6 The trial court must also be “satisfied that the
recommended inpatient or outpatient program of mental health
treatment will meet the specialized mental health treatment
needs of the defendant” (§ 1001.36, subd. (f)(1)(A)(i)), but that
consideration pertains more to the ongoing treatment rather than
entitlement to diversion in the first place (Sarmiento, supra, 98
Cal.App.5th at p. 892).

7
defendant has agreed to comply with all treatment conditions.
(Id., subd. (c)(1)-(3).) The sole contested suitability factor is
whether defendant poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety if treated in the community.7 (Id., subd. (c)(4).)
For purposes of section 1001.36, a defendant poses an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if there is “an
unreasonable risk”—which courts have interpreted to mean a
“likelihood”—“that [defendant] will commit a new violent [super
strike offense].” (§§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4), 1170.18, subd. (c), 667,
subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv); Gomez v. Superior Court (2025) 113
Cal.App.5th 671, 690 (Gomez).) The crime of attempted murder
is a “super strike” offense. (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv)(IV); People v.
Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1150 (Whitmill).)
We review the trial court’s denial of a motion for mental
health diversion for abuse of discretion. (People v.
Graham (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 787, 795 (Graham).) ‘“A court
abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary or capricious
decision by applying the wrong legal standard [citations], or
bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are
not supported by substantial evidence.’” (People v. Gerson (2022)
80 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1080.) In evaluating findings for
substantial evidence, we must view that evidence in the light
most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, including resolving any
conflicts in the evidence in support of that ruling (see People v.
Mumin (2023) 15 Cal.5th 176, 198-199); we may not “reweigh”
the evidence, “‘even if substantial evidence to [support a] contrary

7 At oral argument before this court, the parties
acknowledged that the voluntary inpatient or outpatient
programs proposed for defendant constituted treatment in the
community.

8
[finding] also exists’” (City of San Buenaventura v. United Water
Conservation Dist. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 110, 120). The
defendant has the burden of making a prima facie showing of his
or her eligibility and suitability for mental health diversion
(People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 627), and it is defendant’s
burden on appeal to establish that an abuse of discretion
occurred (People v. Pacheco (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 207, 213
(Pacheco)).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
mental health diversion because its factual finding that
defendant was likely to commit a super strike offense is
supported by substantial evidence. Construed in the light most
favorable to the trial court’s ruling, the evidence at the
preliminary hearing indicated that defendant drove her vehicle at
Adams’s vehicle at such speed that Adams had to “immediately
swerve” out of the way to avoid the collision—and did so after
running multiple red lights; the evidence also indicated that
defendant, at that time, was angry at Adams and had expressed
a desire to run Adams over. Defendant’s conduct, coupled with
her expressed intent, can constitute attempted murder.8 (People
v. Young (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 891, 895 [deliberately driving a
car into people can constitute willful, deliberate, and
premeditated attempted murder, with the automobile treated as
a deadly weapon].) What is more, defendant’s longstanding
animosity toward Adams—expressed during the charged

8 To be sure, the trial court viewed defendant’s driving as
“reckless,” but, as detailed above, drew a distinction between that
conduct and defendant’s specific conduct in “direct[ing] her
vehicle in the direction of the victim” in a way that obligated “the
victim . . . to immediately swerve . . . to avoid a collision.”

9
offenses, during her interview with Dr. Erdelyan (where she said
Adams treats her like “garbage”), and persisting into the court
proceedings themselves—creates a likelihood or risk that
defendant will engage in similar conduct in the future. Indeed,
Dr. Erdelyan’s opinion that defendant did not pose an
“unreasonable risk” was qualified and conditional, applying only
if defendant “receives outpatient mental health treatment” (italics
added), yet defendant had a history of ceasing or resisting mental
health treatment and halting her medications (which is no doubt
why Dr. Erdelyan further recommended that “inpatient”
treatment be “required” as well as recommending forced
medication, if defendant did not voluntarily comply with a
medication regimen). (Pacheco, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 213-
214 [qualified expert opinion that defendant did not pose a risk of
a super strike as long as he remained free from drug use
constituted evidence that risk exists if there is evidence that
defendant might continue to use drugs]; Graham, supra, 102
Cal.App.5th at p. 801 [defendant’s prior noncompliance with
mental health treatment relevant evidence regarding risk of
committing a super strike during diversion]; cf. Sarmiento, supra,
98 Cal.App.5th at pp. 893-894 [defendant’s prior noncompliance
with drug treatment is not dispositive evidence regarding risk of
noncompliance with mental health treatment]; Siam v. Superior
Court (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 67, 84-87 (Siam) [defendant’s prior
noncompliance with prior treatments administered before a
diagnosis or based on a “misdiagnosed mental disorder,”
particularly when there is no evidence in the record to support a
finding of noncompliance, is not dispositive evidence of a risk of
noncompliance for treatment based on a proper diagnosis];
Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1155 [unconditional expert

10
opinion regarding lack of risk of super strike felony relevant and
dispositive of lack of risk].)
Defendant resists this conclusion with what boils down to
five arguments.
First, defendant argues that she cannot be deemed
unsuitable for mental health diversion due to a risk of
committing a super strike offense when the People did not charge
her with such an offense in this case and she has no criminal
history. While the nature of the current charges and a
defendant’s criminal history are certainly relevant to the question
of risk (Gomez, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 690), they are “not
determinative” of this question (Pacheco, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th
at p. 213) and for good reasons. What matters are the
“circumstances of the charged offense,” rather than the actual
offense charged (People v. Bunas (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 840, 861-
862)—and here, as noted above, those circumstances show a risk
of attempted murder. Further, hinging entitlement to diversion
on present charges and past convictions would create a de facto
“one free diversion” rule for anyone not charged with a super
strike offense and not having a criminal history, but nothing in
the text or legislative history of section 1001.36 supports such a
reading.
Second, defendant asserts that the record contains evidence
that she had complied with mental health treatment and a
medication regimen in the past. This is true, but it is not
dispositive because the record—as noted above—also contains
evidence that defendant has abandoned or resisted treatment,
and stopped taking medication, in the past. As noted above, we
cannot reweigh this evidence to come to a different conclusion
than the trial court. Nor is the trial court’s weighing so

11
unreasonable as to constitute an abuse of discretion, as even Dr.
Erdelyan recognized the importance of defendant remaining on
medication when, in her report, she recommended that defendant
may be “required” to be placed with “inpatient” treatment and, if
necessary, ordered to be administered her medications.
Third, defendant urges that the People’s subsequent plea
deal that resulted in a time-served sentence is dispositive
evidence that she did not pose an unreasonable danger to public
safety. It is not dispositive. (See, e.g., Brown, supra, 101
Cal.App.5th at pp. 123-124 [existence of some evidence
supporting a contrary inference of dangerousness is insufficient
to overturn the trial court’s determination].)
Fourth, defendant contends that several cases—and, more
specifically, the decisions in People v. Moine (2021) 62
Cal.App.5th 440, Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, Gomez,
supra, 113 Cal.App.5th 671, and Siam, supra, 118 Cal.App.5th
67—dictate a different ruling in this case. We disagree. As a
threshold matter, comparing the rulings and facts of different
cases is of “limited utility” because “each case necessarily
depends on its own facts.” (People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th
489, 516.) More to the point, none of the cases defendant cites
are sufficiently on point to dictate a finding of insufficient
evidence of risk in this case, where the defendant acted on her
threat to run down the victim by driving at the victim and getting
close enough that the victim had to immediately swerve out of the
way. (Cf. Moine, at pp. 450-451 [defendant’s conduct in making
verbal threats plus unqualified expert opinion that defendant did
not pose risk; no unreasonable risk of super strike]; Whitmill, at
pp. 1153-1155 [defendant’s conduct in “negligently fir[ing] a
single shot in the air away from those nearby” without knowing

12
anyone was nearby; no unreasonable risk of super strike]; Gomez,
at pp. 689, 690 [defendant’s conduct in shouting “get his ass, kill
his ass” while co-defendant struck victim during robbery; no
unreasonable risk of super strike]; Siam, supra, 118 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 83-87 [defendant’s charged conduct in stealing a yacht and
then crashing it into docks, other moored boats and eventually a
seawall; no unreasonable risk of super strike when trial court’s
findings that defendant had a history of refusing or not
complying with treatment were not supported by the record].)
Fifth, defendant attacks the trial court’s reasoning. Citing
the general principle that a trial court abuses its discretion if it
relies upon improper or irrelevant considerations (e.g., People v.
Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 378 [abuse of discretion to
consider “impermissible factors”]), defendant argues that the trial
court’s discretionary finding that she posed a danger to public
safety was infected by the court’s citation to an impermissible
consideration—namely, to the defendant’s in-court conduct
toward the victim and victim’s family, which the court noted was
“very disrespectful” to the court.
For much the same reason that a criminal defendant’s in-
court “misconduct” that “abuse[s] the dignity of the courtroom” is
relevant as evidence of an inability to “comply with relevant rules
of procedural and substantive law” (and thus a potential basis for
denying the right to self-representation) (Faretta v. California
(1975) 422 U.S. 806, 834-835, fn. 46), defendant’s in-court conduct
is relevant in this case as evidence of defendant’s continued
animosity toward the victim and of defendant’s unwillingness or
inability to follow any structured rules (as would be part of a
mental health treatment program). Even if we assume that the
court’s citation to defendant’s in-court conduct as being

13
disrespectful to the court could reasonably be construed as the
trial court implicitly taking umbrage at her outburst and further
assume that such umbrage would be an impermissible
consideration, the trial court’s reference to defendant’s in-court
conduct is ambiguous insofar as it might refer to permissible
factors or an impermissible factor. Where, as here, a trial court’s
finding is ambiguous, that “ambiguit[y] must be resolved in favor
of upholding the action of the trial court if such can be reasonably
done.” (Daly City v. Smith (1952) 110 Cal.App.2d 524, 531;
Richter v. Walker (1951) 36 Cal.2d 634, 639 [“Any uncertainty in
the findings will be construed so as to support the judgment
rather than to defeat it”]; People v. Megladdery (1940) 40
Cal.App.2d 748, 772 [“we must give the order, if possible, that
construction that will uphold the trial court rather than
indulging in another interpretation, even though equally
reasonable, which would result in overruling the trial judge’s
discretionary powers”]), overruled on other grounds in People v.
Simon (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1082, 1093, and People v. Posey (2004)
32 Cal.4th 193, 205.) To the extent defendant argues that her in-
court outburst should not be viewed as evidence of her animosity
or her inability to follow the rules because that outburst was
instead the product of her mental illness, defendant is asking us
to view the evidence differently than the trial court, which is not
permissible under substantial evidence review—at least where,
as here, the record does not make it unreasonable for the court to
interpret defendant’s in-court conduct as it did.
That the court, in stating its reasons, did not parrot the
statutory language (being “an unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety”) and instead rested its ruling on “public safety
concerns” is of no moment because the “record . . . as a whole”

14
indicates that the “court” “applied the proper concept,” as it
looked at the defendant’s conduct and her likelihood of harming
the victim again, factors pertinent to the inquiry into an
“unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” (People v.
Mayfield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 142, 196.)
* * *
Because we have concluded that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in concluding that defendant was not suitable
for mental health diversion, we have no occasion to reach her
alternative argument that the trial court erred in exercising its
residual discretion to deny diversion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

______________________, P. J.
HOFFSTADT

I concur:

_________________________, J.
KIM (D.)

15
The People v. Blythe Fjeld
B347828

BAKER, J., Dissenting

Defendant and appellant Blythe Fjeld (defendant) had no
criminal convictions before this case and she undisputedly suffers
from serious mental illness: schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type.
There is no dispute that her mental illness contributed to the
crimes she was charged with in this case: two counts of assault
with a deadly weapon (a vehicle).1
The trial court, however, twice denied defendant Penal
Code section 1001.36 pretrial diversion—once during a hearing
where the prosecution initially stipulated defendant should get
rapid diversion and again in response to defendant’s later motion
for pretrial diversion. In doing so, the trial court stated

1
Defendant was alleged to have driven her car at her cousin
while defendant was suffering from mental distress. The
majority concedes the cousin testified there was never a time
when defendant appeared to aim her car at the cousin or make an
effort to hit the cousin. The majority, however, believes this
testimony is inconsistent with a prior statement the cousin made
to law enforcement: that defendant “directed her vehicle in [the
cousin’s] direction” and the cousin “had to immediately swerve
[her] vehicle to avoid a collision.” There is no inconsistency.
Defendant could drive in the “direction” of the cousin and cause
the cousin to swerve without aiming at the cousin or attempting
to hit her. And in this criminal proceeding, it is the intent and
aiming that is important. The rest is just bad driving.
defendant posed “public safety concerns”—though that seems
belied by the lower term, time-served sentence the court
ultimately imposed. What is really going on in this case jumps
off the pages of the transcripts of the pertinent hearings: the trial
court denied diversion because it was offended defendant gave
her cousin the middle finger in court.2

2
At the rapid diversion hearing in March 2024, the trial
court said the following at the outset: “Now, the court was
informed that, when defendant was walking out into the
courtroom, she flipped off the family who is sitting in the
courtroom and the victim is also present in court. This really
concerns the court because, again, this is a case where defendant
is looking at four years in state prison. She was given the chance
of possibly getting [rapid diversion], and she does this act, in my
courtroom, in front of me.” Taking the court’s lead, the
prosecution then expressed doubt about the diversion stipulation
to which it previously agreed. And after that, the trial court
returned to articulating its feelings on the matter: “Again, this is
a situation where she does that act in my courtroom in front of
me right before I’m about to make a decision whether or not to
grant [rapid diversion]. And that just shocks me that she would
do something like that.”
In September 2024, at a hearing held to consider
defendant’s subsequently filed formal motion for pretrial
diversion, the trial court returned to the offense it had taken at
defendant’s in-court behavior some six months earlier:
“When . . . defendant walked out into the court [in March
2024], . . . defendant flipped off the victim right in front of the
court. The court indicated that it had public safety concerns, at
that point, denied [rapid diversion]; and then . . . defendant
started to say ‘I don’t give a fuck. I’m done.’ And she was being
very disrespectful to the court.” After the defense attempted to
make a record concerning why it was nonetheless error to deny
diversion, the trial court again made reference on the record to

2
There are certainly times when engaging in offensive in-
court behavior may be valid reason for a trial judge to refrain
from according leniency in punishment. Doing so here, however,
is fundamentally misguided: defendant should not be denied
mental health diversion for offensive in-court behavior when her
mental illness undoubtedly contributed to that behavior. Put in
legal terms, I believe this case falls in the class of cases where a
court abuses its discretion by relying on an improper factor in its
discretionary determination. (See, e.g., People v. Carmony (2004)
33 Cal.4th 367, 378 [trial court abuses its discretion when it
considers impermissible factors]; People v. Hayde (2025) 113
Cal.App.5th 587, 597-598.)
There is no proper basis to find on this record that
defendant poses a risk of committing a super strike crime. (See
generally People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 351 & fn. 3.) I
would reverse with directions to redetermine the matter without
adverse reliance on defendant’s middle finger gesture or vaguely
articulated public safety concerns that do not amount to a risk of
committing a super strike.

BAKER, J.

defendant’s months-earlier middle finger gesture and the offense
it caused—while noting that the court was “always open to
guidance from the higher courts. If they feel that this court has
ruled improperly, then the court would accept that.”

3

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