CourtListener 10861411•Russell v. Specialized Loan Servicing CA2/3
Russell v. Specialized Loan Servicing CA2/3
CourtListener 10861411Calctapp19.05.2026
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Filed 5/19/26 Russell v. Specialized Loan Servicing CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
MICHAEL L. RUSSELL et al., B344406
Plaintiffs and Appellants, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 22AVCV00620
v.
SPECIALIZED LOAN
SERVICING LLC,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Daniel L. Alexander, Judge. Affirmed.
Lorden & Reed and Zshonette L. Reed for Plaintiffs and
Appellants.
Houser, Robert W. Norman, Jr. and Neil J. Cooper for
Defendant and Respondent.
_________________________
Michael and Renita Russell (the Russells) filed a complaint
against the servicer of their home loan, Specialized Loan
Servicing LLP (SLS). According to the Russells, SLS overstated
the amount due under the loan, failed to apply their payments,
and collected monies not due. The Russells alleged this caused
them to file for bankruptcy and sell their home at a short sale.
SLS admitted it erroneously overstated the balance of the loan
and collected more money from the proceeds of the sale than the
Russells owed. After discovering the error, SLS returned the
overpayment to the Russells with interest. SLS then moved for
summary judgment on the ground that the Russells could not
show damages. The trial court granted the motion and denied
the Russells’ motion for a new trial.
On appeal, the Russells argue SLS failed to meet its initial
burden, there are triable issues of material fact, and the trial
court made various errors while evaluating SLS’s motion. The
Russells also argue the court should have granted their motion
for a new trial based on newly discovered material evidence. We
affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. The loan and modifications
In October 2006, the Russells obtained a $673,000 loan
secured by their home in Palmdale (the Property). The Russells
fell behind on their payments, and they entered into a loan
modification agreement with the lender in 2013 (the 2013
Modification). The total amount due under the 2013 Modification
was $720,231.21, consisting of $443,648.51 of interest-bearing
principal and $276,582.70 of non-interest-bearing deferred
principal.
2
SLS started servicing the loan in 2014. At the time, the
Russells were behind on their payments under the 2013
Modification.
In 2015, the Russells and SLS entered into another loan
modification agreement (the 2015 Modification). The 2015
Modification states the “modified unpaid principal balance” of the
loan is $711,115.31 and the “amount deferred through this
modification agreement is $123,434.69.” The agreement notes
the amount deferred in “previous modification(s)” was
$276,582.70.
SLS’s records did not reflect the actual terms of the 2015
Modification. Instead, the records showed a deferred principal
balance of $310,017.39, which was $186,582.70 higher than it
should have been. SLS asserted the inflated deferred principal
balance—which we refer to as “the overstatement”—resulted
from human error while inputting the terms of the 2015
Modification into its records. The overstatement did not affect
the Russells’ monthly payment obligations, which SLS calculated
correctly using the non-deferred principal balance.
In February 2016, SLS began sending the Russells monthly
statements erroneously stating the deferred balance on the loan
was $310,017.39. The statements reflected the Russells’ correct
monthly payment obligations.
The Russells failed to make monthly payments in February
and June of 2016. SLS sent the Russells a breach letter in
October 2016, giving them a month to cure the default. The
Russells failed to do so. Two years later, in October 2018, the
substitute trustee under the deed of trust recorded a notice of
default and election to sell. The notice states the Russells were
nearly $70,000 in arrears.
3
The Russells considered selling the Property in January
2019, and they asked SLS for a payoff demand. SLS sent the
Russells a demand erroneously stating $944,859.10 was due
under the 2015 Modification. The actual amount due was closer
to $750,000.
2. The bankruptcy
In February 2019, the trustee recorded a notice stating the
Property would be sold at a public auction on March 28, 2019.
Ten days before the sale, Renita Russell1 filed a petition for
bankruptcy. In her petition, Renita listed the Property as an
asset worth $625,000.
SLS filed a claim in bankruptcy court for $947,983.04. The
claim stated the Russells had not made any payments on the
2015 Modification for two years. SLS asserted the amount
necessary to cure the default as of March 2019 was $86,291.24.
The Russells made the monthly payments due under the
2015 Modification during the bankruptcy. They also made
payments to the bankruptcy trustee, most of which went towards
paying off the arrearages.
At some point during the bankruptcy, the Russells decided
to separate from each other and sell the Property. In May 2021,
the Russells unsuccessfully listed the Property for sale with an
asking price of $950,000.
A few months later, the bankruptcy trustee filed a motion
to dismiss the case “due to delinquent plan payments which has
caused a material default with respect to the terms of the
confirmed plan.” According to the trustee’s motion, Renita was
1 We refer to the Russells by their first names for the sake of
clarity.
4
delinquent in the amount of $6,093.88. The bankruptcy court
granted the motion on November 9, 2021 and closed the case on
January 7, 2022.
3. The attorney letters
The Russells retained an attorney who sent SLS three
letters between November 2021 and March 2022. The letters
stated the Russells did not understand why the balance on their
loan was so high. The letters asked SLS to provide
documentation on various issues, including “how the
indebtedness reached $905,646.88.” In a March 2022 letter, the
Russells’ attorney noted it appeared SLS had erroneously
included in the 2015 Modification the deferred balance from the
2013 Modification.
SLS responded to the letters and provided the Russells
with documents related to the loan. SLS insisted the loan
balance was correct, and it purported to show how it calculated
the balance. SLS stated the 2015 Modification included a
deferred balance of $400,017.39, consisting of $276,582.70 of
unpaid deferred principal from the 2013 Modification plus
$123,434.69 of new deferred unpaid principal. The letters also
identified “arrears capitalized” consisting of $94,635.85 for
expense advances paid, $90,018.00 for expense advances not yet
paid, and $93,291.35 for administrative fees. The numbers SLS
provided in the letters did not add up to the amounts it claimed
were due.
4. The short sale
In December 2021, the trustee recorded a notice of trustee’s
sale scheduled for January 27, 2022. In response, the Russells
sent SLS a request for mortgage assistance. SLS responded by
offering the Russells the option of a short sale. The offer required
5
SLS to receive at least $737,621.63 from the sale. The trustee
postponed the sale until June 2022.
The Russells and SLS entered into a short sale contract in
April 2022. The Russells sold the Property a month later for
$792,000. SLS received $746,576.74 from the proceeds of the
sale, which it accepted in satisfaction of the 2015 Modification.
5. The complaint
The Russells filed a complaint against SLS in August 2022.
The operative first amended complaint (FAC) asserted nine
causes of action: (1) breach of contract; (2) negligence; (3)
negligent misrepresentation; (4) intentional misrepresentation;
(5) unfair business practices; (6) violation of the Rosenthal Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act (RFDCPA, Civ. Code, § 1788 et
seq.); (7) violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
(RESPA, 12 U.S.C. §2605(e); 12 C.F.R. § 1024.5); (8) receiving
stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496); and (9) accounting.
According to the FAC, the actual balance owed under the
2015 Modification was $600,000 at the time of the sale in May
2022. It alleged SLS stole from the Russells $193,000, which was
the difference between the sales price ($793,000) and the loan
balance ($600,000). The FAC also alleged SLS inflated and
misrepresented the unpaid principal balance, charged fees and
costs in excess of $200,000, failed to offer loss mitigation options
to prevent bankruptcy and foreclosure, recorded false documents,
failed to apply payments, demanded and collected monies not
due, and withheld surplus funds from the short sale.
The FAC alleged SLS’s conduct caused the Russells to file
for bankruptcy, lose equity by selling the Property at a short sale,
suffer damage to their credit, be deprived of the Property, and
incur incidental expenses and attorney fees. The Russells also
6
alleged SLS forced them to “endure great emotional distress,
mental anguish, humiliation, shock, feelings of helplessness and
desperation.”
6. SLS discovers an error in its records
Sometime after receiving the complaint, SLS recalculated
the balance due as of the date the Russells sold the Property.
SLS used in its calculations a deferred balance of $123,434.69,
which was the amount listed in the 2015 Modification. Using the
correct deferred balance, SLS determined the Russells owed
$732,515.37 as of the date they sold the Property.
In November 2023, SLS sent the Russells a letter with the
corrected calculations. SLS included with the letter a check for
$16,214.87. That amount represented the difference between the
actual balance of the 2015 Modification at the time of sale
($732,515.37) and the amount SLS received from the sale
($746,576.74), plus 10 percent interest.
7. SLS’s motion for summary judgment
SLS filed a motion for summary judgment in May 2024.
Among many other grounds for relief, SLS argued the Russells
could not show it caused them to suffer damages. SLS asserted
its evidence showed it properly applied every payment it received
on the 2015 Modification. SLS acknowledged it overstated by
$186,582.70 the deferred balance due under the 2015
Modification, which caused it to receive more money from the sale
than the Russells owed. However, SLS said the Russells suffered
no damages because it returned the overpayment plus 10 percent
interest.
SLS argued its evidence showed the overstatement did not
cause the foreclosure, bankruptcy, or short sale. According to
SLS, the foreclosure was the result of the Russells’ failure to
7
make all monthly payments due under the loan, Renita filed for
bankruptcy because the Property was underwater, and the
Russells sold the home because they decided to end their
marriage.
a. Ollier’s declaration
In support of its motion, SLS submitted a declaration from
its Second Assistant Vice President, Laura Ollier. According to
Ollier, the Russells were already in default when SLS started
servicing the loan in 2014. At the time, the 2013 Modification
was the operative agreement. The Russells applied for mortgage
assistance to cure the default. SLS used a computer program to
determine whether the Russells were eligible for a modification.
The computer program required SLS to divide up into various
categories the deferred balance under the 2013 Modification,
which was $276,582.70. SLS categorized $90,000 as “ ‘expense
advances not yet paid,’ ” and it divided evenly the remaining
$186,582.70 into two categories, “ ‘expense advances paid’ ” and
“ ‘administrative fees.’ ”
Ollier asserted SLS ultimately offered the Russells the
2015 Modification with a total balance due of $711,115.31. The
loan included a deferred principal balance of $123,434.69. It
required the Russells to make a balloon payment of any unpaid
amounts on December 1, 2036.
Ollier stated SLS made an error while entering the terms
of the 2015 Modification into its records. SLS should have
removed the entire deferred balance from the 2013 Modification
($276,582.70). However, “[d]ue to human error,” SLS removed
only $90,000 of the deferred balance. Because of that error, SLS’s
records showed a deferred balance of $310,017.39, rather than
8
$123,434,69. In other words, SLS’s records overstated the
deferred balance by $186,582.70.
According to Ollier, the overstatement did not affect the
Russells’ monthly payment obligations, which SLS had calculated
correctly. SLS properly applied all the payments it received
under the 2015 Modification. The last monthly payment the
Russells made on the loan was in May 2021, a year before they
sold the Property.
Ollier stated SLS did not discover the overstatement until
2023, and it never knowingly demanded more money than it
believed was due. After discovering the overstatement, SLS paid
the Russells the difference between the amount it received from
the sale and the amount actually due at the time, with 10 percent
interest.
b. Krausz declaration
SLS submitted an expert declaration from a forensic
accountant, Gary Krausz. Krausz said he reviewed “SLS’s
Payment History, SLS’s monthly statements, [the Russells’] bank
records . . . , and payment records from the trustee in Renita
Russell’s bankruptcy.”
Krausz asserted SLS properly calculated the Russells’
monthly payment obligations under the 2015 Modification. The
Russells were in default in 2016 and never were out of default
until they paid off the loan in May 2022. The overstatement had
no impact on the monthly payments, the missed monthly
payments, or the amount required to reinstate the loan.
Krausz calculated the amount due on the loan as of May
2022—when the Russells sold the Property—assuming a deferred
balance of $123,434.69. He determined SLS received $14,061.37
9
more from the sale than was owed on the loan, which is the
amount SLS returned to the Russells plus 10 percent interest.
c. Other evidence
SLS attached to the motion excerpts from Renita’s
deposition. In those excepts, Renita testified the Property was
“underwater” when she filed for bankruptcy in March 2019, even
assuming the balance was $276,000 less than SLS claimed at the
time. Renita said she filed for bankruptcy because she believed it
was her only option. As of the date of her deposition, Renita
continued to believe bankruptcy was her only option, even
knowing everything that had transpired since then.
Renita said the Russells decided to sell the Property and
end the bankruptcy when they determined they “were going to go
our separate ways.” But for the separation, Renita would have
continued the bankruptcy.
SLS submitted a copy of Renita’s March 2019 bankruptcy
petition, which Renita signed under penalty of perjury. The
petition lists the Property as an asset valued at $625,000.
8. The Russells’ opposition
In their opposition to SLS’s motion, the Russells argued
SLS failed to meet its initial burden. According to the Russells,
SLS’s motion relied on the premise that the Property was
underwater, notwithstanding the overstatement. They asserted
SLS failed to show the Property was underwater because it
submitted no admissible evidence showing the value of the
Property at the relevant times. According to the Russells, the
sales price did not represent the Property’s true value “given the
urgency of the short sale.”
The Russells argued, even if SLS met its burden, there
were triable issues of material fact on whether the Property was
10
underwater at the time of the sale. According to the Russells, but
for SLS’s overstatement, they would have sold the Property for a
profit rather than pursuing bankruptcy and a short sale. The
Russells also argued there were triable issues of material fact
concerning whether SLS properly applied their payments.
a. Renita’s declaration
Renita submitted a declaration in support of the Russells’
opposition. Renita asserted the Russells discussed selling the
Property in early 2019 and requested a payoff demand from SLS.
SLS provided payoff demands in January and February 2019
showing the Russells owed more than $944,000. Renita was
surprised the balance was so high. She contacted a friend “in the
real estate industry” to ask about putting the Property up for
sale. The friend said the Property would sell for about $800,000.
After learning “we could not sell the Property because it was
upside down,” the Russells decided Renita would file for
bankruptcy protection to force SLS to accept monthly mortgage
payments and allow the Russells to make payments on the
arrearages.
Renita said her records showed the Russells paid SLS more
than $110,000 between March 2019 and May 2021. However, in
May 2021, SLS told Renita the total balance had decreased only
by $40,000. Renita suspected SLS had not applied all the
payments. At that point, she decided to dismiss the bankruptcy
case and try to sell the Property.
Renita asserted the Russells listed the property for sale in
May 2021 with an asking price of $950,000. The Russells did not
11
receive any offers.2 In June 2021, the Russells asked SLS to
accept a deed in lieu of foreclosure. SLS declined the offer,
stating title was not clear because of an issue with a home equity
line of credit.
Renita said she requested another payoff demand in
December 2021. SLS responded that the Russells owed more
than $900,000. That same month, Renita received notice of a
trustee’s sale listing a payoff amount of more than $905,000.
Renita received three more payment demands in March 2022,
each showing the Russells owed more than $915,000.
According to Renita, the Russells learned SLS had
approved them for a short sale in April 2022. The Russells’
attorney advised them to go forward with the sale to avoid
foreclosure.
Renita asserted the short sale caused the Russells to lose
title, possession, and enjoyment of the Property. It also caused
them to sell their personal property and furnishings “in an estate
fire sale” and incur “moving, relocation and storage fees, and
housing and related expenses.” The Russells suffered “extreme
emotional distress as a result of the problems with SLS,” which
led to the breakdown of their marriage.
b. Asuncion’s declaration
The Russells submitted a declaration from Lawrence
Asuncion, who described himself as a “forensic securitization
audit and mortgage foreclosure fraud analyst” and a “subject
matter expert on the secondary mortgage market.” Asuncion said
he holds a “degree in Economics” and has more than 36 years “of
2 At her deposition, Renita testified the Russells received a
single offer “in the [$]500,000[’s].”
12
actual work experience and professional practice in the financial
industry.”
Asuncion stated he reviewed the Russells’ financial
documents and determined SLS failed to apply $4,497.69 worth
of payments to the loan between March 2019 and June 2021.
Asuncion noted SLS’s explanation for the overstatement was not
plausible. He said SLS’s June 2022 letter—which it sent in
response to the Russells’ request for clarification of the amount
owed—was ambiguous and erroneous. According to Asuncion,
SLS’s statements in the letter suggest it made significant
accounting errors.
c. Other evidence
The Russells submitted an IRS Form 1098 Mortgage
Interest Statement for the 2015 Modification stating the
“outstanding mortgage principal” was $544,253.17 as of January
1, 2022. According to the Russells, the form reflects information
SLS disclosed to the IRS.
The Russells also submitted a “Broker’s Price Opinion”
(BPO), which estimated the “drive-by ‘as-is value’ ” of the
Property to be $870,000 as of January 2022. According to the
Russells, SLS produced the BPO in response to their discovery
requests.
SLS filed 36 objections to the Russells’ evidence. We
discuss some of the objections in other sections of the opinion.
9. The court’s orders and judgment
The trial court granted SLS’s motion. The court concluded
SLS was entitled to summary judgment on the breach of contract
and negligence claims because the Russells could not show they
suffered damages. The court noted the Russells did not dispute
they defaulted on the loan, the loan was underwater without
13
regard to the deferred balance, the Russells were not eligible for
further modification, and SLS did not owe them further
modification. The court determined the undisputed evidence
showed the overstatement had no impact on the Russells’
monthly payment obligations or the amount required to reinstate
the loan, the Russells’ decision to sell the Property was
independent of SLS, and SLS ultimately returned to the Russells
the overpayment, plus interest.
The court found the Russells’ misrepresentation claims
were time barred to the extent they were premised on statements
SLS made in 2015 and 2016. The court stated the only actionable
misrepresentations took place after November 2021. However,
those misrepresentations could not have caused the Russells’
damages because they took place after Renita decided to
terminate the bankruptcy and sell the Property. The court also
noted the undisputed facts showed SLS was not aware of the
overstatement until 2023, after the sale. Therefore, any alleged
misrepresentations were not intentional.
With respect to the remaining claims, the court found the
Russells did not demonstrate they lost money or property as a
result of the overstatement. The court stated, “[I]n short, SLS’s
November 2015 overstatement appears to have played no part in
[the Russells’] alleged injuries. . . . [¶] Without the essential
element of some damage, something having been taken from
them, or SLS having something that arguably belongs to the
[Russells], each of their remaining causes of action is subject to
summary judgment based on the undisputed material facts.”
14
The court entered judgment for SLS on December 13, 2024.
The Russells filed a motion for a new trial on December 19, 2024,
which the court denied.3 The Russells timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
1. The trial court properly granted SLS’s motion
for summary judgment
The Russells argue the trial court erred in granting SLS’s
motion for summary judgment. They contend SLS failed to meet
its initial burden, there are triable issues of material fact, and
the court made various errors while evaluating the motion.
a. Standard of review
Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no triable
issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)
A defendant moving for summary judgment must show the
plaintiff cannot establish one or more elements of the cause of
action or cannot refute an affirmative defense. (Id., § 437c,
subds. (o), (p)(2).) If the defendant satisfies this initial burden,
the burden shifts to the plaintiff to present evidence
demonstrating there is a triable issue of material fact on the
cause of action or defense. (Id., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar v.
Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850–851 (Aguilar).)
“There is a genuine issue of material fact if, and only if, the
evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the
underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in
accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar, at
p. 845.) “The pleadings determine the issues to be addressed by a
3 We discuss the Russells’ motion for a new trial in more
detail later in the opinion.
15
summary judgment motion.” (Arce v. The Ensign Group, Inc.
(2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 622, 628 (Arce).)
“On appeal from a summary judgment, we review the
record de novo and independently determine whether triable
issues of material fact exist. [Citations.] We resolve any
evidentiary doubts or ambiguities in favor of the party opposing
summary judgment.” (Arce, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at pp. 628–
629; see also Regents of University of California v. Superior Court
(2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 618 [“Evidence presented in opposition to
summary judgment is liberally construed, with any doubts about
the evidence resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion”];
Arteaga v. Brink’s, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 327, 342 [moving
party’s affidavits are strictly construed while those of the
opposing party are liberally construed].)
When reviewing an order granting a motion for summary
judgment, we perform the same three-step analysis as the trial
court. We “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings,
(2) determine whether the moving party has established facts
justifying judgment in its favor, and (3) determine whether the
nonmoving party has demonstrated a triable issue of material
fact.” (Jones v. Awad (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1200, 1206–1207.)
In conducting our review, we consider “all of the evidence the
parties offered in connection with the motion (except that which
the court properly excluded) and the uncontradicted inferences
the evidence reasonably supports.” (Merrill v. Navegar, Inc.
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 476.) We accept as undisputed facts only
those parts of the moving party’s evidence that are not
contradicted by the evidence of the opposing party. (Arteaga,
supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 342.) “ ‘We need not defer to the
trial court and are not bound by the reasons in its summary
16
judgment ruling; we review the ruling of the trial court, not its
rationale.’ ” (Arce, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 629.)
b. The issues framed by the FAC
At the first step of the analysis, we identify the issues
framed by the FAC. The Russells asserted nine causes of action
in the FAC, each of which had unique elements. However, with
the exception of the accounting claim, each cause of action
required the Russells to show SLS engaged in some sort of
misconduct that caused them to suffer actual damages. (See
Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821
[breach of contract requires the plaintiff to show damages
resulting from the breach]; Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., supra, 26
Cal.4th at p. 477 [negligence requires the plaintiff suffered
damages proximately caused by the defendant’s breach];
Chapman v. Skype Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 217, 230–231
[negligent and intentional misrepresentation require “resulting
damage”]; 12 U.S.C. § 2605(f) [violators of RESPA are liable for
“actual damages to the borrower as a result of the” violation];
Civ. Code, § 1788.30, subd. (a) [a debt collector who violates the
RFDCPA is liable for “actual damages sustained by the debtor as
a result of the violation”]; Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (c) [a “person
who has been injured by a violation of [Pen. Code, § 496] may
bring an action for three times the amount of actual damages”].)
To prevail on their accounting claim, the Russells had to show
“ ‘some balance is due . . . that can only be ascertained by an
accounting.’ ” (Sass v. Cohen (2020) 10 Cal.5th 861, 869 (Sass).)
To satisfy these elements, the FAC alleged SLS engaged in
misconduct by overstating the balance of the 2015 Modification,
collecting monies not due, and failing to apply all the Russells’
17
payments.4 The FAC alleged SLS’s misconduct caused the
Russells to receive less money from the sale of the Property than
they were entitled to receive. It also alleged the misconduct
forced the Russells to file for bankruptcy and sell the Property at
a short sale to avoid a trustee’s sale, which in turn caused them
to lose title and use of the Property, suffer damage to their credit,
experience emotional distress, lose equity, and incur incidental
expenses.
c. SLS met its initial burden
At the second step of the analysis, we ask whether SLS
presented evidence sufficient to justify judgment in its favor. As
we discussed above, the Russells’ claims were premised on
allegations that SLS failed to apply their payments, collected
monies not due, and overstated the balance of the 2015
Modification. We separately address SLS’s evidence as it relates
to each allegation. We then address the Russells’ arguments on
appeal.
4 The FAC also alleged SLS improperly failed to offer
mortgage assistance and recorded false documents. The Russells
do not address those allegations on appeal, so we do not consider
them. (See In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408 [“To
demonstrate error, appellant must present meaningful legal
analysis supported by citations to authority and citations to facts
in the record that support the claim of error”]; Dills v. Redwoods
Associates, Ltd. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 888, 890, fn. 1 [appellate
courts need “not develop the appellants’ arguments for them”].)
18
i. Failure to apply payments
SLS presented evidence refuting the Russells’ claims based
on the allegation that it failed to apply their payments. SLS’s
accounting expert asserted he reviewed “SLS’s Payment History,
SLS’s monthly statements, [the Russells’] bank records . . . , and
payment records from the trustee in Renita Russell’s
bankruptcy.” The expert “traced every payment [SLS] received
and how it was applied to the [2015 Modification],” and he
concluded “all payments were applied correctly.” This was
sufficient to show SLS did not fail to apply the Russells’
payments. Accordingly, SLS met its initial burden to refute
claims based on that allegation.
ii. Collection of monies not due
SLS presented evidence refuting the Russells’ claims based
on the allegation that it collected monies not due. SLS admitted
it received more money from the sale of the Property than the
Russells owed under the 2015 Modification. However, SLS
presented evidence showing it returned the overpayment to the
Russells with interest. SLS’s accounting expert asserted he
reviewed the payment records and concluded SLS received
$14,061.37 more from the sale than the Russells owed under the
2015 Modification. SLS presented evidence that, in November
2023, it returned the overpayment to the Russells with 10
percent interest from the sale date. This was sufficient to show
the Russells suffered no damages as a result of the overpayment,
refuting their claims premised on that allegation.
iii. The overstatement
SLS presented evidence refuting the Russells’ claims
premised on the overstatement. SLS admitted it overstated the
balance due under the loan. However, as we discuss, it presented
19
evidence refuting the Russells’ allegations that the overstatement
caused them to file for bankruptcy and sell the Property.
Because all of the Russells’ alleged damages flowed from the
bankruptcy and sale, SLS met its burden to refute the claims
premised on the overstatement.
SLS presented evidence refuting the Russells’ allegation
that the overstatement caused Renita to file for bankruptcy. The
FAC alleged the Russells had “no choice but to file a Chapter 13
bankruptcy petition to arrange to pay down the arrearages to
save their home.” SLS’s undisputed evidence showed the
Russells were at risk of losing the home because they failed to
make monthly payments in February and June of 2016, which
caused them to default on the loan. According to SLS’s
accounting expert, the overstatement “had no impact” on the
Russells’ scheduled monthly payments or the amount required to
reinstate the loan after the default. Therefore, the overstatement
had “no conceivable impact on [the Russells’] failure to make
monthly payments or reinstate the [2015 Modification].”
Renita seemed to confirm the overstatement did not cause
her to file for bankruptcy. Renita testified at her deposition that
she continued to believe bankruptcy was her only option, even
knowing everything that had transpired since she filed the
petition. In other words, Renita admitted she would have filed
for bankruptcy even if she knew the actual amount due under the
2015 Modification. Considered with the expert declaration, this
evidence was sufficient to show the overstatement did not cause
the Russells to suffer damages related to the bankruptcy,
including damage to their credit and emotional distress. (See
Yanez v. Plummer (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 180, 187 [“conduct is
20
not a substantial factor in causing harm if the same harm would
have occurred without that conduct”].)
SLS also presented evidence refuting the Russells’
allegation that the overstatement caused them to sell the
Property. At her deposition, Renita testified the Russells ended
the bankruptcy and listed the Property for sale because they
decided to separate. The Russells seem to concede that issue on
appeal, admitting their “decision to sell was voluntary, caused by
the separation.” Accordingly, SLS met its burden to show the
overstatement did not cause the Russells to suffer damages
flowing from the sale, including loss of title to the Property, loss
of beneficial use and enjoyment of the Property, emotional
distress, the loss of personal property, and incidental expenses.
Finally, SLS presented evidence refuting the Russells’
allegation that they lost equity because they were forced to
“dispose of the Property at a short sale to prevent the loss by a
trustee sale.” SLS’s undisputed evidence showed the Russells’
default and failure to reinstate the loan—not SLS’s
overstatement—caused the pending trustee’s sale. Therefore,
even assuming the Russells sold the Property for a lower price in
order to avoid the trustee’s sale, any loss of equity was caused by
their default, not by SLS’s overstatement.
To summarize, SLS presented evidence that it properly
applied the Russells’ payments and returned the overpayment it
received from the sale. SLS admitted overstating the loan’s
balance, but it presented evidence showing the overstatement did
not cause the Russells to file for bankruptcy, sell the Property, or
suffer damages flowing from those decisions. SLS also presented
evidence showing any loss of equity resulted from the Russells’
default and failure to reinstate the loan, which were not
21
connected to the overstatement. This evidence refuted the
Russells’ allegations that SLS caused them to suffer damages,
which were essential to their claims for breach of contract,
negligence, negligent and intentional misrepresentations,
violations of RESPA and the RFDCPA, unfair business practices,
and receipt of stolen property. The evidence also refuted an
essential element of the Russells’ accounting claim, which
required them to show “ ‘some balance is due . . . that can only be
ascertained by an accounting.’ ” (Sass, supra, 10 Cal.5th at
p. 869.) Accordingly, SLS met its initial burden on summary
judgment.
iv. The Russells’ arguments
The Russells contend SLS failed to meet its burden because
it produced no admissible evidence showing the fair market value
of the Property. The Russells assert such evidence was necessary
because SLS’s “entire” motion “rested on a single factual premise:
that [the Property] lacked equity at the time of the sale, such that
the admitted accounting error caused no damages.” We disagree.
Contrary to the Russells’ assertion, SLS did not argue they
lacked equity at the time of the sale. In fact, SLS conceded the
Russells had equity, which it erroneously withheld from them.
However, SLS argued the Russells suffered no damages because,
after recognizing its error, it returned the equity plus interest.
SLS did argue the Property was “underwater” when Renita
filed for bankruptcy, meaning it was worth less than the actual
amount due under the 2015 Modification at the time. However,
SLS presented admissible evidence to support that assertion.
SLS submitted Renita’s deposition testimony that the Property
was underwater when she filed for bankruptcy, even assuming
the total balance of the loan was only $668,000. Renita’s
22
testimony was consistent with her March 2019 bankruptcy
petition, in which she represented under penalty of perjury that
the Property was worth $625,000. According to Ollier, as of
February 1, 2019, the Russells owed more than $630,000 on the
2015 Modification, not including any deferred principal. Thus,
assuming a deferred principal balance of $123,434.69, Renita’s
own valuation showed the Property was underwater by more
than $100,000. This was sufficient evidence to support SLS’s
contention that the Property was underwater when Renita filed
for bankruptcy.5
We also reject the Russells’ passing contention that SLS
failed to address their entitlement to statutory damages under
RESPA and the RFDCPA. The Russells did not raise the issue in
their opposition to SLS’s motion for summary judgment. Nor did
they raise it at the hearing on the motion. Their failure to do so
forfeits the issue on appeal. (See California Restaurant
Management Systems v. City of San Diego (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th
1581, 1593, fn. 7 [“When an argument is not asserted below in
opposition to a motion for summary judgment, it is deemed
waived and will not be considered for the first time on appeal to
5 Contrary to the Russells’ arguments, Renita’s bankruptcy
petition and testimony were not inadmissible lay opinion and
hearsay if used to show the Property’s value. The Evidence Code
states the “value of property may be shown” by the opinions of
the “owner or the spouse of the owner of the property . . . being
valued.” (Evid. Code, § 813, subd. (a)(2).) Moreover, Renita’s
statements were party admissions, and therefore not
inadmissible under the hearsay rule. (Id., § 1220.) Thus,
Renita’s statements—both in her bankruptcy petition and at her
deposition—were admissible to show the value of the Property.
23
reverse an order granting summary judgment”]; Ochoa v. Pacific
Gas & Electric Co. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1480, 1488, fn. 3 [it “is
axiomatic that arguments not asserted below are waived and will
not be considered for the first time on appeal”].)
Even if we were to overlook the forfeiture, we would reject
the Russells’ arguments on the merits. Under RESPA, a court
may award up to $2,000 in statutory damages “in the case of a
pattern or practice of noncompliance with the” statute.
(12 U.S.C. § 2605(f)(1)(b).) The FAC did not request statutory
damages under RESPA, nor did it explicitly allege SLS engaged
in a “pattern or practice of noncompliance.” Therefore, SLS did
not have the burden to address the issue in its motion for
summary judgment. (See Conroy v. Regents of University of
California (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1244, 1254 (Conroy) [a defendant
moving for summary judgment need only refute theories of
liability alleged in the complaint].)
The FAC did seek statutory damages under the RFDCPA,
which allows courts to impose penalties between $100 and $1,000
on debt collectors who “willfully and knowingly” violate the
statute. (Civ. Code, § 1788.30, subd. (b).) The FAC alleged the
Russells are entitled to recover a statutory penalty because SLS’s
violations of the RFDCPA were willful and knowing. However,
SLS presented evidence refuting that allegation. Ollier asserted
in her declaration, “SLS was not aware of and did not discover
the error in the deferred principal balance until 2023 and, up
until that time, believed the $310,017.39 deferred balance stated
in its system was correct.” According to Ollier, once SLS
discovered the error, it returned to the Russells the overpayment
plus interest. This was sufficient to show any violations of the
RFDCPA were not knowing or willful. Therefore, SLS met its
24
initial burden to show the Russells were not entitled to statutory
damages under the RFDCPA.
d. The Russells did not raise triable issues of
material fact
Because SLS met its initial burden to show the Russells
could not establish at least one element of each of their causes of
action, the burden shifted to the Russells to present evidence
demonstrating triable issues of material fact. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 850–851.)
The Russells argue they met their burden by presenting
evidence showing they suffered damages under the “prevention
doctrine.” Specifically, they contend they raised triable issues of
fact concerning whether SLS’s overstatement prevented them
from exercising their right to cure the default by selling the
Property through a conventional sale. According to the Russells,
their evidence showed they had substantial equity in the
Property dating back to 2019, which made a conventional sale a
viable option to cure the default. They contend SLS’s
overstatement was a “substantial factor in eliminating a
conventional sale option and steer[ed] the transaction into a short
sale structure” . . . “under which all proceeds were directed to the
lender/servicer and [they] received no equity.”
We agree with SLS that the Russells did not explicitly
plead this theory of liability in the FAC. The FAC alleged the
Russells lost equity because SLS “forced [them] to dispose of the
Property at a short sale to prevent the loss by a trustee sale.” It
did not specifically allege SLS’s overstatement prevented the
Russells from exercising their right to cure the default by selling
the Property in a conventional sale. Nor did it allege the
Property would have sold at a higher price at a conventional sale,
25
even with the impending trustee’s sale. SLS did not have the
burden to negate theories not alleged in the FAC. (See Conroy,
supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 1254.) Nor could the Russells assert new
theories in opposition to SLS’s motion for summary judgment
without first moving to amend the complaint.6 (See Hutton v.
Fidelity National Title Co. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 486, 493.)
Even assuming the Russells properly pleaded the
prevention theory, they failed to show triable issues of fact with
respect to it. The Russells’ theory required them to show they
had more equity in the Property than they received from the sale.
According to the Russells, they met their burden by submitting
evidence showing the Property was worth between $820,000 and
$870,000, and they owed $640,825 as of May 2022. Therefore,
the Russells contend, their evidence shows SLS caused them to
lose between $87,485 and $229,175 worth of equity.
The Russells fail to cite any admissible evidence to support
their claim that the Property was worth $820,000 to $870,000.
The Russells point to Renita’s statement in her declaration that
she “contacted a friend in the real estate industry to inquire
6 According to the Russells, the FAC’s allegations of “an
inflated balance exceeding market value, failed efforts to sell, and
a resulting forced short sale” state “a prevention claim as a
matter of law.” They do not support that assertion with
meaningful analysis or citations to relevant authority. Therefore,
we do not consider it. (See Keyes v. Bowen (2010) 189
Cal.App.4th 647, 655 [“the trial court’s judgment is presumed to
be correct, and the appellant has the burden to prove otherwise
by presenting legal authority on each point made and factual
analysis, supported by appropriate citations to the material facts
in the record; otherwise, the argument may be deemed
forfeited”].)
26
about putting our home up for sale [in 2019]” and “was told that
the house would only sell for about $800,000 at that time.”7 They
also point to the BPO estimating the “drive-by ‘as-is value’ ” of
the Property to be $870,000 as of January 2022.
SLS objected to Renita’s friend’s statement and the BPO on
hearsay grounds, but the trial court did not rule on the
objections. Under these circumstances, “the objections are
presumed overruled and are preserved for appeal.” (Jolley v.
Chase Home Finance, LLC (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 872, 890.) We
review the objections “de novo, consistent with the general
standard of review applicable to summary judgment rulings, that
any doubts as to the propriety of granting a summary judgment
motion should be resolved in favor of the party opposing the
motion.” (Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 535.)
Applying that standard, we sustain SLS’s objections. Renita’s
friend’s statement and the BPO are hearsay if used to prove the
value of the Property, and the Russells do not identify any
relevant exceptions to the hearsay rule. Accordingly, the
evidence was not admissible and we may disregard it. (See Evid.
Code, § 1200, subd. (b) [hearsay is inadmissible except as
provided by law].)
The Russells also failed to present admissible evidence to
support their assertion that they owed $640,825 on the loan as of
May 2022. As best we can tell, the Russells arrive at that
number by subtracting from the amount SLS claimed was due
($917,407.89) the deferred balance under the 2013 Modification
7 It is not clear, and the Russells do not explain, how Renita’s
friend’s assertion that the Property would sell for “about
$800,000” shows it was worth $820,000 to $870,000.
27
($276,582.70). The Russells, however, do not cite any evidence
showing SLS overstated the balance by $276,582.70.8 In
contrast, SLS presented evidence showing the actual deferred
balance was $123,434.69, which was $186,582.70 less than the
amount it claimed was owed ($310,017.39). Using a deferred
balance of $123,434.69, SLS’s accounting expert determined the
Russells owed $732,515.37 as of May 2022. The Russells
presented no evidence to the contrary.
The Russells argue they raised triable issues by producing
a form 1098 Mortgage Interest Statement containing information
SLS purportedly submitted to the IRS. The IRS form states the
principal outstanding on the 2015 Modification was $544,253.17
as of January 1, 2022. The Russells contend this shows SLS
either knew its inflated payoff demands were false, or its
accounting systems were completely unreliable. We disagree.
The IRS form reflects the “outstanding mortgage principal”
balance of the loan—not the total debt owed—and it is entirely
consistent with SLS’s payoff demands to the Russells. Indeed, in
mid-December 2021, SLS sent the Russells a payoff statement
showing they owed a principal balance of $544,253.17, exactly the
same amount as the principal outstanding listed on the IRS
form.9
8 The Russells cite a paragraph of Renita’s declaration in
which she discusses four mortgage statements she received from
SLS in 2022 showing the overstated balance. They also cite
copies of the mortgage statements. The Russells do not
meaningfully explain how Renita’s declaration or the mortgage
statements are evidence the loan’s balance was $640,825.
9 The Russells question how SLS could demand more than
$900,000 to pay off the loan when the outstanding principal
28
We reject the Russells’ argument that they raised triable
issues by presenting evidence showing SLS’s overstatement was
a “superseding cause breaking the causal chain.” The Russells
contend, although they defaulted in 2016, the 2019 inflated
payoff demand “constituted an independent intervening act that
materially altered the legal and factual circumstances.”
Superseding cause is a “defense . . . which absolves a tortfeasor,
even though his conduct was a substantial contributing factor,
when an independent event intervenes in the chain of causation,
producing harm of a kind and degree so far beyond the risk the
original tortfeasor should have foreseen that the law deems it
unfair to hold him responsible.” (Soule v. General Motors Corp.
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 548, 573, fn. 9.) The defense has no application
here.
In passing, the Russells argue they raised triable issues
concerning whether SLS properly applied their payments. The
Russells point to a declaration from their purported expert,
Lawrence Asuncion. Asuncion asserted he reviewed the Russells’
and SLS’s records and concluded SLS failed to give the Russells
credit for $4,497.69 in payments they made to the bankruptcy
trustee.
SLS objected to Asuncion’s declaration as improper expert
testimony under Evidence Code section 720, but the trial court
did not rule on the objection. Considering the objection de novo,
we sustain it. (See Reid, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 535.) Even
balance was only $544,253.17. The answer is that SLS’s payoff
demands included a deferred principal balance of $310,017.39,
outstanding interest of $26,571.15, an escrow advance balance of
$20,001.91, and various other fees on top of the non-deferred
principal balance of $544,253.17.
29
viewing the record in the light most favorable to the Russells,
they failed to present sufficient evidence to establish Asuncion
had the “special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education sufficient to qualify him as an expert on the subject to
which his testimony relates.” (Evid. Code, § 720, subd. (a).)
Asuncion did not purport to have any education, training, or
experience in accounting. Asuncion asserted he holds “a degree
in Economics,” but he did not identify the type of degree, when he
received it, or what institution issued it. Asuncion also claimed
to have more than 36 years of “actual work experience and
professional practice in the financial industry.” However, he did
not identify any specific experience in accounting. Nor did
Asuncion otherwise explain how he gained the knowledge and
skill required to evaluate accounting issues. Without such
evidence, Asuncion was not qualified to give expert opinions on
accounting-related issues. Accordingly, his declaration did not
provide admissible evidence that SLS failed to apply all the
Russells’ payments.
The Russells make a number of other arguments, including
that the trial court erroneously found their claims are barred by
the statute of limitations, made “internally contradictory factual
determinations” regarding the parties’ knowledge, resolved
factual issues related to SLS’s responses to qualified written
requests, weighed evidence, failed to address material evidence,
and failed independently to analyze each cause of action. Even
assuming the trial court erred in those respects, the errors do not
warrant reversal. As we discussed, SLS met its initial burden to
show the Russells could not establish at least one element of each
claim alleged in the FAC. The burden shifted to the Russells to
establish contested issues of fact, which they failed to do.
30
Whether the trial court erred in the manner the Russells contend
does not change that fact. Therefore, the purported errors do not
warrant reversing the judgment. (See F.P. v. Monier (2017) 3
Cal.5th 1099, 1108 [a judgment may not be reversed for a
procedural error unless it results in a miscarriage of justice].)
2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when
it denied the motion for a new trial
The Russells argue the trial court should have granted
their motion for a new trial based on newly discovered material
evidence.
a. Background
The Russells filed a motion for a new trial after the court
granted SLS’s motion for summary judgment. Among other
grounds for relief, the Russells argued a new trial was warranted
based on newly discovered material evidence. The Russells noted
Renita stated in her declaration attached to their opposition that
a friend in the real estate industry advised her the Property was
worth about $800,000. Renita believed she had received an email
in 2019 confirming the valuation, but she could not locate it.
During a conversation with her daughter sometime after the
court granted SLS’s motion for summary judgment, Renita
realized “she had an interaction with another realtor in 2021 who
sent the email with valuation documents.” Renita “searched her
2021 emails and discovered contemporaneous documentation
from licensed realtor Karen Goddard confirming that SLS’s
inflated balance independently prevented a market-value sale.”
The Russells asserted the email could not, with reasonable
diligence, have been discovered and produced earlier.
The Russells attached a printout of the Goddard email to
the motion. Karen Goddard sent the email to Renita on May 6,
31
2021. In the email, Goddard wrote, “I have pulled comparable
homes and tried to get the value up as high as possible. $820,000
is the highest home that has closed in your neighborhood and it
had a pool. Wasn’t as upgraded, so your upgrades would possibly
be a wash for the pool.” According to Goddard, “$850,000 would
be the highest you could list and get an appraisal in—buyers
might drive the price up, but it would not be enough to get you
out without a short sale.” Goddard said, “Listing at $950,000 to
break even, is not really an option as there are no comparable
homes to support that price.” Goddard noted she could not
“figure out how you went from your loan at $673,000 in 2006 to
owing over $907,000 now.” Goddard suggested Renita ask SLS to
audit the file and provide a detailed list of how the loan
“ballooned up so large.”
The Russells argued the Goddard email “materially
strengthen[ed]” their case “by providing professional confirmation
that SLS’s inflated balance independently prevented market sale
and forced the short sale outcome.” They asserted the email also
showed the Property would not have been underwater absent
SLS’s inflated figures.
SLS opposed the Russells’ motion. It argued the Goddard
email did not provide grounds for a new trial because Renita
admitted the email was available to her earlier. SLS also argued
the email was immaterial and inadmissible hearsay if used to
establish the Property’s value.
The trial court denied the motion for a new trial. With
respect to the Goddard email, the court explained “[f]ailure to
recall a name or a year associated with a record does not excuse
failure to produce it earlier. . . . Ms. Russell also does not detail
what efforts she made to search her email for this
32
communication. It is unclear why the email would not have been
revealed through easily ascertainable search terms that could
have been applied to her whole email archive, or at least to a
slightly broader period than a single year. The Court declines to
reverse its judgment based solely on a party’s failure to
responsibly search its email.”
b. Analysis
A party may file a motion for a new trial seeking to
overturn an order granting a motion for summary judgment.
(Doe v. United Air Lines, Inc. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1500, 1504
(United Air Lines).) “Where a party seeks a new trial on the
grounds of newly discovered evidence, ‘[t]he essential elements
which must be established are (1) that the evidence is newly
discovered; (2) that reasonable diligence has been exercised in its
discovery and production; and (3) that the evidence is material to
the movant’s case.’ [Citation.] ‘The newly discovered evidence
must be material in the sense that it is likely to produce a
different result.’ ” (Hill v. San Jose Family Housing Partners,
LLC (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 764, 778–779; see Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 657, subd. 4.)
We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for a new trial
based on newly discovered evidence for an abuse of discretion.
(United Air Lines, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 1504.) We will
not overturn the decision unless the record clearly shows a
manifest and unmistakable abuse of discretion. (Whitlock v.
Foster Wheeler, LLC (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 149, 159.)
Evening assuming the Goddard email constituted “newly
discovered evidence,” the trial court did not abuse its discretion
by finding the Russells failed to exercise reasonable diligence in
discovering and producing it. The Russells do not dispute they
33
had access to the Goddard email when they filed their opposition
to the motion for summary judgment. Nor do they dispute the
trial court’s observation that they could have discovered the
email by applying “easily ascertainable search terms” to Renita’s
“whole email archive, or at least to a slightly broader period than
a single year.” Renita asserted she failed to discover the email
because she limited her initial search to emails received in 2019,
the year she believed the conversation with the realtor took place.
However, the Russells did not explain why she failed to broaden
her search when the limited search yielded no results. Given the
relative ease with which the Russells could have discovered the
Goddard email, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
concluded they failed to show reasonable diligence. Accordingly,
the Russells have not shown the court erred when it denied their
motion for a new trial. (See Fomco, Inc. v. Joe Maggio, Inc.
(1961) 55 Cal.2d 162, 166 [party failed to show diligence where
newly discovered evidence was accessible through “inquiry or
examination” of public records].)
The Russells contend the trial court failed properly to
evaluate whether Renita’s search efforts “satisfied the diligence
standard under the particular circumstances of searching years
of electronic communications.” They contend the court instead
simply considered whether “perfect diligence theoretically could
have uncovered the evidence sooner.” The record refutes their
contentions. The court’s detailed written order reflects a
thorough understanding of the law as well as the Russells’
arguments and evidence. There is nothing even to suggest the
court applied the wrong standard or otherwise failed properly to
evaluate the Russells’ arguments.
34
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment. Specialized Loan Servicing LLC
shall recover its costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
EGERTON, J.
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
ADAMS, J.
35
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