Yessian v. Garfield Beach CVS CA2/3

CourtListener 10861410Calctapp19.05.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 5/19/26 Yessian v. Garfield Beach CVS CA2/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

MICHAEL YESSIAN et al., B343942

Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 20STCV01544)
v.

GARFIELD BEACH CVS, LLC., et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Teresa Beaudet, Judge. Affirmed.
Kisob Law Firm and Apemwoyah Kisob Alaric-Lorenzo for
Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Payne & Fears, Daniel F. Fears, Andrew K. Haeffele, and
Leilani E. Jones for Defendants and Respondents.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Plaintiffs Michael Yessian and Mandi Martinez appeal
from a judgment entered in favor of defendants Garfield Beach
CVS, LLC (CVS) and CVS employee Deborah Padilla. Yessian
and Martinez alleged that Padilla falsely accused them of
stealing at a CVS store. At trial, plaintiffs presented claims for
discrimination, defamation per se, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The jury returned a complete defense verdict.
Plaintiffs filed motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
(JNOV) and for a new trial. The trial court denied the motions.
On appeal, plaintiffs contend the trial judge erred by
refusing to disqualify herself despite a financial conflict of
interest. They additionally assert the court erred by partially
granting defendants’ motion in limine based on the statute of
limitations, thereby limiting the evidence available to prove the
defamation claim; failing to give requested jury instructions; and
denying plaintiffs’ motions for JNOV and a new trial. We affirm
the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 15, 2019, plaintiffs visited a CVS store in
Pomona, California. Martinez asked store manager William
Pineda if there was a restroom. Pineda said the restroom was
closed for cleaning. Martinez left the store and waited for
Yessian in their car.
Yessian asked employee Deborah Padilla whether she had
seen his wife. The parties disputed what was said next, but
Yessian left after the brief exchange. He returned a few
moments later with Martinez. Yessian and Martinez then spoke
with Pineda and Padilla. In a recorded exchange, Yessian said
Padilla had accused him and Martinez of stealing. Padilla denied
accusing them of stealing.

2
In January 2020, plaintiffs filed suit against defendants.
In March 2023, plaintiffs filed their operative third amended
complaint (TAC), asserting claims for discrimination in violation
of the Unruh Act, defamation per se, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and negligent hiring, supervision, or retention
of an employee.
In addition to alleging that Padilla had falsely accused
plaintiffs of shoplifting, the TAC alleged Pineda had also made a
defamatory statement. The statement was contained in a CVS
internal investigative report (the Salesforce Report). The TAC
asserted: “Adam William Pineda, CVS’ employee, told the store’s
District Manager, Quyen Diep, that Plaintiffs were return
customers who were confirmed to have stolen from the store in
the past.”
In February 2023, the trial court granted defendants’
motion for summary adjudication of plaintiffs’ fourth cause of
action for negligent hiring, training, supervision, and/or retention
of an employee. On August 7, 2024, the parties proceeded to a
jury trial on the remaining three causes of action: discrimination,
defamation per se, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. The jury returned a defense verdict on all causes of
action. The court entered judgment in defendants’ favor.
Plaintiffs subsequently filed a JNOV motion and a motion
for a new trial. In the JNOV motion, plaintiffs argued
substantial evidence did not support the defamation per se
verdict. In the new trial motion, plaintiffs argued that certain
trial testimony constituted newly discovered evidence and
surprise. They further contended the trial court erred in failing
to instruct the jury on adoptive admissions (CACI No. 213), and
coerced self-publication (CACI No. 1708), and in granting a

3
defense motion in limine that prevented plaintiffs from using the
Salesforce Report statement as a basis for the defamation per se
claim. The trial court denied both motions.
Plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Plaintiffs Do Not Establish Reversal Is Warranted
Due to the Trial Judge’s Decision Not to Disqualify
Herself
Plaintiffs assert that the trial judge’s failure to recuse
herself violated their due process rights and constituted
structural error. We conclude plaintiffs have forfeited any due
process claim by failing to seek writ review of the order denying
their statutory challenge to the judge and by failing to assert a
due process claim in the trial court. Further, even if not forfeited,
plaintiffs have not established the exceptional circumstances
required to support a due process claim based on judicial bias.
A. Background
On July 24, 2020, the trial judge issued a minute order
disclosing that she is the “trustee and sole beneficiary of a trust
which owns 400 shares of stock that is valued at approximately
$25,336 in [the] CVS Health Corporation, which the Court has
been informed by counsel for Defendant is the parent company of
CVS Pharmacy, Inc., the sole member of Defendant.” The trial
judge stated she was not biased in favor or against any party as a
result, and that “ownership of stock of a parent company is not a
ground for recusal unless facts exist pursuant to which the
parent could be made a party or a party intends to join the parent
to the litigation.” Based on her review of the case and
information provided by the parties on July 23, 2020, the judge

4
did not recuse herself. The parties indicated they did not intend
to join the parent company as a party in the action.
On August 19, 2020, the plaintiffs filed a challenge to the
judge for cause pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3,
subdivision (c)(1),1 on the ground that the judge was the trustee
of a trust with shares in the parent company of the corporate
defendant. The challenge did not assert any due process or other
non-statutory grounds.
On August 21, 2020, the trial court issued an “order
striking statement of disqualification” on the ground that stock
ownership in the parent company of a party is not disqualifying.2
The order reminded the parties that review of the order was
permitted only by a writ of mandate and provided the deadline to

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Code of
Civil Procedure. Section 170.3, subdivision (c)(1), provides: “If a
judge who should disqualify himself or herself refuses or fails to
do so, any party may file with the clerk a written verified
statement objecting to the hearing or trial before the judge and
setting forth the facts constituting the grounds for
disqualification of the judge.”
On appeal, plaintiffs rely only on section 170.1,
subdivision (a)(3)(A), which provides that a “judge shall be
disqualified if any one or more of the following are true:
[¶] . . . [¶] The judge has a financial interest in the subject matter
in a proceeding or in a party to the proceeding.” In the trial
court, they also cited section 170.1, subdivision (a)(6)(A)(iii), as a
basis for disqualification, which states: “A person aware of the
facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be
able to be impartial.”
2 See Central Pacific Railway Co. v. Superior Court (1931)
211 Cal. 706, 719–720 (Central Pacific Railway Co.).)

5
file a petition seeking a writ. Plaintiffs did not challenge the
ruling by filing a petition for writ of mandate.
On August 7, 2024, the first day of trial, the trial court
initiated a discussion with counsel, outside the presence of the
jury, about her prior disclosure of interest in the trust’s stock, the
identity of Garfield Beach CVS, LLC, and its relationship with
CVS Health Corporation. Plaintiffs’ counsel did not say anything
during this discussion. The trial court asked if “anybody need[ed]
to address that issue any further,” and plaintiffs’ counsel
responded in the negative.
B. Forfeiture
As plaintiffs appear to concede, they have forfeited any
claim of statutory error by failing to file a petition for a writ of
mandate. “The determination of the question of the
disqualification of a judge is not an appealable order and may be
reviewed only by a writ of mandate . . . .” (§ 170.3, subd. (d);
People v. Nieves (2021) 11 Cal.5th 404, 498, fn. 13 [review only
available through writ of mandate]; People v. Peoples (2016) 62
Cal.4th 718, 786 [writ of mandate exclusive means of review].)
Plaintiffs assert, however, that their constitutional due process
claim is not forfeited. We disagree.
Our high court has held that in “order to give maximum
effect to the Legislature’s clear intent that disqualification
challenges be subject to prompt review by writ [citation], . . . a
litigant may, and should, seek to resolve such issues by statutory
means, and that his negligent failure to do so may constitute a
forfeiture of his constitutional claim.” (People v. Brown (1993) 6
Cal.4th 322, 336 (Brown).)
In Brown, “because defendant (i) sought writ relief as
required by section 170.3(d) [citation], and (ii) writ relief was

6
summarily denied, he [could] assert on appeal, based on facts
alleged in his unsuccessful disqualification motion under
section 170.1, subdivision (a)(6)(C), a constitutional due process
claim that the judge who presided over his hearing was not
impartial.”3 (Brown, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 336.) Subsequently,
our high court explained in People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th
344, 363, that a defendant who raises a constitutionally based
challenge asserting judicial bias in the trial court “may always
‘assert on appeal a claim of denial of the due process right to an
impartial judge.’ [Citation.]”
Here, plaintiffs did not assert a constitutional claim in the
trial court or seek writ review of the denial of their statutory
challenge. We therefore agree with other courts concluding that,
under such circumstances, a due process claim of judicial bias is
forfeited. (Rivera v. Hillard (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 964, 976, fn. 9
[finding “claim that judicial bias deprived [litigant] of due
process” was forfeited “by failing to timely seek writ relief”]; Tri
Counties Bank v. Superior Court (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1332,
1339 [§ 170.3, subd. (d), did not bar appeal on constitutional
grounds of judicial bias, but the failure to timely address the
issue by statutory means forfeited constitutional claim]; Roth v.
Parker (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 542, 548–549 (Roth) [plaintiff

3 Brown, supra, 6 Cal.4th 322, concerned former
section 170.1, subdivision (a)(6)(C), which stated: “ ‘(a) A judge
shall be disqualified if any one or more of the following is true:
[¶] . . . [¶] (6) For any reason . . . (C) a person aware of the facts
might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be able
to be impartial. Bias or prejudice towards a lawyer in the
proceeding may be grounds for disqualification.’ ” (Brown, at
p. 328, fn. 1.)

7
forfeited nonstatutory constitutional challenge by failing to seek
writ review of order denying motion to recuse].)4
Plaintiffs’ reliance on People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th
395, 445, footnote 16, is misplaced. In Panah, our high court
noted: “We have observed that, notwithstanding the exclusive-
remedy provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3, ‘a
defendant may assert on appeal a claim of denial of the due
process right to an impartial judge.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) In
Panah, however, the defendant did not appear to raise a due
process argument on appeal. (Ibid.) The court therefore did not
reach any relevant conclusion related to due process, judicial
bias, and forfeiture. Panah does not call for a different result
here. (People v. Ault (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1250, 1268, fn. 10 [“cases
are not authority for propositions not considered”].)
C. No due process violation
Even if not forfeited, plaintiffs have not established any
due process error requiring reversal. In the single paragraph in
their appellate briefing devoted to this issue, plaintiffs argue that
the facts require that we assume bias and impropriety. Not so.
Our high court has recognized “the exceptional nature of
the cases in which it had been compelled to conclude that the due
process clause had been violated by a judge’s failure to recuse

4 In Roth, the reviewing court concluded the appellant’s
constitutional claim of judicial bias was forfeited because she
failed to seek writ review of the order denying her statutory
motion to disqualify the trial judge. (Roth, supra, 57 Cal.App.4th
at p. 548.) The court also concluded that appellant waived the
issue by failing to raise it in the trial court and by raising it on
appeal only in her reply brief. (Id. at pp. 548–549.) This
alternative basis for the court’s conclusion does not render the
decision’s other reasoning inapplicable here.

8
himself.” (People v. Freeman (2010) 47 Cal.4th 993, 1004, citing
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. (2009) 556 U.S. 868, 887 [while
showing of actual bias not required, cases requiring recusal based
on due process present “extreme facts”].) “Less extreme cases—
including those that involve the mere appearance, but not the
probability, of bias—should be resolved under more expansive
disqualification statutes and codes of judicial conduct.”
(Freeman, at p. 1005.)
Plaintiffs ignore this authority and instead rely on two
cases, neither of which is persuasive because they do not concern
a due process claim of judicial bias. Both also consider materially
different facts. One concerned direct evidence of significant bias,
illustrated by the judge’s pre-judgment of the case. (Webber v.
Webber (1948) 33 Cal.2d 153, 156, 162 [miscarriage of justice
where trial court “indicated early in the presentation of plaintiff’s
case—and before having heard her evidence . . .—that he was not
favorable to an award of alimony”].) The other involved a judge’s
interference with counsel’s presentation of the case, resulting in
counsel withdrawing a witness. (Pratt v. Pratt (1903) 141 Cal.
247, 250–252 [judge interrupted counsel’s questioning of a
witness and threatened to prejudge defendant unless the witness
was withdrawn].) There were no such circumstances here.
This case does not present exceptional facts showing a
probability of bias. The trial judge lacked any direct or
immediate financial interest in the litigation. The judge was not
required to recuse herself simply because the trust in which she
had an interest owned stock in a parent company of the entity
defendant. (Central Pacific Railway Co., supra, 211 Cal. at
pp. 719–720.) Even had they preserved the claim for review,
plaintiffs proffer no facts that would meet the “exceptionally

9
stringent standard” for establishing a due process violation
arising out of the judge’s failure to recuse herself. (Schmidt v.
Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570, 589 [it is
“ ‘extraordinary’ for an appellate court to find judicial bias
amounting to a due process violation”]; Haas v. County of San
Bernardino (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1017, 1031 [“the high court has
required disqualification only for financial interests that it has
characterized as ‘ “ ‘direct, personal, substantial, [and]
pecuniary’ ” ’ rather than ‘slight.’ ”].)
II. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Granting the Motion
in Limine Based on the Statute of Limitations
Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in granting
defendants’ motion in limine, which argued that the statute of
limitations barred any defamation claim based on Pineda’s
purported statement in the Salesforce Report. (§ 340, subd. (c).)
We find no error.
A. Background
In June 2020, defendants produced the Salesforce Report in
discovery. The report identified “user” Hillary Williams in
connection with the following entry, dated December 2, 2019:
“Spoke to DL Quyen Diep (QD) regarding this case 12/2/19: QD
spoke to the SM Adam (William) Pineda and he stated that the
‘customers’ were return customers who have been confirmed to
have stolen in the past. QD asked her SM what evidence there
was and there wasn’t anything sufficient.”
In plaintiffs’ March 2023 TAC, they added the following
allegation in support of their defamation claim: “Adam William
Pineda, CVS’ employee, told the store’s District Manager, Quyen
Diep, that Plaintiffs were return customers who were confirmed
to have stolen from the store in the past.” In defendants’ April

10
2023 answer to the TAC, they asserted the one-year statute of
limitations under section 340, subdivision (c), as an affirmative
defense.
On July 31, 2024, defendants filed a “Non-Statutory Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings or, in the Alternative, Motion in
Limine to Bar Evidence of Defamation Cause of Action Barred by
Statute of Limitations.” Defendants argued that plaintiffs were
aware of Pineda’s statement in June 2020, and they were
required to bring any defamation claim based on that statement
within one year. Since plaintiffs did not assert a defamation
claim based on the statement until March 2023, defendants
argued the claim was time-barred.
The trial court agreed. It granted the motion in limine in
part, excluding Pineda’s statement for purposes of the defamation
per se claim, but permitting its introduction to establish Pineda’s
discriminatory intent for plaintiffs’ discrimination claim.
B. The statute of limitations barred any
defamation claim based on the statement in the
Salesforce Report
“Generally, a trial court’s ruling on an in limine motion is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] However, when the
issue is one of law, we exercise de novo review.” (Condon-
Johnson & Associates, Inc. v. Sacramento Municipal Utility Dist.
(2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1384, 1392.) “The application of
the statute of limitations on undisputed facts is a purely legal
question [citation]; accordingly, we review the lower [court’s]
rulings de novo.” (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013)
55 Cal.4th 1185, 1191.)
i. Timeliness and waiver
Plaintiffs contend defendants “waived” their statute of

11
limitations defense by failing to raise it in their opposition to
plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, and by asserting it only
on the eve of trial. Yet, plaintiffs concede that defendants
asserted the statute of limitations in their answer as an
affirmative defense. Plaintiffs fail to cite any legal authority
suggesting anything more was needed to preserve the defense to
be raised before or at trial. While plaintiffs argue in their reply
on appeal that the “late” motion in limine deprived them of a
“meaningful opportunity to marshal evidence, seek discovery, or
request leave to amend,” they do not explain why the pleading of
the affirmative defense in the answer was legally insufficient to
provide them adequate notice of that defense. We decline to
develop plaintiffs’ arguments for them. (United Grand Corp. v.
Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 153.) An
appealed order is presumed correct, and error must be
affirmatively shown by citations to legal authority. (Jameson v.
Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609; Lee v. Kim (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th
705, 721.) Plaintiffs have not established the trial court erred in
considering the motion in limine.
Plaintiffs also contend the trial court erred in granting the
motion in limine because defendants filed it after the trial court’s
own deadline. However, the trial court’s order states it
“discussed the timeliness issue with the parties and because the
statute of limitations issue would have to be determined prior to
the conclusion of the trial, the Court and the parties agreed to
address the issue on a shortened briefing schedule prior to the
start of trial.” (Italics added.) Plaintiffs thus appear to have
waived any objection that the motion in limine was untimely
under the trial court’s orders.

12
ii. Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the
limitations period was tolled or extended
a. The discovery rule
Plaintiffs contend the discovery rule prevented the statute
of limitations from beginning to run in June 2020. The argument
lacks merit.
“An important exception to the general rule of accrual is
the ‘discovery rule,’ which postpones accrual of a cause of action
until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause
of action.” (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th
797, 807 (Fox).) “A plaintiff has reason to discover a cause of
action when he or she ‘has reason at least to suspect a factual
basis for its elements.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) “[W]e look to whether
the plaintiffs have reason to at least suspect that a type of
wrongdoing has injured them.” (Ibid.) To “employ the discovery
rule,” a plaintiff must conduct a “reasonable investigation” and
“plead” that “despite diligent investigation” he or she could not
“have reasonably discovered facts supporting the cause of action
within the applicable statute of limitations period.” (Id. at
pp. 808, 809.)
Plaintiffs did not meet this requirement. Defendants
produced the Salesforce Report in June 2020. Plaintiffs did not
assert a claim based on the statement in the report until March
2023. They neither pled diligence in their TAC nor established
diligent investigation. Plaintiffs assert it was not reasonably
possible for them to discover the defamatory nature of the
statement when they received it in June 2020 because of the
“peak of the COVID 19 pandemic.” This explanation is
unsupported and facially unreasonable. The pandemic itself

13
cannot excuse plaintiffs’ lengthy delay in acting on a statement
produced in discovery during that time.
Plaintiffs also contend that Pineda’s statement did not
immediately appear defamatory. Essentially, they argue that
because the statement that plaintiffs were confirmed to have
stolen in the past may have been true—the parties stipulated at
trial that both plaintiffs had previously been convicted of theft-
related felonies—plaintiffs did not know the statement was
defamatory until they confirmed in discovery that the CVS
employees had no knowledge of plaintiffs’ past criminal history.
Aside from undermining any defamation claim (Terry v.
Davis Community Church (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1534, 1553
[truth is a complete defense to defamation]), this argument is
unavailing. The production of an obviously negative statement
about plaintiffs gave them reason to discover a cause of action
based on the report. It alerted them that, at a minimum, they
should immediately investigate further. Plaintiffs contend the
defamatory nature of the statement was only revealed in
additional discovery, but neither below nor on appeal have they
indicated when that discovery took place. They do not dispute
defendants’ assertion on appeal that they never took the
depositions of Hillary Williams, the human resources employee
identified on the top of the Salesforce Report as the “Case
Owner,” or Quyen Diep, who was the “QD” named in the
allegedly defamatory statement.5 Plaintiffs entirely fail to show
they could not “have reasonably discovered facts supporting the

5 Defendants assert that plaintiffs never conducted “a single
deposition during the four-year pendency of this litigation.”
Plaintiffs do not dispute this in their reply.

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cause of action within the applicable statute of limitations
period.” (Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 809.)
b. Equitable estoppel
On appeal and in their motion for new trial, plaintiffs have
asserted that equitable estoppel precluded defendants from
asserting a statute of limitations defense in the motion in limine
as to claims based on the Salesforce Report statement because
defendants misled plaintiffs as to the true author of the
statement.
Plaintiffs rely on Bernson v. Browning-Ferris Industries
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 926, 928, in which the court held that “equitable
considerations may justify an estoppel where the libeled
individual neither knew, nor through the exercise of reasonable
diligence should have discovered, the identity of the authors.” In
Bernson, the plaintiff was the subject of a critical report. He was
unable to bring suit for several years after the report’s
publication because he could not identify the authors. The
Bernson court answered the question of whether the statute of
limitations should apply “when, as a result of the defendant’s
intentional concealment, the plaintiff is not only unaware of the
defendant’s identity, but is effectively precluded as a practical
matter from ascertaining it through normal discovery
procedures.” (Id. at p. 933.)
Bernson is inapposite. Plaintiffs did not delay in amending
their complaint to add claims based on the Salesforce Report
because they did not know whom to name as a defendant.
Plaintiffs sought to hold CVS liable for the statement in the
report, not any individual employee. Although they originally
thought Pineda made the statement, they did not name him as
an individual defendant in the TAC, but only named Padilla.

15
That trial testimony suggested Pineda did not make the
statement, and Williams’s report was inaccurate, has no impact
on the limitations period here. The statute of limitations barred
plaintiffs’ claim based on the report because plaintiffs failed to
assert the claim against CVS within the limitations period.
Moreover, in contrast to Bernson, there is no evidence that
defendants engaged in wrongdoing or intentionally concealed
information necessary for plaintiffs to bring a claim based on the
report.
The trial court had no basis to conclude that defendants
were equitably estopped from asserting a limitations defense as
to any defamation claim based on the Salesforce Report.
C. Republication
Plaintiffs additionally argue the alleged defamatory
statement was republished after June 2020, thereby extending
the limitations period. We disagree.
Each foreseeable republication of a defamatory statement
may constitute a new publication and create a separate cause of
action to reset the statute of limitations. (Schneider v. United
Airlines, Inc. (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 71, 77 [“The person defamed
suffers injury each time the defamatory matter is published (or
republished) and therefore a separate cause of action accrues for
each publication.”].)
In their opposition to the motion in limine, the only
evidence of republication plaintiffs offered was their own
repetition of the statements to third parties. They proffered no
evidence that CVS republished the Salesforce Report statement.
Plaintiffs contend the trial court should have afforded them
additional time to gather evidence of republication, but they
neither asked for a continuance in the trial court, nor explained

16
why they had not obtained such evidence in the year and several
months following defendants’ answer to the TAC. The trial court
did not abuse its discretion in rejecting the argument.
Plaintiffs contend their argument is supported by
Williams’s trial testimony that “other members of colleague
relations have access to” the Salesforce system, which contained
the Salesforce Report. This was not evidence of republication.
That other employees had access to the report does not establish
that the report was viewed or shared. Indeed, Williams also
testified that she did not write the notes with the intent that they
would be shared. She did not distribute the notes to anyone at
CVS until the document was provided to CVS’s attorneys in
connection with plaintiffs’ lawsuit. There was no evidence of
republication within the limitations period.
D. Coerced self-publication
Finally, plaintiffs contend they were coerced into repeating
the defamatory statements, thereby republishing them during
the limitations period. In their surreply to the motion in limine,
plaintiffs submitted declarations stating they had discussed the
defamatory statement with others. The trial court rejected this
argument, finding that the TAC did not contain allegations of any
such discussions. Subsequently, the trial court denied plaintiffs’
request for a jury instruction on coerced self-publication.
The trial court did not err. “A plaintiff cannot manufacture
a defamation cause of action by publishing the statements to
third persons; the publication must be done by the defendant.”
(Live Oak Publishing Co. v. Cohagan (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1277,
1284.) While publication by coercion is an exception to this rule,
the exception is limited to a “narrow class of cases, usually where
a plaintiff is compelled to republish the statements in aid of

17
disproving them,” such as when a derogatory statement is in an
employee’s file and he or she must explain it to subsequent
employers. (Id. at p. 1285; accord, Beroiz v. Wahl (2000) 84
Cal.App.4th 485, 497.)
The plaintiffs’ declarations did not establish or even
suggest coercion. Yessian’s declaration stated he “discussed the
statement made by Adam William Pineda . . . with Scotty Weaver
and Andrew Steinline.[6] I discussed it with them on multiple
occasions . . . . In short, because of the shocking allegations
contained in the statement, I discussed it with other third parties
within the relevant statute of limitations period . . . .” Martinez
declared, “I recall that I have discussed the statement made by
Adam William Pineda in paragraph 2 above with other
individuals. I discussed it with them on multiple occasions ever
since I became aware of it . . . . Since the allegations in the
statement were very shocking to me, I discussed it with other
third parties within the relevant statute of limitations period
. . . .”
Neither declaration stated that plaintiffs were subject to
any coercion when they shared the statements with third parties.
Pineda’s purported statement was in a CVS internal human
resources investigation file. There was no evidence provided
before or during trial indicating plaintiffs were compelled to
repeat the statements. The court properly rejected the argument
as a basis to extend the statute of limitations. Likewise, the
court properly rejected plaintiffs’ request for a jury instruction on
coerced self-publication.

6 The declaration did not provide any identifying or
descriptive information about these individuals, other than their
names.

18
III. The Trial Court Did Not Prejudicially Err in Denying
Plaintiffs’ Request for an Adoptive Admission
Instruction
Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in denying their
request for an adoptive admission instruction under CACI
No. 213. “The propriety of giving a jury instruction is reviewed
de novo.” (Zannini v. Liker (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 610, 624
(Zannini).) We find no prejudicial error.
A. Background
At trial, the following evidence was admitted regarding the
incident at CVS. An audio recording from the store captured the
conversation of Yessian, Martinez, Padilla, and Pineda:

“Pineda: I never said you were stealing
anything. You asked me, you said, can I use the
restroom and I said—
“Martinez: Okay, so—no, but this is what your
employee told my husband on the way, so now I’m
thinking that was why I was not allowed to use the
bathroom, that—
“Pineda: What did he tell her?
“Yessian: She told me that—
“Padilla: He asked—
“Yessian: I said it, she asked me if I needed
help. I said I was looking for my wife, and she said,
is she a short Mexican girl with a big purse?
“Pineda: Uh-huh.
“Yessian: And she said, I said, yes, and she
said, well, she took off with all her stuff and who
knows what else.
“Padilla: I didn’t say—I said she took off.

19
“Yessian: Yes you did, and then she said, well,
is there anything in your bag, because—
“Padilla: She had a basket.
“Yessian: Is there anything in your bag,
because the police are on their way. I said, fine, have
the police on their way, because there’s—why would
there be anything like that, we haven’t bought
anything.
“Pineda: Uh-huh, right.”

After further conversation, they continued:

“Pineda: . . . I didn’t accuse you of stealing, and
I don’t think she—
“Martinez: No, I know—well, why would the
police be called? Why would she have to say, the
police are going to be called, or they’re on the way?
“Padilla: It wasn’t for you.
“Pineda: Well, we all had a—there was
another—there was an issue up here in the front, I
don’t know if you saw.
“Martinez: No, I didn’t see.
“Pineda: There was a gentleman that had been
kicked out for using heroin in our bathroom, and we
were having an issue . . . .”

In her trial testimony, Padilla denied making the
statement, “Is there anything in your bag because the police are
on their way.” She explained that she could not respond to
Yessian’s accusation during the conversation because she was
“always interrupted.”

20
Plaintiffs requested the following jury instruction:

“[CACI No.] 213. Adoptive Admissions
“You have heard evidence that Michael Yessian
made the following statement: ‘And then she said
that is there anything in your bag because the Police
are on their way. I said, fine, have the Police on their
way because there’s—, why would there be anything
in my bag because I haven’t bought anything.’ You
may consider that statement as evidence against
Deborah Padilla only if you find that all of the
following conditions are true:
“1. The statement was made to Deborah Padilla
or made in her presence;
“2. Deborah Padilla heard and understood the
statement;
“3. Deborah Padilla would, under all the
circumstances, naturally have denied the statement
if she thought it was not true; AND,
“4. Deborah Padilla could have denied it but did
not.
“If you decide that any of these conditions are
not true, you must not consider for any purpose
either the statement or Deborah Padilla’s response.
You must not consider this evidence against any
other party.”

Defendants objected to the instruction on relevance
grounds. The trial court sustained the objection without
prejudice.
In closing argument, plaintiffs argued that Padilla’s lack of
a response to Yessian’s assertion that she had accused him of
theft by asking if he had anything in his bag constituted an

21
adoptive admission that she had indeed made this defamatory
statement.
B. Plaintiffs have not established prejudicial error
Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred by refusing to
instruct the jury with CACI No. 213. We need not decide
whether the trial court erred because, even if it did, plaintiffs fail
to establish that the error was prejudicial.
To warrant reversal, an “[i]nstructional error must be
prejudicial. This means it must be reasonably probable that the
complaining party would have obtained a more favorable result
in the absence of the error.” (Zannini, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at
p. 623.) The purpose of the pattern instruction on adoptive
admissions is to limit the jury’s use of evidence that would
otherwise be excluded as hearsay. To that end, the instruction
informs the jury that if it decides any of the listed conditions are
not true, it must not consider the statement or the response for
any purpose. As noted in People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166,
1198, an adoptive admission instruction is “largely a matter of
common sense—silence in the face of an accusation is
meaningful, and hence may be considered, only when the
defendant has heard and understood the accusation and had an
opportunity to reply.”
Here, there was no hearsay objection to the evidence and no
limiting instruction. Plaintiffs were able to argue without
restrictions about how the jury should interpret Yessian’s
statement and Padilla’s response. It is therefore far from clear
that the instruction would have benefited plaintiffs. Critically,
the instruction did not direct the jury that it was required to
consider Yessian’s statement to be evidence against Padilla if it
found the conditions true. Instead, it merely permitted the jury

22
to do so, and prohibited them from considering the statement at
all if any condition was not satisfied. Plaintiffs fail to
demonstrate a reasonable probability that had the trial court
instructed the jury with CACI No. 213, plaintiffs would have
obtained a more favorable result.
IV. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Denying Plaintiffs’
JNOV Motion
Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in denying their
motion for JNOV because substantial evidence did not support
the defamation per se verdicts. We find no trial court error.
A. Background
In their motion for JNOV, plaintiffs relied on the store’s
audio recording of Martinez and Yessian confronting Pineda and
Padilla. As explained above, in the recording, Padilla denied
accusing Yessian or Martinez of stealing. At trial, Padilla also
denied accusing plaintiffs of stealing or of suspecting that they
had stolen anything.
Padilla agreed she told Yessian that Martinez “took off,”
but she repeatedly denied saying, “with all her stuff and who
knows what else.” She explained she meant that Martinez “took
off” from the cosmetics area of the store. Padilla further denied
saying, “Is there anything in your bag, because the police are on
the way,” and explained that Yessian did not have a bag but was
pushing a shopping cart.
When asked about the police being on their way, Padilla
testified: “I did not speak to [Yessian]. I’m thinking he’s hearing
it over our intercom. I just go, it wasn’t for her. That’s how—I
didn’t say the police were there. He’s saying the police were
there. And I go, it wasn’t for you. And I’m thinking he’s meaning
the alarm.” Padilla explained that there was a store alarm used

23
when someone did drugs in the store. She and Pineda both
testified that CVS did not call the police about plaintiffs.
As to Martinez, the special verdict form asked: “Did
Deborah Padilla make the following statement to a person other
than Mandi Martinez: ‘She took off with all her stuff and who
knows what else’?” The jury answered “No.”
As to Yessian, the special verdict form asked: “Did Deborah
Padilla make the following statement to a person other than
Michael Yessian: ‘Is there anything in your bag, because the
police are on their way’?” The jury answered, “No.”
Pursuant to the instructions on the verdict forms, the jury
did not answer any other questions about the defamation claims.
B. Legal principles
Generally, a “ ‘ “motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict may be granted only if it appears from the evidence,
viewed in the light most favorable to the party securing the
verdict, that there is no substantial evidence in support.” ’ ”
(Webb v. Special Electric Co., Inc. (2016) 63 Cal.4th 167, 192.)
However, “ ‘where the trier of fact has determined that the party
with the burden of proof did not carry its burden and that party
appeals, “it is misleading to characterize the failure-of-proof issue
as whether substantial evidence supports the judgment.”
[Citations.] Instead, “where the issue on appeal turns on a
failure of proof at trial, the question for a reviewing court
becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the
appellant as a matter of law.” [Citation.] Specifically, we ask
“whether the appellant’s evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and
unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a character and weight as to leave
no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to
support a finding.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Estes v. Eaton Corp. (2020) 51

24
Cal.App.5th 636, 651 (Estes).) This standard is “ ‘almost
impossible’ ” for a “losing plaintiff to meet.” (Ibid.)
“ ‘ “On review of an order granting JNOV, we ‘ “must
resolve any conflict in the evidence and draw all reasonable
inferences therefrom in favor of the jury’s verdict.” ’ ” ’ ” (Lurner
v. American Golf Corp. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 121, 132 (Lurner).)
To prevail on a claim for defamation per se, plaintiffs had
to establish that there was “ ‘(1) a publication that is (2) false,
(3) defamatory, (4) unprivileged, and (5) has a tendency to injure
or causes special damage.’ [Citation.]” (Briganti v. Chow (2019)
42 Cal.App.5th 504, 509.)
C. The evidence did not compel a finding in favor
of the plaintiffs as a matter of law7
The evidence did not compel a finding in plaintiffs’ favor as
a matter of law. (Estes, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 651.) Indeed,
substantial evidence supported the verdict. Padilla repeatedly
denied making the asserted defamatory statements, both at the
time of the incident and at trial. Her testimony was sufficient to
support the jury’s conclusion that she did not, in fact, make the
statements. (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181
[“unless the testimony is physically impossible or inherently
improbable, testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support
a conviction”].) As a result, plaintiffs’ contrary testimony was not
“uncontradicted and unimpeached.” Plaintiffs urge us to consider

7 As defendants point out, plaintiffs fail to recite the evidence
in support of the jury’s verdicts. On that basis alone, we may
deem any error waived. (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th
1229, 1246.) However, we exercise our discretion to consider
plaintiffs’ argument on the merits. (Burch v. CertainTeed Corp.
(2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 341, 349.)

25
testimony that they assert shows Padilla was not credible.
However, we do not revisit the jury’s credibility determinations,
nor was the trial court permitted to do so. (Lurner, supra, 97
Cal.App.5th at pp. 132–133.)
Plaintiffs did not establish they were entitled to JNOV.8
V. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for New Trial
Finally, plaintiffs argue the trial court erred in denying
their motion for new trial. We have already addressed several of
the grounds asserted in the motion and have rejected plaintiffs’
claims that the trial court erred.9 However, plaintiffs also
contend they were entitled to a new trial based on surprise and
newly discovered evidence due to Williams’s trial testimony.
(§ 657, subds. 3 & 4.) The trial court did not abuse its discretion

8 We need not address plaintiffs’ arguments regarding other
elements of the defamation claim as there was sufficient evidence
to support the jury’s dispositive findings.
9 Plaintiffs argue they were entitled to a new trial because
defendants’ act of raising the statute of limitations in a motion in
limine on the eve of trial constituted surprise, and the motion in
limine was barred by equitable estoppel. For the reasons set
forth in our discussion of the trial court’s order granting the
motion in limine, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial
court’s order denying the motion for new trial on those grounds.
Plaintiffs additionally assert that they were entitled to a new
trial based on “[i]rregularity in the proceedings” and “[e]rror in
law” due to the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on
adoptive admissions and coerced self-publication. (§ 657, subds. 1
& 7.) We have addressed the substance of these arguments above
and, for the same reasons, conclude the trial court did not err in
denying the motion for new trial based on claimed instructional
error.

26
in denying the motion.
A. Legal principles
Section 657 sets forth the circumstances permitting a
court to grant a motion for a new trial. With respect to
Williams’s testimony, the plaintiffs relied on two: “Accident
or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against” (id., subd. (3)); and “Newly discovered
evidence, material for the party making the application,
which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have
discovered and produced at the trial” (id., subd. (4)).
We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse of
discretion. (Zirpel v. Alki David Productions, Inc. (2023) 93
Cal.App.5th 563, 573.) “In doing so, we review the entire record
independently to determine whether any alleged error occurred,
and if so, whether there was resulting prejudice.” (Ibid.)10
B. Discussion
At trial, Williams, the human resources employee listed as
the “Case Owner” of the Salesforce Report, testified that the
report reflected her notes, including the statement attributed to
Pineda: “Adam William Pineda, CVS employee, told the store’s
District Manager, Quyen Diep, that Plaintiffs were return

10 Defendants argue the trial court was required to deny the
motion as to the first, third, and fourth subdivisions of
section 657 because plaintiffs failed to file affidavits in support of
those grounds. (Kabran v. Sharp Memorial Hospital (2017) 2
Cal.5th 330, 336.) However, plaintiffs’ grounds for a new trial
under subdivisions 3 and 4 are based on Williams’s trial
testimony and, under subdivision 1, on the trial court’s rejection
of requested jury instructions. The facts relevant to these
grounds are in the record. We thus decline to affirm the denial of
the motion based solely on plaintiffs’ failure to file affidavits.

27
customers who were confirmed to have stolen from the store in
the past.” However, Williams also testified: “No one ever told me
they were confirmed or suspected shoplifters. These were my
rough notes that I put together that I did not share with
anybody.” She said the notes were “overstated” and
“preliminary.” She further testified that the note was based on
what she had learned from Diep.
When CVS deposed Pineda and asked him about the
statement, he testified: “If that is what I reported, then I’m
assuming that’s accurate.” But, at trial, Pineda denied making
the statement attributed to him in the Salesforce Report. Diep
also testified that he did not recall Pineda making the statement,
but he did recall speaking with Pineda about the incident and
relaying what he learned to Williams.
Plaintiffs asserted that Williams’s testimony entitled them
to a new trial based on “[a]ccident or surprise, which ordinary
prudence could not have guarded against” and “[n]ewly
discovered evidence, material for the party making the
application, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have
discovered and produced at the trial.” (§ 657, subds. 3 & 4.)
We conclude the trial court properly rejected plaintiffs’
argument for two reasons. First, to warrant a new trial, any
surprise must detrimentally impact the party moving for new
trial. (McCoy v. Pacific Maritime Assn. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th
283, 305 (McCoy).) Likewise, new evidence justifies a new trial
only if that evidence is material. (Wall Street Network, Ltd. v.
New York Times Co. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1192 (Wall
Street Network).) With respect to the defamation claim, any
surprise or new evidence regarding which employee made the
statement in the Salesforce Report was neither material nor

28
prejudicial because any defamation claim against CVS based on
the statement was barred by the statute of limitations.
Second, even if the statement was relevant to plaintiffs’
other claims, they failed to show they were unable “to prevent or
guard against [any surprise] by ordinary prudence,” (McCoy,
supra, 216 Cal.App.4th at p. 305), or that they exercised
reasonable diligence in discovering the evidence (Wall Street
Network, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 1192). When deposed,
Pineda’s recollection of the incident was vague. Yet, plaintiffs
admit that after Pineda’s deposition testimony about the
statement, they did not seek further discovery about it. The
document containing the statement identified two other
individuals, Williams and Diep. Indeed, the document itself
reflected that Williams was the “user” who had gathered the
information reflected in the report. The record does not indicate
that plaintiffs attempted to depose either Williams or Diep.
“[T]he party seeking relief has the burden to prove that he
exercised reasonable diligence to discover and produce the
evidence at trial. If he does not make this showing, the motion
must be denied. Moreover, a general averment of diligence is
insufficient. The moving party must state the particular acts or
circumstances which establish diligence.” (In re Marriage of Liu
(1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 143, 153–154.) There is no such evidence
of diligence in the record here. In addition, “ ‘[i]t is well settled
that a party’s right to a new trial upon the ground of surprise is
waived if the alleged surprise is not called to the court’s attention
by a motion for a continuance or other relief. [Citations.]’ ”
(Cameron v. Las Orchidias Properties, LLC (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th
481, 503.) Plaintiffs made no such request here.

29
Plaintiffs further failed to provide any evidence to support
their claim that defendants concealed the author of the statement
or intentionally misled plaintiffs. At most, they point to briefing
defendants submitted in opposition to summary judgment
suggesting that defendants also believed Pineda made the
statement reflected in the report.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a new
trial based on surprise or newly discovered evidence.
DISPOSITION
The judgment and orders denying the motions for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and a new trial are affirmed.
Defendants are entitled to their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

ADAMS, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

EGERTON, J.

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