Pridgen v. Robustelli CA1/3

CourtListener 10861369Calctapp19.05.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 5/19/26 Pridgen v. Robustelli CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

ABDUL PRIDGEN,
Plaintiff and Appellant, A173773
v.
FRANCES ROBUSTELLI, (Alameda County Super. Ct.
No. 24CV097577)
Defendant and Respondent.

Abdul Pridgen sued Frances Robustelli for racial harassment and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court granted her
motion to strike the claims pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute (Code. Civ.
Proc., § 425.16; undesignated statutory references are to this code) and
entered judgment in her favor. Pridgen appeals. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
In 2024, Pridgen sued the City of San Leandro (City) and former City
Manager Robustelli (defendants), alleging racial discrimination, failure to
prevent discrimination and/or harassment, retaliation, wrongful termination,
harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation. All
claims were asserted against the City, but only the last three were asserted
against Robustelli.
Pridgen alleged Robustelli hired him — an African American man — to
be the chief of police in 2021. In 2023, however, she sent a letter “placing
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him on ‘paid administrative leave effective immediately while City
conducted a workplace investigation,’ ” indicating “he was the ‘subject of the
investigation,’ ” and relieving him “ ‘of all duties and responsibilities.’ ”
It did not say why he was being investigated, but he alleged his command
staff made false accusations because they opposed his efforts to remedy
the “longstanding institutionalized pattern of discriminatory hiring
and . . . practices.” Defendants “repeatedly issued press releases and
otherwise leaked information to the press indicating that [he] had been
‘placed on paid leave’ while he was ‘being investigated for departmental
policy violations.’ ” Defendants “intentionally published vague and
nonspecific information about the nature of the investigation” to “leave the
impression that [he] had engaged in serious misconduct . . . and to severely
damage his reputation.” In 2024, after the conclusion of an external
investigation, Robustelli issued a notice to terminate his “at-will employment
for ‘no cause.’ ” An African American female was hired as the next chief of
police.
In 2025, the City filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the defamation
claim. It provided the declaration of the City’s public information officer,
which attached the two press releases issued concerning Pridgen. The press
releases contained statements made by Robustelli.1 Weeks later, Pridgen’s
defamation cause of action was dismissed with prejudice at his request.
Robustelli then filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the claims alleged

1 The first press release contained a single sentence in which Robustelli

said positive things about the person serving as interim chief while Pridgen
was on leave. In the second press release, she stated, “The City is prohibited
by law from releasing any information about public safety personnel, the
length of time . . . to address these matters, reasons for Mr. Pridgen’s
departure, and the full results of the investigation.”

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against her, attaching the public information officer’s declaration and press
releases. After considering the briefing, Pridgen’s declaration, and oral
argument, the trial court granted the motion. It concluded the harassment
and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims — the only remaining
claims alleged against Robustelli — arose from protected activity. Further, it
concluded Pridgen failed to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on those
claims. The court issued judgment in Robustelli’s favor but indicated the
action would continue as to the remaining claims against the City. Pridgen
appealed.
DISCUSSION
Pridgen contends the trial court erred by weighing the evidence in
concluding he had not met his burden to demonstrate a probability of
prevailing on his claims. We disagree.
The anti-SLAPP statute permits a defendant to seek dismissal of
“unmeritorious claims that are brought to thwart constitutionally protected
speech or petitioning activity.” (Robinzine v. Vicory (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th
1416, 1420–1421; § 425.16, subd. (a).) Resolving an anti-SLAPP motion to
strike entails a two-step process. (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384.)
The defendant must first show the claim arises out of “acts in furtherance
of the defendant’s constitutional right of petition or free speech in connection
with a public issue.” (Martinez v. Metabolife Internat., Inc. (2003)
113 Cal.App.4th 181, 186.) If shown, the plaintiff bears the burden of
demonstrating a probability of success on the merits. (Baral, at p. 384.)
The trial court does not weigh the evidence, rather it accepts plaintiff’s
evidence as true and determines whether “the plaintiff has stated a legally
sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing” sufficient for a
favorable judgment. (Id. at pp. 384–385.) “If the plaintiff fails to meet the

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second-step burden, the court will strike the claim.” (Sanchez v. Bezos (2022)
80 Cal.App.5th 750, 763.) We independently review the court’s ruling. (Ibid.)
Pridgen does not challenge the trial court’s conclusion as to the first
step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, i.e., that his claims arose out of protected
activity. So we limit our analysis to whether he met his burden of
demonstrating a probability of success on the merits.2
We begin with the cause of action for racial harassment in violation of
the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA; Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.).
(Id., § 12940, subd. (j).) To establish a prima facie case, Pridgen must “show
that (1) he was a member of a protected class; (2) he was subjected to
unwelcome racial harassment; (3) the harassment was based on race; (4) the
harassment unreasonably interfered with his work performance by creating
an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) [Robustelli]
is liable for the harassment.” (Thompson v. City of Monrovia (2010)
186 Cal.App.4th 860, 876.) The trial court concluded Pridgen failed to make
“a prima facie factual showing” or to present “competent, relevant evidence to
show that he has a probability of prevailing.” In so concluding, the court
acknowledged it was not to weigh evidence, and the record reflects it did not
do so.
In urging reversal, Pridgen relies on the declaration he submitted in
opposition to Robustelli’s motion to strike. In it, he averred that his
command staff opposed his efforts to remedy an “institutionalized pattern of

2 We note that, in asserting his “declaration set forth specific facts

which, if credited, satisfy each element of the challenged causes of action,”
Pridgen does not set forth the elements of the claims nor explain how his
evidence was sufficient to establish their existence. Despite his failure to
make reasoned legal argument on the issue, we elect not to deem his claim
forfeited. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B); Benach v. County of Los
Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852.)

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discriminatory hiring and promotion practices,” and their opposition led them
to make “false accusations that [he] had violated Department polices relating
to honesty and integrity.” He also declared that the “Command Staff
fabricated the false accusations of [his] dishonesty out of racial animus.”
(Italics added.) While Pridgen maintained Robustelli was “deeply aware” of
departmental opposition to his efforts to “bring change” and “knew the
allegations against [him] were false,” he also averred she was “fully
committed to and supportive of [his] vision and the actions [he] was taking to
effectuate them.” In identifying her conduct at issue, he declared she “gave
[him] a letter placing him . . . on paid administrative leave . . . while the city
conducted an investigation,” and she ultimately issued a notice to terminate
him. He also averred “[d]efendants” issued press releases that were “vague
and nonspecific” so as to “leave the impression that [he] had engaged in
serious misconduct.”
Pridgen fails to identify harassment under FEHA. The allegedly
unwarranted placement on leave pending an investigation and termination
do not suffice. (Reno v. Baird (1998) 18 Cal.4th 640, 646–647 [“ ‘commonly
necessary personnel management actions such as hiring and firing . . . do not
come within the meaning of harassment’ ”]; Jumaane v. City of Los Angeles
(2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1390, 1407–1408 [allegedly unwarranted suspension
does not constitute harassment].) “ ‘These actions may retrospectively be
found discriminatory if based on improper motives, but in that event the
remedies provided by the FEHA are those for discrimination, not
harassment.’ ” (Reno, at p. 647.) Nor did Pridgen aver that Robustelli — as
opposed to his command staff — did anything based on race. Indeed,
Pridgen’s briefing does not argue there’s evidence of harassment committed
by Robustelli, much less that it was motivated by race. Thus, reviewing the

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trial court’s ruling de novo — and accepting Pridgen’s evidence as true — we
conclude he failed to make a prima facie factual showing sufficient for a
favorable judgment on his harassment claim against Robustelli, and the
court properly struck it. (Citizens of Humanity, LLC v. Hass (2020)
46 Cal.App.5th 589, 598 [striking proper when necessary element is
missing].)
Next, we turn to Pridgen’s intentional infliction of emotional distress
cause of action. To establish a prima facie case, Pridgen must show “ ‘(1)
extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of
causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional
distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and
(3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the
defendant’s outrageous conduct.’ ” (Davidson v. City of Westminster (1982)
32 Cal.3d 197, 209.) To be outrageous, the conduct “ ‘must be so extreme as
to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.’ ”
(Ibid.) “ ‘Severe emotional distress means “ ‘emotional distress of such
substantial quality or enduring quality that no reasonable [person] in
civilized society should be expected to endure it.’ ” ’ ” (Hughes v. Pair (2009)
46 Cal.4th 1035, 1051.) The trial court concluded Pridgen failed to present
“competent, relevant evidence to show that he has a probability of prevailing”
on this claim. Again, the record does not reflect that it weighed the evidence
in reaching its conclusion.
In arguing he has made a sufficient factual showing, Pridgen relies on
his previously discussed declaration. That is, he cites Robustelli placing him
on leave pending an investigation, making statements in a press release
regarding the situation, and terminating him as the relevant conduct. That
does not suffice. “A simple pleading of personnel management activity is

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insufficient to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress,
even if improper motivation is alleged. If personnel management decisions
are improperly motivated, the remedy is a suit against the employer for
discrimination.” (Janken v. GM Hughes Electronics (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 55,
80, italics added [termination on the basis of protected status not outrageous
conduct].) Moreover, his briefing does not argue — and his declaration does
not aver — that he suffered severe or extreme emotional distress as a result
of Robustelli’s allegedly outrageous conduct. Reviewing the ruling on the
motion to strike de novo — and accepting Pridgen’s evidence as to this claim
as true — we conclude he failed to make a prima facie factual showing
sufficient for a favorable judgment on his intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim, and the court properly struck it.3 (Citizens of Humanity, LLC
v. Hass, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 598.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Robustelli is to recover her costs on appeal.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)

3 Given our conclusion, we do not address Robustelli’s alternate

governmental immunity argument.

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_________________________
RODRÍGUEZ, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
TUCHER, P. J.

_________________________
PETROU, J.

A173773; Pridgen v. Robustelli

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