CourtListener 10861326•People v. Hanson CA2/6
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 5/19/26 P. v. Hanson CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B338897
(Super. Ct. No. 1298239)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Santa Barbara County)
v.
SCOTT RANDOLPH
HANSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
Scott Randolph Hanson appeals a judgment following his
2023 resentencing required by Penal Code section 1172.75.1 He
contends the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to strike
either his 1988 strike prior pursuant to People v. Superior Court
(Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero) or his two prior serious
felony enhancements pursuant to Senate Bill 1393 (2017-2018
Reg. Sess.) based on the remoteness of the priors and his good
conduct in prison. We affirm.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Factual and Procedural Background2
In July 2009, Ixchelle Yakimowich stepped out of the
shower and walked to her bedroom wearing only a towel when
she saw a stranger looking through her window. She yelled to
her fiancé, Matthew Meczka, who ran outside and saw appellant
“ ‘peek out’ ” from behind a hedge near the house. A
confrontation ensued, and appellant struck Meczka with a two-
by-four before running off. When police arrested appellant, they
found a mattress in the backyard that was laying on top of planks
of wood similar to the two-by-four Meczka described. Neighbors
told police that appellant had been peeping into their bedroom
window.
In August 2009, the Santa Barbara County District
Attorney charged appellant with one count of assault with a
deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1), count 1) and two counts of
misdemeanor peeking (§ 647, subd. (i), counts 2 & 3). As to count
1, the People alleged three prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subd.
(e)(2)(A), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(A), three prior serious felony
conviction enhancements (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and four prior
prison term enhancements (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
In November 2009, a jury found appellant guilty as charged
in count 1. He pleaded no contest to the two misdemeanor
counts. The trial court subsequently found true the prior
conviction allegations.
In June 2010, the trial court denied appellant’s motion to
dismiss a strike conviction and sentenced him to a third strike
term of 25 years to life as to count 1, plus two five-year terms
2 A complete statement of the facts can be found in our
prior opinion People v. Hanson (Jul. 27, 2011, B225484) [nonpub.
opn.] (Hanson).
2
pursuant to section 667, subdivision (a), and one year pursuant to
section 667.5, subdivision (b). As to counts 2 and 3, the trial
court sentenced appellant to six months, with the term for count
2 to run consecutively and the term for count 3 to run
concurrently with the term imposed in count 1.
We affirmed appellant’s conviction in an unpublished
opinion. (Hanson, supra, B225484.)
In that appeal, appellant argued, among other things, that
the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to strike his 1988
prior strike conviction. We disagreed and explained that
although appellant’s conviction was remote in time, he spent
much of that time incarcerated. He then committed the current
offense shortly after being released from prison and absconding
from parole supervision. We further explained that even if
appellant’s criminal history was the product of untreated
substance abuse or mental illness, as he claimed, the trial court
properly relied on the prior incidents in concluding that appellant
is “ ‘a serious danger to society.’ ”
Section 1172.75 Proceedings
In 2022, the trial court issued a notice of hearing regarding
appellant’s resentencing eligibility pursuant to section 1172.75
(former § 1171.1). The People filed briefing requesting that the
trial court strike the unauthorized one-year prison prior but
otherwise leave appellant’s sentence intact.
Appellant filed a petition for resentencing, arguing among
other things, that his prior strike convictions were remote in time
and the prior serious felony enhancements should be dismissed
pursuant to section 1385. In his petition, he asserted that
multiple enhancements were imposed, the current offense was
connected to mental illness or prior childhood trauma, and
3
dismissing the enhancements would not create a risk to public
safety. As to resentencing, appellant requested that the trial
court dismiss his 1988 strike prior and resentence him to 18
years in state prison or strike his serious felony priors and
resentence him to 25 years to life in state prison.
The People filed a supplemental opposition contending that
section 1385, subdivision (c) does not apply to appellant’s prior
strike allegations, nothing in the record shows appellant’s mental
health or childhood trauma substantially contributed to the
present offense, and the remoteness of any priors was irrelevant
because appellant had only been out of custody for 50 days when
he committed the instant offense.
At the resentencing hearing, appellant’s counsel argued
that appellant had several mental health diagnoses, was doing
the best he could with treatment given the limited opportunities
for programming, and had no rule violations over the past 13
years. Counsel further argued that the trial court should dismiss
appellant’s 1988 strike prior because he was “extremely young”
when he committed the offense.
The prosecutor responded that appellant had not
participated in many rehabilitative programs or attempted to
mitigate his past risk factors. He also minimized his behavior
and blamed the victims, as reflected in the record from the June
2022 Board of Parole hearing. The prosecutor argued there was
not enough evidence to warrant any mitigation, and it was not in
the interest of justice to strike the strike or dismiss the “nickel”
priors.
After hearing argument, the trial court struck the one-year
prison prior but declined to reduce appellant’s sentence further.
4
The trial court resentenced appellant to a total term of 35 years
and six months to life.
Discussion
Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by
refusing to strike either his 1988 strike prior or his serious felony
priors because doing so would have been in the furtherance of
justice based on the remoteness of the priors and appellant’s good
conduct while incarcerated.
Section 1172.75, subdivision (a) provides that “[a]ny
sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1,
2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of [s]ection 667.5, except for any
enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent
offense . . . is legally invalid.” If a defendant’s current judgment
contains such an enhancement, “the court shall recall the
sentence and resentence the defendant.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (c).)
At resentencing, the trial court may consider whether to
dismiss a prior strike in the furtherance of justice. (People v.
Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340, 364; Romero, supra, 13
Cal.4th at pp. 529-530.) We review the trial court’s refusal to
dismiss a prior strike for abuse of discretion. (People v. Carmony
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 374 (Carmony).)
In reviewing a ruling whether to dismiss a strike, we “must
consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of his
present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony
convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and
prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme’s
spirit . . . .” (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161
(Williams); Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377.)
Here, as detailed in our prior opinion, appellant has an
extensive criminal record that includes a 1982 juvenile
5
adjudication for unlawful entry and assault with intent to commit
rape, a 1987 conviction of contributing to the delinquency of a
minor, and a 1995 conviction for misdemeanor disorderly conduct
(§ 467, subd. (i)) after he was seen peeking into apartments from
a nearby hillside. He also has 10 prior juvenile adjudications or
convictions of property crimes such as burglary, prowling, petty
larceny, and grand theft. (Hanson, supra, B225484, slip opn. at
p. 10, fn. 2.)
In 1998, appellant was convicted of first degree residential
burglary after he entered a home, groped the female victim in the
genital area, and fought with the victim’s husband. Appellant
was sentenced to 13 years in prison.
On May 31, 2009, appellant was paroled after he completed
serving his 13 year prison sentence. On July 20, 2009, just 50
days later, he committed the instant offenses.
In challenging the trial court’s decision, appellant focuses
on the remoteness of his priors and his good conduct while
incarcerated. But remoteness in time is an insufficient basis to
dismiss a strike prior where the defendant “has led a continuous
life of crime after the prior . . . .” (People v. Humphrey (1997) 58
Cal.App.4th 809, 813 [error to strike 20-year-old strike];
Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 163-164 [error to strike 13-
year-old strike].) And while the trial court commended appellant
for his performance in prison over the past 13 years, it did not
find that appellant had “addressed the issues” required “for
society to be safe.”
After considering appellant’s criminal history, his
background, character, and prospects, the trial court explained
there was “insufficient evidence” that appellant’s “risk of future
violence is any less today than it was in 2010.” The trial court
6
therefore concluded it could not find that appellant should be
deemed to be “outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law in whole
or in part.” On this record, there was no error.
Appellant next contends the trial court abused its
discretion in refusing to strike his two serious felony priors
because the goal of public safety could easily be achieved through
a sentence of 18 years or 25 years to life.
At resentencing, the trial court is required to “apply the
sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other
changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial
discretion . . . .” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).)
Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) provides that the trial
court, “ ‘[i]n exercising its discretion’ to dismiss a sentencing
enhancement ‘shall consider and afford great weight to evidence
offered by the defendant to prove’ certain enumerated mitigating
circumstances, and ‘[p]roof of the presence of one or more of these
circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the
enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety.’ ” (People v. Walker
(2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1028 (Walker).) If the sentencing court
finds that striking an enhancement would endanger public
safety, then it need not give great weight to the evidence
presented in support of the mitigating factors. (Walker, at pp.
1028-1030; People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 296
(Mendoza).)
We review the trial court’s refusal to dismiss an
enhancement pursuant to section 1172.75, subdivision (d) and
1385, subdivision (c)(2) for abuse of discretion. (People v. Garcia
(2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848, 851, 856-858; Mendoza, supra, 88
Cal.App.5th at p. 298.)
7
Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
appellant’s request to strike his prior serious felony
enhancements. The only relevant mitigating factors were that
multiple enhancements applied, the charged crime was not a
violent felony, and the enhancements were based on prior
convictions over five years old. (§ 1385, subds. (c)(2)(B), (F), (H).)
Notwithstanding these mitigating factors, the trial court
found that dismissing one or both of appellant’s enhancements
would endanger public safety. Specifically, it noted appellant’s
“high risk of violence” as indicated in the Comprehensive Risk
Assessment report referenced at the 2022 Board of Parole
hearing. The trial court also noted that appellant failed to take
responsibility and continued to blame the victims. For example,
when addressing the 2009 assault of Mr. Meczka, appellant told
the Board of Parole, “It was a tragedy for both [of] us . . . . I’ve
forgiven Mr. Meczka for what has happened.” Given appellant’s
statements, which are indicative of his lack of remorse and
inability to accept responsibility, the trial court could reasonably
conclude he remains a danger to the public.
The trial court also considered appellant’s extensive adult
criminal history, which continued unabated except for brief
occasions when he was out of custody. In this case, appellant had
only been out of custody for 50 days when he committed the
instant offenses, which were of a sexual nature similar to his
prior offenses.
As our high court has observed, “in most cases, ‘if the trial
court finds that dismissal of an enhancement would endanger
public safety, then it is hard to see how dismissal would further
the interests of justice,’ notwithstanding the applicability of any
8
mitigating factors identified in [section 1385,]subdivision (c)(2).”
(Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1033.)
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
YEGAN, Acting P. J.
We concur:
BALTODANO, J.
CODY, J.
9
Jean M. Dandona, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
______________________________
Justin Behravesh, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and David A. Wildman, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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