People v. Session CA2/4

CourtListener 10860830Calctapp18.05.2026

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Filed 5/18/26 P. v. Session CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, B340558

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. PA081310)
v.

DAVONTE SESSION,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Michael Terrell, Judge. Affirmed.
Criminal Appeals Advocates and Kristen J. Mason for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Lindsay Boyd, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Davonte Session appeals from an order following
a resentencing hearing conducted pursuant to Penal Code
section 1172.75.1 Session argues the resentencing court abused
its discretion by (1) declining to strike or dismiss a firearm
enhancement imposed under section 12022.53, (2) imposing
consecutive terms instead of concurrent terms, and (3) imposing
the middle term instead of the low term on the principal count.
We affirm the resentencing order.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
A. Conviction and Original Sentence
This case concerns a gang-related drive-by shooting. In
July 2014, Michelle Ventura and her mother Dora Palacios were
outside a converted garage in Pacoima where they lived. Ventura
was holding her infant daughter, Mia. The garage was attached
to the house of Juan Gutierrez, Mia’s father. Gutierrez was
inside the house, and Ventura’s brother was inside the garage.
At about 6:30 p.m., Ventura saw a brown car driven by a woman
with red hair. At least two men were in the car. Ventura heard
gunshots and ran into the house.
Gutierrez immediately gave chase in his green SUV. A
patrol officer saw a tan SUV speed westbound on Van Nuys
Boulevard followed by Gutierrez’s car. The tan SUV ran a red
light, but Gutierrez stopped. He told the officer shots had been
fired at his house from the tan SUV. The officer caught up with
the tan SUV and ordered the occupants out of the car. Session

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 The background facts are taken from the opinion affirming
Session’s conviction with a modification in sentencing. (People v.
Session (Feb. 7, 2017, B266207) [nonpub. opn.].)

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was in the back seat behind the driver, Anisha Johnson, whose
hair had been dyed bright red. William Leander Jones was in the
front passenger seat, and an underage girl wearing a bright red
t-shirt was in the right rear passenger seat. Two semiautomatic
pistols were found in a compartment in the right rear passenger
section of the SUV. No live ammunition was found in the
magazines or guns.
Two bullet fragments were found in the driveway of
Gutierrez’s house, and three casings were found on his street.
The casings and one of the bullet fragments were matched to the
firearms found in the tan SUV. Bullet holes were found in
Gutierrez’s SUV, in an RV parked in front of his house, in the
garage door, and in a couch behind that door.
Session and Jones were members of the Pacoima Piru
Bloods gang, a rival of the Humphrey Boys gang. The Pacoima
Piru Bloods were associated with the color red. Gutierrez was a
Humphrey Boys gang member, and his house was known to
police for gang activity. The Pacoima Piru Bloods and Humphrey
Boys had been feuding over overlapping territory.
In 2015, a jury convicted Session of shooting at an
inhabited dwelling (§ 246; count 5), assault with a semiautomatic
firearm against Mia, Palacios, and Ventura (§ 245, subd. (b);
counts 6–7 & 9), unlawfully carrying a loaded firearm (§ 25850,
subd. (a); count 10), possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800,
subd. (a)(1); count 11), and possession of ammunition by a felon
(§ 30305, subd. (a)(1); count 12). The jury found all offenses were
committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. (§ 186.22,
subd. (b)(1).) As to count 5, the jury found that a principal
personally used and intentionally discharged a firearm.

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(§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), and (e)(1).) Session admitted a prior
prison term allegation under section 667.5.
Session was sentenced to 15 years to life on count 5, plus
24 years four months on the remaining counts. A different panel
of this Division modified Session’s sentence to stay the term
imposed on count 12 but otherwise affirmed the judgment.

B. Section 1172.75 Resentencing3
In October 2023, after Session became eligible for
resentencing under section 1172.75, Session’s appointed counsel
filed a motion for full resentencing. In addition to requesting the
court strike the prior prison term and gang enhancements,
Session asked the court to strike the section 12022.53 firearm
enhancement pursuant to Senate Bill No. 620 (2017–2018 Reg.
Sess.) (SB 620) and Senate Bill No. 81 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)
(SB 81).
At the initial resentencing hearing in July 2024, the trial
court struck the prior prison term enhancement, and the
prosecution informed the court it would not seek a retrial on the
gang allegations. The court continued the hearing to consider

3 Session’s appellate briefs fail to “[p]rovide a summary of the
significant facts limited to matters in the record” relating to his claims
in this appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(C).) Session
instead quotes twelve single-spaced pages verbatim from the opening
brief filed in his direct appeal. This includes citations to a clerk’s and
reporter’s transcript not part of the record in this appeal and excludes
any discussion of his resentencing. This is sufficient to find Session’s
claims relating to the trial court’s findings forfeited. (See Jogani v.
Jogani (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th 823, 841; see also Perry v. Kia Motors
America, Inc. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1088, 1096.) However, we exercise
our discretion to address the issues on the merits.

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“the gun enhancement and also low term, mid term, high term
issues.”
At the continued hearing a few days later, the prosecution
provided the trial court with a certified copy of Session’s rap
sheet and detailed his criminal history, beginning when he was a
juvenile and including a prison term for “carrying a loaded
firearm” the year before the drive-by shooting in this case. The
prosecutor argued that while Session did “some classes” and had
not reoffended in custody, this was “an extremely aggravated
case.” The prosecutor asserted the victims of the drive-by
shooting included an elderly woman and infant and that it was
only by luck that Session did not kill someone. The prosecutor
requested Session be resentenced to a total term of 53 years and
eight months.
Session’s counsel requested the trial court “impose the low
term” and “run everything concurrent.” The court stated that the
“default is sort of the mid-term” and asked defense counsel what
mitigating factors applied, other than Session being in custody
for 10 years and not “pick[ing] up any new crimes.” Session’s
counsel stated he submitted a mitigation report, which is not part
of the record on appeal, that described Session’s childhood
trauma and psychological, physical, and sexual abuse he
experienced. Session then addressed the court. He explained he
was 19 years old when the crime occurred, provided additional
details about his childhood, and detailed the ways he matured
while in custody.
The trial court noted it had reviewed all the briefs that
were filed in the case. The court stated the principal term was
going to be count 6. It acknowledged Session presented
“substantial mitigation factors” and made “a powerful

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statement,” but found Session’s request for the low term was “not
supported by the record.” The court said it did “not believe that
those mitigating factors come close to outweighing the
aggravating factors.” The court imposed the middle term on
count 6.
As to Session’s request to strike the firearm enhancement,
the trial court determined the “record more than support[ed]” the
enhancement and “[t]he mitigating factors [did] not come close to
overcoming the aggravating factors as it pertains to the use of the
firearm itself.” The court reasoned, “[T]he facts of this case here
were that there were multiple firearms, multiple discharge of
firearms, [and] vulnerable victims.”
The trial court vacated the original sentence of 15 years to
life plus 24 years four months. It resentenced Session to a
shorter total term of 22 years eight months. The terms as to all
counts, except counts 11 and 12, were to be served consecutively.
The following month, the court recalled the matter after
discovering a mistake in applying “the triad for count 5.” The
court corrected the error and resentenced Session to a total term
of 22 years four months, which included a 10-year firearm
enhancement under section 12022.53, subdivision (b). The court
stated it was otherwise implementing what it intended at the
previous hearing. Session timely appealed.

DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Generally, we review a trial court’s sentencing decisions for
abuse of discretion. (People v. Gonzalez (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th
312, 323.) “‘In reviewing for abuse of discretion, we are guided by
two fundamental precepts. First, “‘[t]he burden is on the party

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attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing
decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of
such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to
achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary
determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set
aside on review.’” [Citations.] Second, a “‘decision will not be
reversed merely because reasonable people might disagree. “An
appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in
substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.”’”
[Citation.] Taken together, these precepts establish that a trial
court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so
irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with
it.’” (People v. Strother (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 563, 571.) Further,
remand is unnecessary if the court was aware of its sentencing
discretion or “if the record is silent concerning whether the trial
court misunderstood its sentencing discretion. Error may not be
presumed from a silent record.” (People v. Brown (2007) 147
Cal.App.4th 1213, 1229.)

B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Declining to Strike or Dismiss the Firearm
Enhancement
Session argues the trial court abused its discretion in
declining to strike or dismiss the firearm enhancement imposed
under section 12022.53. He asserts the record contains no
indication the court properly evaluated whether to strike the
enhancement under the frameworks of SB 620 and SB 81. We
disagree.
Section 12022.53, subdivision (b) states, “a person who, in
the commission of a felony specified in subdivision (a), personally

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uses a firearm, shall be punished by an additional and
consecutive term of imprisonment in the state prison for
10 years.” Before 2018, section 12022.53 prohibited courts from
striking its enhancements. (People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th
688, 695.) SB 620, effective January 2018, amended
section 12022.53, subdivision (h) to give trial courts discretion to
strike or dismiss an enhancement “‘in the interest of justice
pursuant to Section 1385.’” (Tirado, at p. 696.) Section 1385,
subdivision (a) provides that a court may, “in furtherance of
justice, order an action to be dismissed.”
SB 81 later added section 1385, subdivision (c). (People v.
Cota (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 318, 334.) The provision provides:

“(1) Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall
dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of
justice to do so, except if dismissal of that
enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.

“(2) In exercising its discretion under this subdivision,
the court shall consider and afford great weight to
evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of
the mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to
(I) are present. Proof of the presence of one or more of
these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of
dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds
that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger
public safety. . . .” (§ 1385, subd. (c).)

In this case, Session argues two mitigating circumstances
applied: (1) application of the enhancement resulted in a
sentence exceeding 20 years, and (2) the current offense was
connected to his childhood trauma. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(C), (E).)
According to Session, the court was obligated to dismiss the

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firearm enhancement because it did not make an express finding
that “dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public
safety.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).)
Our Supreme Court has rejected Session’s claim that
section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) creates a presumption in favor of
dismissing enhancements that can only be overcome by a finding
that dismissal endangers public safety. (People v. Walker (2024)
16 Cal.5th 1024, 1033 (Walker).) Even “absent a finding that
dismissal would endanger public safety, a court retains the
discretion to impose or dismiss enhancements provided that it
assigns significant value to the enumerated mitigating
circumstances when they are present.” (Id. at p. 1029.) “‘[T]he
ultimate question before the trial court remains whether it is in
the furtherance of justice to dismiss an enhancement.’”4 (Id. at
p. 1033.)
Here, the record shows the trial court engaged in the
“‘holistic balancing’” required by section 1385, finding
aggravating factors far outweighed mitigating factors. (Walker,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1034.) Contrary to Session’s contention,
the trial court evaluated whether to strike the firearm
enhancement under SB 620 and SB 81. It acknowledged
reviewing Session’s motion for resentencing, which discussed

4 To the extent Session contends the language of section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2)(C) required dismissal of the enhancement, all
appellate courts that have considered the issue have concluded that
subdivision (c)(2)(C) permits, but does not require a court to dismiss an
enhancement that could result in a sentence of over 20 years. (See e.g.,
People v. Mazur (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 438, 445; People v. Anderson
(2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 233, 239–240.) Session does not discuss this
case law or cite any authority holding that section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2)(C) mandates dismissal of an enhancement.

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both Senate Bills extensively. The court stated it considered the
“mitigation factors that were presented,” including the statement
in which Session spoke powerfully about his youth at the time of
the offense, difficult childhood, and growth in custody. It also
considered the aggravating factors, including Session’s criminal
history, the serious nature of the offense, the discharge of
multiple firearms, and the particularly vulnerable victims. The
court ultimately found “[t]he mitigating factors do not come close
to overcoming the aggravating factors.”
The trial court was not required to use any particular
language in declining to dismiss the firearm enhancement.
(People v. Bravo (2025) 107 Cal.App.5th 1144, 1157.) It “‘is
presumed to have considered all of the relevant factors in the
absence of an affirmative record to the contrary.’” (People v.
Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608, 637.) Here, nothing in the
record demonstrates the court acted arbitrarily or irrationally or
misunderstood the significance of the mitigating factors. The
court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that
dismissing Session’s firearm enhancement was not in furtherance
of justice.

C. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in
Imposing Consecutive Terms
Next, Session asserts the trial court imposed consecutive
sentences on all counts, except counts 11 and 12, without
referencing or applying the criteria set forth in California Rules
of Court, rule 4.425(a).5 He contends this omission establishes an
abuse of discretion. We disagree.

5 Further rule references are to the California Rules of Court.

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Rule 4.425 lists factors “affecting the decision to impose
consecutive rather than concurrent sentences.” They include the
“[f]acts relating to the crimes” and “[a]ny circumstances in
aggravation or mitigation.” (Rule 4.425(a), (b).) A trial court has
“‘broad discretion’” to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences.
(People v. Leon (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 452, 467.)
While Session contends the trial court did not articulate its
reasoning for imposing consecutive sentences, Session’s counsel
did not object or request such clarification. Accordingly, Session
forfeited this claim of error. (People v. Boyce (2014) 59 Cal.4th
672, 730–731 (Boyce) [“‘complaints about the manner in which
the trial court exercises its sentencing discretion and articulates
its supporting reasons cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal’”].)
Even if we consider Session’s claim on the merits, he fails
to show error. At the resentencing hearing, Session’s counsel
asked that all sentences be imposed concurrently, while the
prosecutor asked all sentences be imposed consecutively. The
court thus considered Session’s request to run his sentences
concurrently and denied it.
Several aggravating factors the court identified supported
the imposition of the consecutive terms, and only one was
required. (People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 552 (Davis);
People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 350, fn. 12 (Scott) [“one
relevant and sustainable fact may explain a series of consecutive
sentences”].) For example, the court pointed out multiple
firearms were used in the gang-related drive-by shooting and
vulnerable victims were involved. In identifying these
aggravating circumstances, the court stated the primary reasons
for its decision. It was not required to use any particular

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language or terms for its sentencing choice. (Rule 4.406(a).)
There is no indication in the record the court misunderstood or
abused its discretion.

D. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Imposing the Middle Term
Lastly, Session argues the trial court abused its discretion
by imposing the middle term on the principal count (count 6)
because it failed “to meaningfully engage with the statutory
presumption in favor of the low term under [ ] section 1170(b)(6).”
Session does not demonstrate reversible error.
Where a statute specifies three possible terms of
imprisonment, section 1170, subdivision (b)(1), provides the
middle term is the presumptive term of imprisonment. However,
section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) (section 1170(b)(6)) states,
“[U]nless the court finds that the aggravating circumstances
outweigh the mitigating circumstances [such] that imposition of
the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice, the
court shall order imposition of the lower term if any of the
following was a contributing factor in the commission of the
offense:” “The person has experienced psychological, physical, or
childhood trauma,” or the person was under 26 years of age when
the offense was committed. Once an “initial showing” has been
made that the low term presumption applies, the record must
“affirmatively show compliance with the statute.” (People v.
Fredrickson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 992.)
Here, Session’s counsel did not mention section 1170(b)(6)
when asking the court to impose the low term or object when the
trial court stated the “default is sort of the mid-term.” To the
extent the issue is not forfeited (Boyce, supra, 59 Cal.4th pp. 730–

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731; People v. Tilley (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 772, 778), and
assuming Session made an initial showing that the low term
presumption applied, any error by the trial court was harmless.
An error in sentencing requires remand if “‘“‘it is reasonably
probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party
would have been reached in the absence of error.’”’” (People v.
Gutierrez (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1634, 1638.)
When finding that the low term was not appropriate and
imposing the middle term, the court considered Session’s
evidence of rehabilitation and weighed the mitigating and
aggravating factors present. The court then determined the
aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating circumstances.
We do not reweigh the sentencing factors. (Scott, supra, 9
Cal.4th at p. 355.) The court’s finding was consistent with its
other sentencing decisions. Session does not establish it is
reasonably probable the trial court would have sentenced Session
to the low term had it made an express finding pursuant
to section 1170(b)(6).6 (Davis, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 552.)

6 Session argues there were “multiple instances of confusion” at
the second resentencing hearing such that the trial court may not have
been operating with a full understanding of the record. Session
primarily points to a discussion about whether Session had a strike on
his record, which he did not. At the beginning of the hearing, Session’s
counsel asked the court to exercise its discretion “under Romero to
strike the strike.” Later, after the low term had been imposed, the
court said it was going to deny the Romero motion. When the court
was calculating the total term of Session’s new sentence, Session’s
counsel clarified Session did not have a strike on his record. The court
noted Session’s counsel was correct and calculated Session’s new
sentence accordingly. The court did not reference a strike when it
imposed the middle term on the principal count. There is therefore no
showing the discussion concerning the strike, which was initially

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DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

MORI, acting P. J.
We concur:

TAMZARIAN, J.

COGLIATI, J. **

raised by Session’s counsel, had any impact on the court’s ultimate
sentencing decisions.
** Judge of the Santa Cruz County Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to Article VI, section 6, of the California
Constitution.

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