CourtListener 10860801•Stemcheer Biotechnology v. Gu CA4/1
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 5/18/26 Stemcheer Biotechnology v. Gu CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
STEMCHEER BIOTECHNOLOGY, INC. D085857
et al.,
(Super. Ct. No. CIVSB2119879)
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
YICHENG GU et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Wilfred J. Schneider, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.
Morrow Ni, Xinlin Li Morrow, and Ryan McMenamin for Plaintiffs and
Appellants.
Law Offices of Steven P. Scandura and Steven P. Scandura for
Defendants and Respondents.
Chenchen Wang sued her former business partner, Yicheng Gu, for
conversion and breach of fiduciary duty after Wang dissolved their
corporation, Stemcheer Biotechnology, Inc. (Stemcheer). The case proceeded
to a bench trial, followed by additional briefing. Thereafter, the court found
Wang’s derivative claims on behalf of Stemcheer were barred by her failure to
make a demand on the corporation before bringing the claims, and that Wang
otherwise failed to prove her claims.
On appeal from the judgment, Wang contends the trial court erred by
concluding her certificate of dissolution deprived her of standing to assert a
derivative claim on behalf of the corporation. In addition, Wang argues the
court erred by concluding her derivative claims were barred by her failure to
make a demand on the corporation because any demand would have been
futile. Finally, Wang asserts the trial court’s finding that she failed to prove
her claims for breach of fiduciary duty and standing should be reversed. We
reject Wang’s arguments and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Gu is a former Chinese government official who now lives in the United
States. In his former role, Gu worked with the United Nations and remained
connected to the organization after he left it. In 2019, he conceived of
creating a non-governmental organization (NGO) to capitalize on his
relationships. In March 2020, Gu formed Stemcheer for the purpose of
selling Chinese herbal remedies in the United States.
At some point after the formation of Stemcheer, Gu met Wang’s
mother, Hua Li, whose husband was facing criminal prosecution in China. In
August 2020, Li, through her daughter who lived in the United States,
invested $220,000 in Stemcheer with the understanding that the investment
would fund an existing or new NGO that could use Gu’s political influence
and connections to help secure relief for her husband in China. In their
initial discussions, Gu and Li contemplated purchasing an existing NGO, but
the cost was too high. Instead, Gu, with Li’s acquiescence, decided to form a
new NGO, World Peace and Sustainable Development Foundation (WPSDF).
2
On August 6, 2020, Wang and Gu entered an “Agreement on
Investment in Global Sustainable Development Foundation NGO
Organization Project.” The contract stated that the parties “agree[d] to
establish a limited liability company” called Stemcheer Biotechnology, Inc.,
with a “scope of business” of “engaging in relevant business operation and
buying the shares of Global Sustainable Development Foundation.” The
agreement stated that Wang’s investment of $220,000 constituted a 58.67%
ownership stake in Stemcheer, that Gu would invest $50,000 for a 13.33%
ownership stake, and two additional investors, William Xiao and Chen Wei,
would each contribute $15,000 for a 4% ownership stake. In addition,
another party to the agreement, Dong xia Tang, would be granted a 20%
ownership stake in exchange for her contribution of management expertise.
On October 7, 2020, Gu filed a certificate of incorporation for WPSDF
in New York. The certificate, approved by the New York Secretary of State
the following day, stated WPSDF was a non-profit, charitable corporation and
that its initial directors were Gu, Wang, and Tang.1
In March 2021, Li’s husband’s case was settled in China, and the
family no longer required Gu’s help. Shortly after, Li demanded Gu return
her investment in Stemcheer. In addition, Li and Wang threatened Gu and
told him if he did not return their money, they would report him to the FBI
and accuse him of espionage. On June 10, 2021, Wang issued a “Notice of
Special Meeting of Shareholders” to take place on June 28, 2021 to discuss
1 Wang provided the home address for a friend living in New York to Gu,
which he used as the corporate address for WPSDF on the formation
documents.
3
her “proposal to wind up the company’s business and enter the settlement
procedure.”
In response to Wang’s notice, Gu removed Wang as a signatory on
Stemcheer’s bank account. Gu also asked his accountant to prepare
backdated minutes for a director meeting on December 6, 2020 for
Stemcheer, which purported to reduce Wang’s ownership interest from
58.67% to 40%.
On June 28, 2021, Li held the noticed shareholder meeting. Li
attended on behalf of her daughter through a power of attorney prepared by
their counsel, Guodi Sun. Xiao was also in attendance. Gu was not. At the
meeting, Li and Xiao passed a resolution, prepared by Sun, to dissolve the
corporation. Sun then took the resolution to Stemcheer’s bank and asked the
bank to freeze the company’s bank account. The bank complied with the
request. On July 2, 2021, Wang signed a “Certificate of Election to Wind Up
and Dissolve” Stemcheer and on August 9, 2021 filed the document with the
California Secretary of State.
Once Gu learned Wang had frozen Stemcheer’s bank account, around
July 2, 2021, Gu contacted the bank and had the account reinstated. The
next day, Wang and her counsel contacted the bank and asserted Gu
presented a falsified corporate document (the December meeting minutes
reducing Wang’s ownership interest) to reinstate the bank account. In his
correspondence with the bank, Wang’s counsel threatened to sue the bank for
allowing Gu access to the account.
Leading up to the shareholder meeting and after, Gu issued several
checks from Stemcheer’s bank account, including a check on June 28, 2021
for $200,000 to fund WPSDF. Gu also continued issuing checks from
Stemcheer to himself as salary; the first on April 27, 2021 for $1,500, followed
4
by checks for $5,000 on June 16, 2021, and three checks for $3,500, $5,000
and $5,000 on July 6, 2021. Stemcheer also paid Tang salary via a $3,000
check on June 16, 2021, and two checks for $3,000 each on July 6, 2021.2
On July 12, 2021, Wang, on behalf of herself individually and
derivatively on behalf of Stemcheer, filed the underlying complaint against
Gu. Therein, Wang alleged Gu had breached his fiduciary duty to Stemcheer
by “failing to issue the certificates of shares to the shareholders, listing
himself as the only director in the Information Statement submitted to the
Secretary of State, and cutting the checks, sometimes in substantial amount,
without noticing the shareholders, let alone explaining” their purpose. Wang
also alleged Gu falsified corporate records by preparing the December
meeting minutes purporting to reduce Wang’s ownership to 40%.
Gu answered the complaint with a general denial and asserted various
affirmative defenses. The case proceeded to a bench trial that lasted several
days. Li, Wang, Sun, Gu, and Stemcheer’s accountant, Kevin Wang, testified.
After the conclusion of the trial, the court summarized its understanding of
the evidence and stated it was considering awarding Wang $70,000 for the
reduction of her shares in Stemcheer. The court also expressed
dissatisfaction with Gu’s failure to adhere to standard corporate practices.
The court, however, wanted the parties to provide closing briefs before
issuing its final decision.
According to the briefing schedule set by the court at the conclusion of
trial, the parties submitted closing briefs followed by responses. In his
2 Gu also wrote checks from the Stemcheer account to Evertrust Tax &
Accountancy Corp. for $200 and $2,313 for the preparation and payment of
taxes for another entity owned by Gu, Mae West Energy.
5
closing brief, Gu asserted judgment against Wang on her derivative claims
was required because she had failed to comply with the pre-dispute demand
requirement of Corporations Code section 800.3 In addition, Gu argued
Wang had failed to prove her claims because it was not disputed that Gu’s
attempt to reduce Wang’s ownership interest was invalid, and that before the
dissolution Wang filed with the California Secretary of State, she maintained
majority ownership. Additionally, Gu argued his actions were not a breach of
fiduciary duty because Wang had not shown any reliance on the documents
she alleged were falsified and there was no conversion because the transfer of
funds to WPSDF and other payments were authorized.
In her opening brief, Wang argued that she was not required to satisfy
the requirements of section 800 because any demand would have been futile
since the company had no board, and even if Gu was a director, he was
personally liable for the alleged wrongdoing. In addition, Wang contended
that she had shown Gu breached his duties to Stemcheer by using company
funds to pay himself and others, and to fund WPSDF, and for falsifying
corporate documents. Wang asserted Gu was liable for conversion of
$240,500, which he transferred out of Stemcheer’s bank account without the
company’s consent. Wang sought damages of $240,500 for Stemcheer and
asserted she was individually entitled to $147,811.30 of that amount. In
addition, she asked the court for punitive damages in an unspecified amount.
After the completion of briefing, the trial court issued a minute order
and statement of decision, ruling in favor of Gu. The court found Wang had
failed to comply with section 800 and that Wang had sworn under oath in the
3 Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Corporations
Code.
6
certificate of dissolution filed with the Secretary of State that Stemcheer had
no assets.4 The court also found Wang had failed to prove her claims for
conversion and breach of fiduciary duty. The court entered judgment the
following month and Wang timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I
Standard of Review
“[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court
judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an
appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the
appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal
of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609.) “ ‘In the
absence of a contrary showing in the record, all presumptions in favor of the
trial court’s action will be made by the appellate court. “[I]f any matters
could have been presented to the court below which would have authorized
the order complained of, it will be presumed that such matters were
presented.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 609.)
“In general, in reviewing a judgment based upon a statement of
decision following a bench trial, ‘any conflict in the evidence or reasonable
inferences to be drawn from the facts will be resolved in support of the
determination of the trial court decision. [Citations.]’ [ Citation.] In a
substantial evidence challenge to a judgment, the appellate court will
‘consider all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing
4 The certificate of dissolution referenced by the trial court does not
appear to be contained within the appellate record submitted to this court by
the parties.
7
party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference, and resolving
conflicts in support of the [findings].’ ” (Estate of Young (2008) 160
Cal.App.4th 62, 75–76.) “ ‘It is not our task to weigh conflicts and disputes in
the evidence; that is the province of the trier of fact.’ ” (Estate of O’Connor
(2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 159, 163.)
II
Derivative Standing and Demand Futility
Wang first argues the trial court erred by finding that Stemcheer
lacked standing to pursue a derivative claim against Gu because Wang
dissolved the corporation. As an initial matter, we note that this so-called
“finding” was set forth in the background section of the trial court’s
statement and not as a basis for its decision. However, to the extent that it
could be deemed part of the court’s reasoning, we agree with Wang that the
dissolution of Stemcheer did not eliminate the company’s legal capacity to
pursue claims against Gu. (See Reilly v. Greenwald & Hoffman, LLP (2011)
196 Cal.App.4th 891, 901–902 [“ ‘Courts have repeatedly construed …
section 2010 [and] its predecessors ... as permitting parties to bring suit
against dissolved corporations.’ [Citation.] ‘Under our statutory scheme, the
effect of dissolution is not so much a change in the corporation’s status as a
change in its permitted scope of activity. ... Thus, a corporation’s dissolution
is best understood not as its death, but merely as its retirement from active
business.’ ”].) Indeed, Gu does not dispute this issue in his brief.
Wang next argues the court’s determination that her derivative claims
were barred by her failure to make a demand to Stemcheer’s board of
directors was error because a demand would have been futile. However,
because we next conclude Wang has not shown reversal of her substantive
claims is warranted, we decline to address the issue of demand futility.
8
III
Substantive Claims
Even if Wang established demand futility, she has not shown that
reversal of her substantive claims, either derivatively or individually, is
warranted. Wang argues the trial court erred by finding she failed to prove
her claims for breach of fiduciary duty and conversion. In essence, Wang
asks this court to reevaluate the factual findings made by the trial court. 5
She argues the “record contains undeniable instances of Gu’s self-serving
actions, his disregard for basic corporate governance, and his efforts to
undermine Wang’s rights and misappropriate Stemcheer Biotech’s funds.”
Wang fails, however, to connect any of this alleged wrongdoing by Gu to her
specific claim that he breached a duty owed to her or the corporation.
5 Wang also appears to argue the court’s statement of decision was not
adequate. Citing Code of Civil Procedure section 632, she asserts that “a
written Statement of Decision is mandated to ‘explain the factual and legal
basis for [the court’s] decision as to each of the principal controverted issues
at trial.’ ” This is an incomplete quotation of the provision. It states, “In
superior courts, upon the trial of a question of fact by the court, written
findings of fact and conclusions of law shall not be required. The court shall
issue a statement of decision explaining the factual and legal basis for its
decision as to each of the principal controverted issues at trial upon the
request of any party appearing at the trial.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 632, subd. (a),
italics added.) The record does not contain a request for a statement of
decision, and Wang did not object to the statement once it was filed.
Accordingly, any claim that the statement was deficient is forfeited. (See
Agri-Systems, Inc. v. Foster Poultry Farms (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1135
[consequences of failure to follow Code of Civil Procedure section 632 “are
that (1) the superior court did not commit reversible error by failing to
provide a more detailed rationale for its order … and (2) ‘the appellate court
will imply findings to support the judgment’ ”].)
9
Wang also has not shown that the evidence was insufficient to support
the trial court’s conclusion that she failed to prove her claims at trial.
Instead, she provides us her one-sided version of the evidence and asserts
without any legal authority or argument that Gu’s acts constituted breaches
of his fiduciary duty to Stemcheer and its shareholders. (See Myers v.
Trendwest Resorts, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 735, 739 [“In every appeal,
‘the appellant has the duty to fairly summarize all of the facts in the light
most favorable to the judgment.’ ”].) It is not this court’s role to reevaluate
the evidence in the manner Wang asks. (See Shapiro v. San Diego City
Council (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 904, 912 [“ ‘When two or more inferences can
reasonably be deduced from the facts, a reviewing court is without power to
substitute its deductions for those of the trial court.’ ”]; Shamblin v. Brattain
(1988) 44 Cal.3d 474, 478 [same].)
Likewise, without any legal authority or analysis of the total scope of
evidence presented at trial, Wang asserts that the checks written by Gu
constituted conversion of the company’s assets. Contrary to Wang’s
assertion, the evidence shows that Gu was an executive and director of the
company and that he was authorized to issue checks on behalf of Stemcheer.6
6 Wang argues Gu’s “illicit transfer of $240,500 to his personally
controlled entity [WPSDF], represent a wrongful exercise of dominion over
Stemcheer Biotech’s, and by extension Wang’s, property.” Then, citing Welco
Electronics, Inc. v. Mora (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 202 (Welco), she states,
“Conversion applies to the taking of intangible property rights when
represented by documents such as bonds, notes, bills of exchange, stock
certificates, and warehouse receipts, and it is well settled in California that
shares of corporate stock are subject to an action in conversion.” Wang’s
assertion ignores the contrary evidence that supports the trial court’s finding
that as executive and director of Stemcheer (and under the parties’
contractual agreement concerning Wang’s investment), Gu was authorized to
fund WPSDF with Stemcheer’s funds, including Wang’s investment.
10
Of note, the payment to WPSDF was for the explicit purpose set forth in the
“Agreement on Investment in Global Sustainable Development Foundation
NGO Organization Project” that Wang and Gu entered on August 6, 2020.
The signed contract stated its parties “agree to establish a limited liability
company” called Stemcheer Biotechnology, Inc., with a “scope of business” of
“engaging in relevant business operation and buying the shares of Global
Sustainable Development Foundation.” Gu testified that this was the
purpose of the $200,000 to fund WPSDF. Stated simply, Wang has failed to
provide a reasoned argument, supported by legal authority, to support her
assertion that the trial court’s findings were error.7
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Costs of appeal are awarded to Respondent.
Welco, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th 202 has no bearing on this case. It held,
unremarkably, that fraudulent credit card charges paid by the plaintiff were
properly considered conversion of the plaintiff’s property. (Id. at pp. 209–
212.)
7 Wang also devotes several pages of her brief to her assertion that Gu
“inflicted direct, personal injury on” her by attempting to reduce her
ownership of Stemcheer. Gu, however, does not dispute that this attempt
was invalid and that Wang maintained majority ownership of the company
until she dissolved the entity herself.
11
MCCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
DATO, J.
KELETY, J.
12
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