CourtListener 10860196•Dingizian v. Cruz CA2/7
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 5/15/26 Dingizian v. Cruz CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
SHAWNT DINGIZIAN et al., B343190
Plaintiffs and Respondents, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 224STCV10161)
v.
ROBERT G. CRUZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Lynne M. Hobbs, Judge. Affirmed.
Robert G. Cruz, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
Grant Shenon Almaraz, David M. Almaraz and Nicholas
Koo, for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
________________________
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Robert Cruz and respondents Shawnt and Gassia
Dingizian (the Dingizians) are neighbors involved in an easement
dispute. The Dingizians filed a complaint against Cruz, and Cruz
filed a cross-complaint against the Dingizians in the underlying
civil action. The Dingizians filed a special motion to strike
certain claims in Cruz’s cross-complaint under Code of Civil
Procedure section 425.16, which the trial court granted.1 The
court left intact Cruz’s claims based on unprotected activity, and
did not strike any causes of action in full.2 We affirm because the
stricken allegations relate to protected litigation activity, and
Cruz has not met his burden of demonstrating a probability of
success on the merits of the stricken claims by overcoming the
litigation privilege.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Complaint and Cross-Complaint
Cruz and the Dingizians own homes adjacent to each other
in Pasadena. The properties have a shared easement for ingress
and egress that straddles the property line. In April 2024, the
Dingizians filed a complaint against Cruz for breach of easement,
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
2 We “refer to the proper subject of a special motion to strike
as a ‘claim,’ a term that also appears in section
425.16[, subdivision] (b)(1),” as well as “sometimes use ‘cause of
action’ in its ordinary sense, to mean a count as pleaded.” (Baral
v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 382.)
2
negligent maintenance, nuisance, trespass to chattel, breach of
the covenant of quiet enjoyment, interference with secondary
easement, and declaratory relief.
In May 2024, Cruz filed a cross-complaint against the
Dingizians in propria persona, alleging causes of action for
(1) “Illegal Installation of Obstructions on Established Easement
to Prevent Lawful Access for Ingress and Egress”; (2) interference
with sale of property; (3) “Intentional Destruction of Required
Road Material for Fire Department Vehicles”; (4) intentional
infliction of emotional distress; (5) trespass; (6) breach of the
covenant of quiet enjoyment; and (7) declaratory relief.
B. Anti-SLAPP Motion
On July 24, 2024, the Dingizians filed a special motion to
strike portions of Cruz’s cross-complaint under section 425.16
(anti-SLAPP motion). The Dingizians sought to strike only those
claims based on allegations relating to the filing of their
complaint, as well as prelitigation negotiations and
communication, which Cruz described in his cross-complaint as
litigation threats. The Dingizians did not move to strike any
causes of action in the cross-complaint.
The Dingizians argued the challenged allegations arose
from protected petitioning activity and that the litigation
privilege applied (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b)). They also argued
Cruz could not establish a probability of success on the merits of
his causes of action for illegal installation, interference with the
sale of property, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
breach of quiet enjoyment based on these allegations. The
motion attached the declarations of Shawnt Dingizian and the
Dingizians’ attorney, Nicholas Koo, who attested the
3
communications alleged in the cross-complaint took place in 2021
through the parties’ legal counsel, and in late 2023, between the
Dingizians’ counsel and Cruz, who was unrepresented at that
time. The declarations stated that in late 2023, the Dingizians
offered to dissolve the easement in exchange for a waiver of all
claims against Cruz.
Cruz opposed, arguing through counsel that the challenged
allegations were “context” rather than a basis for any of his
claims. He also argued that, although certain allegations could
be construed as prelitigation statements, the litigation privilege
did not apply to the 2021 communications because the Dingizians
could not have reasonably believed they had a viable litigation
claim at that time. Cruz filed a declaration attaching various
property records from the Los Angeles County Recorder’s Office
and attesting to his ownership of his parcel, but presented no
other evidence.
The Dingizians’ reply argued Cruz’s allegations of legal
threats directly supported elements of his causes of action and to
show his damages, and thus were “not just alleged to provide
context;” their motion merely sought to strike the allegations
Cruz characterized as “legal threats,” rather than his entire
complaint or any causes of action; and Cruz could not show any
probability of success on the challenged claims because they were
based on activities protected by the litigation privilege.
On October 15, 2024, the court held a hearing on the anti-
SLAPP motion and granted the motion “as to the allegations
identified in [the Dingizians’] motion.” The court concluded the
Dingizians met their burden of demonstrating that the
challenged claims arose from allegations of protected activity,
specifically prelitigation settlement negotiations preceding the
4
filing of a civil action. The court determined the Dingizians
“presented evidence that these ‘threats’ were efforts at
prelitigation negotiation to resolve the easement dispute and
potentially waive the claims now asserted in this matter. . . .
These claims were made in judicial proceedings, by litigants, to
achieve the objects of the litigation, and were connected to the
action.” The court stated the allegations at issue were more than
“mere context,” noting Cruz argued the Dingizians’ “prelitigation
negotiations constituted a violation of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, outrageous conduct for the purposes of inflicting
severe emotional distress, acts designed to interfere with
Defendant’s sale of the property, and violations of the covenant of
quiet enjoyment,” evidencing “a clear intent to impose liability
upon [the Dingizians] for, among other things, their litigation-
related conduct.” Thus, the court could address Cruz’s “claims for
relief based on [the Dingizians’] threats of litigation,” “even
though [Cruz] assert[ed] other, non-protected conduct” in the
same counts.
On the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, the trial
court concluded that Cruz’s claims arising from protected activity
were barred by the litigation privilege and that Cruz “fail[ed] to
offer any evidence to substantiate any elements of his claims”
arising from protected activity. Thus, Cruz had not established a
probability of prevailing on the merits of those claims. The court
also awarded the Dingizians attorney fees of $12,900.
The court did not fully strike any of the causes of action in
the cross-complaint. Instead, the court ordered stricken the
following portions of Cruz’s cross-complaint:
5
In the “General Facts” section of Cruz’s cross-complaint:
• “Demand for Easement Agreement: The Plaintiffs’
attorneys communicated with the Defendant,
demanding that the Defendant enter into an
easement agreement favoring the Plaintiffs under the
threat of filing a frivolous lawsuit for nonexistent
damages[.]” (Stricken in full.)
• “Lawsuit for Breach of Easement: The Plaintiffs had
their attorneys file a Superior Court case, accusing
the Defendant of breaching the easement[.]”
(Stricken in full.)
In the first cause of action for obstruction of easement:
• “Good Faith and Fair Dealing: Failure to Negotiate
in Good Faith: Plaintiffs’ refusal to negotiate the
removal of obstructions, coupled with the threat of
frivolous litigation, demonstrates a lack of good faith
and fair dealing. Plaintiffs’ actions were intended to
coerce the Defendant into an unfavorable easement
agreement, thereby abusing legal processes.”
(Stricken in full.)
• “Conclusion: Plaintiffs’ actions constitute a clear and
ongoing violation of the Defendant’s easement rights,
local codes, and principles of good faith and fair
dealing.” (Emphasized language stricken.)
In the second cause of action for interference with sale of
property:
• “Plaintiffs’ Intentional Actions: Plaintiffs’ intentional
installation of obstructions and threats of frivolous
6
litigation were designed to coerce the Defendant and
interfere with his property rights, including the sale
of the property.” (Emphasized language stricken.)
In the fourth cause of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress:
• “Threats of Frivolous Litigation: Plaintiffs’ legal
threats to coerce the Defendant into an unfavorable
easement agreement under the threat of a frivolous
lawsuit further exemplify Plaintiffs’ malicious intent
and outrageous conduct.” (Stricken in full.)
• “Mental and Emotional Impact: Plaintiffs’ actions
have caused significant mental and emotional
distress to the Defendant. The continued obstruction
of the easement, destruction of property, and ongoing
legal threats have created a pervasive sense of
anxiety and helplessness for the Defendant.”
(Emphasized language stricken.)
• “Direct Result of Plaintiffs’ Actions: The emotional
distress suffered by the Defendant is a direct result of
the Plaintiffs’ intentional and malicious actions. The
ongoing obstruction, destruction of property, and
threats have created a continuous and pervasive
impact on the Defendant’s mental well-being.”
(Emphasized language stricken.)
• “Conclusion: Plaintiffs’ actions constitute a clear and
intentional infliction of emotional distress upon the
Defendant. The deliberate obstruction of the
easement, destruction of property, and threats of
frivolous litigation have caused significant emotional
7
and psychological harm.” (Emphasized language
stricken.)
In the sixth cause of action for breach of the covenant of
quiet enjoyment:
• “Legal Threats and Coercion: Plaintiffs’ threats of
frivolous litigation were designed to intimidate
Defendant and force an unfavorable easement
agreement, further interfering with Defendant’s quiet
enjoyment.” (Stricken in full.)
• “Conclusion: Plaintiffs’ actions constitute a clear
breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. The
unauthorized installation of obstructions, destruction
of property, and legal threats have significantly
interfered with Defendant’s lawful use and
enjoyment of the Defendant’s Property.” (Emphasized
language stricken.)
Cruz timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
Under section 425.16, commonly known as the anti-SLAPP
statute, “[a] cause of action against a person arising from any act
of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition . . .
shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court
determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a
probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16,
subd. (b)(1); see Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson (2019)
8
6 Cal.5th 610, 619-620 [“[a] court may strike a cause of action
only if the cause of action (1) arises from an act in furtherance of
the right of petition or free speech ‘in connection with a public
issue,’ and (2) the plaintiff has not established ‘a probability’ of
prevailing on the claim”].)
A special motion to strike may also “operate against a so-
called ‘mixed cause of action’ that combines allegations of activity
protected by the statute with allegations of unprotected activity,”
as here. (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 381-382 (Baral)
[“cause of action” under the anti-SLAPP statute is not limited to
entire causes of action, but also encompasses “claims that are
based on the conduct protected by the statute” in mixed causes of
action].) In such cases, “an anti-SLAPP motion, like a
conventional motion to strike, may be used to attack parts of a
count as pleaded,” with only the defective portion of the cause of
action stricken. (Id. at p. 393.)
Pursuant to section 425.16, subdivision (e), an “ ‘act in
furtherance of a person’s right of petition or free speech under the
United States or California Constitution in connection with a
public issue’ includes: (1) any written or oral statement or writing
made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any
other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral
statement or writing made in connection with an issue under
consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial
body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any
written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the
public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public
interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of
the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of
9
free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public
interest.”
In ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion, the court engages in a
two-step process. “First, the defendant must establish that the
challenged claim arises from activity protected by section 425.16.
[Citation.] If the defendant makes the required showing, the
burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the
claim by establishing a probability of success.” (Baral, supra,
1 Cal.5th at p. 384, accord, Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009 (Bonni); Park v. Board of Trustees of
California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1061 (Park).)
“ ‘ “If the plaintiff fails to do so, the motion to strike is granted
and the prevailing defendant is entitled to recover his or her
attorney fees and costs. (§ 425.16, subd. (c).)” ’ ” (Contreras v.
Dowling (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 394, 404.) Only a claim “that
satisfies both prongs of the anti-SLAPP statute—i.e., that arises
from protected speech or petitioning and lacks even minimal
merit—is a SLAPP, subject to being stricken under the statute.”
(Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89, italics omitted;
see Baral, at p. 396 [“claims for relief that are based on
allegations of protected activity” may be stricken individually if
they lack merit].)
“A claim arises from protected activity when that activity
underlies or forms the basis for the claim.” (Park, supra,
2 Cal.5th at p. 1062.) Thus, “[t]he defendant’s first-step burden is
to identify the activity each challenged claim rests on and
demonstrate that that activity is protected by the anti-SLAPP
statute. A ‘claim may be struck only if the speech or petitioning
activity itself is the wrong complained of, and not just evidence of
liability or a step leading to some different act for which liability
10
is asserted.’ ” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019)
7 Cal.5th 871, 884 (Wilson); see Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 1009 [“[t]he defendant’s burden is to identify what acts each
challenged claim rests on and to show how those acts are
protected under a statutorily defined category of protected
activity”]; Park, at p. 1060.) “To determine whether a claim
arises from protected activity, courts must ‘consider the elements
of the challenged claim and what actions by the defendant supply
those elements and consequently form the basis for liability.’ ”
(Wilson, at p. 884; accord, Park, at p. 1063.)
“ ‘If the core injury-producing conduct upon which the
plaintiff’s claim is premised does not rest on protected speech or
petitioning activity, collateral or incidental allusions to protected
activity will not trigger application of the anti-SLAPP statute.’ ”
(Area 51 Productions, Inc. v. City of Alameda (2018)
20 Cal.App.5th 581, 594 (Area 51); see Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at
pp. 393-394 [“Allegations of protected activity that merely
provide context, without supporting a claim for recovery, cannot
be stricken under the anti-SLAPP statute”].)
“As to the second step inquiry, a plaintiff seeking to
demonstrate the merit of the claim ‘may not rely solely on its
complaint, even if verified; instead, its proof must be made upon
competent admissible evidence.’ ” (Sweetwater Union High
School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 940;
accord, Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781,
788.) “ ‘We have described this second step as a “summary-
judgment-like procedure.” [Citation.] The court does not weigh
evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims. Its inquiry is
limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient
claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to
11
sustain a favorable judgment. It accepts the plaintiff’s evidence
as true, and evaluates the defendant’s showing only to determine
if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law.’ ” (Monster
Energy, at p. 788; see Taus v. Loftus (2007) 40 Cal.4th 683, 714
(Taus) [the court should grant the section 425.16 motion “ ‘if, as a
matter of law, the defendant’s evidence supporting the motion
defeats the plaintiff’s attempt to establish evidentiary support for
the claim’ ”].) “[I]n cases involving allegations of both protected
and unprotected activity, the plaintiff is required to establish a
probability of prevailing on any claim for relief based on
allegations of protected activity.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at
p. 395.)
We review an order granting an anti-SLAPP motion de
novo. (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1067.)
B. The Stricken Claims Arose from the Dingizians’ Protected
Petitioning Activity
We first consider whether the stricken claims against the
Dingizians “arise[] from any act . . . in furtherance of the[ir] . . .
right of petition.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) An “ ‘act in furtherance
of a person’s right of petition’ . . . includes: (1) any written or oral
statement or writing made before a . . . judicial proceeding . . . ,
[or] (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in
connection with an issue under consideration or review by a . . .
judicial body.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e).) “ ‘A cause of action “arising
from” defendant’s litigation activity’ ” falls within those
categories. (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1056.)
Protected acts “include[] communicative conduct such as the
filing, funding, and prosecution of a civil action.” (Ibid.)
12
The stricken claims alleged the Dingizians threatened
litigation if Cruz did not agree to their proposed resolution of the
easement dispute, and that these allegations supported his
causes of action. Specifically, Cruz alleged violations and harm
arising from the Dingizians’ litigation threats in four of his
causes of action. In the first cause of action for obstruction of
easement, Cruz alleged their “refusal to negotiate the removal of
obstructions, coupled with the threat of frivolous litigation,”
violated principles of good faith and fair dealing. In the second
cause of action for interference with sale of property, Cruz alleged
the Dingizians’ “threats of frivolous litigation were designed to
coerce [Cruz] and interfere with his property rights, including the
sale of the property.” In the fourth cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, Cruz alleged the Dingizians’
“legal threats” exemplified their “malicious intent and outrageous
conduct” and caused him significant emotional distress. And in
the sixth cause of action for breach of the covenant of quiet
enjoyment, Cruz alleged the Dingizians’ “threats of frivolous
litigation were designed to intimidate Defendant and force an
unfavorable easement agreement, further interfering with
[Cruz’s] quiet enjoyment” and lawful use of his property.
We conclude the Dingizians’ alleged litigation threats are
the wrong complained of and are not simply “evidence of liability
or a step leading to some different act for which liability is
asserted.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1060.) Such prelitigation
communications are deemed protected petitioning activity
because they are statements or writings made in connection with
an issue pending in a judicial proceeding within the meaning of
section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2). (See Flatley v. Mauro (2006)
39 Cal.4th 299, 322, fn. 11 (Flatley) [“ ‘ “communications
13
preparatory or in anticipation of bringing an action or other
official proceeding” ’ ” are protected by section 425.16]; Lunada
Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 472
[“Correspondence ‘made “in anticipation of litigation
‘contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration’ ” ’
can be a petitioning activity protected by the anti-SLAPP
statute”].) As alleged by Cruz, the Dingizians’ communications
all involved their threat to bring a lawsuit if he did not accept an
“unfavorable easement agreement.” This protected activity
“underlies or forms [a] basis for” his identified causes of action as
pled, thus the cross-complaint contains claims arising from
protected activity. (Park, at pp. 1062-1063.) The Dingizians
satisfied the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis.
Cruz raises no claim of error as to any specific stricken
allegation. Rather, he argues his claims are based on
“unprotected, tortious conduct” involving “physical obstruction
and harassment” by the Dingizians, not constitutionally
protected petitioning activity. And, that even if portions of the
complaint refer to the Dingizians’ litigation activity, such
references are “incidental.” Cruz appears to believe that the trial
court “struck the Cross-Complaint in its entirety.” But as stated,
the trial court did not strike any causes of action in their entirety,
and it considered only those allegations relating to the
Dingizians’ protected petitioning activity. Courts may strike only
claims arising from allegations of protected activity in causes of
action that have mixed bases. (See Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at
p. 393.) “When relief is sought based on allegations of both
protected and unprotected activity, the unprotected activity is
disregarded at [the first] stage.” (Id. at p. 396.) This allows
courts to “rule on plaintiffs’ specific claims of protected activity,
14
rather than reward artful pleading by ignoring such claims if
they are mixed with assertions of unprotected activity.” (Id. at
p. 393.) The court followed that procedure here: it focused on the
factual allegations of protected activity in the cross-complaint,
and determined that Cruz sought relief based on those
allegations. Cruz is not barred from proceeding on his claims
based on unprotected activity.
C. Cruz Did Not Demonstrate a Probability of Success on the
Merits
Because the Dingizians met their initial burden of showing
that Cruz’s claims arose from protected activity, the burden
shifted to Cruz to “demonstrate that [his claims are] both legally
sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of
facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by
the plaintiff is credited.” (Premier Medical Management Systems,
Inc. v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th
464, 476, italics and quotation marks omitted; accord, Taus,
supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 714-715.) In determining whether Cruz
met his burden, we consider “the pleadings[] and supporting and
opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or
defense is based.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2).) We do not, however,
“weigh [defendant’s] evidence against the plaintiff’s, in terms of
either credibility or persuasiveness. Rather, the defendant’s
evidence is considered with a view toward whether it defeats the
plaintiff’s showing as a matter of law, such as by establishing a
defense or the absence of a necessary element.” (1-800 Contacts,
Inc. v. Steinberg (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 568, 585; accord, Taus,
at pp. 714-715.)
15
Here, the trial court correctly concluded Cruz’s claims
against the Dingizians arising from protected activity are barred
by the litigation privilege codified in Civil Code section 47,
subdivision (b). “[T]he privilege bars a civil action for damages
for communications made ‘[i]n any . . . judicial proceeding,’ ”
subject to certain exceptions set forth in the statute. (Hagberg v.
California Federal Bank (2004) 32 Cal.4th 350, 360.) “ ‘[T]he
privilege applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or
quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants
authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and
(4) that [has] some connection or logical relation to the action.’ ”
(Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007)
41 Cal.4th 1232, 1241.) “The privilege ‘is not limited to
statements made during a trial or other proceedings, but may
extend to steps taken prior thereto, or afterwards.’ ” (Ibid.; see
Johnson v. Ralphs Grocery Co. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1097, 1104
(Johnson) [litigation privilege applies to “ ‘prelitigation
communications involving the subject matter of the ultimate
litigation’ ”].)
The litigation privilege bars virtually all tort claims based
on such communications, except malicious prosecution. (Kimmel
v. Goland (1990) 51 Cal.3d 202, 209; see Feldman v. 1100 Park
Lane Associates (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1492 [“the
litigation privilege has been held to apply broadly to all but a
very few types of tort actions based on a privileged
communication”].) This includes claims for intentional infliction
of emotional distress, interference with prospective economic
advantage, and invasion of privacy, among others. (Silberg v.
Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 215.) The litigation privilege also
may apply “to suits for wrongful conduct outside the scope of
16
traditional tort claims” (Feldman, at p. 1492), including causes of
action for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of quiet
enjoyment where the same communicative conduct formed the
basis for the tort and breach causes of action (id. at pp. 1494-
1498), and for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing where the claim was based on protected conduct (Digerati
Holdings, LLC v. Young Money Entertainment, LLC (2011)
194 Cal.App.4th 873, 886). The litigation privilege is
“ ‘interpreted expansively.’ ” (Timothy W. v. Julie W. (2022)
85 Cal.App.5th 648, 662.) “Any doubt about whether the
privilege applies is resolved in favor of applying it.” (Kashian v.
Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892, 913.)
Here, Cruz alleged causes of action for obstruction of an
easement, interference with sale of property, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and breach of the covenant of
quiet enjoyment against the Dingizians.3 As discussed, the
alleged bases for these causes of action included the Dingizians’
“legal threats” or “threats of frivolous litigation” as conduct for
which Cruz sought relief. Cruz’s stricken claims are all based on
the Dingizians’ alleged statements and conduct in settlement
negotiations and in anticipation of filing their civil complaint
against him. The alleged statements and conduct directly relate
to the object of the underlying lawsuits, that is, the parties’ use of
and alleged interference with the easement. The litigation
privilege thus provides a substantive defense to Cruz’s causes of
3 The cross-complaint also alleged causes of action for
“Intentional Destruction of Required Road Material for Fire
Department Vehicles” and trespass, but the Dingizians do not
argue that any allegations supporting those causes of action
arose from protected activity.
17
action based on such “ ‘prelitigation communications involving
the subject matter of the ultimate litigation.’ ” (Johnson, supra,
204 Cal.App.4th at p. 1104.)
Cruz argues he “submitted declarations, photographs, and
historical context of physical interference, including obstructions
and confrontations,” “sufficient to establish a prima facie case for
intentional torts and easement interference.” However, evidence
of physical interference or other unprotected activity is not
relevant to whether Cruz could establish a probability of success
on the merits of his claims based on the allegations of protected
activity identified by the court in the first step.4
4 Before oral argument, Cruz moved to augment the record to
include his objections to plaintiffs’ evidence in support of the
special motion to strike and Cruz’s declaration and exhibits,
which he filed in the trial court with his opposition to the special
motion. We grant the request to augment the record with these
materials.
Cruz also seeks judicial notice of several documents and
photographs attached to his reply brief. We deny judicial notice
of these materials. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.252(a)(2)(B)-
(C) [party seeking judicial notice must file a motion stating
“[w]hether the matter to be noticed was presented to the trial
court and, if so, whether judicial notice was taken by that court;”
and “[i]f judicial notice of the matter was not taken by the trial
court, why the matter is subject to judicial notice under Evidence
Code section 451, 452, or 453”].) To the extent the reply brief
attaches material unrelated to the protected activity at issue,
judicial notice is also denied based on relevance grounds. (City of
Hesperia v. Lake Arrowhead Community Services Dist. (2023)
93 Cal.App.5th 489, 508-509 [appellate court “ ‘may decline to
take judicial notice of matters not relevant to dispositive issues
on appeal’ ”].)
18
Accordingly, Cruz cannot meet his burden under the second
step of the section 425.16 analysis because he cannot
demonstrate a probability of prevailing on his claims. (Flatley,
supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 323 [litigation privilege “may present a
substantive defense a plaintiff must overcome to demonstrate a
probability of prevailing”]; Bergstein v. Stroock & Stroock &
Lavan LLP (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 793, 814 [“ ‘A plaintiff cannot
establish a probability of prevailing [in responding to a special
motion to strike] if the litigation privilege precludes the
defendant’s liability on the claim’ ”].)
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order granting the special motion to strike
is affirmed. The Dingizians may recover their costs on appeal.
MARTINEZ, P. J.
We concur:
FEUER, J.
STONE, J.
19
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