Graham v. Western University of Health Sciences CA2/7

CourtListener 10860195Calctapp15.05.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 5/15/26 Graham v. Western University of Health Sciences CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

CATHERINE GRAHAM, B349398

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 24STCV11955)

WESTERN UNIVERSITY OF
HEALTH SCIENCES et al.,

Defendants and
Respondents.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Maurice A. Leiter, Judge. Affirmed.
Catherine E. Graham, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Pazzani & Sandhu, Karen J. Pazzani and Lester F. Aponte
for Defendants and Respondents.
______________________________
Catherine Graham appeals from a judgment entered after
the trial court sustained the demurrer filed by the Western
University of Health Sciences (University) and related
defendants without leave to amend. Graham alleged, among
other claims, that the University and individual defendants
fraudulently concealed facts in their recruitment information,
including the school’s “cult-like” culture, and the information the
University provided informed her decision to enroll in the college
of optometry’s doctorate program, from which she was dismissed.
On appeal, Graham challenges only the court’s order sustaining
the demurrer to her fraudulent concealment cause of action. We
affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Second Amended Complaint
Graham filed this action on February 1, 2023. After the
trial court sustained demurrers to her initial and first amended
complaints, on February 3, 2025 Graham filed her second
amended complaint (complaint). The complaint alleged six
causes of action against the University, its board of trustees, and
five individuals: Elizabeth Zamora (chair of the board), Elizabeth
Hoppe (dean of the optometry school), Dr. Ida Chung (associate
dean of academic affairs), Naida Jakirlic (optometry school
instructor), and Andrea Quezada (admissions counselor)
(collectively, the University defendants).1

1 The complaint also named Crystal Sin, a graduate of the
college of optometry. According to the University, Sin was never
served, and she was not a party to the demurrer. However, the

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The complaint alleged Graham attended the college of
optometry’s doctorate program starting in August 2018. After
she appealed a “[trivial] grade discrepancy” in April 2019, Chung
retaliated against her by placing her on academic probation, and
in January 2020 she was dismissed from the college. Graham
subsequently reenrolled, but from August 2021 to June 2022 the
University “operated under a ‘cult-like’ covert culture, engaging
in harassment, unauthorized use of her data, and false
advertising practices.” Further, in May 2022 Graham “reported
various incidents” to the University’s board of trustees,
“including unauthorized processing of her information
by . . . Quezada and cyber law violations.”
The complaint alleged causes of action for fraudulent
concealment, intentional misrepresentation, violation of the
Comprehensive Computer Data and Access Fraud Act (Pen. Code,
§ 502), negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress
(IIED), and failure to prevent harassment (Gov. Code, § 12940,
subd. (k)).2 With respect to the fraudulent concealment cause of

judgment dismissed the second amended complaint in its
entirety.
2 Graham included at the end of the sixth cause of action an
“ADDENDUM” containing four additional causes of action. The
University defendants moved to strike these causes of action on
the basis the trial court had already dismissed them. In its
ruling on the demurrer, the court found the motion to strike was
moot. Graham has forfeited any challenge to the implied
dismissal of the four causes of action by not addressing them on
appeal. (Ko v. Maxim Healthcare Services, Inc. (2020)
58 Cal.App.5th 1144, 1147, fn. 3 [plaintiffs forfeited challenge to
order sustaining demurrer to cause of action by not briefing the
issue]; Aptos Council v. County of Santa Cruz (2017)

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action, Graham alleged Quezada and Jakirlic, as agents of
Hoppe, presented recruitment information to her and other
prospective students at the University’s “Preview Days” in 2017
“but intentionally failed to disclose other facts.” Specifically, they
failed to disclose “the so-called ‘shared governance’ nature of the
‘University’” and that it “‘involve[d] the sharing of and access to
private information on computer systems . . . and computer
networks.’” They also did not disclose “the culture” of the
University, which was “‘cult-like’” and was only “revealed to
[Graham] after she enrolled as a degree-seeking student.” The
University had a fiduciary duty to disclose these facts to the
public or to Graham, who was a student or prospective student.
Defendants knew these facts and intended to deceive Graham
“because of the embarrassment of being a cult or cult-like entity
that did not achieve recognition as a religion.” Graham’s reliance
on the information presented on the University’s website, in its
catalog, and at events like the Preview Days “inform[ed] her
decision to apply” and was “justifiable.” Further, Graham
withdrew from the University “because of their culture of falsity,”
and she was “harmed in the ‘cult-like’ mechanisms . . . namely,
that the mechanisms caused cybercriminal activity on her
personal devices.”
On March 7, 2025 the University defendants filed a
demurrer to all causes of action in the complaint except for the
IIED cause of action, which was asserted against only Sin. With
respect to fraudulent concealment, the University defendants

10 Cal.App.5th 266, 296 [“Issues not raised in the appellant’s
opening brief are deemed waived or abandoned.”].)

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argued the operative complaint failed to sufficiently allege a duty
to disclose or Graham’s justifiable reliance. In her opposition,
Graham did not address the University defendants’ arguments
regarding the sufficiency of the fraudulent concealment cause of
action. Instead, Graham argued she had followed the trial court’s
order by alleging the six causes of action for which the court had
granted leave to amend and provided (unidentified)
“clarifications” of the causes of action.

B. The Trial Court’s Ruling
On June 10, 2025 the trial court sustained the University
defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend. The court found
Graham’s “[v]ague allegations” did not establish a claim for
fraudulent inducement, and she failed to sufficiently allege a
duty to disclose or justifiable reliance.
On July 8, 2025 the trial court entered a judgment in favor
of the University defendants dismissing the complaint in its
entirety.
Graham timely appealed.3

3 In her opening brief Graham also seeks review of the trial
court’s July 8, 2025 order striking her request to disqualify Judge
Leiter under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1. Graham did
not identify this order in her notice of appeal, but in any event,
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3, subdivision (d),
the exclusive means for review of a judicial disqualification
determination is by filing a petition for writ of mandate within
10 days after notice of entry of the court’s order on
disqualification, not an appeal from the order. (See Curle v.
Superior Court (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1057, 1059.) Graham did not
file a petition after receiving the court’s order. We therefore do
not address this issue.

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DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review
“‘In reviewing an order sustaining a demurrer, we examine
the operative complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges
facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory.’”
(Matthews v. Becerra (2019) 8 Cal.5th 756, 768; accord, T.H. v.
Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. (2017) 4 Cal.5th 145, 162.)
When evaluating the complaint, “we assume the truth of the
allegations.” (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204,
209; accord, Lee v. Hanley (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1225, 1230.)
However, we do not accept the truth of conclusions of fact or law
alleged in the complaint. (Centinela Freeman Emergency Medical
Associates v. Health Net of California, Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 994,
1010 [“‘“‘We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts
properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions
of fact or law.’”’”].)
A trial court abuses its discretion by sustaining a demurrer
without leave to amend where “‘there is a reasonable possibility
that the defect can be cured by amendment.’” (Loeffler v. Target
Corp. (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1081, 1100; accord, City of Dinuba v.
County of Tulare (2007) 41 Cal.4th 859, 865.) “‘“The plaintiff has
the burden of proving that [an] amendment would cure the legal
defect, and may [even] meet this burden [for the first time] on
appeal.”’” (Starlight Cinemas, Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co.
(2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 24, 32; accord, Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital
Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 970-971.)

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B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Sustaining the Demurrer to
Graham’s Fraudulent Concealment Cause of Action
“The required elements for fraudulent concealment are
(1) concealment or suppression of a material fact; (2) by a
defendant with a duty to disclose the fact; (3) the defendant
intended to defraud the plaintiff by intentionally concealing or
suppressing the fact; (4) the plaintiff was unaware of the fact and
would have acted differently if the concealed or suppressed fact
was known; and (5) plaintiff sustained damage as a result of the
concealment or suppression of the material fact.” (Rattagan v.
Uber Technologies, Inc. (2024) 17 Cal.5th 1, 40 (Rattagan).)
In California, fraud must be alleged with particularity.
(Rattagan, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 43; Robinson Helicopter Co.,
Inc. v. Dana Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 979, 993.) “‘This
particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts which
“show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the
representations were tendered.”’” (Rattagan, at p. 43.)
“California courts apply th[is] same specificity standard to
evaluate the factual underpinnings of a fraudulent concealment
claim at the pleading stage, even though the focus of inquiry
shifts to the unique elements of the claim.” (Ibid.) “[T]he
complaint must [therefore] include specific allegations
establishing all the required elements” of fraudulent concealment
to be actionable. (Id. at p. 65.)
The complaint failed to allege with particularity what facts
the University defendants failed to disclose, the basis for the
alleged duty to disclose, and in what manner Graham relied on
the concealment of these facts to her detriment. As to the first
element of fraudulent concealment, the complaint alleged in a
very conclusory manner what material facts the University

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defendants failed to disclose. For example, the complaint alleged
the University defendants failed to disclose the University’s
“‘cult-like’ covert culture” and that there was a “shared
governance” structure of the University that “involve[d] the
sharing of and access to private information on computer
systems.” But the complaint failed to set forth any facts that
showed the cult-like covert culture or the governance structure
that led to the University gaining access to Graham’s private
information (other than that the University was a “corporation”).
Nor did Graham allege how the nondisclosures were material to
Graham’s decision to enroll in the optometry program. The
complaint also failed to allege what statements were made at the
University’s 2017 Preview Days that were misleading or untrue.
On this basis alone, the operative complaint lacked
sufficient particularity to state a cause of action for fraudulent
concealment. (See Rattagan, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 43 [the
complaint must include “the content of the omitted facts” where
plaintiff alleges fraudulent concealment based on a defendant’s
exclusive knowledge of undisclosed facts]; Blickman Turkus, LP
v. MF Downtown Sunnyvale, LLC (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 858,
877-878 [“unspecified statements on an identified topic [i.e.,
defendant’s ability to pay rent]” did not provide “the substance of
those statements” sufficient to support a fraudulent concealment
claim based on a theory of partial concealment].)
In addition, Graham did not adequately allege the
University defendants had a duty to disclose. As discussed, the
operative complaint alleged the University owed a fiduciary duty
to disclose its shared governance structure, computer systems
information sharing, and social culture to students, prospective
students, or the public. The complaint asserted the University

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defendants had a fiduciary duty to Graham under Thomas v.
Regents of University of California (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 587.
But the Thomas court concluded there was no authority for the
plaintiff student-athlete’s contention that the university’s coaches
had a fiduciary relationship with their student-athletes. (Id. at
p. 630.)
On appeal, Graham argues the University defendants’ duty
to disclose was imposed by statute, citing the general fraud
statute (Civ. Code, § 1710); the false advertising law (Bus. & Prof.
Code, § 17500); the false advertising provision of the Medical
Practice Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 2271; see id., § 2000); and the
Consumers Legal Remedy Act (Civ. Code, § 1770). However,
none of these statutes requires universities or their
administrators to disclose their social culture, governance
structure, or computer systems to prospective students, current
students, or the public, nor does Graham explain how these
statutes support her theory the University defendants had a duty
to disclose these facts.
Finally, Graham failed to plead with particularity her
reliance on the alleged concealed facts. Graham alleges certain
representations by the University “inform[ed] her decision to
apply,” but she does not allege that she would have acted
differently (for example, not enrolled in the optometry school) had
she learned of the true nature of the University’s social culture,
shared governance structure, and computer systems.4

4 Graham does not argue on appeal that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying leave to amend her second
amended complaint, nor does she address how she could amend
the complaint to cure its legal defects. Because Graham has
failed to meet her burden to support leave to amend, we affirm

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DISPOSITION

The judgment of dismissal is affirmed. The University
defendants are to recover their costs on appeal.

FEUER, J.
We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J.

STONE, J.

the trial court’s denial of leave to amend. (Spears v. Spears
(2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1294, 1307 [affirming denial of leave to
amend in light of plaintiff’s failure to identify a specific allegation
that would cure the defect in his claim]; Lebrun v. CBS Television
Studios, Inc. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 199, 212 [affirming denial of
leave to amend where plaintiffs “d[id] not suggest how they could
amend the complaint”].)

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