In re Consuelo G. CA2/7

CourtListener 10860192Calctapp15.05.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 5/15/26 In re Consuelo G. CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re CONSUELO G. et al., B349112
Persons Coming Under the (Los Angeles County
Juvenile Court Law. Super. Ct. No.
24CCJP02394)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,

Plaintiff and
Respondent,

v.

LUCIA G.,

Defendant and
Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Marguerite D. Downing, Judge. Affirmed.
Suzanne Davidson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, Jacklyn K. Louie, Principal Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________________

Lucia G. (Mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order
terminating her parental rights over one-year-old twins
Consuelo G. and Pedro G. Mother argues the court abused its
discretion in failing to apply the beneficial parental relationship
exception to termination of parental rights. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Dependency Petition
On August 1, 2024 the Los Angeles Department of Children
and Family Services (Department) filed a dependency petition on
behalf of Consuelo and Pedro alleging under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1),1 that the twins
tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine at birth.
The petition also alleged, pursuant to subdivisions (b)(1) and (j),
that Mother had a history of substance abuse and was a current
abuser of methamphetamine, amphetamine, and marijuana, and
her almost-two-year-old daughter Isabella G. (the twins’ half-

1 Further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

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sister) had been removed from Mother’s care due to substance
abuse.2
At the jurisdiction hearing on September 13, 2024, the
juvenile court sustained the petition, and at the disposition
hearing a few weeks later, the court declared Consuelo and Pedro
dependents of the court and removed them from Mother’s
custody.3 Mother was granted monitored visitation for a
minimum of three times a week for three hours each visit.
Mother’s case plan included drug and alcohol services, weekly
drug testing, parenting classes, and individual counseling.

B. The Reunification Period
After they were born, Consuelo and Pedro spent 19 days in
the neonatal intensive care unit. Upon their discharge, they were
placed with Maria M., who was also the caregiver (and now the
adoptive parent) of Isabella. The Department social worker
observed “an attachment” between the twins and Maria, and
Maria was able to meet the children’s needs. Consuelo and Pedro
received occupational therapy through the regional center.
At the outset of the case, Mother enrolled in parenting,
domestic violence, and anger management classes. However, she

2 Mother’s parental rights over Isabella were terminated in
March 2024, and Isabella was subsequently adopted by Maria M.
Mother also had an older daughter, 10-year-old Heavenly C., who
had been placed in a legal guardianship with a maternal uncle.
3 Mother informed the Department social worker that the
twins were a product of rape and Mother knew only a nickname
for the father. The juvenile court found the Department made
due diligence efforts to identify and contact the father, but his
whereabouts were unknown.

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was terminated from her programs around March 2025 after she
stopped attending. Mother failed to appear for all ordered drug
tests between August 2024 and February 2025. Between
August 2024 and March 2025 Mother visited the twins
consistently three days per week for three hours each visit.
However, Mother’s visits became less consistent in March 2025.
Maria monitored the visits and did not report any concerns.
Mother was “attentive, affectionate, and able to meet [the
children’s] needs such as feeding, changing their diaper[s], and
caring for them.”
At the six-month review hearing (§ 366.21, subdivision (e))
held on May 20, 2025, the juvenile court found Mother’s progress
was not substantial. The court terminated Mother’s reunification
services and set the matter for a selection and implementation
hearing.

C. Mother’s Visitation After Termination of Reunification
Services
During June and July 2025, Mother visited the twins only
once or twice per week. Maria continued to monitor visits and
stated Mother was “attentive and caring to the children’s needs
and wants.” Other than the inconsistency in scheduling, Maria
had no concerns regarding visitation. There was a three-week
period in August 2025 during which Mother did not visit the
children, and Maria stated she did not receive any messages from
Mother regarding visits.
The Department reported the twins were thriving in
Maria’s home. Maria was “warm and loving” with the children,
and she wanted “to provide the children with a loving and stable
home environment.” The social worker noted “[i]t is evident that

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they have all formed a bond with each other.” Maria was also
interested in ensuring the twins and Isabella had a relationship
with Heavenly, whom Maria had invited to the twins’ first
birthday party.

D. The Selection and Implementation Hearing
On September 16, 2025 the juvenile court held the selection
and implementation hearing. Mother testified she visited
Consuelo and Pedro consistently three times per week until
May 2025. Around that time, Mother lost her housing. She
began visiting the twins only twice per week because she did not
want them to see her “not showered and properly dressed.” She
also stated it was harder to find transportation to visits while she
was unhoused.
In late August 2025 Mother enrolled in a residential
substance abuse program. Mother explained there was a
“blackout period” at the beginning of the program, during which
she could not have any visits with the twins. However, Mother
stated she had two visits with the twins in September 2025.
Mother testified that during visits she played with the
twins and talked and sang to them. They responded by clapping,
smiling, and reaching their hands out to Mother. Consuelo blew
kisses to Mother, and both children put their heads on Mother’s
chest. They crawled to Mother and waved at her. Consuelo
sometimes cried at the end of visits, and at the end of the most
recent visit, Pedro acted “very serious.”
Mother’s counsel argued termination of parental rights
would be detrimental to the children because Mother had
maintained consistent visitation and the children “have this

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connection with her.” Mother was attentive to the children and
took care of their emotional and physical needs during visits.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court found by
clear and convincing evidence that Consuelo and Pedro were
adoptable and it would not be detrimental to terminate Mother’s
parental rights. The court found Mother’s visitation “has been,
for the most part, regular since these children were removed from
her.”4 However, the court observed that the children had lived
with Maria for their entire lives and only had monitored visits
three days a week with Mother. The court also found Mother’s
interpretation of the twins’ reactions to her was “more
speculative than informative because given their age . . . they
reach out to a lot of people who look sympathetic.” The court
found no exception to adoption applied, and it terminated
Mother’s parental rights and designated Maria as the prospective
adoptive parent.
Mother timely appealed.

4 The minute order for the selection and implementation
hearing states that Mother “has not maintained regular
visitation with the child.” However, “[w]here there is a conflict
between the juvenile court’s statements in the reporter’s
transcript and the recitals in the clerk’s transcript, we presume
the reporter’s transcript is the more accurate.” (In re A.C. (2011)
197 Cal.App.4th 796, 799-800; accord, Garner v. BNSF Railway
Co. (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 660, 668.)

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DISCUSSION

A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
“At the section 366.26 hearing, the focus shifts away from
family reunification and toward the selection and implementation
of a permanent plan for the child.” (In re S.B. (2009) 46 Cal.4th
529, 532; accord, In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 630
(Caden C.).) “‘Once the court determines the child is likely to be
adopted, the burden shifts to the parent to show that termination
of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under one of
the exceptions listed in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1).’” (In re
B.D. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1218, 1224-1225 (B.D.); accord, In re
Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53 [“the court must order adoption
and its necessary consequence, termination of parental rights,
unless one of the specified circumstances provides a compelling
reason for finding that termination of parental rights would be
detrimental to the child”].)
Under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), the parent
may avoid termination of parental rights if the parent establishes
by a preponderance of the evidence “that the parent has regularly
visited with the child, that the child would benefit from
continuing the relationship, and that terminating the
relationship would be detrimental to the child. [Citations.] The
language of this exception, along with its history and place in the
larger dependency scheme, show that the exception applies in
situations where a child cannot be in a parent’s custody but
where severing the child’s relationship with the parent, even
when balanced against the benefits of a new adoptive home,
would be harmful for the child.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 629-630; accord, B.D., supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 1225.)

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A parent has regular visitation and contact when the
parent “‘visit[s] consistently,’ taking into account ‘the extent
permitted by court orders.’” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 632; accord, In re I.E. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 683, 691.)
Whether “‘the child would benefit from continuing the
relationship’” with his or her parent is shaped by factors “such as
‘[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the
parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction
between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.’”
(Caden C., at p. 632; accord, In re Katherine J. (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 303, 316-317 (Katherine J.).) When determining
whether termination of parental rights would be detrimental to
the child, courts need to consider “how the child would be affected
by losing the parental relationship—in effect, what life would be
like for the child in an adoptive home without the parent in the
child’s life.” (Caden C., at p. 633; accord, In re D.P. (2022)
76 Cal.App.5th 153, 164.)
“‘If severing the natural parent/child relationship would
deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment
such that,’ even considering the benefits of a new adoptive home,
termination would ‘harm[ ]’ the child, the court should not
terminate parental rights.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 633; accord, Katherine J., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 317.)
“While application of the beneficial parental relationship
exception rests on a variety of factual determinations properly
reviewed for substantial evidence, the ultimate decision that
termination would be harmful is subject to review for abuse of
discretion.” (Caden C., at p. 630; accord, In re I.E., supra,
91 Cal.App.5th at p. 691.)

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B. The Juvenile Court Did Not Err in Terminating Mother’s
Parental Rights
Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in
finding the beneficial parental relationship exception did not
apply because the evidence showed the twins had a strong bond
with Mother and a continuation of that relationship would be
beneficial to them.
As discussed, the juvenile court found Mother had satisfied
the first step of the beneficial parental relationship exception
analysis by consistently visiting the children. With respect to the
second step, Mother argues the children would benefit from
continuing their relationship with her because they smiled and
reached out to her, rested their heads on her chest, and crawled
to her. However, the court’s finding Mother did not have a
substantial, positive, emotional attachment with the children was
supported by substantial evidence. Although the children
appeared to enjoy their visits with Mother, there is no evidence
they regarded her as anything more than a friendly playmate.
The children had never lived with Mother. While they may have
sometimes been unhappy when visits ended, there is no evidence
the children had any behavioral changes during the three weeks
that they did not see Mother. That the children sometimes
enjoyed spending time with Mother is not sufficient to show they
had a substantial emotional attachment to her. (See
Katherine J., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 318 [“the beneficial
relationship exception demands something more than the
incidental benefit a child gains from any amount of positive
contact with her natural parent”]; B.D., supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1230 [“an emotional attachment is one where the child views
the parent as more than a mere friend or playmate and [whose]

9
interactions with the parent were not ambivalent, detached, or
indifferent”].)
As to the third Caden C. factor, the juvenile court did not
abuse its discretion in finding the benefit and security provided
by the children’s placement with Maria outweighed any harm
that would be caused by the children’s loss of their relationship
with Mother. As discussed, the children had been living with
Maria almost their entire lives. They had a bond with Maria and
were thriving in her home. They were also able to live with one
of their half-sisters and maintain a relationship with the other
half-sister. Maria ensured the twins received regional center
services. On this record, there is no showing of “‘exceptional
circumstances [citation], to choose an option other than the norm,
which remains adoption.’” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 631.) The court therefore did not abuse its discretion in finding
the benefit and security provided by the children’s continued
placement with Maria as the prospective adoptive parent
outweighed any harm that would be caused by the loss of their
parental relationship with Mother. (Id. at p. 634; Katherine J.,
supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 317.)

DISPOSITION

The order terminating Mother’s parental rights is affirmed.

FEUER, J.
We concur:

SEGAL, Acting P. J. STONE, J.

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