People v. Hughey CA2/7

CourtListener 10859010Calctapp14.05.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 5/14/26 P. v. Hughey CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B342848

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. SA032585)
v.

FREDDIE HUGHEY,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Joseph J. Burghardt, Judge. Affirmed.
Edward H. Schulman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Seth P. McCutcheon and Charles Chung,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Respondent.
________________________
INTRODUCTION

Freddie Hughey appeals the superior court’s resentencing
decision under Penal Code section 1172.75, which struck
Hughey’s four prison prior enhancements under section 667,
subdivision (b).1 Hughey contends the court abused its discretion
by declining to additionally dismiss his prior strike allegations
pursuant to Penal Code section 1385 and People v. Superior
Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero). We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Conviction and Sentence
In 1998, Hughey “went into a law office, and while no one
was there, took a wallet.” Hughey was convicted in 1999 by a
jury of petty theft with a prior theft-related conviction (§ 666).
The jury found true that Hughey served four prior prison terms
within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b), and that
Hughey had suffered four previous serious or violent felony
convictions within the meaning of the Three Strikes law, sections
667, subdivisions (b) through (i), and 1170.12, subdivisions (a)
through (d). Hughey’s four strike convictions consisted of: 1991
convictions for kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a)) and second degree
robbery (§ 211); and 1980 convictions for assault with a deadly
weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)) and forcible rape (former §§ 261.2/261.3,
now § 261, subd. (a)(2)).

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
Hughey was sentenced to 25 years to life for a third-strike
offense under the Three Strikes law, plus four years for the
prison priors.

B. Resentencing Proceedings
In 2022, Hughey was identified as eligible for resentencing
under section 1172.75, which invalidated certain one-year prison
prior enhancements under section 667.5, subdivision (b). The
court struck Hughey’s four prison prior enhancements “[t]o
prevent over-detention” in September 2022, reducing his sentence
by four years, and indicated Hughey “is still entitled to a full-
resentence, if requested, at a later date.”
Hughey, through his appointed counsel, requested a full
resentencing in September 2024. Hughey argued his conduct did
not fall within the spirit of the Three Strikes law and the court
should dismiss his prior strikes in its discretion under
section 1385. He argued that two of his prior strikes, the
kidnapping and robbery convictions, arose out of the same
incident; his offenses generally stemmed from substance abuse;
his present offense of petty theft was not a violent felony; his
advanced age and physical disabilities decreased his risk of
recidivism; his prior strikes were 33 and 44 years old; and he had
participated in rehabilitative programming and avoided rule
violations in prison, earning the “lowest possible” risk assessment
scores.
At the time of his resentencing request, Hughey reported
he was 74 years old, and “his physical condition has diminished
during his period of incarceration. He has been confined to [a]
wheelchair due to constant back pain related to sciatica. In
addition, he has been diagnosed with chronic hepatitis C,

3
bilateral primary osteoarthritis of the hip, and cirrhosis of the
liver.” Hughey provided certificates of completion from his
rehabilitative programming.
The People opposed Hughey’s resentencing request, noting
that Hughey was now eligible for parole and that if the court
struck his prior strike offenses and imposed a determinate term
as requested, Hughey would be released immediately. The
People argued Hughey fell within the spirit of the Three Strikes
law because his prior strike offenses were “heinous” and his
criminal history was extensive, including convictions for
pandering and assault with intent to commit oral copulation.
The People asserted that “the fact that two of [Hughey’s] strikes
are from one case is ultimately immaterial,” because “he also had
two other strikes arising from separate cases” and “another
uncharged strike . . . for assault with intent to commit forced oral
copulation.” The People argued there was insufficient evidence of
Hughey’s substance use or mental illness, and that Hughey’s
rehabilitative efforts, age, and disabilities were more properly
considered by the parole board, which had recently denied
Hughey parole.
In his reply, Hughey requested resentencing as a second
strike offender.
The court heard the matter in December 2024. Hughey’s
counsel argued at the hearing that if Hughey were convicted of
the petty theft offense “today with this same record, the
maximum sentence . . . that could be imposed would be six years
or [the] high term doubled.”
The court stated, “This is a really difficult decision” because
“from the defense perspective, this is an individual who was
convicted of petty theft with a prior and has done a great deal of

4
rehabilitative programming,” but “[o]n the other hand, from the
prosecution’s perspective, this individual’s prior convictions are
horrific. [¶] He has prior convictions for several violent sex
offenses. [¶] He has a long criminal record. He did not do well
on parole. He just kept committing crimes for decades.” The
court observed “it appears [Hughey] was afflicted with cannabis
use disorder” and “also abused alcohol, cocaine and heroin,” and
he “was found not competent in 1999 due to mental health and
mental illness” and had previously reported “that he hears voices,
suffers from P.T.S.D., and takes . . . psychiatric medication.” The
court noted Hughey’s elderly age and his physical condition and
illnesses; that Hughey’s “current offense is not serious or violent”
and “the strikes . . . at this point are old;” and his risk
assessments were low and “[h]e’s done a large amount of
rehabilitative programming.” The court stated that “the nature
and circumstances of the current offense . . . weighs in favor of
the defendant.”
But the court concluded that the “nature and circumstances
of the prior convictions that constitute strikes, that weighs
strongly against the defendant.” The court recounted Hughey’s
most serious criminal history, including “tr[ying] to become a
pimp for an undercover officer”; “forc[ing] [a] victim to commit
oral copulation at knifepoint and then robb[ing] the victim”; and
committing kidnapping and robbery and “ma[king] comments
such that he was going to rape the victim” when “[h]e had just
gotten out of prison five days before that.” The court further
considered other instances in Hughey’s “extremely long criminal
record,” such as a juvenile adjudication for battery on a probation
officer and convictions for burglary, petty theft, carrying a loaded
firearm in public, loitering where children are present, receiving

5
stolen property, and being under the influence. The court stated
Hughey “basically . . . [has] been in continuous custody since
1980. As soon as he gets out, he commits another violent offense.
[¶] He’s been committing crimes continuously since 1968 for
30 years until he was given a 25-to-life sentence. . . . He did not
appear to learn anything from his time in custody [before then],
especially the serious offenses where he got four years, eight
years, and eleven years. [¶] He violated parole numerous times.”
The court determined that “in terms of . . . the Romero
motion,” “considering the nature and circumstances of his current
offense, prior convictions, and background, character, and
prospects, . . . I can’t say that he’s outside the spirit of the Three
Strikes law.” The court denied Hughey’s motion and resentenced
him to 25 years to life pursuant to the Three Strikes law. The
court also suspended Hughey’s $10,000 restitution fine.
Hughey timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
Effective 2022, Senate Bill No. 483 “retroactively
invalidate[d] prison prior enhancements imposed pursuant to
section 667.5, subdivision (b), except those that were based on a
conviction for a sexually violent offense.” (People v. Green (2024)
104 Cal.App.5th 365, 368 (Green); accord, People v. Rogers (2025)
108 Cal.App.5th 340, 348, fn. 5 (Rogers).)
Senate Bill No. 483 also added former section 1171.1, now
section 1172.75, to the Penal Code (see Green, supra,
104 Cal.App.5th at p. 370; Rogers, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at
p. 348, fn. 5), “establish[ing] a mechanism to provide affected

6
defendants a remedy for those legally invalid enhancements.”
(People v. Burgess (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 375, 380.)
Section 1172.75 requires the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation to “identify those persons in their
custody currently serving a term for a judgment that includes an
enhancement” under section 667.5, subdivision (a). (§ 1172.75,
subd. (b); see Burgess, at p. 380; accord, People v. Gray (2024)
101 Cal.App.5th 148, 163.) Once the court verifies that “the
current judgment includes [such a] sentencing enhancement . . .
the court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.”
(§ 1172.75, subd. (c); accord, Gray, at p. 163; Burgess, at p. 380.)
In addition to striking the invalid prior prison term
enhancements, section 1172.75 requires a “full resentencing,”
applying “the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and . . . any
other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial
discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to
promote uniformity of sentencing.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2); see
Green, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 373; accord, People v. Garcia
(2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848, 855 (Garcia).) Section 1172.75 also
permits the resentencing court to “consider postconviction factors,
including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of
rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that
reflects whether age, time served, and diminished physical
condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for future
violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances have
changed since the original sentencing so that continued
incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.” (§ 1172.75,
subd. (d)(3); accord, People v. Dowdy (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1, 7
(Dowdy); Garcia, at p. 856.)

7
As part of full resentencing, section 1385 permits the court
to “dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to
do so.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1).)2 In Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th 497,
our Supreme Court held “a court may exercise the power to
dismiss granted in section 1385” with respect to prior felony
conviction allegations under the Three Strikes law. (Id. at p. 504;
see Rogers, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 364 [“trial court ha[s]
the authority to exercise its discretion under section 1385(a) and
Romero to strike any or all of [a defendant’s] strike priors after
recalling his sentence and for the purpose of resentencing him
under section 1172.75”].)
“ ‘[I]n ruling whether to strike or vacate a prior serious
and/or violent felony conviction allegation or finding under the
Three Strikes law . . . “in furtherance of justice” pursuant to
Penal Code section 1385(a), or in reviewing such a ruling, the
court in question must consider whether, in light of the nature
and circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or
violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background,
character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside
the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be

2 In 2022, the Legislature “amended section 1385 to specify
mitigating circumstances that courts must consider when
deciding whether to strike a sentence enhancement in the
furtherance of justice.” (Dowdy, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 9;
accord, People v. Hernandez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 981, 991.)
Hughey does not argue on appeal that any of the mitigating
circumstances enumerated in section 1385, subdivision (c), apply
to his case. (See Dowdy, at p. 9 [“It is well established . . . that
section 1385, subdivision (c) applies by its terms to a sentence
‘enhancement,’ but not to a sentence derived from the alternative
sentencing scheme of the Three Strikes law”].)

8
treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or
more serious and/or violent felonies.’ ” (People v. Carmony (2004)
33 Cal.4th 367, 377 (Carmony); accord, People v. Williams (1998)
17 Cal.4th 148, 161.) The court must consider “ ‘ “both . . . the
constitutional rights of the defendant, and the interests of society
represented by the People, in determining whether there should
be a dismissal.” ’ ” (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 530, italics
omitted.)
“[A] trial court’s refusal or failure to dismiss or strike a
prior conviction allegation under section 1385 is subject to review
for abuse of discretion.” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 375.)
“[A]n appellate court may not substitute its judgment about
appropriate sentencing for that of the trial court, but instead
must give due regard to the discretion vested in that court.
[Citations.] The appellate court can find a reversible abuse of
discretion only if it concludes that no reasonable judge would
have agreed with the trial court’s decision. [Citations.] Unless
that standard is met, the appellate court must affirm the
decision, even if it ‘ “might have ruled differently” ’ on the Romero
motion ‘ “in the first instance.” ’ ” (People v. Dain (2025)
18 Cal.5th 246, 258.)
“[A] trial court will only abuse its discretion in failing to
strike a prior felony conviction allegation in limited
circumstances. For example, an abuse of discretion occurs where
the trial court was not ‘aware of its discretion’ to dismiss
[citation], or where the court considered impermissible factors in
declining to dismiss [citation]. Moreover, ‘the sentencing norms
[established by the Three Strikes law may, as a matter of law,]
produce[] an “arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd” result’
under the specific facts of a particular case. [Citation.] [¶] But

9
‘[i]t is not enough to show that reasonable people might disagree
about whether to strike one or more’ prior conviction allegations.”
(Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.) “Because the
circumstances must be ‘extraordinary . . . by which a career
criminal can be deemed to fall outside the spirit of the very
scheme within which he squarely falls once he commits a strike
as part of a long and continuous criminal record, the continuation
of which the law was meant to attack’ [citation], the
circumstances where no reasonable people could disagree that
the criminal falls outside the spirit of the three strikes scheme
must be even more extraordinary.” (Ibid.) Even so, “the abuse of
discretion standard is neither ‘empty’ [citation] nor are all
recidivists the kind of career criminals appropriately considered
under that scheme. Cumulative circumstances, including that a
defendant’s crimes were related to drug addiction and the
defendant’s criminal history did not include actual violence, may
show that the defendant is outside the spirit of the Three Strikes
law.” (People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1134, 1140-1141.)

B. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By
Denying Hughey’s Romero Motion
Hughey argues that the superior court “failed to give
meaningful value to post-conviction factors akin to those set forth
in Penal Code section 1172.75, subdivision [(d)](3).” In Hughey’s
view, “the trial court’s failure to meaningfully value those factors
while placing undue emphasis on his past criminal record more
than 30 years past requires reversal,” and Hughey further seeks
“remand with directions to explain how or why Hughey’s 25 years
of exemplary in-prison performance nonetheless reinforced the

10
trial court’s original decision in 1999 to impose Three Strikes
punishment.”3
We cannot say the court abused its discretion. In its ruling,
the court expressly and thoroughly weighed the relevant
considerations for and against granting Hughey’s Romero motion
and acknowledged the decision was “difficult.” The court
specifically considered Hughey’s circumstances relevant to the
postconviction factors in section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(3),
namely his “disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the
defendant while incarcerated[;] evidence that reflects whether
age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have
reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence[;] and evidence
that reflects that circumstances have changed since the original
sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the
interest of justice.” As relevant to this provision, the court noted
that Hughey “has done a great deal of rehabilitative

3 For the first time on reply, Hughey raises the Reform Act,
which authorizes resentencing through section 1170.126 for
certain defendants serving indeterminate third strike life
sentences. (See People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (2025)
18 Cal.5th 838, 850-851.) Hughey argues he was eligible for
Reform Act resentencing and the superior court failed to make
findings under this statute. The record indicates that “Hughey
previously petitioned for resentencing under section 1170.126”
and his petition was denied. (See Guevara, at p. 851 [“The
ameliorative provisions of the Reform Act . . . do not apply in
cases in which the defendant was previously convicted of certain
enumerated offenses, including those involving sexual
violence . . .”].) Further, “ ‘ “[i]t is axiomatic that arguments
made for the first time in a reply brief will not be entertained
because of the unfairness to the other party.” ’ ” (People v.
Silveria and Travis (2020) 10 Cal.5th 195, 255.)

11
programming” while incarcerated and that he was in his 70s and
“has a physical condition which confines him to a wheelchair,” in
addition to other chronic health conditions. The court further
considered Hughey had “no rules violations for force or violence
in the time he’s been in prison,” and his risk assessments
reflected the “lowest possible score.”
Aside from Hughey’s post-conviction circumstances, the
court also considered that Hughey’s current offense of conviction,
petty theft with a prior, was “not serious or violent” and that his
strike offenses “at this point are old.” The court recounted that
Hughey had served in the military, and also had reported mental
illness diagnosis, symptoms, and treatment.
Nevertheless, the court believed the circumstances of
Hughey’s four prior strike convictions “weigh[ed] strongly
against” granting the Romero motion. These convictions were
serious, including repeated violent and sexual offenses, including
forcible rape with great bodily injury, assault with a deadly
weapon with personal infliction of great bodily injury,
kidnapping, and robbery. Regarding the strike offenses, Hughey
violated probation and parole multiple times, and he committed
the kidnapping and robbery just “five days” after his release from
prison.
In addition to the strike offenses, Hughey’s criminal history
was “extremely long,” and involved other violent and firearm
offenses including burglary, battery, carrying a loaded firearm,
and assault with intent to commit rape. The court observed that
Hughey had “been in continuous custody since 1980” and “[a]s
soon as he gets out, he commits another violent offense,”
summarizing Hughey’s record as “committing crimes
continuously since 1968 for 30 years until he was given a 25-to-

12
life sentence in 1999.” For this reason the court did not abuse its
discretion by concluding that Hughey was not outside the spirit of
the Three Strikes law. (See People v. Mendoza (2022)
74 Cal.App.5th 843, 857 [no abuse of discretion in denying
Romero motion where “the trial court gave primary weight to
Defendant’s extensive criminal history” which reflected “a career
criminal who is unable to remain out of prison for more than a
few years at a time”]; People v. Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th
608, 640 [“Due to his continuous history of criminal conduct,
[defendant] ‘appears to be “an exemplar of the ‘revolving door’
career criminal to whom the Three Strikes law is addressed.” ’ ”].)
Hughey contends that “[g]iven the trial court’s clear focus
on Hughey’s record at the time his current sentence was imposed,
the court[’]s passing reference to the d[e ]minim[i]s nature of his
current committing offense and to his efforts at rehabilitation
does not support a finding of true ‘weighing or balancing the pros
and cons’ of its sentencing discretion as envisioned by Romero.”
Hughey submits that the court “gave only lip service to [his] post-
conviction in-prison performance but clearly rendered its decision
on the basis of his pre-conviction behavior.” In essence, Hughey
does not contend the court failed to consider relevant factors but
argues the court should have weighed these factors differently.
“An appellate court is not authorized to substitute its
judgment of the relative weights of aggravating and mitigating
factors properly considered by the trial court. [Citations.]
. . . ‘Where the record demonstrates that the trial court balanced
the relevant facts and reached an impartial decision in
conformity with the spirit of the law, we shall affirm the trial
court’s ruling.’ ” (People v. Zichwic (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th
944, 961.)

13
Because here the trial court duly weighed the relevant
factors, Hughey does not demonstrate an abuse of discretion. As
described, the court thoroughly reviewed the proper
considerations for and against granting the motion. Because
reasonable people could disagree as to whether Hughey fell
outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law, the court’s decision to
retain Hughey’s prior strike convictions was not so unreasonable
as to constitute an abuse of discretion. (See People v. Taylor
(2020) 43 Cal.App.5th 1102, 1113 [no abuse of discretion denying
Romero motion despite defendant’s age and poor health where
“the trial court considered the probation report, records presented
by the defense, including [defendant’s] health records, and
evidence presented at trial” and “noted [defendant’s] ‘lengthy’ and
‘fairly consistent’ criminal history and found he fell squarely
within the three strikes law”]; People v. Philpot (2004)
122 Cal.App.4th 893, 906 [same, where “[d]efendant has
manifested a persistent inability to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law” and his “past criminal history was
extensive and serious,” despite that defendant’s current offenses
were “neither violent nor serious” and his “prior offenses were the
result of his drug addiction”].) That the court found Hughey’s
extensive and violent criminal history to be the weightiest
consideration does not establish an abuse of discretion on this
record. (Cf. People v. Mendoza, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at p. 857
[although trial court referred to criminal history as “controlling”
in Romero analysis, “this statement can be interpreted as the
trial court’s identification of the factors it relied on most heavily
in conducting the analysis”].)

14
DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

MARTINEZ, P. J.
We concur:

SEGAL, J. FEUER, J.

15

Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort

Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.