CourtListener 10857716•Dawadi v. Adhikari
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 4/16/26 Certified for Publication 5/12/26 (order attached)
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
BHASKAR DAWADI, D086131
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
(Super. Ct. No. 24CU003740C)
PRASANNA ADHIKARI et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Catherine A. Richardson, Judge. Affirmed.
Daniel J. Winfree for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Sterling Law Group, Randall C. Sterling and Justin R. Sterling for
Defendants and Respondents.
Bhaskar Dawadi appeals from a judgment of dismissal entered after
the trial court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend on statute of
limitations grounds. On our independent review, we conclude that his claims
were barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, we affirm the
judgment.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Loan Agreement and Default
In January 2015, Dawadi loaned money to Pradhi, Inc.—a corporation
controlled by respondent Prasanna Adhikari—under a written agreement
requiring repayment within one year at zero percent interest. Adhikari made
no payments during the one-year repayment period that ended in January
2016.
B. Payments
Beginning in June 2021, about five and one-half years after the loan
was due, Adhikari made three $1,000 payments. The first two checks noted
within the memo section: “BR Dawadi-Pradhi Loan Payment.” The third,
made in November 2023, only stated: “Payment.” Adhikari subsequently
denied ever having borrowed money from Dawadi. Dawadi also attempted to
obtain a personal guarantee from Adhikari, which Adhikari refused.
C. Litigation
In July 2024, Dawadi filed a complaint alleging two causes of action for
breach of contract and one for fraud in the inducement. Respondents
demurred on multiple grounds, including the statute of limitations. Dawadi
opposed, arguing that the check annotations constituted a written
acknowledgment of the debt sufficient to revive it under Western Coal and
Mining Co. v. Jones (1946) 27 Cal.2d 819 (Western Coal).
The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. The
court found the four-year statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure
section 3371 had run by January 2020; that the 2021 payments could not by
themselves revive the barred claim under section 360; and that Western Coal
1 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
2
was distinguishable because it involved a subsequently executed written
agreement between the parties, not check annotations. This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
Dawadi contends the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer
because the check annotations constituted a sufficient written
acknowledgment of the debt to create a new contract and revive the barred
cause of action. We disagree.
A. Guiding Principals
On appeal from a judgment dismissing an action after sustaining a
demurrer without leave to amend, the standard of review is de novo. “ ‘We
give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its
parts in their context. [Citation.] Further, we treat the demurrer as
admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but do not assume the truth of
contentions, deductions, or conclusions of law.’ ” (Best v. Ocwen Loan
Services, LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 568, 574.) “ ‘When a demurrer is
sustained, we determine whether the complaint states facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action.’ ” (Ibid.) When it is sustained without leave to
amend, “ ‘we decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that the defect
can be cured by amendment.’ ” (Ibid.) And it is an abuse of discretion to
sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if the plaintiff shows there is a
reasonable possibility any defect identified by the defendant can be cured by
amendment. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)
Where, as here, the statute of limitations appears on the face of the
complaint and its attached exhibits, the question whether the claim is time-
barred is a pure question of law. Written documents attached to the
complaint are incorporated into it and may be considered on demurrer.
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(Qualcomm, Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London (2008)
161 Cal.App.4th 184, 191.)
Section 360 provides that, “No acknowledgment or promise is sufficient
evidence of a new or continuing [tolling] contract” for the statute of
limitations “unless the same is contained in [a] writing, signed by the party
to be charged.” For promissory notes, a payment on principal or interest may
stop the running of the limitations period, but only prospectively, and only if
made before the period has expired. The statute expressly provides that “no
such payment of itself shall revive a cause of action once barred.” (§ 360.)
California law recognizes a distinction between acknowledgments made
before and after the statute of limitations has run. An acknowledgment
made before the limitations period expires “does not create a new obligation”
but “merely continues the original obligation through a new statutory
period.” (Eilke v. Rice (1955) 45 Cal.2d 66, 73.) By contrast, the
“acknowledgment of a debt already barred by the statute gives rise to a new
contract and a new cause of action dating from the acknowledgment.” (Ibid.)
However, for such an acknowledgment to be legally operative, it must
constitute a “direct, unqualified, and unconditional admission of a debt which
a party is liable and is willing to pay.” (Curtis v. City of Sacramento (1886)
70 Cal. 412.) “The unqualified recognition of the legally expired obligation
creates by law an implicit waiver of the statute of limitations and a promise
by appellant to pay.” (Buescher v. Lastar (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 73, 75–76
(Buescher).) If the “acknowledgment is accompanied by . . . qualifying
expressions or circumstances” that “repel the idea of an intention . . . to pay,
no implied promise is created.” (Western Coal, supra, 27 Cal.2d at p. 823.)
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B. Analysis
Here, the loan was due in January 2016. The statute of limitations for
a written contract is four years. (§ 337.) The cause of action was therefore
barred as of January 2020—more than four years before this suit was filed in
July 2024. The statute of limitations bar is apparent on the face of the
complaint. Importantly, the statute of limitations operates as a procedural
bar to the remedy, not an extinguishment of the underlying debt.
(McCormick v. Brown (1868) 36 Cal. 180.) The debt may persist in a moral
sense, but Dawadi’s legal remedy expired in January 2020.
The three payments Adhikari made beginning in June 2021 were made
after the limitations period had already expired. Under the plain language of
section 360, those payments cannot by themselves revive the barred cause of
action. (Eilke v. Rice, supra, 45 Cal.2d at pp. 73–74; Kaichen’s Metal Mart,
Inc. v. Ferro Cast Co. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 8, 15.) Section 360 applies only
to continuing contracts against which the statute has not yet run at the time
of the payment or acknowledgment; the payments do not “revive a cause of
action once barred.” The payment rule of Martindell v. Bodrero (1967)
256 Cal.App.2d 56, which holds that a partial payment before expiration of
the limitations period is sufficient to extend the bar, is therefore inapplicable
here.
Dawadi argues, however, that the check annotations, “BR Dawadi-
Pradhi Loan Payment,” constitute a written acknowledgment sufficient to
create a new contract and a new cause of action under Western Coal and
Eilke. We are not persuaded.
The standard for a sufficient post-expiration written acknowledgment
is demanding. The acknowledgment must be unqualified and unconditional,
a flat, direct admission of the debt. In Buescher, the Court of Appeal found
5
sufficient acknowledgment where the debtor wrote letters years after the
limitations period had run, flatly admitting he owed the money. (Buescher,
supra, 61 Cal.App.3d at p. 76.) The court held that this unqualified
recognition and acknowledgement of the expired obligation was by itself
sufficient to revive the debt because it constituted an implicit waiver of the
statute of limitations. (Ibid.)
The check annotations here do not meet that standard. The notation
“BR Dawadi-Pradhi Loan Payment” identifies a payee and categorizes a
transaction for accounting purposes. It does not constitute an unqualified
admission of a subsisting obligation, a statement of the amount owed, a
promise to pay any remaining balance, or a waiver of any defense. It is an
accounting notation, not an acknowledgment.
Moreover, the surrounding circumstances decisively rebut any
inference of an unconditional intent to pay. Dawadi’s own complaint alleges
that Adhikari refused his explicit request to personally assume or revive the
debt and subsequently denied having borrowed the money at all. An explicit
refusal to revive a debt is the clearest possible “qualifying expression” that
repels the idea of an intention or contract to pay within the meaning of
Western Coal. (Western Coal, supra, 27 Cal.2d at p. 823.) Where the record
reflects a clear, unqualified denial, not a clear, unqualified acknowledgment,
the check annotations cannot bear the legal weight Dawadi places on them.
Finally, the loan agreement’s own terms foreclose the argument. The
contract contained an integration clause and required any amendment to be
in writing, signed by both parties. A unilateral check annotation does not
satisfy that requirement.
Western Coal is distinguishable. In that case, the parties executed a
new, intervening written agreement, signed by both parties, that expressly
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referenced the underlying obligations, thus constituting a formal instrument
that functioned as a new contract. Such an instrument does not exist here.
The trial court correctly distinguished Western Coal on this basis.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Adhikari is awarded the costs on appeal.
KELETY, J.
WE CONCUR:
DO, Acting P. J.
HUFFMAN, J.*
* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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Filed 5/12/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
BHASKAR DAWADI, D086131
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No. 24CU003740C)
v.
PRASANNA ADHIKARI et al., ORDER CERTIFYING
OPINION FOR PUBLICATION
Defendants and Respondents.
THE COURT:
The opinion in this case filed April 16, 2026 was not certified for publication. It
appearing the opinion meets the standards for publication specified in California Rules of Court,
rule 8.1105(c), the request pursuant to rule 8.1120(a) for publication is GRANTED.
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the opinion meets the standards for publication
specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c); and
1
ORDERED that the words "Not to Be Published in the Official Reports" appearing on
page one of said opinion be deleted and the opinion herein be published in the Official Reports.
DO, Acting P.J.
Copies to: All parties
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