CourtListener 10857588•People v. Lemus CA4/1
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 5/12/26 P. v. Lemus CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D086179
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCN459327)
MARTIN LEMUS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
David G. Brown, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
Lisa A. Kopelman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Kristine A.
Gutierrez and Flavio Nominati, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Martin Lemus appeals his sentence for a robbery conviction,
contending the trial court erred by finding that his previous juvenile
adjudication qualified as a prior strike and for a prior serious felony
enhancement based on a gang enhancement under an earlier version of Penal
Code1 section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1). He seeks full resentencing. In
People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576, 583 (Fletcher), the California
Supreme Court determined whether a prior conviction qualifies as a strike
and for a prior serious felony enhancement based on a gang enhancement
depends on current law, even if the prior conviction occurred under a
previous version of the gang statute. The Attorney General concedes that the
case should be remanded to permit a retrial on the gang enhancement under
current law, and we accept that concession.
Lemus further asserts the juvenile adjudication cannot serve as the
basis for a prior serious felony enhancement, and we agree.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment, vacate the trial court’s findings
as to the prior juvenile adjudication, and remand for a retrial on the gang
enhancement and for a full resentencing.
BACKGROUND
In September 2024, Lemus took two shirts from Macy’s without paying
for them, spit on and then attempted to punch a loss prevention officer, ran
away from and struggled with responding law enforcement officers, and gave
the officers a false name. Based on that incident, the People charged Lemus
with robbery (§ 211), resisting an officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)) and giving false
information to an officer (§ 148.9, subd. (a)). The information also included
allegations of a serious felony prior (§§ 667, subd. (a)(1), 668, & 1192.7, subd.
(c)) and a strike prior (§§ 667 (b)–(i), 1170.12, & 668) based on a 2013 juvenile
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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adjudication of assault likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4))
with a criminal street gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)).
In January 2025, a jury convicted Lemus on all counts. The trial court
subsequently found true the allegation that Lemus had a prior serious felony
and a strike prior based on the 2013 juvenile adjudication. The trial court
sentenced Lemus to the middle term of three years for the robbery, doubled
for the strike, and credit for time served for the other offenses, for a total
term of six years. The court struck the section 667, subdivision (a)(1) five-
year enhancement for the prior serious felony.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Lemus contends his sentence must be reversed: (1) because
the trial court did not determine whether his prior adjudication qualifies as a
strike under the current version of section 186.22, subdivision (b), as required
by Fletcher, supra, 18 Cal.5th 576; and (2) the court erred by finding the prior
serious felony enhancement true based on the juvenile adjudication. Lemus
seeks a remand including full resentencing. The Attorney General concedes
the case must be remanded for retrial on whether the gang related prior
offense qualifies as a strike prior under the current version of section 186.22.
In its appellate briefing, the Attorney General does not address the prior
serious felony enhancement or whether the remand requires a full
resentencing. We accept the Attorney General’s concession, agree with
Lemus that the juvenile adjudication now cannot serve as the basis for a
serious felony enhancement, and conclude that the matter must be remanded
to permit retrial on whether the gang enhancement constitutes a strike prior
and for a full resentencing.
“In 2021, the Legislature amended section 186.22 with the passage of
Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 333), enacting
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the STEP Forward Act of 2021. (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 1.) Among other
things, Assembly Bill 333 changed the elements of gang offenses and
enhancements by narrowing the definitions of ‘criminal street gang,’ ‘pattern
of criminal activity,’ and ‘what it means for an offense to have commonly
benefitted a street gang.’ (People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206,
[citation]; see § 186.22, subds. (f), (g), as amended by Stats. 2021, ch. 699,
§ 4.)” (Fletcher, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 583.)
In Fletcher, the California Supreme Court concluded that even if “a
defendant has suffered a conviction under the prior version of section 186.22,”
courts must look to current law, as amended in Assembly Bill 333, to
determine “whether the conviction qualifies as a prior serious felony
conviction under subdivision (c)(28) of section 1192.7 for purposes of the
Three Strikes law and prior serious felony enhancements.” (Id. at pp. 583,
587, 603–604, 607.) There, “[t]he only evidence introduced to prove these
allegations consisted of . . . abstracts of judgments” for each defendant that
included gang enhancements based on a prior version of section 186.22. (Id.
at pp. 606–607.) Because the convictions were not “obtained under Assembly
Bill 333’s more stringent requirements, and the abstracts of judgment . . . do
not alone prove the elements of the alleged prior serious felony and strike
prior enhancements beyond a reasonable doubt,” the court “revers[ed] . . . the
findings on these enhancements for retrial under the correct law.” (Id. at
p. 607.)
As recognized by Lemus and the Attorney General, the same analysis
applies here. The evidence in the trial court shows only that Lemus suffered
a felony adjudication with a gang enhancement in 2013, under the then-
existing version of section 186.22, subdivision (b), but does not demonstrate
compliance with the more stringent requirements added by Assembly Bill
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333. The assault with great bodily injury could qualify as a strike offense
only with the gang enhancement. (§§ 667.5, subd. (c), 1170.12, subds. (a) &
(b), 1192.7, subd. (c).) Accordingly, under Fletcher, we must vacate the true
finding on the strike prior and remand to permit the People to retry the gang
enhancement under current law to determine whether Lemus’s prior
conviction qualifies as a strike prior.
Lemus additionally argues with citation to relevant authority that
“juvenile adjudications cannot be considered . . . a prior serious felony
conviction for purposes of the mandatory five-year enhancement in section
667, subdivision (a).” (People v. Smith (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1080, fn.
10; People v. West (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 100, 110.) We conclude the trial
court erred by concluding Lemus’s juvenile adjudication permitted the
imposition of a five-year prior serious felony enhancement, even though the
court later struck the enhancement. Accordingly, we vacate the court’s true
finding as to the prior serious felony enhancement.
The proper remedy is to remand the matter to permit retrial of the
gang enhancement under the current section 186.22 and for a full
resentencing following retrial or the People’s election not to pursue retrial.
(People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [“We have held that when part of
a sentence is stricken on review, on remand for resentencing ‘a full
resentencing as to all counts is appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its
sentencing discretion in light of the changed circumstances.’ ”].)
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DISPOSITION
We reverse the judgment and vacate the trial court’s prior strike and
prior serious felony enhancement findings. The matter is remanded with
directions: (1) to provide the People with the option to retry the prior gang-
related allegations under section 186.22 as amended by Assembly Bill 333 to
determine whether the prior adjudication qualifies as a strike; and, whether
or not the People go forward with retrial, (2) to fully resentence Lemus.
IRION, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
DO, J.
CASTILLO, J.
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