People v. Escalera CA4/2

CourtListener 10857228Calctapp11.05.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 5/11/26 P. v. Escalera CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, E084390

v. (Super.Ct.No. FWV17003792)

OSCAR ALVARADO ESCALERA, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. John Nho Trong

Nguyen, Judge. (Retired judge of the Orange Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice

pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed in part; vacated in part with

directions.

Aaron J. Schechter, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

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Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve Oetting and Paige B.

Hazard, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

A jury convicted Oscar Alvarado Escalera of committing 34 sex offenses against

his stepdaughter, Jane Doe 1. On appeal, he argues that the trial court prejudicially erred

by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of attempt for each completed

offense. He also argues that the trial court committed structural error by not reading the

unanimity instruction for each charged count. In addition, he contends that the trial court

was not authorized to issue a no-contact order under Penal Code section 1202.05, because

Doe 1 was an adult when the order was entered. (Unlabeled statutory references are to

the Penal Code.) We agree about the no-contact order but remand for the trial court to

consider imposing a protective order under section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1) (section

136.2(i)(1)). We also direct the trial court to correct clerical errors in the sentencing

minute order and the abstract of judgment. We otherwise affirm.

BACKGROUND

I. Family background

Jane Doe 1 was born in January 1998. Doe 1’s mother, Yvette P., met Escalera in

2003. In 2005, Yvette and Escalera married. Escalera had a minor son, who was born in

1999. Escalera and Yvette had one daughter, who was born in 2006.

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II. Doe 1 reports sexual abuse

Doe 1 lived at home when she was 19 and attended community college, where she

played on the basketball team. During the summer of 2017, Doe 1 turned in a writing

assignment to her basketball coach in which she described being raped by an uncle

named Oscar. When the coach asked Doe 1 about the disclosure, Doe 1 said that the

incident happened in the past and she did not want to discuss it further.

In September 2017, Yvette borrowed Doe 1’s cell phone to contact Escalera while

Doe 1 was asleep. Yvette noticed that Escalera had sent Doe 1 multiple text messages

with “really inappropriate things,” such as Escalera asking Doe 1 whether she had

showered or shaved. Yvette woke Doe 1, who then told her mother that Escalera had

been sexually abusing her since she was about nine or 10 years old. Yvette did not

immediately call the police.

Doe 1 called her basketball coach because she was uncertain whether Yvette

would ever contact law enforcement, and Doe 1 “knew it wasn’t going to end unless

[they] did.” Doe 1 went to her coach’s house and disclosed that Escalera had been

sexually abusing her. Doe 1 said that everything that she had written for the summer

assignment was true except that the perpetrator was her stepfather, not her uncle. The

basketball coach took Doe 1 to the police station, where Doe 1 reported the abuse to

officers.

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III. The charges

The People charged Escalera by third amended information with a total of 43

sexual offenses alleged to have been committed against Doe 1 when she was between

nine years old and 19 years old, with numerous offenses alleged to have been committed

every year during that period. The People also alleged that numerous aggravating

circumstances applied.

The People alleged that Escalera committed the following 35 offenses when Doe 1

was a minor: (1) when Doe 1 was nine, one count of aggravated sexual assault of a child

under 14 years old (§ 269, subd. (a)(1); count 1) and two counts each of sexual

intercourse or sodomy with a child age 10 or younger (§ 288.7 subd. (a); counts 2-3) and

oral copulation or sexual penetration of a child age 10 or younger (§ 288.7, subd. (b);

counts 4-5); (2) from age 10 through age 13, one count per year of each of lewd and

lascivious conduct upon a child under age 14 (§ 288, subd. (a); counts 8, 11, 15, 19) and

aggravated sexual assault by rape and by sodomy of a child under age 14 (§ 269, subd.

(a)(1) & (3); counts 6-7, 9-10, 12-13, 16-17); (3) from age 12 through age 13, one count

per year of aggravated sexual assault by oral copulation of a child under 14 (§ 269, subd.

(a)(4); counts 14 & 18); and (4) from age 14 through age 17, one count per year of each

of forcible rape of a child over age 14 (§ 261, subd. (a)(2); counts 20, 24, 28, 32), forcible

sodomy of a minor age 14 or older (§ 286, subd. (c)(2)(C); counts 21, 25, 29, 33), sexual

penetration by foreign object of a minor over age 14 (§ 289, subd. (a)(1)(C); counts 22,

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26, 30, 34), and forcible oral copulation of a minor over age 14 (former § 288a, subd.

(c)(2)(C); counts 23, 27, 31, 35).

The People alleged that when Doe 1 was 18 and 19, Escalera committed one count

per year of forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2); counts 36 & 40), forcible sodomy (§ 286,

subd. (c)(2)(A); counts 37 & 41), and sexual penetration by a foreign object (§ 289, subd.

(a)(1)(A); counts 38 & 42). The People also alleged that Escalera committed two counts

of forcible oral copulation when Doe 1 was 19. (§§ 287, subd. (c)(2)(A), former 288a,

subd. (c)(2)(A); counts 43 & 48.)

The People also charged Escalera with committing four sexual offenses against a

different minor, Jane Doe 2, but the jury acquitted Escalera of those counts. Those

counts accordingly are irrelevant to this appeal.

IV. Doe 1’s testimony

Doe 1 was 26 years old when she testified at trial. When Yvette and Escalera

were married, Yvette worked at night and on weekends. When Doe 1 was nine years old,

Escalera started watching pornographic movies with her at night while Yvette was at

work and the other children slept. While doing so, Escalera massaged Doe 1’s legs,

arms, and back and caressed her hair. He also touched the outside of Doe 1’s “private” or

“pubic” area, both when she was clothed and when she was unclothed, approximately six

to eight times when she was nine.

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Escalera thereafter regularly sexually abused Doe 1 until she was 19 and reported

the abuse to law enforcement. She described in detail the subsequent abuse and its

progression over the years. When Doe 1 was 10 years old, Escalera started having sexual

intercourse with her, inserted his penis into her vagina at least 20 times, inserted sex toys

into her vagina and anus at least 30 times, and had her orally copulate him between 10

and 20 times.1 Escalera regularly performed each of those acts in every subsequent year

(with variation in frequency from 10 to 30 times per year depending on how often Doe

1’s mother worked) until Doe 1 reported the abuse at age 19. When Doe 1 was 14,

Escalera started inserting his penis into her anus, which he did more than 10 times that

year and then at least 10 times per year until she reported the abuse.

Throughout the years, the frequency of abuse involved the same regular pattern,

process, or routine. Escalera sexually abused Doe 1 approximately twice per week on

nights when Yvette worked.

V. Escalera’s testimony

Escalera denied that he ever sexually abused Doe 1 when she was a minor, and he

denied that he would ever have sex with a child. He claimed that he began having a

consensual sexual relationship with Doe 1 when she was 18 years old. He and Doe 1

started flirting, and then “[i]t turned sexual.” The sexual relationship lasted

1 Doe 1 testified that Escalera started inserting sex toys in her anus when she was 10
and 11. She also explained that he “[a]lmost always” inserted sex toys in both her vagina
and her anus.

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approximately one to three months. He admitted that he had vaginal sex with her more

than once and engaged in “other sex acts” with her. He denied that he ever used any sex

toys with Doe 1. Escalera denied that he ever forced Doe 1 to have sex with him and

denied that he raped her.

VI. The verdict

The jury acquitted Escalera of the following offenses involving Doe 1: (1) All

five offenses alleged to have occurred when she was nine years old (§§ 269, subd. (a)(1),

288.7, subds. (a)-(b); counts 1-5) and (2) the four aggravated sexual assault by sodomy

counts alleged to have occurred each year when Doe 1 was age 10 through 13 (§ 269,

subd. (a)(3); counts 7, 10, 13, 17). The jury convicted Escalera of the remaining 34

offenses. (§§ 261, subd. (a)(2) [counts 20, 24, 28, 32, 36, 40], 269, subd. (a)(1) [counts 6,

9, 12, 16], 269, subd. (a)(4) [counts 14 & 18], 286, subd. (c)(2)(A) [counts 37 & 41], 286,

subd. (c)(2)(C) [counts 21, 25, 29, 33], 287, subd. (c)(2)(A) [count 48], 288, subd. (a)

[counts 8, 11, 15, 19], former 288a, subd. (c)(2)(A) [count 43], former 288a, subd.

(c)(2)(C) [counts 23, 27, 31, 35], 289, subd. (a)(1)(A) [counts 38 & 42], 289, subd.

(a)(1)(C) [counts 22, 26, 30, 34].) In a bifurcated proceeding, the court found true three

aggravating circumstances as to specified offenses, including count 26 (§ 289, subd.

(a)(1)(C)). The court sentenced Escalera to an aggregate term of 336 years to life in state

prison.

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DISCUSSION

I. Alleged instructional errors

A. Unanimity instructions

Escalera contends that the trial court violated his constitutional rights to due

process and a jury trial and thereby committed structural error by failing to orally instruct

the jury with the unanimity instruction for each charged count. We independently review

claims of instructional error. (People v. Lewis (2023) 14 Cal.5th 876, 900.) We find no

prejudicial error.

1. Relevant proceedings

The jury was charged with deciding Escalera’s guilt on 47 separate counts. For

each count, the written jury instructions contain a separate unanimity instruction that is a

slightly modified version of CALCRIM No. 3500. The instructions are numbered 3500-

1, 3500-2, and so on, with the number following the hyphen representing the count

corresponding to that instruction.

Each written unanimity instruction contains two paragraphs. The first paragraph

identifies the offense charged, the count number, and the period during which the offense

allegedly occurred. The second paragraph is the same for each count and reads: “The

People have presented evidence of more than one act to prove that the defendant

committed this offense. You must not find the defendant guilty unless you all agree that

the People have proved that the defendant committed at least one of these acts and you all

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agree on which act he committed.” The jury was provided with four copies of the written

jury instructions during deliberations.

Before reading the unanimity instructions to the jury, the court took a recess and

had an off-the-record discussion with counsel. The court subsequently made the

following statement on the record without the jury present: “During the break, [the]

Court discussed how to read the last 48 pages of instructions. Unanimously for each of

the counts, counsel agreed for, counsel agreed for the Court to read the instruction 3501,

3502 so forth until 48. The Court will read the first instruction in full. Tell the jury that

the second part of the instruction, the Court reads the second part. The Court will not

read it, because it’s exactly the same for the 48 counts. The instructions that you receive

has the entire instruction. Okay. Is that okay?” The prosecutor answered, “Yes,” and

defense counsel responded, “That’s fine.”

The court then resumed reading the instructions to the jury. When the court

reached the unanimity instructions, it told the jury: “Now I have 48 cases to read to you.

We are going to get it done. Okay. Based on counsel’s consent, what I’m going to read

is as follow[s]: [¶] 48 pages. Okay. 47 pages. Okay. Is it 47—47 pages. I’m going to

read the first page. Listen carefully. I call is 3500-1. All the way up to 3500-48. Okay.

Each page, 3500-1 pertains to one specific period, first period. Dash 2, second period.

Dash 3, third period, so forth and so on. Follow me so far? Okay. So let’s begin.”

The court then read the entirety of the unanimity instruction for count 1, including

the above modified second paragraph of CALCRIM No. 3500. After reading the

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instruction, the court commented: “Follow me? Understand? Okay. Now, what I’m

going to do is as follows. I’m going to read this instruction from 3500-1 to 3500-48,

there are two parts. The first part tells you what charge period. Count 1, January 13,

2007, to January 13, 2008. Count 2, is different. But the second count is exactly the

same in each of those 48 pages—47 pages. Whatever. Okay. So I’m not going to read

the second part. Is that okay with you?” The jurors answered, “Yes,” and the court

continued as follows: “I’ll give you this thing to read in the jury room. Okay. I’m going

to read it twice so you know what I’m talking about. All the following instructions

contain the second part. It reads as follows: [¶] The People have presented evidence of

more than one act to prove that the defendant committed this offense—to the next. To

the next one and the next one. Okay. [¶] You must not find the defendant guilty unless

you all agree that the People have proved that the defendant committed at least one of

those acts and you all agree on which act he committed. [¶] That second part, I’m not

going to read it. Is that good? You know what I’m saying; right?” The jury again

responded in the affirmative.

The court then read the unanimity instruction for count 2 as follows: “Now, 3500-

2. The second time period now. [¶] The defendant is charged with engaging in sexual

intercourse or sodomy with a child ten years or younger, violation of Penal Code section

288.7(a), in Count 2 on or about January 13, 2007, to January 12, 2008. [¶] That same

period of time, but different charge. Same period of time, different charge. Right?

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Right? Okay. So same period of time, two different charges.” For the remaining 45

counts, the court only read the first paragraph of the written unanimity instruction.

For some of the remaining 45 unanimity instructions, the jurors confirmed that

they did not need the court to read the second paragraph. For others the court said

something like “[s]ame second paragraph already read.”

2. Analysis

We need not decide whether the trial court erred by not reading the full unanimity

instruction for every count, because any such error was harmless under any standard.

(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [federal harmlessness standard]; People

v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836-837 [state law harmlessness standard].) We

presume that the jury followed the written instructions if there was any variance between

the oral and written instructions. (People v. Grimes (2016) 1 Cal.5th 698, 729; People v.

Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 200-201 (Mills).) And it is undisputed that the court

provided the jury with four copies of the written instructions that included the complete

two-paragraph unanimity instruction as it applied to each count.

Moreover, the court did read the full unanimity instruction to the jury twice. (Cf.

People v. Milosavljevic (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 640, 646-648 [failure to give unanimity

instruction altogether not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt].) The court explained in

detail that the second paragraph (the actual unanimity portion of each of the instructions)

applied equally to each of the 47 counts. The jurors affirmatively indicated that they

understood the approach taken by the court, and they confirmed that they did not want the

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court to repeat the second paragraph of the unanimity instruction for each count. In

addition, the court repeatedly reminded the jurors that the same second paragraph that it

had read aloud twice applied to the unanimity instruction for subsequent counts.

Given those circumstances, we conclude that any putative error in failing to orally

instruct the jury with the complete unanimity instruction for each count was harmless

beyond a reasonable doubt. (See, e.g., People v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, 189-190

(Garceau) [no due process violation in failure to read a full instruction by inadvertently

omitting a paragraph of the instruction because the error was not prejudicial given that

the jury received the correct written instruction], overruled on another ground in People

v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 117-118; Mills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 200-201 [“no

reversible error, structural or otherwise” to misread three jury instructions given that the

jury was given the correctly worded instructions]; People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler

(2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 455 [error in misreading of jury instruction “of no moment” given

that the jury was given “a written instruction that properly and fully stated the law”];

People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 687 (Osband) [error in orally misstating

instructions harmless because the jury was given correct written instructions]; People v.

Andrews (1989) 49 Cal.3d 200, 215-216 (Andrews) [same].)

Relying on United States v. Becerra (9th Cir. 2019) 939 F.3d 995 (Becerra) and

Guam v. Marquez (9th Cir. 1992) 963 F.2d 1311 (Marquez), Escalera argues that “[t]he

trial court’s failure to read orally the unanimity instructions for each count constitutes

structural error.” The argument is unpersuasive. We are not bound by Ninth Circuit

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precedent. (People v. Federico (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 1418, 1424, fn. 4.) We instead

are bound by the decisions of our Supreme Court. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior

Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 454.) Our Supreme Court has held that errors in reading

instructions to the jury are subject to harmlessness analysis. (See, e.g., Garceau, supra, 6

Cal.4th at pp. 189-190; Osband, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 687; Andrews, supra, 49 Cal.3d at

pp. 215-216.)

In addition, Becerra and Marquez are distinguishable. In both cases, the federal

district courts did not read any instructions to the jury at all; they just provided the juries

with written instructions and said to follow those. (Marquez, supra, 963 F.2d at

pp. 1312-1313; Becerra, supra, 939 F.3d at pp. 997-998.) In Marquez, the Ninth Circuit

held “that the refusal of a trial court to read the elements of an alleged offense to the jury

compels an automatic reversal because the impact of the error on the jury’s performance

of its duties cannot be reviewed.” (Marquez, at p. 1316.) Becerra followed Marquez

because it was binding precedent. (Becerra, at pp. 1002-1003.) Becerra acknowledged

that the “[o]mission of a single element of the charged offense from the jury instructions

is error, but not structural error.” (Id. at p. 1003.)

The present case is unlike Marquez and Becerra in that the trial court did not fail

to read the jury all of the instructions on the many charged offenses. Any putative error

in the trial court’s reading of the instructions therefore does not rise to the level of the

errors in Marquez and Becerra and therefore does not amount to structural error under

those cases.

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For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not prejudicially err

by failing to read the complete unanimity instruction for every count.

B. Lesser included offense instructions

Escalera contends that the trial court prejudicially erred “by failing to sua sponte

instruct, on the attempt lesser included offense corresponding to each completed crime.”

We are not persuaded.

1. General intent offenses

The trial court had no duty to instruct the jury on attempt for any of the general

intent offenses. The third amended information charging Escalera with the 34 offenses of

which he was convicted merely incorporates the statutory definition of those charged

offenses; it does not allege any particular facts in detail. We accordingly apply the

elements test to determine whether one offense is a lesser included offense of another.

(People v. Fontenot (2019) 8 Cal.5th 57, 65.) “‘The elements test is satisfied if the

statutory elements of the greater offense include all of the statutory elements of the lesser

offense, such that all legal elements of the lesser offense are also elements of the

greater.’” (People v. Robinson (2016) 63 Cal.4th 200, 207 (Robinson).)

For general intent crimes, the required mental state is “‘only an intent to do the act

that causes the harm; a crime is characterized as a ‘specific intent’ crime when the

required mental state entails an intent to cause the resulting harm.’” (People v. Davis

(1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 518, fn. 15.) Escalera was convicted of 18 counts of forcible rape,

sodomy, and oral copulation. (§§ 261, subds. (a)(2) & (c)(2)(C), 286, subd. (c)(2)(A) &

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(C), 287, subd. (c)(2)(A), former 288a, subd. (c)(2)(A) & (C); counts 20-21, 23-25, 27-

29, 31-33, 35-37, 40-41, 43, 48.) All of those offenses are general intent crimes. (Davis,

at p. 519 [sodomy is a general intent crime]; People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1015,

1022 [“Rape is a general intent offense”]; People v. Warner (2006) 39 Cal.4th 548, 557

[forcible oral copulation is a general intent offense]; People v. Whitham (1995) 38

Cal.App.4th 1282, 1293 [“[R]ape (§ 261), sodomy (§ 286), and oral copulation ([former]

§ 288a) are all general intent crimes”].)

“An attempt to commit a crime consists of two elements: a specific intent to

commit the crime, and a direct but ineffectual act done toward its commission.” (§ 21a.)

Attempt accordingly is a specific intent crime.

The attempted offenses for forcible rape, sodomy, and oral copulation therefore

include “a particularized intent that goes beyond what is required by the completed

offense” (People v. Bailey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 740, 753) of forcible rape, sodomy, and oral

copulation. Because specific intent is not an element of the general intent offenses of

forcible rape, sodomy, and oral copulation, not all of the elements of the attempt offenses

are elements of the completed offenses. (Ibid.; Robinson, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 207.)

Attempt therefore is not a lesser included offense of forcible rape, sodomy, and oral

copulation. The trial court consequently was not required to instruct the jury on attempt

for those offenses. (Bailey, at p. 753.)

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2. The remaining offenses

A trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on lesser included offenses “if there

is substantial evidence the defendant is guilty of the lesser offense, but not the charged

offense.” (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 177 (Breverman), disapproved on

another ground in People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 260, fn. 7.) The obligation

does not arise “when there is no evidence that the offense was less than that charged”

(Breverman, at p. 154) and the evidence shows only that “the defendant is either guilty of

the offense charged or not guilty at all” (People v. Anderson (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 419,

425 (Anderson); People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 98). We independently review a

trial court’s failure to instruct on a lesser included offense. (People v. Licas (2007) 41

Cal.4th 362, 366.)

The remaining 16 offenses of which Escalera was convicted and as to which he

claims that the trial court should have instructed the jury on the lesser included offense of

attempt are: (1) four counts of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child under age 14

(§ 288, subd. (a); counts 8 [age 10], 11 [age 11], 15 [age 12], 19 [age 13]); (2) four counts

of aggravated sexual assault by rape of a child under age 14 (§ 269, subd. (a)(1); counts 6

[age 10], 9 [age 11], 12 [age 12], 16 [age 13]); (3) two counts of aggravated sexual

assault by oral copulation of a child under age 14 (§ 269, subd. (a)(4); counts 14 [age 12]

& 18 [age 13]); (4) four counts of sexual penetration by a foreign object of a minor over

age 14 (§ 289, subd. (a)(1)(C); counts 22 [age 14], 26 [age 15], 30 [age 16], 34 [age 17]);

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and (5) two counts of sexual penetration by a foreign object (§ 289, subd. (a)(1)(A);

counts 38 [age 18] & 42 [age 19]).

We assume for the sake of argument that attempt is a lesser included offense for

each of those 16 offenses. The record contains no evidence that Escalera merely

attempted but failed to complete any of those offenses. In describing the sexual acts that

Escalera committed against her over the course of 10 years, Doe 1 never described any

acts by Escalera that would constitute incomplete attempts to commit any of those 16 sex

offenses. For example, there was no evidence that Escalera ever attempted to insert his

penis or a sex toy into Doe 1’s vagina or anus but failed to complete the act. Nor was

there evidence that Escalera was ever thwarted in his efforts to commit the offenses at

issue. Moreover, Escalera denied that he ever had any sexual contact with Doe 1 before

she was 18, and he denied that he ever used any sex toys with her when she was 18 and

19.

In sum, there was evidence that Escalera committed the charged offenses, and

there was his testimony that he did not commit them, but there was no evidence that he

attempted but failed to complete their commission. The trial court accordingly had no

obligation to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of attempt for the remaining

16 specific intent offenses. (Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 177; Anderson, supra, 97

Cal.App.3d at p. 425.)

Escalera argues that because the jury acquitted him of all of the offenses allegedly

committed when Doe 1 was nine years old, the jury “could have been inclined to believe

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that some of the completed crimes that were alleged to have occurred when Jane was

older than 10 did not actually happen, but appellant merely attempted them.” He

contends that “reasonable jurors could have believed that appellant engaged in some sort

of inappropriate relationship with Jane when she was a minor, but that the sexual acts as

alleged by [Doe 1] did not happen at the times or in the manner that Jane described them

to have happened.” The argument lacks merit. We can only speculate about why the jury

acquitted Escalera of the offenses that allegedly occurred when Doe 1 was nine years old.

But the fact remains that the record contains no evidence of any uncompleted attempts to

commit the 16 specific intent offenses of which Escalera was convicted. The trial court

therefore was not required to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of attempt

for those offenses. (Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 177.)

II. No contact order under section 1202.05

Section 1202.05 provides that if a defendant receives a prison sentence for certain

sexual offenses against a victim who “is a child under the age of 18 years, the court shall

prohibit all visitation between the defendant and the child victim.” (Id., subd. (a), italics

added.) The restrictions on visitation imposed by the provision “apply only to victims

who are under the age of 18 at the time of the contemplated visitation.” (People v. Scott

(2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1323 (Scott).)

The probation department recommended that the court prohibit all visitation

between Escalera and Doe 1 under section 1202.05. At sentencing, the court stated that it

intended to order “all visitations prohibited between the defendant and the child victim”

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under section 1202.05. Defense counsel interjected that Doe 1 was an adult and not a

child victim, and the court agreed. The prosecutor requested that the court issue “a stay

away order … under Marsy’s Law.”2 The court ruled: “The order will be issued that no

visitation whatsoever. No connection between the defendant and the victim in this case.

No communication between the defendant and victim in this case under any form.”

The parties agree that section 1202.05 did not authorize the court to prohibit

contact between Escalera and Doe 1, because she was an adult when the order was

entered. We concur. Issuance of a no-contact order under section 1202.05 was therefore

unauthorized. (Scott, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 1323.)

The People nevertheless contend that the order should be affirmed with

modifications. The People argue that although the trial court never mentioned section

136.2(i)(1), “the circumstances” show that the order was actually issued pursuant to that

provision, which the People argue authorizes such an order. We disagree. Although the

trial court acknowledged Doe 1’s status as an adult when it issued the order, there is

nothing in the record to show that the trial court contemplated issuing the no-contact

order under section 136.2(i)(1). Moreover, the no-contact order issued by the court did

not conform to the requirements of section 136.2(i)(1).

Section 136.2(i)(1) provides: “When a criminal defendant has been convicted of a

crime … that requires the defendant to register pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 290,

2 Article I, section 28, subdivision (b)(2) of the California Constitution provides:
“In order to preserve and protect a victim’s rights to justice and due process, a victim
shall be entitled to … [¶] … be reasonably protected from the defendant and persons
acting on behalf of the defendant.”

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the court, at the time of sentencing, shall consider issuing an order restraining the

defendant from any contact with a victim of the crime. The order may be valid for up to

10 years, as determined by the court. This protective order may be issued by the court

regardless of whether the defendant is sentenced to the state prison …. It is the intent of

the Legislature in enacting this subdivision that the duration of a restraining order issued

by the court be based upon the seriousness of the facts before the court, the probability of

future violations, the safety of a victim and the victim’s immediate family, and any

information provided to the court pursuant to Section 273.75.”

Each of the 34 sex offense counts of which Escalera was convicted required him to

register as a sex offender under subdivision (c) of section 290.3 (§ 290, subd. (c)(1).)

The trial court accordingly was required to consider whether to impose an order

restraining Escalera “from any contact with a victim of the crime” under section

136.2(i)(1). But section 136.2(i)(1) requires that the court set a time limit up to a

maximum of 10 years for such an order. The trial court did not set a time limit for the

no-contact order. Moreover, section 136.2(i)(1) sets forth factors that the court is

required to consider in setting the duration of the order. There is no indication in the

record that the court considered any of those factors. In addition, the court could not

impose a blanket no-contact order under section 136.2(i)(1). Rather, section 136.2(i)(1)

3 Subdivision (c)(1) of section 290 provides that the following people “shall
register” as sex offenders: “A person who, since July 1, 1944, has been or is hereafter
convicted in any court in this state … of a violation of … Section 261, … Section 266j,
267, 269, 285, 286, 287, 288, 288.3, 288.4, 288.5, 288.7, 289, or 311.1, or former Section
288a.”

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authorizes the court to issue an order prohibiting Escalera from contacting Doe 1, but it

does not authorize the court to prohibit Doe 1 from contacting Escalera. For all of these

reasons, the court’s no-contact order was not authorized under section 136.2(i)(1).

The trial court was required, however, to consider whether to issue a protective

order under section 136.2(i)(1). We accordingly remand the matter for the trial court to

do so.

III. Clerical errors

We agree with the parties that the abstract of judgment contains clerical errors that

should be corrected. (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185-188.)

At sentencing, the court imposed but stayed a $10,000 restitution fine under

section 1202.4, subdivision (b). The abstract of judgment reflects that the fine was

imposed but not that it was stayed. In addition, the abstract incorrectly indicates that

Escalera was sentenced on August 29, 2024, when the sentence was actually imposed on

July 23, 2024. We accordingly direct the trial court to amend the abstract to make these

corrections.

In addition, the sentencing minute order should be corrected to accurately reflect

the sentence orally pronounced. (People v. Wynn (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1221.)

The corrected minute order from the bifurcated proceeding at which the trial court found

the aggravating circumstances true does not reflect that the court found those

circumstances true as to count 26.

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DISPOSITION

The no-contact order imposed at sentencing under section 1202.05 is vacated. The

trial court is directed to consider imposition of a protective order under section

136.2(i)(1). The trial court is also directed to prepare a corrected abstract of judgment to

reflect that (1) the $10,000 restitution fine imposed under section 1202.4, subdivision (b),

was stayed and (2) Escalera was sentenced on July 23, 2024; the court is directed to

provide a copy of the corrected abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections

and Rehabilitation. The trial court is further directed to amend nunc pro tunc the

corrected minute order of April 10, 2024, to reflect that the trial court found the

aggravating circumstances true as to count 26. In all other respects, the judgment is

affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

MENETREZ
J.

We concur:

McKINSTER
Acting P. J.

LEE
J.

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