People v. Fernandez CA2/8

CourtListener 10857227Calctapp11.05.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 5/11/26 P. v. Fernandez CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE, B341463

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. SA037937
v.

ABEL FERNANDEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, William L. Sadler, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with instructions.
Christopher Lionel Haberman, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Steven D. Matthews, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
Abel Fernandez appeals the trial court’s denial of his
motion to vacate a conviction pursuant to section 1473.7. We
reverse and remand with instructions for the trial court to enter
an order granting the motion. Undesignated citations are to the
Penal Code.
In 2000, Officer Araceli Negrete called a pager number,
leaving her phone number. A few minutes later, Negrete
received a call from a man who identified himself as Abel.
Negrete and the caller arranged to meet in a parking lot in
twenty minutes for Negrete to buy $60 worth of narcotics. Abel
said he would be wearing sweats.
Negrete drove to the parking lot in an unmarked car.
Fernandez approached the car, wearing green sweats. Negrete
drove off before Fernandez reached her. Another officer watching
the parking lot saw Fernandez drop what turned out to be a
plastic baggy containing cocaine in a shopping cart in the parking
lot. Fernandez had a pager with the number Negrete had left on
it. After officers arrested Fernandez, they searched his
apartment pursuant to a search warrant and found $650 cash,
marijuana, a scale, a rifle, and ammunition.
An information charged Fernandez with violating the
prohibition of selling, transporting, or offering for sale a
controlled substance and being a felon in possession of a
firearm. The information further alleged Fernandez had a
juvenile felony adjudication.
The parties eventually reached a negotiated disposition.
Fernandez’s total exposure was 11 years and four months. The
prosecution initially offered six years, then 270 days. The agreed
upon disposition was a plea of no contest to a new charge of
possession of a controlled substance for sale for which Fernandez

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would serve 180 days in jail and three years’ probation. The rest
of the charges would be dismissed.
At the plea hearing, the prosecution advised Fernandez
that “[i]f you’re not a citizen of the United States, your plea here
today can cause you to be deported, denied re-entry, denied
naturalization, or denied amnesty.” At a later hearing, the court
sentenced Fernandez in accordance with the plea agreement.
Fernandez later successfully petitioned to have his conviction
dismissed.
In 2024, Fernandez filed a motion to vacate his conviction
under section 1473.7. The parties discussed a new immigration-
neutral plea but did not reach agreement. After a hearing, the
trial court denied the motion, finding the record showed
Fernandez knowingly and intelligently waived his rights and
took the plea to avoid significant jail time.
Fernandez appeals.
Because the record establishes Fernandez suffered from
prejudicial error in accepting the plea, we reverse and remand to
the trial court.
Section 1473.7 allows noncitizens who have served their
sentences to vacate their convictions if they can establish that
their convictions are invalid due to prejudicial error impairing
their ability to meaningfully understand, defend against, or
knowingly accept the actual or potential immigration
consequences of their conviction. (§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(1).) To
show prejudicial error, the noncitizen must demonstrate a
reasonable probability that the noncitizen would have rejected
the plea if the noncitizen had correctly understood the
immigration consequences. (People v. Espinoza (2023) 14 Cal.5th
311, 316 (Espinoza).)

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In making this determination, we consider the totality of
the circumstances. (Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p.
320.) Those circumstances include the noncitizen’s ties to the
United States, the importance the noncitizen placed on avoiding
deportation, the noncitizen’s priorities in negotiating a plea
bargain, and whether the noncitizen had reason to believe an
immigration-neutral disposition was available. (Id. at 320.)
However, this list is not exhaustive, and no single type of
evidence is necessary for relief. (Id. at p. 321.) Any assertions by
the noncitizen must be corroborated with objective evidence. (Id.
at p. 316.) Objective evidence can include facts in declarations,
contemporaneous documentation of the noncitizen’s immigration
concerns, and the charges the noncitizen faced. (Id. at p. 321.)
We review independently whether noncitizens have
demonstrated a reasonable probability they would have rejected a
plea offer had they understood its immigration consequences.
(Espinoza, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 319.) Where the trial court has
based its rulings on a “cold record,” or, in other words, only
documentary evidence, we need not defer to trial court fact
finding. (Id. at pp. 319–320.)
We apply these guidelines to this case.
The error Fernandez alleges is that he subjectively failed to
understand the mandatory immigration consequences his plea
would have. Case law establishes that the noncitizen’s subjective
misunderstanding qualifies as sufficient error under the statute.
(People v. Manzanilla (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 891, 909–910
(Manzanilla) [focus is on noncitizen’s own error in not
understanding the plea would subject him to mandatory
deportation and permanent exclusion].)

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Objective and contemporaneous evidence supports
Fernandez’s assertion. During the hearing, the prosecution
advised Fernandez that his plea “can” have immigration
consequences. According to our Supreme Court, there is a critical
difference between being notified the plea may have immigration
consequences and being told the plea will make one immediately
deportable. (People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 523 (Vivar)
[failure to advise of certain immigration consequences of plea
rendered representation constitutionally deficient].) When a
noncitizen receives only the first advisement in a situation calling
for the second, the advisement is insufficient. (Id. at p. 533
[advisement that plea might have adverse immigration effects
insufficient where deportation would be mandatory].)
Here, Fernandez was pleading to an aggravated felony.
(Manzanilla, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at pp. 903–904.) Under
immigration law, that made him deportable and provided
grounds for permanent exclusion. (Ibid.)
A minute order reflects, “The defendant is advised that
upon conviction he will be deported if he is not a United States
citizen.” However, the transcript from the hearing reflects no
such advisement, nor does the prosecution argue Fernandez
received such an unequivocal advisement. From the record we
can discern the only immigration advisement provided to
Fernandez was the ambiguous one from the prosecution, as
described above. Fernandez’s statement corroborates that his
counsel did not advise him of any mandatory immigration
consequences. Fernandez has established his subjective
misunderstanding of the mandatory immigration consequences of
his plea.

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The trial court found that there was no legal invalidity
because Fernandez had been advised of the consequences of the
plea and knowingly and intelligently waived his rights. The
court noted “the charging document itself implies that he
knew.” We read the record differently. As described above, the
only immigration advisement Fernandez received did not alert
him to the mandatory immigration consequences.
We next consider whether Fernandez established the error
was prejudicial. Here, our focus is whether there is a reasonable
probability Fernandez would have turned down the plea if he
understood the immigration consequences. (Vivar, supra, 11
Cal.5th at pp. 528–529 [reasonable probability inquiries focus on
whether the noncitizen would have refused plea, not whether the
noncitizen would have obtained a more favorable result].)
Fernandez declares he would have refused the plea had he
understood. We look to the totality of the circumstances to see if
objective evidence corroborates these claims.
We first consider Fernandez’s ties to the United States.
Fernandez fled to the United States from Cuba with his entire
family when he was seven. That same year, the United States
granted political asylum and legal residency to Fernandez and
his family.
At the time of his plea, Fernandez’s three brothers lived in
the United States. His mother also remained in the United
States, and Fernandez supported her financially when she
needed assistance. His father lived in the United States until his
death in 2024. Fernandez completed all of his schooling in this
country. At the time of the plea, he had been working for Fox
Studios, a job he returned to after his release. All of Fernandez’s
family ties were in the United States, which he considered his

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home. Cuba was a foreign country to him, and he feared
returning for the same reasons his family had previously fled.
The prosecution argues Fernandez’s ties pale in comparison
to those of noncitizens with spouses and children. While a spouse
and children may provide compelling evidence of a noncitizen’s
connection to the country, we will not penalize Fernandez for
being single at the time of his plea. In determining the strength
of the noncitizen’s ties, it is logical to look at the closest
relationships in the noncitizen’s life. Where the noncitizen is a
young, single person, this will likely be the noncitizen’s parents
and siblings. The ties Fernandez shows are sufficient to
demonstrate the importance he would place on remaining in the
United States. (People v. Rodriguez (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 301,
325 [deep, lifelong ties to United States compelling evidence
noncitizen would reject plea leading to mandatory deportation].)
This desire is particularly strong where the noncitizen is an
asylee. In addition to facing disruption of the most important
relationships in the noncitizen’s life, an asylee must also fear
returning to a place the asylee has an adjudicated reason to
fear. (People v. Padron (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 950, 963 (Padron)
[asylee’s desire to avoid deportation corroborated by findings
required to grant asylum].)
We turn next to the importance Fernandez placed on
immigration consequences and his priorities in negotiating a plea
bargain. Fernandez declares he would not have accepted the plea
bargain had he understood the attendant mandatory immigration
consequences and “would have done anything to avoid putting
[him]self at risk of the severe immigration consequences.” He
states his counsel did not discuss such consequences with him.
As mentioned above, as an asylee, the risks associated with being

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deported were especially acute for Fernandez. (Padron, supra,
109 Cal.App.5th at p. 963.)
Finally, we consider whether there was reason for
Fernandez to believe an immigration-neutral disposition was
possible. The prosecution emphasizes how great Fernandez’s
exposure on the charged crimes was: 11 years and four
months. The trial court similarly found Fernandez’s exposure
and his desire to avoid a long jail sentence mattered most in
making his plea. The prosecution also emphasizes the strength
of the evidence against Fernandez and his previous strike. While
these points are valid, in the end, the prosecution agreed to a
mere six months’ jail time and a charge not included in the
original information. The prosecution offers no persuasive reason
to believe an immigration safe offer would have been
automatically rejected. (Manzanilla, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p.
909 [where opening offer was 365 days, reasonable to think
reduction to 364 days might be accepted].) At the very least,
Fernandez could have hoped for a charge with lesser immigration
consequences than the mandatory deportation and loss of asylum
the current charge entailed. (Padron, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at
p. 965 [noncitizen may have reasonably hoped to receive plea
with lesser immigration consequences that would not cause
mandatory deportation and loss of asylum].)
The prosecution argues Fernandez’s counsel’s arguments
about immigration safe possible pleas are mere speculation. But
that is almost always true of this type of inquiry and here, the
facts support a belief that it would not have been unreasonable
for Fernandez to believe such a disposition could be reached.
(People v. Singh (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 147, 154.) That the
prosecution remained amenable to reaching such a plea even at

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the time of Fernandez’s section 1473.7 motion corroborates this
belief. It also undermines the prosecution’s argument that there
could never have been an immigration safe plea.
The prosecution cites People v. Martinez (2013) 57 Cal.4th
555, 564 for the point that a court can take into consideration the
probable outcome of a trial in judging the likelihood the
noncitizen would refuse a plea. The more salient point from that
case is its holding that the court is not determining if the
prosecution would have offered a different bargain but whether
there was reason to believe the defendant would have expected or
hoped for one. (Id. at p. 567.) Moreover, as the United States
Supreme Court has held, where a trial may be the only option
with a possibility of avoiding deportation, taking that gamble is
not automatically irrational. (Lee v. United States (2017) 582
U.S. 357, 371.) Fernandez has established it is reasonably
probable he would have rejected the plea had he understood the
mandatory immigration consequences.
DISPOSITION
We reverse and remand for the trial court to enter an order
granting Fernandez’s motion pursuant to section 1473.7.

WILEY, ACTING P. J.
We concur:

VIRAMONTES, J. SCHERB, J.

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