CourtListener 10857224•West v. Keshishyan CA2/5
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 5/11/26 West v. Keshishyan CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
RACHEL S. WEST, B334984
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 21STCV27365)
v.
HAKOP KESHISHYAN et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Theresa M. Traber, Judge. Affirmed.
Keosian Law, Harout Greg Keosian and Benjamin
Aydindzhyan for Defendants and Appellants.
Law Offices of Timothy D. Otte and Timothy D. Otte for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
——————————
Defendants and appellants Platinum Motorsports, Inc.,
Hakop Keshishyan, Top Speed, Inc., and Gevork Keshishyan
appeal the court’s order denying their motion to set aside the
default and default judgment secured by plaintiff Rachel West.1
Defendants maintain the court erred because (1) they presented
substantial evidence of excusable neglect, (2) equitable principles
demanded the default be set aside, and (3) the punitive damages
award was unconstitutionally excessive. We agree with
plaintiff’s argument that procedural irregularities, including the
absence of an adequate record to rebut the presumption that the
judgment was properly entered as well as the absence of citations
to the record in support of defendants’ arguments, require
affirmance of the judgment.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In a first amended complaint, plaintiff alleged causes of
action for forgery, conversion and theft, unfair business practices,
and violations of the Automotive Repair Act. The complaint
centered on the allegation that plaintiff delivered her damaged
vehicle to defendants for repair, plaintiff’s insurance company
issued a check made out to plaintiff and Platinum Motorsports,
Inc. to cover the repairs, and defendants forged plaintiff’s
1 Appellants maintain the order is appealable as an order
after judgment affecting their substantial rights. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(1).) But the notice of appeal reflects the
appeal is from the default judgment; the box corresponding to an
appealable order after judgment is not checked. In general, the
trial court’s denial of a motion to set aside a judgment may be
reviewed on appeal from the judgment. (Kester Motors, Inc. v.
Haddad (1952) 109 Cal.App.2d 369, 373.) In any event, because
it is reasonably clear that the scope of the appeal included a
review of the court’s order and plaintiff does not demonstrate any
prejudice from the incomplete notice of appeal, we are required to
liberally construe the notice of appeal to protect the right of
appeal. (In re J.F. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 70, 75.)
2
signature on the check before depositing it into their bank
account. The complaint alleged, “[d]efendants were informed
that they were not to perform the estimated work on [p]laintiff’s
vehicle, and therefore knew the money was not theirs to take and
knew that they did not have [p]laintiff’s authorization to
negotiate the check.” Plaintiff claimed she demanded the money
be returned to her, but defendants refused to do so. Ultimately,
defendants performed work on the vehicle which, unbeknownst to
plaintiff, was invoiced at a price roughly $19,000 lower than the
amount of the check; defendants retained the windfall.
Default of Platinum Motorsports, Inc. and Top Speed, Inc
was entered in March 2022. In April 2022, default of the
remaining defendants was entered. Judgment was entered on
March 30, 2023.
A hearing on defendants’ motion to set aside the default
and default judgment occurred on September 8, 2023. The trial
court noted defendants incorrectly based the motion on mistake,
surprise or excusable neglect under Code of Civil Procedure2
section 473, subdivision (b) rather than moving to correct
mistakes in the judgment to conform to the court’s intentions
under section 473, subdivision (d). It determined the motion was
not a timely challenge to the underlying judgment but exercised
its discretion to construe the motion as one made pursuant to
section 473, subdivision (d), and used it as a vehicle to amend the
damages award.3
2 Further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
3 A motion made pursuant to section 473, subdivision (b)
must be made “within a reasonable time, in no case exceeding six
3
An amended judgment was filed on October 24, 2023. The
new judgment deleted the statutory treble damages previously
assigned to defendant Hakop Keshishyan and reduced punitive
damages imposed for each of the remaining defendants.4
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
An order denying a motion to set aside a default judgment
is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Rios v. Singh (2021) 65
Cal.App.5th 871, 885.) “The fate of such a motion ‘“rests almost
entirely in the discretion of the court below, and appellate
tribunals will rarely interfere, and never unless it clearly appears
that there has been a plain abuse of discretion.”’ [Citations.]”
(Anderson v. Sherman (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 228, 237.) “Under
the abuse of discretion standard, ‘“[t]he trial court’s findings of
fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law
are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is
reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.”’ [Citation.]” (G.F.
Galaxy Corp. v. Johnson (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 542, 551.)
II. The Unrebutted Presumption of Correctness
A. Defendants’ Burden
We begin with the presumption that the court did not
abuse its discretion and, on matters as to which the record is
months, after the judgment . . . .” (§ 473, subd. (b).) Section 473,
subdivision (d) does not specify a deadline for making the motion.
4 Punitive damages were reduced in the following manner:
(1) Platinum Motors, Inc. from $100,000 to $38,000; (2) Top
Speed, Inc. from $150,000 to $56,000; and (3) Gevork Keshishyan
from $292,000 to $76,000.
4
silent “‘intendments and presumptions are indulged to support’”
the court’s ruling. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d
557, 564; see also Professional Collection Consultants v.
Lauron (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 958, 970–971.) “[T]he burden is on
an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented
to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error
that justifies reversal of the judgment. [Citations.]” (Jameson v.
Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609.) In this respect, “[t]he
appellant must present an adequate argument including citations
to supporting authorities and to relevant portions of the record.
[Citations.]” (Yield Dynamics, Inc. v. TEA Systems Corp. (2007)
154 Cal.App.4th 547, 557.)
B. The Inadequate Record
Defendants maintain they “presented substantial evidence
of excusable neglect” and that “the equities” in their favor were
“compelling.” But a copy of defendants’ motion (including any
supporting evidence) is not included in the clerk’s transcript.
Moreover, defendants voiced no objection to the court revamping
defendants’ motion to one made under section 473, subdivision (d)
thereby giving the impression that any previous argument
grounded in section 473, subdivision (b) or equity was abandoned.
Similar problems arise when attempting to review
defendants’ constitutional claim. At the hearing, defense counsel
thanked the court for “providing a thorough tentative,”5 and then
5 The court commenced the proceedings by commenting that
it had issued a “revised tentative ruling” and that there was both
a prior hearing and supplemental briefing on the issues. The
record does not include a transcript of the prior hearing or a
tentative ruling. The only briefing in the record is that of
plaintiff in opposition to the motion.
5
took aim at the court’s method of calculating damages. The
discussion between defense counsel and the court included
numerous references to the court’s tentative ruling as well as to
cases cited in defendants’ motion.6 In the midst of the discussion,
the court “agreed” with the defense counsel’s argument that its
original calculation of punitive damages was “out of proportion”
(presumably referring to the calculation in the initial judgment)
and, when it issued the second judgment, it substantially reduced
the punitive damages. But, without a record that includes the
moving papers and the tentative decision, we are unable to
conclude the back-and-forth between defense counsel and the
court demonstrates the court abused its discretion by not
providing an additional reduction to the punitive damages.7
6 At one point, defense counsel referred to page seven of the
tentative decision suggesting the court’s analysis was by no
means condensed.
7 Both parties seem to assume the trial court’s ruling on the
motion is reflected in the second judgment. This may or may not
be true. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court ordered a stay
of execution of the judgment to remain intact “pending my ruling”
and pointed out, “I’m going away at the end of the month. I’ll try
to get it done before then, so that you’ll have some clarity.” While
the record includes the subsequent revised judgment, thereby
suggesting the motion was otherwise denied, the record does not
contain a specific ruling on the motion other than the court’s
comment at the hearing that a challenge to the underlying
judgment was “too late.” Given the thorough tentative decision
acknowledged by defense counsel, it is reasonable to expect the
court to issue a ruling targeting the motion rather than simply
amending the damages award in the judgment. Regardless, even
if we accept the second judgment as a ruling on the section 473,
6
Because of these gaps in the record, defendants are unable
to rebut the presumption that the court properly denied
defendants’ motion and correctly entered judgment. (Maria P. v.
Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295–1296 [failure to provide an
adequate record requires the issues on appeal to be resolved
against the appellant]; Sanders v. Walsh (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th
855, 873–874 [it is the appellant’s burden on appeal to present an
adequate record for review]; Hotels Nevada, LLC v. L.A. Pacific
Center, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 336, 348.)8
III. The Absence of Record Citations
“‘It is the duty of a party to support the arguments in its
briefs by appropriate reference to the record, which includes
providing exact page citations.’” (Duarte v. Chino Community
Hospital (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 849, 856; see also Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).) Plaintiffs argue defendants’ challenge
to the court’s order and judgment should be rejected because
“[o]ther than some procedural matters, [defendants’] opening
brief includes not a single citation to the clerk’s transcript.”
Indeed, the entire argument section of the opening brief is devoid
of any citation to the record.
subdivision (d) aspect of the motion, the other deficiencies in the
record warrant rejection of defendants’ appellate contentions.
8 In their reply brief defendants state they designated “the
motion papers” for inclusion in the record. Defendants prepared
a notice designating the record on Judicial Council form APP-003
which, in section four, states that a motion to vacate the
judgment and ruling thereon will be included in clerk’s transcript
“but [the appealing party] must provide the date each document
was filed, or if that is not available, the date the document was
signed.” Defendants did not fill in the space designated for the
date of these documents.
7
Defendants filed a reply brief but did not address its failure
to support their positions with references to the record other than
to mention (without citation to authority) that “[p]rocedural
forfeiture doctrines should not be rigidly applied where doing so
would defeat the strong policy favoring trial on the merits.”
We are not persuaded by defendants’ unsupported
contention. “‘“The appellate court is not required to search the
record on its own seeking error.” [Citation.] Thus, “[i]f a party
fails to support an argument with the necessary citations to the
record, . . . the argument [will be] deemed to have been waived.
[Citation.]” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Shenouda v. Veterinary
Medical BD. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 500, 514.) Because none of
defendants’ arguments (including those in the reply brief) are
supported by citation to the record they are deemed waived and
can do nothing to rebut the presumption that the judgment was
correctly entered.
8
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Plaintiff is to recover costs on
appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
KUMAR, J.*
We concur:
HOFFSTADT, P. J.
MOOR, J.
Retired Judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI,
section 6 of the California Constitution.
9
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