David R. v. Sells CA1/5

CourtListener 10857115Calctapp11.05.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 5/11/26 David R. v. Sells CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

DAVID R.,
A172453
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Humboldt County
Super. Ct. No. CV2401517)
JONATHAN SELLS,
Defendant and Appellant.

Jonathan Sells (Appellant) appeals from a civil harassment restraining
order (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6)1 protecting David R. (Respondent). We
affirm.
BACKGROUND
In August 2024, Respondent filed a request for a civil harassment
restraining order alleging harassment by Appellant starting in February
2023. At an evidentiary hearing held in November 2024, Respondent,
Appellant, and Appellant’s wife testified. Respondent also submitted into
evidence and played for the court videos from his home security system.

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil

Procedure.

1
The court subsequently issued a written decision finding by clear and
convincing evidence that Appellant engaged in harassment against
Respondent.2 The court specifically found Appellant had subjected
Respondent to “long and continuing verbal abuse,” including slurs based on
Respondent’s sexual orientation; had twice “used his pickup truck to
intimidate [Respondent]”; and “frequently drives by [Respondent’s] house,
revving his engine, speeding, and exceeding decibel levels of over 100.” The
court noted that Appellant denied harassment in his testimony, but found
that “[v]ideo evidence establishes, however, that [Appellant] lacks credibility
in his denials of harassing conduct.” In contrast, the court found
“[Respondent] credible in his version of the facts[.] The harassing behavior
has been ongoing since 2023, gradually escalating in intensity in 2024.” A
five-year civil harassment restraining order issued.
DISCUSSION
I. Motions in Limine
Prior to the evidentiary hearing, Appellant filed two motions in limine.
Appellant argues the trial court erred in denying both motions. We reject the
challenges.
A. Issue Preclusion
Appellant’s first motion in limine argued that Respondent was
precluded from relying on allegations of harassment he made in an April
2024 petition, which had been denied. Appellant did not attach that petition,

2 “ ‘Harassment’ is unlawful violence, a credible threat of violence, or a

knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that
seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no
legitimate purpose. The course of conduct must be that which would cause a
reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually
cause substantial emotional distress to the petitioner.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).)

2
but attached the written denial by a different bench officer. The decision on
the April 2024 request concluded, “While it is clear that the parties have
ongoing disagreements, the Court does not find by the evidence presented at
the hearing that there is” harassment within the meaning of the statute. In
denying Appellant’s motion in limine, the trial court reasoned, “the
accumulation of facts presented previously did not individually disqualify
those facts from further consideration as being part of a continuing course of
conduct. Instances of alleged harassment that may not cumulatively support
a finding . . . that civil harassment was proven are nevertheless susceptible of
being considered as part of a continuing course of conduct should there be
additional evidence that shows their substance and relevance.”3
“In order for issue preclusion to apply, the following elements must be
met: (1) the issue sought to be precluded from relitigation must be identical
to that decided in a former proceeding; (2) the issue must have been actually
litigated in the former proceeding; (3) the issue must have been necessarily
decided in the former proceeding; (4) the decision in the former proceeding
must be final and on the merits; and (5) the party against whom preclusion is
sought must be the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former
proceeding.” (Williams v. Doctors Medical Center of Modesto, Inc. (2024) 100
Cal.App.5th 1117, 1131–1132 (Williams).) “The party asserting issue
preclusion has the burden of establishing the above elements.” (Id. at

3 “ ‘Course of conduct’ is a pattern of conduct composed of a series of

acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose,
including following or stalking an individual, making harassing telephone
calls to an individual, or sending harassing correspondence to an individual
by any means, including, but not limited to, the use of public or private mails,
interoffice mail, facsimile, or email.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(1).)

3
p. 1132.) “A lower court’s application of issue preclusion is reviewed de novo.”
(Ibid.)
We agree with the trial court that Appellant failed to establish the
identical issue was litigated in the prior proceeding. “ ‘ “The ‘identical issue’
requirement addresses whether ‘identical factual allegations’ are at stake in
the two proceedings, not whether the ultimate issues or dispositions are the
same.” ’ ” (Williams, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 1132.) The issue decided in
the prior proceeding was whether the incidents through April 2024
constituted harassment. The issue presented in the underlying proceeding
was whether the incidents through November 2024 constituted harassment.
The trial court’s decision discusses multiple incidents taking place after
April, and therefore the issues are not identical. Moreover, the incidents
considered in the first petition were relevant to whether Appellant’s
harassing course of conduct was likely to recur. (See also R.D. v. P.M. (2011)
202 Cal.App.4th 181, 190 [“Behavior that may not alone constitute an
intentionally harassing course of conduct logically still might show an
intention to resume or continue an already established course of harassing
conduct”].)
B. Postpetition Events
Appellant’s second motion in limine sought to bar Respondent from
introducing evidence at the November 2024 hearing regarding incidents that
were not included in the August petition. Because more than three months
had elapsed between the filing of the petition and the hearing, and because
the trial court had denied Respondent’s request for a temporary restraining
order, this motion sought to bar Respondent from introducing evidence of
events occurring after the August petition was filed. The court denied the
motion.

4
Appellant relies solely on the proposition that “parties cannot introduce
evidence about issues outside the pleadings.” (Emerald Bay Community
Assn. v. Golden Eagle Ins. Corp. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1091.) To be
sure, “[w]hen evidence is not pertinent to the issues raised by the pleadings,
the evidence is irrelevant and it is proper to preclude the introduction of such
evidence.” (Schweitzer v. Westminster Investments, Inc. (2007) 157
Cal.App.4th 1195, 1214.) But Respondent’s petition raised the issue of
whether Appellant had engaged in harassment. Appellant has not
established that Respondent was obligated to allege each evidentiary fact in
support of this issue. “ ‘[T]he complaint need only allege facts sufficient to
state a cause of action; each evidentiary fact that might eventually form part
of the plaintiff’s proof need not be alleged.’ ” (Pich v. Lightbourne (2013) 221
Cal.App.4th 480, 495.)
II. Substantial Evidence
Appellant argues no substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
finding of harassment by clear and convincing evidence. We disagree.
As an initial matter, Appellant’s statement of the facts regarding the
harassment relies almost exclusively on his own testimony, and includes
none of Respondent’s testimony about Appellant’s conduct. “An appellant
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment must cite
the evidence in the record supporting the judgment and explain why such
evidence is insufficient as a matter of law. [Citations.] An appellant who
fails to cite and discuss the evidence supporting the judgment cannot
demonstrate that such evidence is insufficient. . . . An appellant, such as
[Appellant], who cites and discusses only evidence in [his] favor fails to
demonstrate any error and waives the contention that the evidence is

5
insufficient to support the judgment.” (Rayii v. Gatica (2013) 218
Cal.App.4th 1402, 1408.)
In any event, Appellant’s challenge is unavailing. Appellant argues
Respondent provided no evidence to corroborate his testimony. But “ ‘[t]he
testimony of a single witness may be sufficient to constitute substantial
evidence.’ ” (Citizens Business Bank v. Gevorgian (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th
602, 613.) Moreover, Respondent did present corroborating evidence: his
home security videos. While Appellant challenges the trial court’s finding
that the videos establish Appellant engaged in harassing conduct, he chose
not to submit the videos as part of the record on appeal. “ ‘[W]here exhibits
are missing [from the record on appeal] we will not presume they would
undermine the judgment.’ ” (Hiser v. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. (2003) 111
Cal.App.4th 640, 657.)
Appellant also challenges the following finding in the trial court’s
written order: “[Respondent] has similarly been harassed by his next-door
neighbor, Derek Daniels. This court authorized the issuance of a restraining
order against Daniels on November 20, 2024 for similar harassment. The
evidence establishes that [Appellant] and Daniels are acquaintances, having
been seen by [Respondent] on at least six occasions together at Daniels’
residence next door.” Although Appellant does not include it in his brief, the
court immediately followed these sentences with, “On September 15, 2024,
[Respondent] overheard Daniels and [Appellant] talking in front of his house,
discussing their intentions to harass [Respondent] until he could no longer
function.” Assuming, without deciding, that it would be improper for the trial
court to rely on Appellant’s association with Daniels, Appellant has not
established this association was material to the trial court’s finding that
Appellant engaged in harassment. “ ‘As an aspect of the presumption that

6
judicial duty is properly performed [(Evid. Code, § 664)], we presume . . . that
the court knows and applies the correct statutory and case law [citation] and
is able to distinguish admissible from inadmissible evidence, relevant from
irrelevant facts, and to recognize those facts which properly may be
considered in the judicial decisionmaking process.’ ” (In re Marriage of
Davenport (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1526.)
III. Evidentiary Ruling
Appellant argues the trial court erred in refusing to admit a letter
Appellant attempted to put in evidence. We conclude any error was
harmless. (See Zuniga v. Alexandria Care Center, LLC (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th
871, 888 [“The trial court’s error in excluding evidence is grounds for
reversing a judgment only if the party appealing demonstrates a ‘miscarriage
of justice’—that is, that a different result would have been probable if the
error had not occurred”].)
The excluded letter was written by a social worker at the Eureka
Veterans Affairs medical clinic in 2020, and stated that Respondent “has
received care with the Eureka VA Medical Clinic since April 2019.
[Respondent] experiences functional limitations imposed by an
emotional/mental health-related issue as a result of his military service.”
Appellant argues this letter would have undermined Respondent’s credibility
by contradicting his testimony that he started seeing a therapist in 2021. In
fact, Respondent was asked when he saw a doctor “in relationship to the
anxiety that these events have caused?” (Italics added.) In answering this
question, Respondent testified, “So since 2021, that started with Daniels, and
then again, when this started up with [Appellant], I saw -- maybe it was
February, March. I can’t exactly recall. I started seeing a therapist again on
coping mechanisms to deal with this.” The letter’s representation that

7
Respondent began seeing a therapist in 2019 to address issues relating to his
military service does not contradict Respondent’s testimony that he began
seeing a therapist in 2021 to address issues relating to harassing conduct by
Daniels and, later, Appellant. Appellant has not demonstrated prejudice
from any error in excluding the letter.
IV. Fees on Appeal
Respondent seeks to recover his fees on appeal. We agree that
Respondent is entitled to appellate fees. (§ 527.6, subd. (s) [“The prevailing
party in an action brought pursuant to this section may be awarded court
costs and attorney's fees, if any”]; City of Rocklin v. Legacy Family
Adventures-Rocklin, LLC (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 713, 737 [“ ‘ “ ‘A statute
authorizing an attorney fee award at the trial court level includes appellate
attorney fees unless the statute specifically provides otherwise’ ” ’ ”].) We will
remand for the trial court to determine the amount of appellate fees. (City of
Rocklin, at p. 738.)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Respondent shall recover his costs on appeal.
The matter is remanded for a determination of Respondent’s appellate
attorney fees.

SIMONS, J.

We concur.
JACKSON, P. J.
BURNS, J.

(A172453)

8

Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort

Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.