In re M.G. CA3

CourtListener 10856436Calctapp08.05.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 5/8/26 In re M.G. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Tehama)

In re M.G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court C105014
Law.
(Super. Ct. No. 25JU-000040)
TEHAMA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

B.T.,
Defendant and Appellant.

B.T., the mother of minor M.G. (mother), appeals from the juvenile court’s orders
denying her petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 and terminating her
parental rights under section 366.26.1 She maintains that she showed a change of
circumstance sufficient to modify the court’s prior order bypassing her for reunification
services. She also contends that the parental-benefit exception to adoption applied. We
see no error in the juvenile court’s orders and therefore affirm.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

1
BACKGROUND
I.
M.G. was born to mother and G.R. (father) in April 2025. Mother has four older
children (M.G.’s half-siblings) who were removed from her care in prior dependency
proceedings due to unresolved substance abuse issues and neglect. She also has
numerous prior convictions for drug-related offenses. Mother began drinking at age
seven, started using marijuana by age nine, and was addicted to methamphetamine by
age 11. At the time of the present dependency proceedings, mother was 34 years old and
had struggled for over two decades battling addiction.
Three days after M.G.’s birth, the Tehama County Department of Social Services
(Department) filed a dependency petition alleging a failure to protect (§ 300, subd. (b)(1))
and abuse of a sibling (§ 300, subd. (j)). The petition asserted that mother had untreated
substance abuse issues that hindered her ability to provide safe and adequate care for
M.G. Mother received minimal prenatal care during her high-risk pregnancy and
exposed M.G. to methamphetamine and THC in utero, although M.G. tested negative for
substances at birth. The petition further alleged that mother’s untreated substance abuse
issues had led to the removal of M.G.’s half-siblings from mother’s care.
The Department’s detention report described mother’s long history of significant
substance abuse. She tested positive for methamphetamine in five prior dependency
cases with the Department. Her reunification services for M.G.’s half-siblings in those
cases were terminated, and termination of her parental rights for those children was
pending. Mother did not participate in the substance abuse or housing services the social
worker offered while pregnant with M.G., and mother tested positive for THC when
M.G. was born. The Department was concerned that mother would continue to abuse
substances, including methamphetamine, placing M.G. at risk of being exposed to poor
living conditions, lack of supervision, and threat of physical harm or neglect as her half-
siblings had been.

2
The juvenile court detained M.G. in foster care and ordered supervised visits for
mother five times per week for a total of five hours.
The Department’s May 2025 jurisdictional report recommended that the juvenile
court sustain the petition, declare M.G. a dependent child, and set the matter for
disposition. By that point, mother’s parental rights had been terminated as to two of
minor’s half-siblings. Mother attended M.G.’s newborn doctor appointment in
April 2025 and had enrolled in parenting classes in May; she said she was attending drug
and alcohol services to “stay on track.” Mother visited M.G. when M.G. was
hospitalized for pneumonia. Mother continued to test positive for THC in April 2025.
In an update submitted to the juvenile court toward the end of May 2025, the
Department reported that mother was visiting with M.G. at the supervised visitation
center five days a week for one hour a day and that the visits were going well. Mother
claimed she had been clean for 157 days, which meant that M.G. was exposed to
substances in utero for approximately five months. The Department noted that, in the
prior dependency cases, mother tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamines
in May 2024 and had 25 no call, no show positive tests from May 2024 to
November 2024 (when mother was pregnant with M.G.).
The update also informed the juvenile court that M.G. was hospitalized for a “brief
resolved unexplained event” in May 2025, and her caregiver reported that she was having
“jitters” about every 15 minutes, sometimes causing her eyes to roll back in her head.
During additional medical testing, M.G. had eight episodes of “ ‘blank stare,’ ” although
her other vitals were normal. Mother attended a follow-up appointment with M.G.’s
pediatrician.
The concurrently filed dispositional report recommended that M.G. remain in
foster care and that the juvenile court bypass mother for reunification services under
section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) and (11). Those provisions allow a juvenile court to
bypass a parent for services if the parent has had reunification services terminated for a

3
sibling or half-sibling of a dependent child, or if the parent has previously had his or her
parental rights terminated as to another child, if the parent has not subsequently made a
reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to the removal of the sibling or half-sibling
from that parent. (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(10) & (11).) The report additionally recommended
that the court decline to offer reunification services to father and set a section 366.26
hearing.
The report noted that, while mother visited consistently with M.G., was attentive
and responsive to her needs during visits, and was participating in various services, the
Department did not believe she would be ready to care for M.G. in six months if the court
granted reunification services. To support its recommendation, the Department cited
mother’s history of abusing illegal substances, achieving brief periods of sobriety when
under court supervision, and then returning to substance abuse and criminal activities
when no longer supervised. The Department stated that, in 2013, mother stayed clean for
approximately 10 months with family maintenance services, but relapsed, causing two of
her older children to be re-detained; in 2022, she remained sober for about a year, but
again relapsed, and her older children were eventually detained again in 2024. The report
also recounted mother’s extensive child welfare history concerning M.G.’s half-siblings,
including numerous reports of dangerous and unsanitary conditions in the home. The
report stated that “[a]ll of [mother’s] juvenile dependency cases involve her children
being removed and detained due to living in deplorable conditions while she was using
drugs. A recurrent theme has also been her involvement and subjection of the children to
domestic violence relationships.” Because mother had not demonstrated any long-term
changes despite numerous services offered in her prior dependency cases, including
domestic violence support, wraparound services, general counseling, parent education,
family therapy, and substance abuse treatment, the Department believed she would put
M.G. in similar dangerous situations if she were returned to mother’s care.

4
The parties filed written briefs on the bypass issue. The Department argued that
mother’s efforts at rehabilitation were not adequate to treat the problems leading to the
removal of M.G.’s half-siblings. Rather, they were reflective of the same pattern that had
plagued mother since the first removal of one of her children 12 years earlier: getting
clean while under court supervision but eventually relapsing and neglecting the care and
safety of her children. Mother argued that the Department had failed to show she should
be bypassed for services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) and (11). She had been
sober for 175 days (nearly six months), consistently attended substance abuse meetings
and other drug treatment, sought out a mental health evaluation, secured a sponsor, and
had a strong support system. She no longer used THC and lived with her sister in a stable
home with adequate baby supplies.
The juvenile court held a combined contested jurisdictional and dispositional
hearing on June 3, 2025. Although the record before us does not include a reporter’s
transcript for this hearing, other documents in the record indicate that mother testified on
her own behalf, called her sponsor and the social worker as witnesses, and submitted
multiple exhibits into evidence to show her progress in addressing her substance abuse
issues. Her counsel argued against finding jurisdiction and objected to bypassing mother
for services.
The juvenile court sustained the petition as true, declared M.G. a dependent child,
determined that the Department had met its burden by clear and convincing evidence to
bypass mother for services, and found that mother had failed to show that providing her
with reunification services was in M.G.’s best interest. The court ordered supervised
visitation one time a month for one hour and set a section 366.26 hearing.
II.
In August 2025, mother filed a petition under section 388 to change the juvenile
court’s order bypassing her for services. The petition asserted that mother had obtained
and completed services on her own. Mother stated that she had been sober for 255 days,

5
participated in drug treatment, planned to become a heavy equipment operator, and took
steps to obtain a loan and to save to buy a home. She argued that providing her with
reunification services would be better for M.G. because it would allow M.G. to be with
her mother and reaffirm their mother-daughter bond.
The next month, the Department filed its section 366.26 report, recommending
that the juvenile court terminate parental rights to make then five-month-old M.G.
available for adoption. M.G. was considered generally adoptable, despite her earlier
health problems, due to her young age. Prospective adoptive parents had not yet been
identified, but the Department continued to assess family members as possible placement
resources, and M.G.’s current caregiver was identified as a concurrent placement option.
According to the section 366.26 report, mother had visited with M.G. once since
the last court hearing. The Department recounted in detail mother’s history since at least
2012 of abusing illicit substances, committing drug-related crimes, having her children
removed from her care due to her substance abuse and neglect, and achieving sobriety for
short periods of time, only to repeatedly relapse once her other children were returned to
her care. Her substance abuse and neglect of her older children spanned nearly a decade,
and the Department believed that M.G. deserved a life of stability, unlike the turbulent
times her half-siblings had endured.
In October 2025, the juvenile court held a combined hearing to address mother’s
section 388 petition and to consider the termination of parental rights. The court
admitted the Department’s section 366.26 report into evidence as well as 14 exhibits
mother offered to demonstrate her sobriety and treatment efforts.
Mother testified that she had been clean for 316 days, or a little over 10 months
(not including marijuana), which she claimed was her longest period of sobriety since she
was a teenager. She said this period of sobriety was different because she sought out
services on her own after realizing the severity of her substance abuse problem. Mother

6
acknowledged using marijuana while pregnant with M.G. but said her doctor had
prescribed it.
Mother attended weekly Narcotics Anonymous meetings and completed the first
step of the 12-step program; she also attended other group programs that provided her
with a solid support system. She participated in therapy and parenting classes and
applied what she had learned when interacting with two of her older children. She
testified that she was renting a house and was in escrow to purchase a home. She was
employed as an in-home supportive services caregiver, earned about $3,000 a month, and
had a driver’s license and working car. She wanted to obtain logging and heavy
equipment operator certificates.
Mother said that when children learn they were adopted, “it hinders them. It
affects them in some way.” Mother believed she could provide everything that the
caregiver was currently providing to M.G.; in mother’s view, nothing was lacking in her
home or in her parenting skills compared to the caregiver. Mother described her
relationship with two of her older children and their caregivers as positive and said she
attended the children’s extracurricular activities when given the opportunity. One of the
half-siblings had met M.G. in passing, but mother wanted them to know M.G. if possible.
Since the dispositional hearing in June 2025, mother had visited with M.G. on four
occasions, for an hour each time, per the court’s order. The visits went well, although
mother feared M.G. “wouldn’t recognize me so much” by the last visit. She also attended
several of M.G.’s medical appointments.
Following the close of evidence, mother’s counsel argued that circumstances had
changed and that it was in M.G.’s best interest to provide mother with reunification
services. Counsel emphasized that mother sought out services on her own but could
accomplish more with court-ordered services. If the juvenile court did not reopen
reunification services, counsel urged the court not to terminate mother’s parental rights or

7
select adoption as the permanent plan but instead allow mother more time to demonstrate
her dedication to her recovery and to reunite with M.G. sometime in the future.
M.G.’s appointed counsel agreed with mother that there was a change in
circumstance sufficient to justify giving mother services.
The Department asked the juvenile court to deny the section 388 petition and
terminate mother’s parental rights because there had been no real change in
circumstances. Mother’s history included significant drug addiction with sporadic
periods of sobriety followed by continuous relapses. The gravity of the harm of placing
M.G. in that environment was high, and it was not in her best interests to grant mother
reunification services or delay adoption. The court took the matter under submission.
One week later, the juvenile court issued its ruling denying mother’s section 388
petition and terminating parental rights. Regarding mother’s petition, the court found
neither a substantial change in circumstance nor that it would be in M.G.’s best interests
to provide mother with services. The court reasoned that mother failed to show a
significant change in circumstances when considering her extensive dependency history,
which had resulted in her other children living in “deplorable conditions”; mother’s
decades of drug abuse and drug-related criminal offenses; and the numerous services and
resources provided to her in prior dependency cases that did not successfully address her
serious drug addiction. The court further reasoned that because M.G. was removed at
birth and mother had minimal contact with her during visitation, they did not share a
significant bond. The court acknowledged that no evidence was presented regarding
M.G.’s bond with her caregiver, but it noted that the caregiver was identified as a
concurrent placement for purposes of adoption. The court determined that it was not in
M.G.’s best interest to reopen reunification services for mother; rather, it was in the
child’s “best interest to have permanency in a stable, drug-free home.” The court thus
denied the section 388 petition, adopted the Department’s proposed findings and orders
as to the section 366.26 hearing, and terminated mother’s and father’s parental rights.

8
Mother timely appealed from both the order denying her section 388 petition and
the order terminating her parental rights.
DISCUSSION
I.
Mother first contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her
section 388 modification petition.
A petition to change a juvenile court order under section 388 must allege that there
are changed circumstances or new evidence to justify the requested order and that the
requested order would serve the minor’s best interests. (In re Malick T. (2022)
73 Cal.App.5th 1109, 1122.) The petitioner has the burden of proof on both points by a
preponderance of the evidence. (Ibid.; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(h)(1)(D).) A
juvenile court’s decision on a modification petition “will not be disturbed on appeal in the
absence of a clear abuse of discretion.” (In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 415.)
Mother maintains that her significant efforts to address her drug addiction and
establish a stable life demonstrated a change in circumstances. The juvenile court found
otherwise, and we conclude there is adequate support in the record for that determination.
The record before the juvenile court showed that, while mother participated in some
services and treatment on her own, she had only completed step one of the 12-step
Narcotics Anonymous program and had been sober for only 10 months (not including
marijuana)—one month longer than what she testified to as her longest period of sobriety
over 23 years of severe drug addiction. The record further showed a recurring pattern of
mother receiving treatment and services, achieving periods of sobriety while under court
supervision, but then suffering relapses that endangered the health and safety of her other
children and prevented her from reunifying with them. On that record, the juvenile court
did not abuse its discretion in concluding that mother’s current efforts did not establish a
genuine change for purposes of revisiting its earlier order bypassing mother for
reunification services. (See In re Cliffton B. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 415, 423-424

9
[father’s seven months of sobriety, “while commendable, was nothing new,” in light of
long history of drug use and “periods of sobriety alternat[ing] with recurring drug use”];
In re Ernesto R. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 219, 223 [“Appellant’s completion of a drug
treatment program, at this late date, though commendable, is not a substantial change of
circumstances”].) And because we conclude the trial court committed no error with
respect to the first element of section 388, we need not address mother’s argument that
ordering reunification services would be in M.G.’s best interest.
II.
Mother next contends that the juvenile court erred when it failed to apply the
parental-benefit exception and terminated her parental rights under section 366.26. We
disagree.
The parental-benefit exception to the termination of parental rights applies where a
parent has “maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would
benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) In In re
Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 631, 636 (Caden C.), our state supreme court explained
that, to qualify for the exception, a parent must prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence: “(1) regular visitation and contact, and (2) a relationship, the continuation of
which would benefit the child such that (3) the termination of parental rights would be
detrimental to the child.” On appeal, we review the first two elements for substantial
evidence and the third for abuse of discretion. (Id. at pp. 639-640.)
Mother initially faults the juvenile court for failing to analyze the case in
accordance with Caden C. This contention is misplaced because mother never asked the
juvenile court to apply the parental-benefit exception. Furthermore, an appellate court
will presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the juvenile court was
aware of and complied with the law, including Caden C. (In re A.L. (2022)
73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1156; People v. Jacobo (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1416, 1430.)

10
Mother points to nothing in the record suggesting that the juvenile court was unaware of
the relevant law.
Mother has also failed to show any error in the juvenile court’s decision to
terminate parental rights, because there is substantial evidence to support an implied
finding that the parental-benefit exception does not apply. The first element under
Caden C.—regular visitation and contact—is “straightforward. The question is just
whether ‘parents visit consistently,’ taking into account ‘the extent permitted by court
orders.’ ” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) Here, the parties agree, as do we, that
mother regularly visited with M.G. to the extent permitted by the juvenile court’s orders,
satisfying the first element.
But substantial evidence supports an implied finding that the second element—that
minor would benefit from continuing the relationship with her parent—did not apply.
That prong of the analysis focuses on the child and recognizes that the parental
relationship may be shaped by a multitude of factors such as “ ‘[t]he age of the child, the
portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect
of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.’ ” (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) In assessing this element, courts often consider how
children feel about, interact with, look to, or talk about their parents. (Ibid.)
Here, the juvenile court found mother and M.G. did not share a strong bond, given
their limited contact during the dependency proceedings, and substantial evidence in the
record supports that finding. M.G. was one day old when she was detained in connection
with the dependency proceeding. She has never lived with mother or been in her care
and has instead lived her entire life with her caregiver. Mother initially was allowed five
one-hour visits per week in April and May of 2025, and her visits were generally
positive. But visits were reduced to one hour per month from June to October 2025,
when the juvenile court held the section 366.26 hearing. Mother herself testified that
since the June dispositional hearing, she had only visited M.G. four times for one hour

11
each visit and was concerned at the last visit that M.G. would not recognize her based on
their limited time together. There was no evidence proffered to show a strong and
reciprocal bond between mother and M.G. And as an infant, M.G. was too young to
express her own feelings about her mother. Given their limited interactions, substantial
evidence supports the conclusion that mother failed to prove the existence of a
relationship, the continuation of which would benefit M.G. (In re Andrea R. (1999)
75 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1109 [appellate record supported implied finding by juvenile court
that parents had failed to establish parental-benefit exception]; see also Bowers v.
Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 873-874, italics omitted [“the power of an
appellate court [on substantial evidence review] begins and ends with the determination
as to whether, on the entire record, there is substantial evidence, contradicted or
uncontradicted, which will support the determination, and when two or more inferences
can reasonably be deduced from the facts, a reviewing court is without power to
substitute its deductions for those of the trial court”].) Given this conclusion, we need
not address the third element under Caden C. concerning whether it would be detrimental
to M.G. to sever the relationship. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 631, 633 & 636.)

12
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s orders denying mother’s section 388 petition and terminating
her parental rights under section 366.26 are affirmed.

FEINBERG, J.

We concur:

MAURO, Acting P. J.

RENNER, J.

13

Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort

Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.