CourtListener 10856402•State Compensation Ins. Fund v. ReadyLink Healthcare CA4/1
State Compensation Ins. Fund v. ReadyLink Healthcare CA4/1
CourtListener 10856402Calctapp08.05.2026
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 5/8/26 State Compensation Ins. Fund v. ReadyLink Healthcare CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
STATE COMPENSATION D083359
INSURANCE FUND,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. PSC1500168)
v.
READYLINK HEALTHCARE, INC.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Kira L. Klatchko, Judge. Affirmed.
Roxborough, Pomerance, Nye & Adreani, Drew E. Pomerance, Vincent
S. Gannuscio and Joseph C. Gjonola for Defendant and Appellant.
Rhett R. Johnson, R. Timothy O’Connor and Tony M. Chang for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. (ReadyLink) appeals a judgment entered in
favor of State Compensation Insurance Fund (SCIF) following orders
granting motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and for a
new trial. It contends the trial court erred: (1) in dismissing certain of its
defenses and cross-claims before trial; (2) in granting the JNOV; and (3) in
granting a new trial. We disagree with the first and second contentions, and
conclude the third contention is moot. Hence we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
At the core of this appeal is an insurance dispute on which nine
different decisionmaking bodies1 have weighed in over the past 20 years.
Distilled to its essence, the dispute is as to what, if any, balance ReadyLink
owes SCIF in premiums for a workers’ compensation insurance policy (the
SCIF policy) that SCIF issued to ReadyLink for the 12-month period
commencing September 1, 2005 (the 2005 policy year).2
In discussing this dispute, we will mention the role of each of the nine
bodies that have weighed in on it. But we will focus particular attention on
publicly available opinions from five of those bodies, as follows:
1. A 2009 proposed decision from an administrative law judge (the
ALJ): In re Appeal of ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. from the Decision
of the State Compensation Insurance Fund (Aug. 6 2009) Dept. of
Ins. No. AHB-WCA-08-14 (ReadyLink Agency Appeal);
2. A 2009 order of the California Insurance Commissioner
(Commissioner) adopting the ReadyLink Agency Appeal decision and
designating it as precedential (Sept. 30, 2009);
3. A 2012 opinion of the Second District Court of Appeal: ReadyLink
Healthcare, Inc. v. Jones (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1166 (ReadyLink I);
1 These nine decisionmaking bodies include: an administrative court;
the Insurance Commissioner of the State of California; the Los Angeles
County Superior Court; the Second District Court of Appeal; the United
States District Court for the Central District of California; the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeal; the Riverside County Superior Court; the Fourth District
Court of Appeal, Division One; and the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the Central District of California.
2 SCIF is “a quasi-governmental entity,” “ ‘subject to the jurisdiction and
control of the state Insurance Commissioner,’ ” that “ ‘ “is at once both an
agency of the state and an insurance carrier.” ’ ” (Cover Right Roofing, Inc.
v. State Compensation Ins. Fund (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 415, 419.)
2
4. A 2014 opinion of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals: ReadyLink
Healthcare, Inc. v. State Compensation Ins. Fund (9th Cir. 2014)
754 F.3d 754 (ReadyLink II); and
5. A 2020 opinion of our court, the Fourth District Court of Appeal,
Division One: State Comp. Ins. Fund v. ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc.
(2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 422 (ReadyLink III).
A. ReadyLink, the Insurance Policy, and the Role Payroll Played
in Calculating Each Year’s Annual Premium
At the time the insurance policy at issue was in effect, and for some
time before and after, ReadyLink was a staffing agency in the business of
supplying nurses on a temporary basis to healthcare providers. For six and
one-half years, from September 1, 2001, through February 28, 2007,
ReadyLink contracted with SCIF to insure it under the terms of a workers’
compensation insurance policy.
The insurance policy provided for ReadyLink to pay to SCIF, each
policy year, a premium that was to be “determined by [reference to SCIF’s]
manuals of rules, rates, rating plans and classifications” and that would
depend on the dollar value of ReadyLink’s payroll for that year. (ReadyLink
III, 50 Cal.App.5th at pp. 439–440; ReadyLink I, 210 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1169–1170.)
Because it was impossible to predict with certainty at the start of a
policy year such variables as the number of jobs that would be booked that
year, the number of hours that each job would require, or the rates of
compensation for the nurses who would staff the jobs, the dollar value of a
given year’s payroll could not be known until the end of the year. Thus the
policy provided: (1) for an estimated premium to be determined in advance of
a given policy year; (2) for the estimated premium to be invoiced by SCIF,
and paid by ReadyLink, before the policy year commenced; (3) for an audit of
ReadyLink’s payroll and other records to be performed by SCIF after the
3
close of the policy year; (4) for a final premium to be retroactively calculated
by SCIF based on the audit’s results and then, depending on whether the
final premium was more or less than the estimated premium; (5) for the
difference between the estimated premium and the final premium to be trued
up by means of either a payment by ReadyLink to SCIF or a refund by SCIF
to ReadyLink.
B. ReadyLink’s Per Diem Program
ReadyLink differed from other temporary-nurse staffing agencies in the
manner in which it compensated its nurses. As determined by the ALJ and
the Commissioner in proceedings that we describe post:
“On average, a nurse working in California in 2004 earned
$30.24 per hour, depending upon location, skill level, area
of specialty and years of experience. Experienced nurses
could earn up to twice that amount per hour. Nurses
employed by ReadyLink made considerably less than the
state average. In fact, nearly 60% of ReadyLink’s contracts
paid nurses only $6.75 per hour, just above California’s
minimum wage in 2005. Not one of ReadyLink’s nurses
made over $20.00 per hour regardless of work location or
experience. Thus, a typical ReadyLink nurse working three
12-hours shifts during a one week time period would earn
only $243 in wages, while their counterpart employed by
the hospital itself would earn $1,088.64 in wages for that
same time period. ReadyLink’s hourly wage also [was]
significantly lower than that paid by other nurse registries
in the Los Angeles area. Hourly wages for temporary
nurses in Southern California range[d] from $20 per hour
to $50 per hour.” (ReadyLink Agency Appeal, supra, Dept.
of Ins. No. AHB-WCA-08-14 at pp. 11–12, fns. omitted.)
This disparity between compensation received by ReadyLink nurses
and compensation received by other nurses was attributable to an approach
to compensation unique to ReadyLink (the per diem program) that the ALJ
and the Commissioner described as follows:
4
“ReadyLink admits the hourly wage received by its
nurses is below average, and explains its ability to recruit
nurses at this wage level by emphasizing its unique per
diem program. Under ReadyLink’s per diem program, each
nurse employed by ReadyLink, regardless of where the
employee lives or how long a shift the employee works,
receives a daily per diem amount. . . .
“ReadyLink has developed its own proprietary software
program to calculate the amount of per diem pay an
employee receives on a daily basis. Initially, a ReadyLink
[recruiter] will enter information from ReadyLink’s hospital
contract into the software program. Information entered
into the system includes the amount the hospital is paying
ReadyLink per hour for each nurse[ ] as well as the shifts
available. Recruiters [employed by ReadyLink] merely call
up on their computers the available hospital contracts[,]
and the software program automatically calculates the per
diem rate taking into consideration ReadyLink’s expenses
and profit margin. The program itself provides recruiters
with the exact amount to be paid in per diem and is
programmed not to exceed the federal per diem amounts
listed in 41 Code of Federal Regulations, Chapter 301,
Appendix A [Continental United States (CONUS) tables3].
“ReadyLink does not require its employees to
demonstrate a permanent tax home outside of the work
location, nor does ReadyLink monitor employee tax data to
ensure compliance with IRS regulations. ReadyLink does
not provide employees with information regarding the IRS
rules, nor does ReadyLink explain the workers’
compensation impact of below market wages. Thus, unlike
other nurse registries, ReadyLink [nurses] working within
50 miles of their permanent tax home receive per diem
3 The CONUS tables are standardized, location-specific tables that set
forth per diem employee reimbursement rates approved by the federal
government. According to ReadyLink, these rates are “are standard
nationwide, except for approximately 300 ‘non-standard areas,’ generally
metropolitan areas where lodging and other living costs tend to be higher.”
5
payments just like those nurses who have relocated for
their positions.[4]
“ReadyLink does not require employees to provide any
documentation regarding the use of their per diem
payments. ReadyLink assumes the per diem payments are
being expended for business travel purposes and does not
inquire as to how per diem money is spent. ReadyLink
does not collect receipts or any other information
substantiating the use of the per diem payments.
ReadyLink does not require its employees to return any per
diem monies not spent on travel expenses.” (ReadyLink
Agency Appeal, supra, Dept. of Ins. No. AHB-WCA-08-14 at
pp. 12–13, fns. omitted.)
Pursuant to its per diem program, ReadyLink categorized a substantial
component of the payments it made to its nurses as expense reimbursements
as distinguished from payroll. In other words, ReadyLink excluded per diem
payments from payroll.
C. SCIF’s Annual Audits, and the Additional Premium SCIF
Invoiced ReadyLink for the 2005 Policy Year Based on
Inclusion of Per Diem Payments in Payroll
ReadyLink asserts, and SCIF does not dispute, (1) that, throughout the
period during which SCIF insured it, ReadyLink supplied SCIF with records
revealing the existence of the per diem program and the breakdown between
per diem payments and other payments that ReadyLink made to its
employees; and (2) that, in the audits that followed each of the first five years
of coverage (i.e., the 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004 policy years), SCIF’s
4 According to the ALJ and the Commissioner, more than half of
ReadyLink’s nurses worked at hospitals within 50 miles of their homes.
6
auditors did not express any objections to ReadyLink’s exclusion of per diem
payments from payroll.5
But, following the conclusion of the 2005 policy year, things changed.
According to findings of the ALJ: In 2007, while reviewing ReadyLink’s
payroll registers as part of an audit for the 2005 policy year, SCIF’s auditor
discovered that ReadyLink had been paying nurses a minimum wage of
approximately $6.75 per hour plus a much higher stipulated per diem
amount. Although the auditor had conducted dozens of audits of nurse
staffing agencies and registries during her employment with SCIF, she had
never seen an agency pay more than 50 percent of wages in the form of per
diem payments or pay hourly wages that were significantly below the
average hourly rate typically paid to trained, licensed, registered nurses in
California. She repeatedly asked ReadyLink to furnish documentation to
justify the per diem payments, but ReadyLink provided no such
documentation. Based on the lack of supporting documentation, SCIF
concluded that per diem payments should be included as payroll. Including
those payments in payroll resulted in ReadyLink’s premium increasing by
$555,327.53, for a total annual premium of $800,106.00. (ReadyLink I,
supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 1170.)
On the basis of the audit findings, SCIF invoiced ReadyLink $555,327
in additional premium payments (the additional premium), on top of
$253,805 in premium that ReadyLink had previously paid to it in estimated
premium, for the 2005 policy year. ReadyLink disputed SCIF’s invoice for
5 SCIF contends the auditors expressed no objection to the exclusion of
per diem payments from payroll during the 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004
policy years because they did not detect it until later. ReadyLink by contrast
contends the auditors expressed no objection either because the exclusion of
per diem from payroll conformed to the policy’s terms or for deceitful reasons,
discussed post.
7
the additional premium; and, beginning in 2007, there ensued a series of
proceedings involving efforts by ReadyLink to avoid, and efforts by SCIF to
enforce, payment of the additional premium.
In addressing these efforts (and ReadyLink’s claims of error on appeal),
we proceed with a discussion in two parts. The first discussion focuses on
claims of error rooted in proceedings, from 2007 to 2022, in which several
decisionmaking bodies determined that a set of workers’ compensation
regulations known as the USRP6 governed calculation of payroll under the
SCIF policy and that the USRP required ReadyLink’s per diem payments to
be included in payroll.7 Thereafter, the second discussion focuses on claims
6 The term USRP refers to the California Workers’ Compensation
Uniform Statistical Reporting Plan—1995, which is a “compendi[um] of
administrative rules and regulations governing the issuance of workers’
compensation coverage by SCIF and other [insurance] carriers. They set
forth classifications, rates and rating systems approved by the [Insurance]
[C]ommissioner pursuant to [Insurance Code] sections 11658 and 11730 et
seq. and have been incorporated by reference into the California Code of
Regulations.” (ReadyLink III, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 431, fn. 4; see also
ReadyLink I, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 1, fn. 1 [“The provisions of the
USRP . . . are part of the Insurance Commissioner’s regulations, at title 10,
California Code of Regulations, section 2352.1”].)
7 Before commencing our discussion of the proceedings culminating in
this appeal, we address several motions and requests that the parties filed
during the pendency of the appeal. Specifically, SCIF filed a motion to
dismiss and for sanctions, ReadyLink filed a cross-motion for sanctions, and
each party filed a brief and a request for judicial notice in support of its
motion(s) and a brief in opposition to its adversary’s motion(s). (SCIF also
attempted to file an unauthorized reply brief.) Each of these items pertains
to arguments by SCIF that the appeal should be dismissed on the grounds
that: (1) ReadyLink is not legally aggrieved by the judgment and thus lacks
standing to appeal; and (2) statements ReadyLink made in a bankruptcy
action (see post) should estop it from claiming it is legally aggrieved. Having
examined the parties’ arguments and the supporting documentation, we
conclude the motion to dismiss is without merit, and we decline to award
8
of error arising from a 2023 trial, post-trial motions, and judgments that
capped those proceedings.
II. DISCUSSION ONE—The USRP and SCIF’s Rate Filing
A. Additional Background
1. 2007-2014: ReadyLink’s Appeals Challenging SCIF’s
Decision to Include Per Diem Payments in Payroll for the
2005 Policy Year, and the Role that USRP Regulations
Played in Those Appeals
Between 2007 and 2012, ReadyLink initiated a series of appeals in
which it challenged SCIF’s inclusion of per diem payments in payroll for the
2005 policy year. The first such appeal was to SCIF’s customer assistance
program, the second was to the Department of Insurance (DOI), the third was
to the Los Angeles County Superior Court, and the fourth was to the Second
District Court of Appeal. (ReadyLink I, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 1170;
ReadyLink III, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at pp. 433–435.)
Central to each of these proceedings was the USRP. Indeed, so pivotal
was the USRP to each stage in this escalation of appeals that the very first
sentence of the opinion written by the ALJ read: “This appeal . . . arises from
a dispute between . . . SCIF . . . and . . . ReadyLink . . . regarding the proper
calculation of payroll for premium . . . purposes under the terms of
the . . . USRP.” (ReadyLink Agency Appeal, supra, Dept. of Ins. No. AHB-
WCA-08-14 at p. 1, italics added.) In keeping with this description of the
dispute, the ALJ framed the matter before her as confined to one single
question: “For policy year 2005, did SCIF properly include per diem
payments made to [ReadyLink] nurses as ‘payroll’ or ‘remuneration’ pursuant
to USRP, Part 3, Section V?” (ReadyLink Agency Appeal, supra, Dept. of Ins.
No. AHB-WCA-08-14 at p. 2, italics added.)
sanctions to either party. The requests for judicial notice are granted, and
the motions are denied.
9
According to the USRP, a per diem payment should be excluded from
payroll if each of two requirements is satisfied. These requirements are:
(1) that the “amount [of the payment] is reasonable” and (2) that “the
employer’s records show that the employee worked at a job location that
would have required the employee to incur additional expenses not normally
assumed by the employee.”
The USRP does not elaborate on either of these requirements. Thus,
the ALJ engaged in “a lengthy analysis, including [a] review of federal tax
law,” and, on the basis of this analysis, concluded: (1) that a per diem
payment is “reasonable” and thus satisfies the first requirement “ ‘if it
comports with common sense, is not lavish or extravagant, and is not made
for the purpose of circumventing per diem regulations’ ”; and (2) that, for
such a payment to satisfy the second requirement, the “employer must
provide records proving that each employee receiving per diem
reimbursement worked at a location that required the employee to incur
‘additional duplicate living expenses and that such expenses were mitigated
by per diem reimbursement.’ ” (ReadyLink I, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1171.)
Applying this interpretation, the ALJ determined that the per diem
payments ReadyLink had made during the 2005 policy year satisfied neither
requirement. Specifically:
“The [ALJ] concluded that ReadyLink failed to prove
that its per diem payments were reasonable under the
USRP because it paid ‘a below-market hourly wage for the
type of work being performed’ and then used the per diem
payments to ‘increase[ ] its nurses’ income while avoiding
payroll tax liabilities for itself.’ [In arriving at this
conclusion, the ALJ] expressly rejected ReadyLink’s
contention that its per diem payments were reasonable
because they comported with the federal per diem amounts
10
for the Continental United States (CONUS) listed in 41
Code of Federal Regulations, Chapter 301, Appendix A . . . .
Instead, the [ALJ] found that ReadyLink failed to prove the
per diem payments reflected the traveling nurses’
anticipated living expenses, failed to show that its nurses
worked at locations that required additional duplicate
living expenses beyond normal commuting expenses, failed
to monitor employee eligibility for per diem payments, and
failed to require its employees to substantiate their per
diem expenses.” (ReadyLink I, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1171; see also ReadyLink Agency Appeal, supra, Dept. of
Ins. No. AHB-WCA-08-14 at pp. 16–40.)
As noted ante, the ALJ set forth her analysis, findings, and conclusions
in a proposed decision that issued in 2009. Then, in an order issued that
same year, the Commissioner adopted the ALJ’s proposed decision and
designated it as precedential. Thereafter, ReadyLink sought review of the
Commissioner’s order by filing a petition for peremptory writ of
administrative mandamus in Los Angeles County Superior Court.
(ReadyLink I, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 1172.) That court denied the writ
(ibid.), whereupon ReadyLink appealed to the Second District Court of
Appeal. In 2012, the Second District affirmed, (id., at pp. 1168, 1188)8 and
its opinion became final following the denial of a petition for review filed in
the California Supreme Court. (ReadyLink II, supra, 754 F.3d at p. 756.)
2. 2015-2022: SCIF’s Collection Action Against ReadyLink,
and ReadyLink’s Discovery that It Was SCIF’s Rate Filing,
8 In 2011, while the matter was pending before the Second District Court
of Appeal, ReadyLink filed a putative class action lawsuit against SCIF in the
United States District Court for the Central District of California, contending
federal law preempted the Commissioner’s decision. (ReadyLink II, supra,
754 F.3d at pp. 756–757.) The district court dismissed that suit on
abstention grounds, and in 2014 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
(Id., at p. 757.)
11
Not the USRP, that Governed the Computation of Payroll
For Purposes of Calculating Premiums
a. SCIF’s Complaint, ReadyLink’s Answers, Entry of
Judgment, and Reversal of Judgment
Notwithstanding the decisions of the ALJ, the Commissioner, the Los
Angeles County Superior Court, the Second District, the federal district
court, and the Ninth Circuit, ReadyLink did not remit the $555,327.53 in
additional premium to SCIF. Thus, in 2015, SCIF initiated the lawsuit from
which the present appeal is taken.
SCIF initiated the lawsuit with the filing of a complaint for breach of
contract9 in a new forum: Riverside County Superior Court. ReadyLink
responded by filing an answer that included a general denial and asserted
nine affirmative defenses. (ReadyLink III, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 437.)
SCIF filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings targeting the
answer. The trial court granted the motion with leave to amend. ReadyLink
then filed an amended answer that included a general denial, asserted six
affirmative defenses—estoppel, ratification, fraud, unclean hands, waiver,
and violation of Insurance Code section 38110—and added, in support of
those defenses, a set of allegations to the effect that ReadyLink’s decision to
9 The complaint also asserted two claims in the nature of common
counts. But, inasmuch as the distinctions among these claims and the breach
of contract claim are not significant for the purposes of this appeal, we use
the term breach of contract to refer to all three.
10 The defense of violation of Insurance Code section 381 was premised on
language in that section pertaining to insurance policies “of a character
where the exact premium is only determinable upon the termination of the
contract.” (Ins. Code § 381, subd. (f)(2).) That language requires that such
policies specify “the basis and rates upon which the final premium is to be
determined and paid.” (Ibid.)
12
insure with SCIF for the 2005 policy period had been induced by deceptive
conduct on the part of SCIF. In this regard, the amended answer alleged:
− That “ReadyLink [had been] upfront with SCIF about its
compensation structure and fully disclosed its per diem
[program] to SCIF.”
− That, “with full knowledge of [ReadyLink’s
compensation] structure,” SCIF had represented “that
the premium[ ] SCIF was offering” “would be based
upon ReadyLink’s compensation method” and would be
“the premium SCIF would charge.”
− That “SCIF [had] repeatedly audited ReadyLink for
[prior policy] years,” yet “did not say a peep to
ReadyLink about whether ReadyLink’s compensation
formulas could lead to an additional premium down the
road.”
− That, “[b]ased upon SCIF’s audits, ReadyLink believed,
and had every reason to believe, that SCIF had looked at
ReadyLink’s payroll practices and properly charge[d]
premiums based on those practices.”
− That “SCIF either intentionally or recklessly quoted
premiums to ReadyLink [that] SCIF either knew or
should have known were false,” thereby using “a classic
bait and switch of quoting a lower premium to
ReadyLink[,] knowing SCIF would come back years later
and contend ReadyLink did not properly classify its
payroll and, therefore, was subject to a higher
premium.”
SCIF filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to the
amended answer. (ReadyLink III, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 439.) The trial
court granted the motion without leave to amend and entered judgment in
favor of SCIF. (Id., at pp. 440–441) ReadyLink appealed the judgment to the
Fourth District Court of Appeal, Division One (id., at p. 442); and, in 2020,
this court reversed.
13
In reversing the trial court, the court of appeal noted ReadyLink’s
acknowledgment “that it [had] previously litigated and lost its challenge to
SCIF’s decision to include per diem amounts as payroll for the 2005
insurance year” and agreed with ReadyLink that the trial court nonetheless
had erred in concluding that the amount of premium ReadyLink owed SCIF
for the 2005 policy year had been determined in the prior proceedings.
(ReadyLink III, 50 Cal.App.5th at pp. 429–430.) Summarizing ReadyLink’s
position and its own reasoning in reversing the judgment, the court of appeal
wrote:
“ReadyLink . . . argues [1] that it has never had the
opportunity to challenge whether SCIF otherwise properly
calculated the premium amount that it claims is due,
pursuant to the terms of the contract between the parties,
or [2] whether SCIF’s past conduct, which ReadyLink
alleges includes SCIF’s acceptance of ReadyLink’s
exclusions of its per diem payments from payroll in prior
policy years and SCIF’s exclusion of per diem amounts in
paying out on workers’ compensation claims filed by
ReadyLink employees, might bar SCIF from being entitled
to collect that premium amount under the contract.
“We agree with ReadyLink that the trial court erred in
granting SCIF’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. A
full review of the collateral administrative and judicial
proceedings [including the ReadyLink Agency Appeal,
ReadyLink I, and ReadyLink II opinions] demonstrates
that ReadyLink and SCIF have not previously litigated the
vast majority of issues raised by SCIF’s action seeking to
collect additional premium amounts from ReadyLink, and
further reveals that those issues could not have been
litigated in the administrative action. We therefore reverse
the judgment.” (ReadyLink III, 50 Cal.App.5th at pp. 429–
430.)
14
b. Rate Deviations
As discussed ante, the issues litigated in the ReadyLink Agency Appeal
revolved around whether or not ReadyLink’s per diem program complied with
the USRP. But, notably, workers’ compensation insurers are not required to
hew to the USRP rates in devising their approaches to setting premiums.
Rather, the Insurance Code permits them to depart from the USRP rates by
filing “rate deviations” with the Office of the Insurance Commissioner (OIC).
(Ins. Code § 11734, subd. (b) [“[a]n insurer may develop its own classification
system upon which a rate may be made or adopt the classification system” of
the USRP].)
c. ReadyLink’s Discovery that the Computation of
Payroll For Purposes of Calculating Premiums
Under the SCIF Policy Was Governed Not By the
USRP, But by SCIF’s Rate Filing
ReadyLink contends that, at some point prior to entry of the second
order granting judgment on the pleadings in the present case (see ante), it
made a discovery that completely changed the complexion of the case.
Specifically, it says it learned that a fundamental premise undergirding the
ReadyLink Agency Appeal and the decisions of the Commissioner and courts
that flowed from it—the premise that calculation of premiums under the
SCIF policy was governed by the USRP—was incorrect, and that the
calculation of such premiums was instead governed by a wholly different
standard.
As expressed by ReadyLink’s counsel, in a letter he sent to SCIF in
2017:
“[At the time of the 2007 audit,] SCIF used the language of
the . . . USRP to reject ReadyLink’s position concerning the
exclusion of per-diem payments [from] payroll . . . in SCIF’s
premium calculation. [¶ . . . ¶] Throughout [the ensuing
appeal to the OIC], SCIF continued to represent that the
15
USRP’s provisions . . . governed the premium dispute.
[¶ . . . ¶] The [ALJ], having no reason to question SCIF’s
representation . . . , issued a decision favorable to SCIF.
Currently, SCIF and ReadyLink are engaged in litigation
in which SCIF has continued to contend that the language
of the USRP controls. In fact, SCIF has calendared . . . a
court hearing on its Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
based upon this same position.
“However, ReadvLink has discovered that SCIF’s
representations on this issue made to ReadyLink[,] . . . to
the [DOI] and to the state and federal courts have been
false. The USRP is in fact irrelevant to the dispute
because . . . SCIF did not adopt the USRP’s
provisions . . . pertaining to per diem but rather, via its own
rate filings, SCIF adopted a different, more lenient
standard.”
What ReadyLink characterized as a “more lenient” standard is set forth
in the right-hand column of this chart, which juxtaposes the standard
expressed in the USRP and the standard expressed in SCIF’s rate filing:
Per Diem Payments Are Excluded from Payroll . . .
Under The USRP Under the SCIF Rate Filing.
if the “amount is reasonable and the if the amount is “based on actual or
employer’s records show that the documented expenditures by an
employee worked at a job location that employee and . . . [is] of a type not
would have required the employee to normally assumed by an
incur additional expenses not employee.”
normally assumed by the employee.”
According to ReadyLink, SCIF had exercised its right to deviate from
the USRP11 but concealed this information from ReadyLink, the ALJ, the
11 The trial court, in its ruling on a summary adjudication motion
discussed post, said the record before it “suggest[ed]” that the SCIF rate filing
revealing that SCIF had opted out of the USRP’s standard for calculating
premiums was part of the record before the ALJ in 2009. And SCIF argues
that ReadyLink has been aware of the SCIF rate filing throughout all of the
16
DOI, and the courts,12 and the difference mattered. As argued in
ReadyLink’s opening brief on appeal:
“State Fund thus deviated from the USRP by eliminating
the requirements that the expenditures be “reasonable”
and that they be determined solely by the “employer’s
records” or by the location of the job site. The [SCIF] rate
filing only requires that the expenditures be “actual or
documented” and be of a type not normally assumed by the
employee.
“By giving the employer the alternative to provide either
“actual” or “documented” expenditures, State Fund gave
the employer one of two separate and distinct means to
establish the legitimacy of the per diem expenses. First,
legal proceedings, but chose for strategic and tactical reasons not to argue it
to the ALJ. ReadyLink, for its part, asserts: that it “had no reason to suspect
[at that time] that SCIF had opted out of the USRP” standard; that SCIF
“apparently never disclosed to anyone directly involved in the dispute . . .
that it [had done] so;” and that ReadyLink, the ALJ, the Commissioner, and
the courts reasonably relied on SCIF’s representations that calculation of
SCIF premiums was governed by the USRP. We express no opinion as to
when ReadyLink knew or should have known about the deviation in SCIF’s
rate filing.
12 The trial court, in its ruling on a summary adjudication motion
discussed post, said the record before it “suggest[ed]” that the SCIF rate filing
revealing that SCIF had opted out of the USRP’s standard for calculating
premiums was part of the record before the ALJ in 2009. And SCIF argues
that ReadyLink has been aware of the SCIF rate filing throughout all of the
legal proceedings, but chose for strategic and tactical reasons not to argue it
to the ALJ. ReadyLink, for its part, asserts: that it “had no reason to suspect
[at that time] that SCIF had opted out of the USRP” standard; that SCIF
“apparently never disclosed to anyone directly involved in the dispute . . .
that it [had done] so;” and that ReadyLink, the ALJ, the Commissioner, and
the courts reasonably relied on SCIF’s representations that calculation of
SCIF premiums was governed by the USRP. We express no opinion as to
when ReadyLink knew or should have known about the deviation in SCIF’s
rate filing.
17
the employer can collect an employee’s actual receipts and
compute the actual amount of expenses for which
reimbursement is appropriate. Alternatively, if the
employer does not wish to collect actual receipts or other
evidence of expenses, it may nevertheless still comply by
being able to otherwise document the basis of the per diem
payments. One means to document the expenses is to show
compliance with the IRS Federal CONUS tables. IRS
Publication 1542 states that the tables provide ‘the
maximum per diem rate’ without treating part of the per
diem allowance as wages for tax purposes. . . . At all
relevant times, ReadyLink’s per diem payments were
‘documented’ expenses within the meaning of the [SCIF]
rate filing, as the payments were made pursuant to the
documented IRS CONUS tables.”
d. ReadyLink’s Cross-Complaint
In 2022, after SCIF’s lawsuit returned to the trial court, ReadyLink
filed a motion for leave to file a cross-complaint asserting claims for fraud,
breach of contract, and promissory estoppel; and the trial court granted the
motion.
The cross-complaint represented both a continuation of and a departure
from the positions that ReadyLink had taken in its amended answer. It
represented a continuation inasmuch as it included allegations, similar to
those set forth in its amended answer, focusing on conduct by SCIF that
allegedly had induced ReadyLink to believe, prior to the audit, that, in 2005,
per diem payments would continue to be excluded from payroll (e.g., the
allegations, discussed ante, supporting the affirmative defenses of estoppel,
ratification, fraud, unclean hands, waiver, and violation of Insurance Code
section 381.)
But the cross-complaint represented a departure from the answer in
that it also included allegations, similar to those set forth in the letter
ReadyLink’s counsel had sent to SCIF in 2017, focusing on provisions of the
18
SCIF policy and SCIF rate filing that allowed for per diem payments, in
certain circumstances, to be excluded from payroll (e.g., the SCIF rate filing
that ReadyLink’s counsel had accused SCIF of having concealed in the prior
proceedings).
e. SCIF’s Motion for Summary Judgment, or in the
Alternative for Summary Adjudication, and Its
Demurrer to the Cross-Complaint
While ReadyLink’s motion for leave to file its cross-complaint was
pending, SCIF filed a motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, for
summary adjudication (collectively, MSJ); and, while that motion was
pending, it filed a demurrer to the cross-complaint. Ruling first on the MSJ,
the trial court decided that ReadyLink’s estoppel defense presented “a triable
issue of fact as to whether [SCIF]’s conduct from 2000-2005 [had] misled
ReadyLink[,] causing it to reasonably believe that its per diem practices were
consistent with [SCIF]’s policy.” On this basis, the court denied the motion
for summary judgment. But it granted summary adjudication with respect to
ReadyLink’s fraud and Insurance Code section 381 defenses. Then, the
following week, the court sustained the demurrer to the cross-complaint, but
granted ReadyLink leave to amend.
f. ReadyLink’s Amended Cross-Complaint, and the
Demurrer SCIF Filed in Response to It
ReadyLink filed an amended cross-complaint in which it elaborated on
the allegations of the original cross-complaint and asserted cross-claims for
breach of contract, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and promissory
estoppel. SCIF demurred to the amended cross-complaint, and the trial court
sustained the demurrer with respect to the fraud, negligent
misrepresentation, and promissory estoppel cross-claims, but permitted the
breach-of-contract cross-claim to proceed.
19
g. The Bifurcation Motion and the Motions in Limine
As trial approached, SCIF filed motions in limine and a motion to
bifurcate that resulted in evidence pertaining to the SCIF rate filing being
excluded; in SCIF’s breach of contract claim and ReadyLink’s waiver defense
being tried to a jury; and in resolution of ReadyLink’s estoppel defense and
breach of contract cross-claim being deferred to a postverdict phase of the
case.13
The trial court’s rulings on the MSJ, the demurrers, the motions in
limine, and the motion to bifurcate had the effect of (1) preserving for trial
ReadyLink’s defenses focusing on conduct by SCIF that allegedly had induced
ReadyLink to believe, prior to the audit, that, in 2005, per diem payments
would continue to be excluded from payroll, but (2) eliminating from the case
ReadyLink’s claims and defenses focusing on provisions of the SCIF policy
and SCIF rate filing that allowed per diem payments, in certain
circumstances, to be excluded from payroll.
B. ReadyLink’s Claim of Error with Respect to the Elimination of
Claims and Defenses
ReadyLink contends the trial court erred in eliminating from the case
its claims and defenses focusing on provisions of the SCIF policy and SCIF
rate filing that allowed per diem payments, under certain circumstances, to
be excluded from payroll. In support of this contention it argues that,
because prior proceedings were based exclusively on the USRP, it was denied
an opportunity to prove that its per diem payments “compl[ied] with” or
13 It is unclear what became of ReadyLink’s ratification, fraud, and
unclean hands defenses. The parties do not mention those defenses in their
appellate briefs. Hence we deem them forfeited. (Howard Jarvis Taxpayers
Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 1208, 1219 fn. 3 [issues
not raised on appeal are forfeited].)
20
“were made pursuant to the documented IRS CONUS tables” and, therefore,
“were ‘documented’ expenses within the meaning of the [SCIF] rate filing.”
C. Analysis
In examining ReadyLink’s contention, we begin by observing that the
rate filing’s phraseology is inherently ambiguous. As noted ante, the rate
filing provides that per diem payments are excluded from payroll if the
amount is “based on actual or documented expenditures by an employee
and . . . [is] of a type not normally assumed by an employee” (italics added).
But the terms “actual” and “documented” are not mutually exclusive. Hence,
at the outset of our analysis, we struggle to understand the purported
dichotomy in the rate filing’s disjunctive reference to the two terms.14
But, irrespective of the meaning one might choose to ascribe to the
term “actual” in the rate filing, we cannot accept the meaning ReadyLink
advocates for actual’s alternative: “documented.” Certainly, “documented” is
susceptible to a variety of meanings. But one meaning to which it is not
susceptible is the one underlying ReadyLink’s contention.
As discussed ante, ReadyLink’s interpretation of “documented” in the
rate filing is (1) that, “if the employer does not wish to collect actual receipts
or other evidence of expenses, [then] it may nevertheless still comply by being
able to otherwise document the basis of the per diem payments” (italics in
original) and (2) that “[o]ne means to document the expenses is to show
compliance with the IRS Federal CONUS tables.” But, as also noted ante, it
already has been determined (by the ALJ and the Commissioner), and
affirmed on appeal (by the Los Angeles County Superior Court and the
Second District Court of Appeal), that ReadyLink in fact did not comport
14 The parties have not invited our attention to any evidence bearing on
the origin or drafting history of the phrase “actual or documented” as used in
the SCIF rate filing.
21
itself in a way that could be interpreted to be in compliance with regulations
governing the CONUS tables.
As found by the ALJ and the Commissioner, ReadyLink made per diem
payments without ascertaining the distance between a recipient’s home and
their job assignment and without requiring or requesting, let alone
maintaining, documentation as to how the per diem funds received were
spent. (See ante.) Under a regimen such as this, an employee would receive
thousands of dollars in “per diem” payments tax-free, and be at liberty to
spend those payments however they pleased, even if assigned to work at a
hospital across the street from their home.15
Of the 257 nurses who ReadyLink assigned to jobs during the 2005
policy period, the ALJ found that “ReadyLink failed to prove that 142 of
[them] worked outside the metropolitan area in which they lived, such that
[their job assignments] would [require them to] incur duplicate living
expenses not normally assumed.” (ReadyLink Agency Appeal, supra, Dept. of
Ins. No. AHB-WCA-08-14 at pp. 10, 32.) In fact, “108 of the nurses working
during the policy year at issue lived within 20 miles of their place of
employment” (id, at p. 33), many of those 140 nurses lived much closer to
their assignment than that (id., at pp. 10–12, 34, 41–49), and 11 of them
lived in the same zip code as the job to which they had been assigned. (Ibid.)
15 While the ALJ’s findings did not include an example quite so egregious
as that, they certainly came close. Describing ReadyLink’s per diem policy as
“dubious,” the ALJ cited, as examples of nurses receiving substantial untaxed
per diem payments without records to substantiate their eligibility: a nurse
“who lived one mile from the hospital [and] collected nearly $16,000 in meal
and lodging expenses from ReadyLink;” one “who worked 6 miles from home
[and] received $23,000 in untaxed lodging and meal expenses;” and one who,
“[w]hile working for more than one year at a hospital 16 miles from her tax
home, . . . collected over $47,000 in tax-free per diem payments.”
22
In light of these circumstances the ALJ found, with reference to the 142
nurses referenced ante, that “[t]hese nurses clearly lived in their own homes
and returned to those homes every day and night at the completion of their
shift,” “[n]one of [them] incurred duplicate lodging expenses nor did they
incur any expenses beyond [those] normally assumed by an employee,” and
“no evidence was presented to prove that the IRS intended [its] regulations to
reward ‘temporary’ employees working 10 miles from home with a tax-free
windfall.”16 (ReadyLink Agency Appeal, supra, Dept. of Ins. No. AHB-WCA-
08-14 at p. 33.)
While the standard for excluding per diem payments from payroll
under the SCIF rate filing may not be the same as the standard that was
before the ALJ and Commissioner (i.e., the standard under the USRP),17 we
nonetheless have no difficulty concluding that, under the SCIF rate filing, as
under the USRP, invocation of the CONUS tables is meaningless in the
absence of record-keeping that could demonstrate that such invocation was
justified. Thus we conclude as a matter of law that, whatever “documented”
means, it does not mean rote reliance on the amounts set forth in the CONUS
tables applied to employees without documentation on an employee-by-
16 In the words of the ALJ, “[n]urses ‘travelling’ to and from work are
merely commuting in the clearest sense, and a taxpayer’s costs of commuting
between home and business are nondeductible personal expenses and thus
not subject to tax exempt reimbursement.”(ReadyLink Agency Appeal, supra,
Dept. of Ins. No. AHB-WCA-08-14 at p. 33.)
17 We express no view regarding the extent to which results flowing from
a correct interpretation of the standard for excluding per diem payments
from payroll under the SCIF rate filing should correlate with results flowing
from the ALJ’s interpretation of the USRP.
23
employee basis of, inter alia, the distance between the employee’s home and
work.
For the foregoing reasons, even if we were to accept ReadyLink’s
position that the standard set forth in the SCIF rate filing should be
interpreted by reference to the CONUS tables, differences between that
standard and the standard articulated in the USRP would not alter the result
in this case. Thus the trial court did not prejudicially err in excluding
evidence focusing on provisions of the SCIF policy and SCIF rate filing.
III. DISCUSSION TWO—The Trial
Having addressed ReadyLink’s claim of error with respect to the trial
court’s narrowing of the case, we now turn to its claims of error arising from
the trial that followed. As mentioned ante, those claims are that the trial
court erred in granting JNOV and a new trial. To furnish some background
for those claims of error, we return to our summary of this matter’s
procedural history, picking back up with the jury selection phase of the case.
A. Additional Background
1. Opening Statements and Preliminary Jury Instruction
At the commencement of voir dire, each counsel delivered mini opening
statements, including one in which ReadyLink’s counsel conceded that SCIF’s
audit had been performed correctly, but contended that ReadyLink
nonetheless had defenses to payment:
“We challenged [the audit] at various agencies and courts,
and we lost. It was determined that [SCIF] did their audit
correctly. [¶] However, even though they did their audit
correctly, we contend that we have other legally valid
reasons and defenses for not having to pay that premium
bill. [¶] And that’s what this trial is about, that even
though the audit was correct, we still don’t owe [SCIF] that
additional premium.”
24
Then, following voir dire and swearing in of the jurors, the trial court
instructed the jury to similar effect, saying:
“Although you will get to decide in this case whether or not
ReadyLink owes premium to [SCIF] for the 2005 policy
year, one issue that has already been decided and on which
I now instruct you is that ReadyLink’s per diem payments
are considered to be payroll for purposes of calculating
premium.
“You may not reconsider that determination. However, you
may consider the evidence admitted in this case for the
purpose of deciding whether ReadyLink has a valid defense
to [SCIF]’s claims.”
Thereafter, ReadyLink’s counsel delivered an opening statement in
which he made clear that the crux of the defense he was going to be
presenting to the jury was waiver:18
“It’s a pretty simple case. [¶] I think it comes down to the
fact that [SCIF] misled us and [SCIF] changed the rules.
They changed the rules, which misled us.
“[¶ . . . ¶]
“After the 2005 policy year, [SCIF] came out to ReadyLink
and they conducted a routine audit of our payroll and they
decided that our per diem reimbursements were payroll. [¶]
They said according to the applicable workers’
compensation rules and laws, our per diem was not true
reimbursement, but instead, was payroll. [¶] And they
claimed that because our per diem was payroll, they added
18 “Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right after
knowledge of the facts.” (Roesch v. De Mota (1944) 24 Cal.2d 563, 572; accord
Lanigan v. City of Los Angeles (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1030.) The
thrust of ReadyLink’s waiver defense was that SCIF relinquished any
contractual right to include per diem payments in payroll for the 2005 policy
year because it did not include such payments in payroll for the 2000, 2001,
2002, 2003, and 2004 policy years, despite knowing about the per diem
program throughout those years. See post.
25
those reimbursements of per diem back into the payroll,
and that resulted in an increase in premium. [¶] It was a
massive increase in premium of 555,000 dollars on top of
the 250,000 we had already paid for that year. [¶] That’s
why we’re here. [¶] We haven’t paid that 555,000 dollars
in premium because we don’t think we owe it. [¶] I told all
of the jurors here in that very, very brief [mini opening]
statement[,] and the judge has [instructed] you . . . [,] that
we challenged that decision that per diem was payroll at
both the California Department of Insurance and in
subsequent lawsuits, and we lost. [¶] Those decisions said
that per diem is payroll when it comes to workers’
compensation. [¶] But, ladies and gentlemen, it was not
until the most recent court decision in 2020 that a court
told us that even though the audit was correct and even
though per diem is payroll, that doesn’t mean we owe
[SCIF] the money for the additional premium. [¶] The
court said that we have the right to go to trial and present
our defenses to [SCIF]’s claim that we owe them 555,000
dollars in additional premium. [¶] And that’s why we’re
here. Because [SCIF] misled us and they changed the rules
on us. That’s our defense of waiver, which you’re going to
hear about.
2. Evidence
The presentation of evidence included testimony from several
witnesses. Among them were: a premium collection specialist named Alexis
Inniss, who had been employed by SCIF for 30 years; and a certified public
accountant named Carlyn Irwin, who was employed by an economic
consulting firm.
Inniss testified about certain features of the SCIF policy and about the
invoice for the final premium. In addition, she walked the jury through
SCIF’s calculation of the final premium. Her testimony supported SCIF’s
position that ReadyLink owed it $555,327.53 in additional premium for the
2005 policy year.
26
Irwin testified that she had (1) reviewed the information ReadyLink
had provided to SCIF, (2) analyzed Inniss’s calculations “to determine that
she was sourcing the right information from the right place,” and (3)
concluded, on the basis of that review, that Inniss’s “math was correct.” In
addition, she testified that, after performing those steps, she (4)
independently calculated the premium “from scratch” and (5) “concluded that
the invoice was properly calculated.” Her testimony (like Inniss’s testimony)
supported SCIF’s position that ReadyLink owed it $555,327.53 in additional
premium for the 2005 policy year.
ReadyLink did not rebut this evidence. Instead its counsel told the
court: “I’m not going to dispute any calculation that results in what our
premium is. [¶ . . . ¶] So I stipulate that the mathematical calculations on
the invoice to get to 555,327 are correct.”
3. Jury Instructions, Closing Arguments, Special Verdict
Form, and Verdict
As the trial proceeded, the court and counsel engaged in discussions
about jury instructions and a special verdict form. During those discussions,
ReadyLink’s counsel acknowledged the existence of the insurance contract
and said that ReadyLink was not going to require SCIF to establish the
elements of a contract because “[t]he issue in this case is whether ReadyLink
proved their waiver.” In keeping with these remarks, the parties agreed to
dispense with a jury instruction (CACI No. 303) setting forth the elements
that a plaintiff must establish to prove a breach of contract claim.
Thereafter, in his closing argument, ReadyLink’s counsel returned to
the waiver-focused theme of his opening statement, arguing: “It’s really a
simple case. [¶ . . . ¶] Is [SCIF] entitled to collect an additional 555,000
dollars in premium or did it waive its right to do so because for five straight
years it never included per diem as payroll?”
27
During closing arguments the jury was presented with a special verdict
form to which the parties had stipulated. In keeping with ReadyLink’s
counsel’s mini opening statement, his traditional opening statement, and his
closing argument, the liability portion of the special verdict form focused
exclusively on the topic of waiver. It read as follows:
“In this trial, [SCIF] contends that ReadyLink owes
additional outstanding premium on the 2005 policy year
invoice based on its audit of ReadyLink’s 2005 workers
compensation policy. ReadyLink contends that it does not
owe [SCIF] any money because [SCIF] waived its right to
include per diem in payroll for the 2005 audit. Please fill
out this verdict form to indicate your decision:
“1. Did ReadyLink prove by clear and convincing evidence
that [SCIF] intentionally and knowingly waived its right to
include per diem as payroll for the 2005 audit?
“__________ Yes __________ No
“If you answered Yes to Question# 1, please skip the next
question, and sign and date this verdict form. If you
answered No to this question, please answer Question #2.
“2. Did [SCIF] prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that it is owed $555,327.53 by ReadyLink?
“__________ Yes __________ No
“If you answered Yes to Question # 2, please skip the next
question, and sign and date this verdict form. If you
answered No to this question, please answer Question #3.
“3. How much in outstanding premium does ReadyLink
owe [SCIF] for the 2005 policy?
“$________________________” (Italics added.)
At the conclusion of its deliberations, the jury responded to the three
questions in the special verdict form by selecting “No” in response to
questions 1 and 2, and filling in a zero on the line for the response to question
28
3. In other words, it found against ReadyLink on the issue of liability; but it
awarded no damages.
4. Additional Rulings and Entry of Judgment
While the jury was deliberating SCIF filed, and the trial court granted,
a motion for nonsuit disposing of what remained of the cross-complaint. In
addition, the trial court found for SCIF on ReadyLink’s estoppel defense.
Following the verdict, the entry of nonsuit, and the finding disposing of the
estoppel defense, the court entered judgment: (1) “in accordance with the
[s]pecial [v]erdict” on the complaint; and (2) in favor of SCIF on the cross-
complaint.
5. Posttrial Motions and Entry of Judgment
After entry of judgment, SCIF filed motions for JNOV and for new trial
on the issue of damages. In support of these motions, it argued that it had
made an unrebutted evidentiary showing that the amount of premium owed
for the 2005 policy period was $555,327.53 and that the jury had engaged in
misconduct during deliberations.19 The court granted both motions and
directed a verdict awarding SCIF $555,327.53 in damages for breach of
contract. Then, in keeping with the directed verdict, the court entered an
amended judgment awarding SCIF $555,327.53. It is from the order
19 In support of the motion for a new trial, SCIF filed an affidavit in
which one of the jurors testified that, despite the court’s instructions to the
contrary, several jurors had expressed an intention during deliberations to
treat the per diem payments as something other than payroll or to consider
the effects that awarding damages might have on ReadyLink’s ability to
continue as a going concern. We do not address the contents of this affidavit
because we conclude post that the order granting a new trial is moot.
29
granting a new trial and the amended judgment that the present appeal is
taken.20
B. ReadyLink’s Claim of Error with Respect to the JNOV
ReadyLink contends the trial court erred in granting JNOV to SCIF.
In addressing this contention, we begin with the legal principles governing
JNOV motions.
1. Applicable Legal Principles
A trial court is required to render JNOV whenever a motion for a
directed verdict should have been granted, had such a motion been made.
(Code Civ. Proc., § 629; see also 7 Witkin, Cal. Proc. (6th ed. 2025) Trial
§ 427.) And a motion for directed verdict should be granted when “no other
reasonable conclusion is legally deducible from the evidence,” such “that any
other holding would be so lacking in evidentiary support that a reviewing
court would be impelled to reverse it upon appeal.” (In re Lances’ Estate
(1932) 216 Cal. 397, 400 (Lances’ Estate).) Thus, a motion for directed
verdict is appropriate whenever, “disregarding conflicting evidence and
giving [non-movant’s] evidence all the value to which it is legally entitled,
including every legitimate inference which may be drawn therefrom, the
result is a determination that there is no evidence of sufficient substantiality
to support a verdict in favor of [non-movant] if such verdict was given.”
(Ibid.; see also Newing v. Cheatham (1975) 15 Cal.3d 351, 359 [“ ‘A motion for
20 After entry of the amended judgment, ReadyLink filed for bankruptcy
protection in the United States District Court for the Central District of
California, triggering an automatic stay of proceedings in this case. Then,
several months later (after the bankruptcy case had been closed, the stay
lifted, and this case reactivated), SCIF filed a motion seeking an award of
$907,998.38 in prejudgment interest. The trial court entered an order
granting that motion. ReadyLink appealed that order. The appeal from that
order is pending in this court as case no. D086045.
30
a directed verdict may be granted upon the motion of the plaintiff, where,
upon the whole evidence, the cause of action alleged in the complaint is
supported and no substantial support is given to the defense alleged by the
defendant.’ ”].)
2. Analysis
As can be seen in our summary ante of what transpired at trial, SCIF
presented two witnesses who testified to the appropriateness and accuracy of
the $555,327.53 additional premium calculation, and ReadyLink did not
rebut their testimony. ReadyLink also did not dispute any element of SCIF’s
breach of contract claim, and it did not prevail on any affirmative defense. In
sum, at trial, after the court had instructed the jury that it could not
reconsider the inclusion of per diem in payroll: (1) ReadyLink conceded that
the only issue left for the jury to resolve with regard to liability was the
waiver defense; (2) the jury resolved that defense against ReadyLink; (3) the
court resolved the other remaining defense—estoppel—against ReadyLink;
and (4) ReadyLink further conceded, as to damages, that the audit resulting
in a $555,327.53 invoice had been performed correctly. As a consequence,
there was no remaining defense to liability, and there was no substantial
evidence that the amount SCIF was owed was zero or any other amount
apart from the $555,327.53 balance that SCIF witnesses Inniss and Irwin
each had independently calculated. Under circumstances such as this, it is
fair to say that a finding of zero damages “would be so lacking in evidentiary
support that a reviewing court would be impelled to reverse it upon appeal.”
(Lances’ Estate, supra, 216 Cal. at p. 400.)
In contending to the contrary, ReadyLink points out that the jury heard
testimony: (1) that SCIF was not obligated to collect the additional premium;
(2) that it had discretion to forego enforcing its right to collect the additional
premium; and (3) that, in exercising that discretion, it could have chosen to
31
enforce its right to collect the additional premium only prospectively, rather
than retrospectively and “without warning” for the 2005 policy year. In this
same vein, ReadyLink also points to (4) evidence that SCIF did not charge
additional premium for the 2006 policy year; and (5) to a lack of evidence that
SCIF needed additional premium, beyond the $250,000 it had received at the
commencement of the 2005 policy year, “to administer [ReadyLink’s] account,
[to] cover the cost of claims, or for any other purpose.” ReadyLink argues
that such testimony amounted to substantial evidence on the basis of which
the jury could reasonably have concluded that SCIF “had not suffered any
damages when it chose to invoice ReadyLink for additional premium
following its 2005 . . . policy year.”
But this argument misapprehends the concept of harm suffered in a
breach of contract case, such as this, in which a plaintiff defeats a defendant’s
affirmative defenses and establishes that a contract has been breached as a
result of the defendant’s failure to pay the monetary consideration it
promised under the contract. In such a situation, the harm sustained is the
promisee’s loss of the benefit of its bargain; and the measure of damages is
the amount that would “give the [promisee] the benefit of [its] bargain and
insofar as possible . . . place [it] in the same position [it] would have been had
the promisor performed the contract.” (See Overgaard v. Johnson (1977)
68 Cal.App.3d 821, 824.) In other words, SCIF having proven that
ReadyLink breached the parties’ contract, and the jury and the court having
rejected ReadyLink’s defenses, SCIF was “entitled to damages that are the
equivalent to the benefit of [its] contractual bargain.” (Lewis Jorge
Construction Management, Inc. v. Pomona Unified School Dist. (2004)
34 Cal.4th 960, 968.) Those damages are set at $555,327.53, and there is no
evidence as to any other amount.
32
Thus it is of no consequence that a promisee (SCIF in this case) might
not be required to claim the amount it is owed or might be of sufficient means
to get by without receiving the entirety of that amount. If it received less
than what it bargained for, it is harmed. Consequently, we conclude the trial
court did not err in granting JNOV.
C. ReadyLink’s Claim of Error with Respect to the Order Granting
a New Trial
When a trial court enters JNOV and an order granting a new trial (new
trial order), and the JNOV is appealed, the new trial order takes effect only if
the JNOV is reversed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 629, subd. (d); see also 7 Witkin,
Cal. Proc. (6th ed. 2025) Trial § 433.) Here, the JNOV is not being reversed.
Hence the new trial order is moot, and we need not address ReadyLink’s
contention that the trial court erred in entering it.
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. SCIF is entitled to costs on appeal.
KELETY, J.
WE CONCUR:
DATO, Acting P. J.
DO, J.
33
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