In re S.F. CA1/4

CourtListener 10855921Calctapp07.05.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 5/7/26 In re S.F. CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re S.F., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE, A172335
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Alameda County Super. Ct.
v. No. JV-029518-03)
S.F.,
Defendant and Appellant.

In this juvenile wardship proceeding (Welf. & Inst. Code § 602), the
juvenile court sustained a petition against minor S.F. for first degree murder,
attempted first degree murder, and attempted robbery. The court imposed
concurrent maximum times of confinement of 25 years to life for first degree
murder, 15 years to life for attempted first degree murder, and 8 months for
attempted robbery. The court granted him 951 days credit for time he spent
in custody before his dispositional hearing.
S.F. raises two issues on appeal. First, he contends that insufficient
evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding that the attempted murder
was premeditated and deliberate, a prerequisite for the charge’s first-degree
designation. If the charge were reduced to second degree, the maximum term
of confinement would be seven years instead of fifteen. (See Welf. & Inst.

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Code, § 726, subd. (d)(1); Pen. Code, § 664, subd. (a).) Second, he contends
that the court should have granted him two more days credit for a total of
953, and the Attorney General agrees. We conclude that only the second
contention has merit. We therefore affirm the finding that the attempted
murder was premeditated and deliberate, and we modify the dispositional
order to reflect 953 days of precommitment credit.
BACKGROUND
In July 2021, 16-year-old S.F. left a market with his dog, having bought
dog food inside. Two young men stopped him outside the market door, and
one of them took S.F.’s dog from him at gunpoint. After briefly going back
inside the store, S.F. came out and fired multiple gun shots at the two men,
who were walking away with the dog. Four of the shots hit one of the men,
who died as a result.
Three days later, around 3:30 a.m., S.F. stood near the side of a gas
station building. He had the same gun that he had used in the earlier
incident, loaded with at least one live round. Robert Whelan pulled up to one
of the gas pumps and went inside to buy coffee, noticing S.F. at the side of the
building. Whelan returned to his car with the coffee and filled his tank.
As he started to get into the car, S.F. jumped out, pointed the gun at
Whelan’s face, and screamed something along the lines of, “Give me all your
money, motherfucker.” S.F. was about five to six feet from Whelan. Whelan
believed that S.F. was going to shoot him in the head.
Instead of complying with S.F.’s demand, Whelan threw his coffee at
S.F.’s face, ducked down to avoid the gunfire he anticipated, and looked for
something with which to fight back. As he threw the coffee, S.F. fired one
shot, hitting Whelan in the abdomen. Whelan reached for a garbage can lid
so that he could use it as a shield or a weapon. When he stood back up, S.F.

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was running across the parking lot, and the gas station shop clerk was calling
911. S.F.’s cell phone lay on the ground near Whelan’s car.
At S.F.’s jurisdictional hearing, regarding the gas station incident, the
juvenile court stated: “The evidence supported finding beyond a reasonable
doubt that the shooter in that particular incident did in fact act with a
requisite malice intent to kill and took the direct step by shooting the victim
from a range of approximately five feet away. There’s no reasonable doubt
that the shooter in fact acted willfully and with deliberation and
premeditation.”
Police arrested S.F. on March 30, 2022, and his dispositional hearing
was held on November 6, 2024. The juvenile court credited S.F. with
951 days of precommitment confinement.

DISCUSSION
I.
S.F. argues that insufficient evidence supports the finding that his
attempted murder of Whelan was premeditated and deliberate. We disagree.
We review this challenge as we would in an adult criminal case.
(In re A.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 647, 653.) Specifically, “ ‘we review the
whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to decide whether
substantial evidence supports the conviction, so that a reasonable fact finder
could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Ibid.; see Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 5.780 [specifying proof beyond a reasonable doubt as standard of
decision]; Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1008.) We must
assume the existence of every fact in support of the judgment that the
juvenile court reasonably could deduce from the evidence. (People v. Morales
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 76, 88.) “Where the circumstances reasonably justify the
trier of fact’s findings, a reviewing court’s conclusion that the circumstances

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might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant
the judgment’s reversal.” (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 358.)
Murder is presumed to be second degree (People v. Anderson (1968)
70 Cal.2d 15, 24–25), and it requires the formation of a specific intent to kill
(see id. at p. 26; Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)). To qualify as first degree, the
murder additionally must be “willful, deliberate, and premeditated.”
(Pen. Code, § 189, subd. (a).) A reviewing court does not distinguish between
attempted and completed first degree murder for the purpose of determining
whether there is sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation.
(People v. Herrera (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1456, 1462, fn. 8, disapproved on
other ground by People v. Mesa (2012) 54 Cal.4th 191, 198–199.)
“ ‘ “[P]remeditated” means “considered beforehand,” and “deliberate”
means “formed or arrived at or determined upon as a result of careful
thought and weighing of considerations for and against the proposed course
of action.” ’ ” (People v. Lee (2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 636.) Establishing that a
murder or attempted murder was premeditated and deliberate “ ‘ “requires
more than a showing of intent to kill; the killer must act deliberately,
carefully weighing the considerations for and against a choice to kill before he
or she completes the act[ ] . . . .” ’ ” (People v. Serrano (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th
1324, 1333.) “[T]he requisite reflection need not span a specific or extended
period of time.” (People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 543.)
To evaluate whether substantial evidence supports a finding of
premeditation, reviewing courts generally look to evidence of planning,
motive, and the manner of the attack. (People v. Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d
at pp. 26–27.) These factors “are descriptive and neither normative nor
exhaustive, and . . . reviewing courts need not accord them any particular
weight.” (People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 379, 420.) They merely help

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the reviewing court structure its inquiry. (People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th
1117, 1125.)
S.F. argues that he planned a robbery, not a murder. But even if that
is one of the reasonable conclusions a trier of fact could reach, we cannot
agree with S.F. that “there is no evidence that [he] planned to kill, or even
considered killing Whelan.” To the contrary, there is substantial evidence
that he planned a robbery and that he considered killing or planned to kill
his victim. To start with, he brought a loaded gun that he knew was in
working order. (See, e.g., People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 87
[defendant bringing a loaded gun and shooting an unarmed victim reasonably
suggests that defendant “considered the possibility of murder in advance”].)
In addition, he arrived at the gas station before Whelan, and he did not
initiate the robbery until after Whelan had bought coffee and filled his tank.
While he waited, he had time to think about what he would do.
The events that unfolded would permit the trier of fact to infer that
S.F. used that time to consider, or perhaps commit to, the possibility that he
would kill if his victim were to resist. S.F. positioned himself within five or
six feet of Whelan, pointed his loaded gun at Whelan’s face, and demanded
money, implicitly threatening to kill him if he did not comply. The close
range increased the likelihood that Whelan would die if S.F. were to fire.
(People v. Poindexter (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 572, 588 [shooting victim from
relatively close range supported finding of premeditation].) Moreover,
Whelan saw S.F.’s demeanor and heard S.F.’s tone of voice. He testified that
he believed that S.F. was going to shoot him in the head. This first-hand
impression supported an inference that S.F. was prepared to, or intended to,
kill Whelan.

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When Whelan threw the coffee instead of complying, S.F. pulled the
trigger without hesitation. Viewed in the context of the foregoing facts, S.F.’s
unhesitating response permits an inference that he had weighed the
considerations for and against killing before he initiated the robbery, and had
armed himself because he was willing to kill. Prior reflection, the juvenile
court could infer, either had already resulted in a decision to kill his victim or
allowed S.F. to make a fast, deliberate decision in the moment once Whelan
resisted. The bullet hit Whelan in the abdomen, a vital part of the body,
further supporting the juvenile court’s conclusion that S.F.’s act was
deliberate and premeditated. (People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1082
[firing shot at victim’s abdomen from close range indicated deliberate attempt
to kill].)
We are unpersuaded by S.F.’s argument that there is no evidence of
motive. The evidence supports an inference that S.F. attempted to kill
Whelan to further the robbery, to eliminate Whelan as a witness, or for
simple revenge because Whelan did not comply with S.F.’s demand. (See
People v. Watkins (2012) 55 Cal.4th 999, 1026; People v. Brito (1991)
232 Cal.App.3d 316, 323 [victim refusing to comply with robbery demand and
trying to flee was evidence of motive to kill].) Regarding the first of these
motives, S.F. argues that shooting Whelan would not have furthered the
robbery because the sound of the gunshot likely would have drawn a store
employee’s attention. But when S.F. pulled the trigger, Whelan had already
shown that he would not cooperate. The juvenile court could infer that S.F.
then decided (or previously had decided when considering what he would do if
faced with resistance) to press the matter rather than to retreat, even if his
action could draw attention.

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S.F. also argues that evidence relating to the manner of the attempted
killing did not show a preconceived design to take Whelan’s life. (See People
v. Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 27.) Instead, he contends, the evidence
shows that he shot Whelan “reflexively and impulsively” when Whelan
unexpectedly threw the coffee at his face. In support of this theory, S.F.
points to evidence that he did not shoot Whelan immediately; he fired only
when Whelan threw the coffee, presumably an unexpected and startling
event; he did not fire again; and he ran, without completing the robbery.
While S.F. offers a reasonable view of the evidence, our inquiry is not
whether substantial evidence could support S.F.’s contention that he did not
act with premeditation. It is only whether substantial evidence supports the
juvenile court’s conclusion that he did. (See People v. Zamudio, supra,
43 Cal.4th at p. 358.) As with planning and motive, evidence relating to the
manner of the attempted killing provides such support. S.F. knowingly
pointed a loaded gun at Whelan’s head while standing five or six feet away.
When startled, his first response was not to retreat but to shoot, firing from
close range and hitting Whelan in the abdomen. The juvenile court could
infer that S.F. then ran after firing a potentially fatal shot because he lost his
nerve or he feared getting caught—not because he had shot impulsively.
We do not suggest that the prosecution’s evidence of premeditation and
deliberation was particularly strong. A different finder of fact might have
agreed with S.F.’s arguments about which inferences are more plausible, and
the substantial-evidence issue presented on appeal may be closer than most.
Viewing the record as a whole, however, we conclude that sufficient evidence
relating to planning, motive, and manner of attempted killing supports the
juvenile court’s finding that S.F. attempted to kill Whelan with
premeditation and deliberation.

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II.
S.F. contends that the juvenile court should have credited him 953 days
instead of 951 days for his time in custody before his dispositional hearing.
The Attorney General agrees, as do we.
The juvenile court must subtract days that a juvenile spends in custody
before disposition from their maximum period of physical confinement.
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 875, subd. (c)(1)(C); In re Antwon R. (2001)
87 Cal.App.4th 348, 352.) The court subtracts the full period of
precommitment custody starting with the day of arrest and including the day
of the dispositional hearing. (See Pen. Code, § 2900.5; People v. Bravo (1990)
219 Cal.App.3d 729, 735 [custody credit includes days of arrest and
sentencing]; Antwon R., at p. 352 [minors are entitled to same reduction that
adults receive under Penal Code section 2900.5].)
Starting with his arrest on March 30, 2022, S.F. spent all days in
custody until and including his dispositional hearing on November 6, 2024.
Properly calculated (including an extra day for the leap year in 2024), this
was 953 days. When, as in this case, there is no dispute about a calculation
error, we need not remand the matter for recalculation. (See In re Antwon R.,
supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 353.) Instead, we may modify the dispositional
order.

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DISPOSITION
The dispositional order is modified to reflect that S.F. is entitled to
953 days’ credit for precommitment custody. The juvenile court is directed to
prepare the amended order and to forward a copy to the appropriate
authorities. As modified, we affirm the judgment.
GOLDMAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

STREETER, Acting P. J.
SWEET, J. *

*Judge of the Marin Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice

pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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