Tamayo v. City of Los Angeles CA2/3

CourtListener 10853725Calctapp05.05.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 5/5/26 Tamayo v. City of Los Angeles CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

ISMAEL TAMAYO, B340045

Plaintiff and Appellant, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 23STCP01715

CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Stephen I. Goorvitch, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Gregory G. Yacoubian and Gregory G.
Yacoubian for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Hydee Feldstein Soto, City Attorney, Denise C. Mills, Chief
Deputy City Attorney, Kathleen A. Kenealy, Chief Assistant City
Attorney, Shaun Dabby Jacobs, Supervising Assistant City
Attorney, Michael M. Walsh, Deputy City Attorney for
Defendants and Respondents City of Los Angeles and Michel
Moore.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Appellant Ismael Tamayo appeals from the trial court’s
denial of his petition for writ of administrative mandate brought
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5.1 Tamayo, a
former police officer for the Los Angeles Police Department
(LAPD), went camping with two other LAPD officers and, after
drinking heavily, shot one of the officers. Tamayo maintained
that his conduct was the result of a dissociative episode caused by
service-connected post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The
LAPD Board of Rights (the Board) found Tamayo guilty on three
charges and recommended a penalty of termination, which Chief
of Police Michel Moore imposed. Tamayo filed a petition for writ
of administrative mandate challenging the decision by the City of
Los Angeles and the Chief of Police (collectively, Respondents) to
terminate his employment. He also moved to augment the
administrative record. Tamayo contended that Respondents
erred by applying an “objectively reasonable” standard from
Graham v. Connor (1989) 490 U.S. 386 (Graham), to assess his
misconduct, and that Respondents abused their discretion by
imposing termination instead of an alternative remedy. The trial
court denied his petition. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts and procedural history
A. Tamayo’s military and employment background
Tamayo was hired by LAPD as a police officer in 2006. He
previously served on active duty in the United States Army
between 1994 and 1998 and was deployed to Kuwait during this

1 All subsequent undesignated statutory references are to
the Code of Civil Procedure.

2
time. Tamayo also served with the California National Guard.
Tamayo was recalled to active duty in 2001, 2004, and 2007, and
experienced combat. In 2013, the Department of Veterans Affairs
diagnosed Tamayo with “service-connected” PTSD and assigned
him a total rating of 30 percent disability.
B. The May 2, 2020 incident
The relevant facts are undisputed. On May 2, 2020,
Tamayo, Officer Mark Mascareno, and Sergeant Javier Vega
went to Apple Valley to camp and target shoot. The officers were
friends and co-workers. Beginning around 6:30 p.m., the officers
set up targets and shot various firearms. Around 7:30 p.m., the
officers ate dinner and consumed alcoholic beverages. Tamayo
estimated he had a 12-ounce beer with dinner, followed by four to
six more beers and approximately six ounces of whiskey. For
several hours the officers “ ‘were just chatting, normal
conversation, . . . laughing and just having a good old time.’ ”
Around 12:30 a.m. to 1:00 a.m., the officers started getting
ready for bed. Tamayo stated he needed to urinate and walked
behind his truck. He still had his semi-automatic Glock pistol on
his belt. Mascareno saw Tamayo hunched over by his truck
“ ‘like if he had passed out standing up.’ ” Mascareno asked
Tamayo “ ‘[w]hy are you being so creepy over there?’ ” Mascareno
then saw Tamayo holding his pistol in a double-handed, “ ‘low
ready position.’ ” Tamayo repeatedly called out, “ ‘Get back. Stay
back.’ ” Mascareno said, “ ‘Hey man, put your gun away. What
are you doing?’ ” Tamayo shot at Mascareno three times. The
third shot hit Mascareno in the left shoulder area.
Vega yelled out to Tamayo to give him the gun. Tamayo
turned the gun on Vega and repeated “ ‘Mark, Javi, fall back,’ ”
and then ran off into the desert.

3
Mascareno sought help from campers at a nearby campsite
who called the San Bernardino Sheriff’s Department. He was
transported to a hospital for his injuries, which were not fatal.
Tamayo eventually lost consciousness. He was found by
the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department and taken into
custody. Approximately nine hours after the shooting, Tamayo’s
blood was drawn, and his blood alcohol concentration was 0.085
percent.
C. Tamayo’s account
According to Tamayo’s testimony before the Board, he was
standing behind his truck after getting up to urinate and he
heard a voice he did not recognize say something threatening in a
foreign language. He looked over at the fire ring and did not see
Mascareno or Vega. He heard a gunshot. Tamayo testified, “[I]
immediately got down on a knee, and I unholstered my pistol
from my hip and I fired three rounds into that direction of that
gunshot and voice, which is about, I want to say, 60 to 70 feet
away.”
Tamayo testified that after he shot the rounds, he thought
he and his fellow officers were being ambushed so he reverted
back to his military training and moved away so the enemy
would not know where he was. He then blacked out and woke up
on his back holding his gun and could see a police helicopter
flying over the campsite.
D. Criminal proceedings and the Department of
Veterans Affairs Rating Decision
The San Bernardino County District Attorney’s Office
criminally charged Tamayo with assault with a deadly weapon.
The San Bernardino County Superior Court granted Tamayo’s

4
petition for mental health diversion under Penal Code section
1001.36, over the District Attorney’s opposition. On April 22,
2022, the court dismissed the case against Tamayo after he
successfully completed the diversion program.
In 2020, the Department of Veterans Affairs reexamined
Tamayo and increased his disability from 30 percent to
70 percent.
E. The Department’s disciplinary proceedings
LAPD’s Use of Force Review Board (UOFRB) and the Chief
of Police conducted an administrative review. The presentation
to the UOFRB did not directly address Tamayo’s PTSD, however
it did reference the criminal court’s dismissal of Tamayo’s case
pursuant to a mental health diversion program. The UOFRB and
the Chief of Police both concluded that Tamayo’s “actions were a
substantial deviation, without justification, from approved
Department tactical training.”
On April 30, 2021, the Chief of Police ordered Tamayo to
face the following charges before the Board:
Count 1: On or about May 3, 2020, you,
while off-duty, utilized tactics that were found to
be a substantial deviation, without justification,
from approved Department tactical training,
that reached a finding of Administrative
Disapproval.
Count 2: On or about May 3, 2020, you,
while off-duty, exhibited your firearm that
resulted in a finding of Out of Policy,
Administrative Disapproval.
Count 3: On or about May 3, 2020, you,
while off-duty, used Lethal Force that resulted

5
in a finding of Out of Policy, Administrative
Disapproval.
The Board held administrative hearings on multiple dates
starting in May 2021. The Board heard testimony from Tamayo,
Mascareno, Vega, Dr. Nadim N. Karim, a clinical and forensic
psychologist retained by Tamayo, and other witnesses. The
Board also admitted documentary evidence into the record,
including a report by Dr. Karim, and the Department’s Use of
Force policy.
The Board found Tamayo guilty on all counts. The Board
relied on LAPD’s policies and discussed the “objectively
reasonable officer” standard set forth in Graham, supra, 490 U.S.
386, which is incorporated into LAPD’s use of force policies and
extends to off-duty use of force. The Board concluded that
Tamayo’s “planning was deficient” with respect to his decision to
carry a firearm while consuming “extremely large amounts of
alcohol.” The Board also emphasized Tamayo’s testimony that he
“did not, and could not, identify what he was shooting at” when
he shot Mascareno, which deviated from the four basic firearm
rules. Lastly, the Board noted that the evidence showed that
Tamayo “was not taking fire, and was not injured in any way”
when he shot Mascareno and “had ample time in this situation to
take actions to de-escalate the situation and failed to do so.”
Based on the totality of the circumstances, the Board
recommended a penalty of termination. The Chief of Police
adopted the recommendation, effective May 31, 2021.

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F. Tamayo’s mandate petition before the trial
court
On May 19, 2023, Tamayo filed a petition for writ of
mandate, directing Respondents to set aside the decision to
terminate him. Tamayo also moved to augment the
administrative record. On May 16, 2024, the trial court denied
both the writ and the motion to augment the record.
First, the trial court addressed Tamayo’s argument that he
should not be found guilty of misconduct since he “ ‘was off-duty
and not acting in his capacity as a police officer,’ ” and because he
“ ‘fell into a dissociative state due to PTSD, a condition caused by
trauma he experienced during his combat deployments.’ ” The
trial court noted that Tamayo did not discuss the administrative
findings of guilt made by the Board, identify which findings he
was challenging, or demonstrate with citations to the record that
the Board’s findings were against the weight of the evidence.
(Shenouda v. Veterinary Medical Bd. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 500,
513 (Shenouda) [a petitioner “must identify (with citations to the
record) the factual findings made by the board that he or she is
challenging and demonstrate (with citations to the record) why
those factual findings were against the weight of the evidence”].)
The trial court nevertheless continued to address Tamayo’s
“unsupported arguments.” The trial court found that Tamayo
was subject to discipline for his off-duty conduct, and that his
PTSD was not the exclusive cause of the incident. Rather, the
trial court upheld the Board’s finding that Tamayo’s “planning
was deficient” with respect to his decision to carry a firearm
while consuming “extremely large amounts of alcohol.” The trial
court considered Tamayo’s argument that his alcohol use
stemmed from his mental health condition, but nevertheless

7
found that it did not adequately address the Board’s finding,
since “even if [Tamayo] could not stop himself from drinking, he
could have stopped himself from carrying a firearm while he was
drinking.”
The trial court further found that LAPD and the Board
correctly applied the objectively reasonable officer standard to
Tamayo’s case, despite his arguments that this standard did not
apply to him because of his mental disorder. The trial court
noted that Tamayo “cite[d] no legal or LAPD authority to support
his argument that the Graham standard does not apply to an
officer with a mental disorder (especially one who elected to carry
a firearm while drinking heavily).” The trial court concluded that
it would not create a new standard to apply, “especially one that
would open the floodgates for individualized determinations of
reasonableness.” For the foregoing reasons, the trial court found
that the weight of the evidence supported the Board’s finding
that Tamayo was guilty on all counts, and Tamayo failed to show
a prejudicial abuse of discretion in those findings.
Next, the trial court determined that the decision to
terminate Tamayo was not an abuse of discretion. Rather, the
trial court found that the Board properly considered the
mitigating and aggravating factors, the fact that there were no
LAPD positions available for a police officer to not carry a
firearm, and Dr. Karim’s testimony that he would not recommend
Tamayo carry a firearm if he returned to work. The trial court
found that Tamayo failed to comply with LAPD’s policies
regarding use of a firearm, and exhibited poor judgment in
carrying a firearm after consuming large amounts of alcohol, and
under these circumstances, it was reasonable for Respondents to

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conclude that “ ‘any discipline less than termination would not be
sufficient in light of the facts and circumstances of this case.’ ”
Addressing Tamayo’s argument that the Chief of Police
“ ‘should have applied, on [Tamayo’s] behalf, for a disability
pension, pursuant to Los Angeles City Charter Section 1312,’ ”
the trial court first noted that Tamayo did not show that he
raised this issue before the Board. Moreover, citing Los Angeles
City Charter section 1300, the trial court noted that this section
did not apply to Tamayo since he was not hired “ ‘on or before
January 28, 1967.’ ” Regardless, the trial court found that it was
unclear why the Chief of Police should have applied for a
disability pension on Tamayo’s behalf when he himself applied
for disability pension benefits on October 13, 2020, before his
May 2021 hearings, and received a disability pension on March 8,
2024.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, including the
“ ‘magnitude of the misconduct’ ” and the “egregious” and
“reckless” nature of the incident, the trial court concluded that
the Board did not abuse its discretion in terminating Tamayo.
Lastly, the trial court denied Tamayo’s motion to augment
the record. Tamayo sought to augment the record with two
documents: (1) his application for disability pension benefits
dated October 13, 2020; and (2) Findings of Fact adopted by the
Board of Fire and Police Pension Commissioners (Pension Board)
on March 7 and 8, 2024, regarding his application for a disability
pension. The trial court found that Tamayo’s application
predated the Board of Rights hearing, and thus, Tamayo could
have submitted this application as evidence before the Board.
Moreover, the trial court found that the Pension Board’s findings
that Tamayo suffered from PTSD were not relevant, since they

9
were made one year after the Board of Rights hearing, and in any
event, it was undisputed that Tamayo suffered from PTSD.
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court denied Tamayo’s
petition for a writ of administrative mandate and denied his
motion to augment. Tamayo timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of review
“Section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure governs
judicial review by administrative mandate of a final decision or
order rendered by an administrative agency.” (Johnson v.
Housing Authority of City of Oakland (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 603,
612.) “A trial court’s review of an adjudicatory administrative
decision is subject to two possible standards of review depending
upon the nature of the right involved.” (Wences v. City of Los
Angeles (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 305, 313.) “If the administrative
decision substantially affects a fundamental vested right, the
trial court must exercise its independent judgment on the
evidence.” (Ibid.) “Where, as here, a case involves a police
officer’s vested property interest in his employment, the trial
court is required to exercise its independent judgment.” (Barber
v. Long Beach Civil Service Com. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 652, 658
(Barber).) “In exercising its independent judgment, a trial court
must afford a strong presumption of correctness concerning the
administrative findings, and the party challenging the
administrative decision bears the burden of convincing the court
that the administrative findings are contrary to the weight of the
evidence.” (Fukuda v. City of Angels (1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 817.)
“After the trial court has exercised its independent
judgment upon the weight of the evidence, an appellate court

10
need only review the record to determine whether the trial court’s
findings are supported by substantial evidence.” (Bixby v. Pierno
(1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 143, fn. 10.) “[I]n making that
determination, we must resolve all conflicts and indulge all
reasonable inferences in favor of the party who prevailed in the
trial court.” (Barber, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 659.) “ ‘[O]ur
function on appellate review is solely to decide whether credible,
competent evidence supports [the] court’s judgment,’ ” and “[i]f
the record contains facts to support that judgment, we must
affirm.” (Shenouda, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 512.)
On questions of law, including the interpretation of
statutes, city charters, and administrative regulations, we apply
our de novo standard of review. (Molina v. Board of
Administration, etc. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 53, 61; Don’t Cell Our
Parks v. City of San Diego (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 338, 350.) We
also “ ‘review de novo whether the agency’s imposition of a
particular penalty on the petitioner constituted an abuse of
discretion by the agency. [Citations.] But we will not disturb the
agency’s choice of penalty absent “ ‘an arbitrary, capricious or
patently abusive exercise of discretion’ ” by the administrative
agency.’ [Citation.]” (Bedard v. City of Los Angeles (2024) 106
Cal.App.5th 442, 454.)

II. Tamayo waived any argument challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial
court’s findings of guilt
As an initial matter, Respondents correctly note and
Tamayo concedes in his reply brief that he has not challenged the
trial court’s finding that the weight of the evidence supports the
administrative findings of guilt on all three charges. Since
Tamayo failed to make this argument in the Board proceedings or

11
before the trial court, he has abandoned it. (Rand v. Board of
Psychology (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 565, 587 [contention not
raised at the administrative hearing or in the trial court is
forfeited]; Golden Door Properties, LLC v. County of San Diego
(2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 467, 554–555 (Golden Door Properties)
[“ ‘ “Issues not raised in an appellant’s brief are deemed waived or
abandoned” ’ ”].)
III. The trial court did not err in concluding that
Respondents correctly applied LAPD’s policies
Instead of challenging the sufficiency of the evidence of the
charges against him, Tamayo argues that Respondents erred by
applying LAPD’s policies to him. Specifically, Tamayo argues:
(1) Respondents cannot hold a police officer accountable for off-
duty misconduct if the officer is not exercising his police powers
to effect an arrest or seizure; and (2) the reasonable officer
standard set forth in Graham is inapplicable when an officer is in
a dissociative state, because he is not capable of acting rationally.
We conclude that both arguments lack merit.
First, we find that the trial court correctly concluded that it
is well-established that “police officers may be disciplined for off-
duty misconduct that has a reasonable nexus to their public
employment.” (See Pasadena Police Officers Assn. v. City of
Pasadena (1990) 51 Cal.3d 564, 571–572 [“[W]hile the off-duty
conduct of employees is generally of no legal consequence to their
employers, . . . [t]o maintain the public’s confidence in its police
force, a law enforcement agency must promptly, thoroughly, and
fairly investigate allegations of officer misconduct; [and] if
warranted, it must institute disciplinary proceedings”]; Hankla v.
Long Beach Civil Service Com. (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1223
[finding civil service commission abused its discretion by

12
reinstating a police officer, where the officer, while off-duty,
negligently shot and nearly killed the driver of another vehicle
following a dispute over a trivial driving incident]; Anderson v.
State Personnel Bd. (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 761, 772 [upholding
dismissal of off-duty officer who engaged in repeated acts of
public nudity]; Gray v. State Personnel Bd. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d
1229 [upholding dismissal of off-duty officer who accosted and
threatened to shoot a male visiting his ex-girlfriend]; Cranston v.
City of Richmond (1985) 40 Cal.3d 755, 760, 771 [upholding
discharge of off-duty police officer who led fellow police officers
and highway patrol car on high speed chase].)
Second, we conclude that the trial court correctly
determined that Respondents did not err in applying the
“objectively reasonable” officer standard to Tamayo’s misconduct.
The LAPD use of force policy in place at the time of Tamayo’s
conduct provides: “when warranted, Department personnel may
use objectively reasonable force to carry out their duties.” To
determine “objective reasonableness,” LAPD applies the
definition from Graham, which states, “[t]he reasonableness of a
particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a
reasonable officer on the scene . . . .” LAPD’s use of force policy
does not set forth any separate standards to apply for officers
with mental disorders or impaired judgment. Pertinent to the
instant case, LAPD issued a training bulletin in August 2017
stating officers “who get involved in a use of force while off duty
are subject to the same objectively reasonable standard used to
adjudicate on-duty uses of force.” As the trial court noted,
Tamayo did not cite any “legal or LAPD authority in support of
his argument that the Graham standard does not apply to an

13
officer with a mental disorder (especially one who elected to carry
a firearm while drinking heavily).” Tamayo still fails to do so.
Furthermore, we decline Tamayo’s suggestion to apply a
criminal insanity defense to his administrative hearing to
exonerate him from misconduct. Crucially, LAPD’s use of force
policy does not consider an officer’s mental state and does not
allow for an insanity defense. Moreover, Tamayo does not cite
any legal or regulatory authority to support his argument that a
criminal standard determining legal insanity should apply to an
administrative hearing which focuses on civil/regulatory
misconduct.
IV. Tamayo waived any challenge to Respondent’s
decision to terminate
The trial court found that the weight of the evidence
supported Respondent’s decision to terminate Tamayo, and
therefore Respondents did not abuse their discretion. Tamayo
does not challenge this finding. That is, he does not make or
support any argument that the termination penalty was not in
the range of allowable discipline or was an abuse of discretion.
He has therefore waived this challenge. (Golden Door Properties,
supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 555.) Tamayo instead argues that
termination was not the appropriate punishment and that
Respondents “should have chosen options other than disciplinary
action, such as a disability pension.” However, “[t]he penalty
imposed by an administrative body will not be disturbed in
mandamus proceedings unless an abuse of discretion is
demonstrated. [Citations.]” (Barber v. State Personnel Board
(1976) 18 Cal.3d 395, 404.) “Neither an appellate court nor a
trial court is free to substitute its discretion for that of the
administrative agency concerning the degree of punishment

14
imposed. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) Since Tamayo fails to argue, let
alone demonstrate an abuse of discretion in Respondent’s
disciplinary actions we will not disturb the trial court’s decision
with respect to their decision to terminate.
V. Tamayo waived any challenge to the trial court’s
decision not to augment the record

Lastly, Tamayo’s opening brief does not challenge the trial
court’s decision not to augment the record with documents
related to his application for disability pension benefits. He has
accordingly forfeited this issue. (Golden Door Properties, supra,
50 Cal.App.5th at p. 555.) Instead, in his opening brief, Tamayo
renews his request to augment the record “for the purpose of
showing the extent of the relief he would receive should he
prevail in his appeal.” He explains that if we decide this appeal
in his favor, he will “receive backpay from approximately May 31,
2021, the date he was relieved of duty, to approximately January
18, 2024, the date he was awarded a disability pension.”
However, because we conclude that Tamayo’s petition for a writ
of administrative mandate was properly denied, there is no
reason to augment the record since Tamayo has not prevailed on
his appeal. Accordingly, we deny Tamayo’s second request to
augment the record. (Steele v. International Air Race Association
of America (1941) 47 Cal.App.2d 61, 63 [reviewing courts will not
order documents to be added to the record “except on a showing
that they are material to and will assist in a determination of the
appeal on its merits”].) We also deny Tamayo’s request for a writ
of mandate to reinstate his employment and backpay, since he
has failed to prevail on his appeal.

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DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment. Respondents shall recover their
costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

HANASONO, J.

We concur:

EGERTON, Acting P. J.

ADAMS, J.

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