In re M.S. CA2/7

CourtListener 10853332Calctapp05.05.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 5/5/26 In re M.S. CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re M.S., a Person Coming B344422
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. VJ46698)

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

M.S.,

Defendant and
Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Benjamin R. Campos, Commissioner. Reversed
and remanded with directions.
Arielle Bases, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, Deepti Vaadyala and David F. Glassman,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________
M.S. appeals from a juvenile court order transferring him
from the juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction
pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 707,
subdivision (a)(1).1 In 2021 the Los Angeles County District
Attorney filed a juvenile wardship petition under section 602,
subdivision (a), charging M.S. with first degree murder based on
his shooting of another minor (Brandon F.) at a residential party
on the night of May 31 that year. In February 2022 the juvenile
court granted the People’s motion to transfer.
In granting the transfer motion, the juvenile court
considered the five criteria set forth in section 707 that the court
was required to consider in deciding whether a minor should be
transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction, including (1) the
minor’s degree of criminal sophistication; (2) whether the minor
“can be rehabilitated” prior to expiration of the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction; (3) the minor’s prior delinquent history; (4) whether
prior attempts to rehabilitate the minor have been successful;
and (5) the circumstances and gravity of the alleged offense.
(§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)-(E).) On appeal, M.S. contends substantial
evidence does not support the court’s transfer decision, and the

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.

2
court considered improper factors in evaluating the second
criterion.
We agree the juvenile court erred with respect to the
second criterion in relying on recidivism data from the Division of
Juvenile Justice (DJJ) system for juvenile offenders (which was
closed by statute at the end of June 2023) and an expert opinion
relying on that data to predict whether M.S. could be
rehabilitated prior to expiration of the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction after receiving rehabilitative services in the Secure
Youth Treatment Facility (SYTF) system. The SYTF facility
replaced the DJJ as part of “[j]uvenile justice realignment”
enacted by Senate Bill No. 823 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.)
(Stats. 2020, ch. 337, § 1(e)) (Senate Bill 823). The court’s
reliance on data from the failed DJJ system to predict outcomes
at the SYTF facility was contrary to the Legislature’s stated
intent in establishing the SYTF system to provide more robust
rehabilitative services for youth offenders. Further, substantial
evidence did not support the court’s finding that the SYTF would
provide enhanced mental health and substance abuse treatment
and other services.
We therefore reverse the juvenile court’s order transferring
M.S. to a court of criminal jurisdiction and remand for the
juvenile court to reconsider the second criterion and determine,
in light of all five criteria, whether the People have met their
overarching statutory burden of demonstrating by clear and
convincing evidence that M.S. is not amenable to rehabilitation
under section 707, subdivision (a)(3).

3
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Alleged Offense
On the evening of May 31, 2021 M.S., who was then
17 years old, attended the 18th birthday party of his ex-
girlfriend, L.R., at her residence in the City of Maywood. L.R.’s
aunt, who attended the party, saw M.S. and asked him to leave
because she was concerned about his prior violence and drug use,
and she was afraid that something bad would happen if he
stayed. M.S. left the party but later returned.
Brandon was at the party that night. In 2019 M.S. and
Brandon had a confrontation in which Brandon accused M.S. of
robbing him.2 After M.S. returned to the party, he approached
Brandon and called him a “‘fucking snitch.’” Brandon appeared
scared after this encounter, and he left the party with two
friends. One of Brandon’s friends later reported that he saw M.S.
holding onto something in his waistband after M.S. returned to
the party.
After Brandon left, the aunt observed a “commotion” at the
front of the house. The aunt saw her sister and another
individual holding M.S. down. M.S. was able to free himself and
started running down the street in the direction Brandon had
gone. The aunt heard someone say that M.S. was holding a gun.
Surveillance video from nearby residences showed an individual
matching M.S.’s description walking down the street in the area
where the party took place, and several voices can be heard
shouting M.S.’s name at least four times. Then three gunshots

2 M.S. was charged with robbery and assault in connection
with that incident, but the charges were later dismissed.

4
can be heard, and the same individual can be seen running back
the way he had come. L.R.’s aunt and another guest at the party
believed M.S. was under the influence that night.
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s deputies responded to a radio
call reporting a shooting at the Maywood residence that had
occurred at about 11:00 p.m. on May 31. When the deputies
arrived, they found Brandon lying on the ground suffering from
gunshot wounds. He died at the scene.
At around 3:00 a.m. the following morning, sheriff’s
deputies investigating the murder observed M.S. live streaming
on his social media account while stating, “‘I just shot that fool,
he should be cold by now . . . . I shot that nigga because he tried
to snatch my chain. Fuck that nigga.’” M.S. continued, “‘I need
to kill again . . . get high again. I put that nigga in the ground.’”
The deputies were able to determine M.S.’s location from the
landmarks in the background of the video, and they arrested him.
Investigators obtained a search warrant for M.S.’s social
media accounts. In February 2021 M.S. messaged another user
stating, “‘I need a glock . . . not a revolver,’” and the user
responded, “‘U still gone kill the nigga with either.’” M.S.
responded, “‘Nah ima go to war.’” Two days before the shooting,
when asked whether he would attend L.R.’s party, M.S. stated,
“‘Ima end up smoking some1.’” When asked who, M.S. replied,
“‘Nah . . . I know . . . what Ima do.’” In the morning after the
shooting, M.S. posted a photo of a handgun captioned “‘Fuck a
snitch.’” M.S. also posted on his social media account after the
shooting, “‘I just shot that fucking snitch.’”

5
B. The Petition and Motion To Transfer
On June 2, 2021 the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s
office filed a section 602 petition charging M.S. with one count of
murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)). M.S. was 17 years and
11 months old at the time of the alleged offense. On February 24,
2022 the People filed a motion to transfer M.S. from the juvenile
court to a court of criminal jurisdiction under section 707,
subdivision (a)(1). The People attached a probation report and
detention observation reports from M.S.’s detention in juvenile
hall following his arrest. Defense counsel submitted exhibits in
opposition to the transfer motion.

C. The Evidence at the Transfer Hearing
The juvenile court held a 10-day hearing starting on
December 3, 2024. Documents submitted by the parties and the
testimony of witnesses provided the following background
information.

1. M.S.’s childhood, mental health, and substance abuse
M.S. was primarily raised by his father, after his mother
abandoned the family when M.S. was five years old. When M.S.
was around seven years old, he was placed on a 72-hour
psychiatric hold after punching a peer. He was diagnosed with
bipolar disorder, mood disorder, and attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and was prescribed antipsychotic
and ADHD medications. M.S. remained on these medications
until he was about 13 years old, at which point his father allowed
him to stop taking the medications because M.S. did not like how
the medications made him feel. While he was in detention, M.S.
was diagnosed with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD).

6
M.S. began drinking alcohol and using controlled or illegal
substances when he was 14 or 15 years old. He used Xanax and
marijuana daily, consumed alcohol regularly, and used nitrous
oxide and LSD weekly. At some point his friends began
withholding Xanax from him because it caused him to fall asleep
or act erratically. M.S. reported that he attempted to fight his
friends to obtain more Xanax and acknowledged that he was
“‘blacking out’” while under its influence. M.S. said he consumed
a “‘whole bunch’” of Xanax and “‘microdosed’” on the morning of
Brandon’s murder.

2. M.S.’s previous history of delinquency
In February 2019, when M.S. was 15 years old, he
committed misdemeanor vandalism and possession of spray paint
(Pen. Code, §§ 594.1, subd. (e)(1), 594.2, subd. (a)) and was
ordered to complete 10 hours of community service as part of a
diversion program. The following month M.S. was arrested for
resisting and obstructing an officer (id., §§ 69, subd. (a), 148,
subd. (a)(1)), and he was again ordered to complete community
service and participate in family therapy. In April M.S. was
arrested for robbery and the assault of Brandon (id., §§ 211, 245,
subd. (a)(4)), but the charges were later dismissed. In August
2019 M.S., then 16, was arrested for resisting and obstructing an
officer and battery (id., §§ 148, subd. (a)(1), 242). He was
declared a ward of the court and placed on informal probation at
home. M.S. was next arrested in June 2020, when he was 17, for
misdemeanor possession of aerosol paint with intent to deface
property. The juvenile court again released him to his father on
probation at home.

7
3. M.S.’s post-arrest detention at Barry J. Nidorf
Juvenile Hall
M.S. was housed at Barry J. Nidorf Juvenile Hall from the
time of his June 2021 arrest until July 2023. He initially
received positive behavioral notes from detention officers and
attended school consistently. On January 8, 2022, however, M.S.
and another youth engaged in “horseplay,” and M.S. kicked, then
slapped the youth across his face. A detention officer spoke with
the other youth about signing a document against M.S., and M.S.
tried to intimidate the youth by yelling, “‘Don’t sign your death
certificate.’” Between April 2022 and March 2023, M.S.
continued to get into fights with other youths, including on one
occasion displaying gang signs. Another time, after an officer
performed a routine search of M.S. and his room and told M.S. a
strip search had been authorized, M.S. attempted to punch and
kick the detention officers. The officers then recovered a sharp
metal tip from him. On one occasion M.S. kicked in and broke a
staff office door; on another, he threw a trash can at a window,
attempting to break it.
Despite this behavior, M.S. started participating in therapy
through the Los Angeles County Department of Mental Health
(DMH) twice a week; a peer mentorship program called the Anti-
Recidivism Coalition (ARC) once a week; weekly therapy with
Homeboy Industries; an art class; a weekly program to develop
coping skills; and a music program. M.S. graduated from high
school in March 2023, and he enrolled in college classes soon
thereafter.

8
In recorded jail phone calls from December 2022 to early
July 2023, M.S. referenced killing people, admitted to using
substances while in detention, attributed his negative behavior to
using Xanax, arranged for contraband substances to be delivered
to him, and threatened physical harm to L.R. In April 2023
detention officers recovered a cell phone from M.S.’s room and
discovered he had posted videos on social media showing him
displaying gang signs.
From May to late June 2023, M.S. received positive
behavioral notes from detention officers.

4. M.S’s detention at Los Padrinos Juvenile Hall
In July 2023 M.S. was moved to Los Padrinos Juvenile Hall
after Nidorf juvenile facility was found unsuitable for housing
youth offenders. M.S. attended school consistently and
participated in offered services, including weekly mental health
therapy. However, M.S. engaged in four physical fights between
July 2023 and February 2024.
Recorded phone calls between M.S. and L.R. from this
period reflected M.S. both reaffirming and questioning his gang
and drug lifestyle. In late July 2023 M.S. discussed his continued
access to substances in detention, stated he wanted to change his
life, and shared his regret for how he had treated L.R. In August
and September, however, he threatened to physically harm L.R.
and her coworkers and stated, “‘I’m not changing for shit.’” In
October he told L.R. that he did not want to continue the same
lifestyle or worry about the “‘opps’” and “‘homies.’” In December
he shared his fear of being stuck with “‘this bullshit mentality,’”
stated he was “‘tired of living like this,’” and expressed his desire
for a “‘normal life.’” But he then said, “‘Never mind . . . I’m going

9
to go home and fuck the city up.’” In January 2024, M.S. told
L.R. that he regretted how he talked to her and wished he had
“‘learned how to treat a woman’” before their relationship.
During the 11-month period from March 2024 through
January 2025, M.S. received positive behavioral notes from
detention officers and had no reported instances of violent or
threatening conduct, although he assisted another youth offender
as part of “horseplay” in feigning a seizure in September 2024.
Detention observation reports from this period noted that M.S.
was “respecting staff and getting along with peers,” “showing
maturity and growth as a young man,” “possess[ing] leadership
and respect,” sharing future plans of success, “practice[ing]
conflict resolution by communicating without getting upset,” and
“counsel[ing] his peers and encourag[ing] them to run a
productive program.” M.S. continued to attend college courses,
weekly mental health services, and weekly community-based
programming. However, as we will discuss, from April to
November 2024 M.S. posted live stream videos and made other
posts to his social media account that suggested he had developed
an association with the Playboys criminal street gang.

5. The prosecution’s gang evidence
Javier Avila, a Bell Police Department investigator
assigned to a gang task force covering the City of Maywood,
testified as the People’s gang expert. Avila first met M.S. in 2018
when police contacted a group of individuals who were tagging
monikers associated with the Dia Trece criminal street gang.
M.S., then 14 years old, was with the individuals when they were
detained. Avila opined that prior to Brandon’s murder in
May 2021, M.S. was a member of the Dia Trece gang. Avila

10
based his opinion on M.S.’s frequent association with Dia Trece
gang members, his tagging, and his social media post prior to the
shooting in which he said, “‘On my Diablos set.’” Avila testified
this statement showed M.S.’s allegiance to the Dia Trece gang.
While in detention, M.S. posted videos and messages that
referred to and displayed hand gestures associated with the
Playboys gang (and not the Dia Trece gang), suggesting that M.S.
had become associated with the Playboys gang. However, Avila
did not have sufficient information on which to opine whether
M.S. had become a member of the Playboys gang. Avila clarified
that a person who is “associated with” a gang means the person
has “hung out with them,” but becoming a gang member means
the person has claimed allegiance to the gang.
In April 2024 M.S. posted a live stream video of himself in
the detention setting making hand gestures resembling a Playboy
bunny symbol commonly used by the Playboys gang.3 In another
video M.S. referred to the “56 hood” and made hand gestures that
looked like the numbers “5” and “6,” and he later posted the
number “6” and “da6.” Avila testified the Playboys gang’s 56th
Street clique used the numbers “5” and “6” as identifying
symbols. In August, detention officers found papers in M.S.’s
room with writing containing the words “Looney,” which was
M.S.’s moniker, “Looney Tunez,” “Looneyoffda6,” and the
numbers “5” and “6.” In late November investigators discovered
M.S. had “liked” a social media post by an individual whose
moniker was associated with the Playboys gang.

3 M.S. had access to a contraband cell phone while in
juvenile hall on which he filmed the live stream videos and made
social media posts.

11
6. Other prosecution evidence
Los Angeles County Supervising Deputy Probation Officer
Kurtis Miller testified about the services and programming that
would be available for M.S. at the Barry J. Nidorf SYTF if he
were adjudicated a ward of the court by the juvenile court. Miller
was assigned to the facility in July 2023, after the prior Nidorf
juvenile hall facility closed, and the facility reopened as an SYTF
facility (with new rehabilitative treatment programs. Under the
SYTF system, within 30 days of a youth offender’s arrival, the
facility would coordinate with DMH and Los Angeles County
Office of Education to provide the offender an individualized
rehabilitation plan that would identify appropriate treatment,
including for mental health and substance abuse issues. Youth
offenders would be assigned a caseworker, who would conduct
weekly sessions with the offender to track behavior and ensure
compliance with the treatment program.
Miller explained the programming at Nidorf SYTF was
“more robust” than at Los Padrinos. DMH provided group and
individual sessions with licensed clinicians, including substance
abuse therapy, and a separate substance abuse treatment
program was onsite seven days a week. Youth offenders could
also participate in college courses; peer mentorship; and art,
sports, music, and workforce development programs. Further,
the SYTF had gang intervention programs to help youth with
gang affiliations, and it housed those youths in units without
gang conflicts. Miller acknowledged that the programming at
Nidorf SYTF had only begun in July 2023, and therefore, there
was “no conclusive evidence yet about [the programs’] impact on
recidivism on youthful offenders.” However, Miller opined that in
most cases, youth offenders who were previously housed at Los

12
Padrinos and came to the Nidorf SYTF after disposition have “a
shift in [their] behavior.”
Clinical psychologist Blake Carmichael, Ph.D., testified and
submitted an expert report.4 Dr. Carmichael opined that M.S.
may not be suitable for juvenile jurisdiction with respect to four
of the five statutory criteria under section 707. As to the second
criterion whether M.S. could be rehabilitated prior to expiration
of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction (within three-and-a-half years),
Dr. Carmichael expressed a “significant concern about the
juvenile court’s ability to address [M.S.’s] immediate needs and
the limited time available to oversee a reintegration into
community and occupational life.” Dr. Carmichael concluded
“juvenile jurisdiction may not be suitable under this provision of
WIC 707.” (Boldface omitted, italics added.) He explained there
were heightened risk factors, including M.S.’s family functioning,
community influences, personal attributes (including aggression),
continued affiliation with a gang, and his behavior while in

4 We grant M.S.’s motion to augment the record to include
the reports of Dr. David Contreras, Dr. Blake Carmichael, and
Regina Robles, which were submitted to the juvenile court; M.S.’s
written objections to curtailment of cross-examination filed on
December 5, 2024; and the court’s August 11, 2025 minute order
denying M.S.’s motion for rehearing. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rules 8.407, subd. (a)(3), (4) & (12).) We also grant M.S.’s request
to take judicial notice of the Assembly Committee of Public
Safety’s analysis of Assembly Bill No. 2361 (2021-2022 Reg.
Sess.), as amended March 31, 2022. However, we deny M.S.’s
request to take judicial notice of letters of support filed on M.S.’s
behalf after the transfer hearing. (Adams v. Bank of America,
N.A. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 666, 674 [“‘Reviewing courts generally
do not take judicial notice of evidence not presented to the trial
court.’”].)

13
detention. M.S. had “made some improvements” and exhibited
the capacity to grow and mature, but even while he was receiving
increased programming in the middle of 2023, he “vacillated”
with respect to his ability to avoid aggression and substance
abuse. Dr. Carmichael noted M.S.’s vacillation on phone calls
with L.R. in which he sometimes said he would “‘get better’” and
get a job when he gets out, and other times said he was going
back to “‘the streets.’”
Dr. Carmichael described the services generally offered at
SYTF facilities (based on a July 2022 brochure), including
behavioral therapy, crisis intervention, psychiatric medication
services, and substance abuse programming, in addition to
comprehensive education services, life skills, mentorship, and
community reentry. According to Dr. Carmichael, the SYTF
programming was patterned on services previously provided by
the DJJ, and in the absence of research and statistics showing
outcomes from programming at a SYTF, he was relying on data
from DJJ, which showed high re-arrest and recidivism rates.
Specifically, published data showed that 75 percent of young
adults who participated in DJJ programming were arrested
within three years of their release for new crimes, and nearly
30 percent were returned to state custody for felonies. By
contrast, the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) provided specialized rehabilitation
services for youth offenders that would provide a longer period of
oversight for transition back into the community.
Based on these factors, Dr. Carmichael opined that M.S.
“may not be appropriate for juvenile justice” during the time he
had remaining under juvenile court jurisdiction. He clarified that
it was “possible” M.S. could be rehabilitated during this time

14
period, but he was “skeptical” that M.S. could sustain those gains
“given the need for oversight, [and] the risk of recidivism” in
three to five years. Dr. Carmichael could not provide a
percentage estimate of M.S.’s chance of success and did not
believe any research could confidently predict a youth offender’s
rehabilitation in a three-and-a-half year program.

7. The defense witnesses
Clinical psychologist David Contreras, Psy.D., testified and
submitted an expert report for the defense. He concluded M.S.’s
rehabilitative “prognosis” was “positive,” meaning that he would
benefit from future intervention efforts and make gains in
addressing the risk factors that were relevant to his
rehabilitation. Dr. Contreras noted that M.S. had not
consistently received intervention prior to being detained in
juvenile hall, and when he was initially detained, he showed “lots
of concerning behaviors.” However, once M.S. became involved in
programming, he showed improvement with an upward
trajectory and a “more positive arc of engagement” during the
last year. Dr. Contreras acknowledged there were recent
“detours into problematic behaviors” from that trajectory,
including M.S. possessing contraband (the cell phone) and
posting videos on social media. But Dr. Contreras opined that
M.S.’s “improvement” in responding to feedback had “positive
implications for his engagement going forward,” and M.S. was
“beginning to develop insight into [his] problematic thinking
patterns.”
Dr. Contreras explained that as a psychologist, he could not
make long-term predictions whether an individual would reoffend
because young adults are rapidly changing, noting he did not

15
have a “crystal ball.” Instead, his role was to provide an opinion
on whether the prognosis for an offender is good (or not) going
forward. Dr. Contreras noted M.S.’s behavior and engagement in
treatment had “peaks and valleys,” but M.S. was engaging “more
consistently now over time.” M.S.’s prognosis for his remaining
three-and-a-half years in juvenile custody was “good” because he
was 21 years old and at a point where he had the potential to
mature and grow within his remaining treatment time, and his
recent progress showed that “change [wa]s under way.” Further,
in contrast to the “limited complement of services” that were
available to M.S. in juvenile hall, which principally served as a
detention center, the SYTF would offer a multidisciplinary team
of social workers, a psychologist, mental health staff, and
technicians, and it would offer M.S. an individualized
intervention program that would address his risk factors and
clinical needs, provide behavioral therapy, offer supplemental
services like peer mentoring, and monitor his treatment progress.
Social worker Regina Robles testified and submitted an
expert report concluding M.S. could be rehabilitated prior to the
expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. M.S. and his father
had maintained a peer rather than a parent-child relationship,
and M.S.’s mental health had deteriorated after his father
allowed him to stop taking his prescribed medications, leading to
increased behavioral issues. M.S. never had his psychological,
substance abuse, or mental health issues appropriately addressed
before he was detained. Further, M.S. was not receiving the
intensive mental health and substance abuse services he needed
at Los Padrinos. Nonetheless, M.S. had demonstrated his
commitment to rehabilitation over the past year by graduating
high school, enrolling in college, seeking drug counseling,

16
engaging in mental health counseling, and remaining open to
additional services.
Susy Rios testified as a registered drug counselor for the
Los Angeles Centers for Alcohol and Drug Abuse program (L.A.
CADA), a program at Los Padrinos that provided early
intervention, prevention, and outpatient referrals for substance
abuse. She first assessed M.S. in October 2023, at which time
she wanted to refer M.S. to outpatient treatment, but she was
unable to do so because M.S. was housed in a high security unit.
Instead, Rios enrolled M.S. in early intervention programming,
which she described as “an educational, lowest level of care”
addressing topics like “the effects of drugs and alcohol, [and]
coping skills.” M.S. attended 16 group and individual sessions
over the course of a year, during which Rios observed that M.S.
was actively engaged in the sessions and grew more open about
his substance abuse history and what triggered his use. M.S.
needed outpatient substance abuse services, and if he were
housed at SYTF, Robles could refer him to receive the services.
Caeser Galvez testified as a mentor in the ARC program at
Los Padrinos, which provides rehabilitation and wraparound
services for individuals who were previously incarcerated.
Galvez had known M.S. for 14 months, worked with him every
day, mentored him individually two days a week, and discussed
gang membership and drug use as part of M.S.’s individual
sessions. Galvez stated M.S. was “taking his rehabilitation and
recovery seriously,” had gone “above and beyond” with
programming, and was “easily [in the] top five” of the
200 offenders with whom Galvez had worked at Los Padrinos.
The ARC program at SYTF had a larger number of mentors
serving a smaller population.

17
A director for an athletic and life skills program and two
detention officers from Los Padrinos also testified regarding
M.S.’s personal growth, mature and respectful behavior, positive
influence on other offenders, and active engagement in
programming.

D. The Juvenile Court’s Ruling
On February 28, 2025, after hearing argument of counsel,
the juvenile court granted the prosecution’s motion to transfer.
The court noted it had reviewed all the testimony, evidence,
transcripts, expert reports, and pleadings, and it explained that it
viewed its analysis through the “overarching lens . . . of
amenability,” taking into account “the arch of the minor’s
behavior and . . . the totality of the circumstances.” The court
provided its ruling on each of section 707’s five criteria, finding
the prosecution had met its burden by clear and convincing
evidence on three of the five criteria. (See § 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)-
(E).)
The juvenile court found, as to the first factor, that M.S.’s
degree of criminal sophistication weighed in favor of transfer.
The court concluded that M.S. planned and prepared to kill
Brandon. M.S. and Brandon had a prior history of conflict, and
M.S. intended to kill his perceived rival by attending L.R.’s party
and “manufactur[ing] [a] confrontation” with Brandon. The
killing was not “spur-of-the-moment,” given that M.S. pursued
Brandon even after he was physically restrained by the party
attendees. Although there was some evidence that M.S. was
under the influence of Xanax on the night of the offense, he
posted on social media shortly after the murder that he had to
“‘get high and kill that shit,’” and the court was “taking the minor

18
at his word.” Further, after the shooting M.S. bragged about the
killing in his live stream video posted on social media, suggesting
his motive for killing Brandon was to establish a “dominant
position” over him. Although some of M.S.’s post-arrest behavior
“showed some insight, showed some compassion, . . . for the most
part, it’s negative.”
The juvenile court found the second criterion (whether M.S.
could be rehabilitated prior to expiration of the court’s
jurisdiction) weighed in favor of transfer. The court stated it
relied heavily on the analysis and testimony of Dr. Carmichael
and Dr. Contreras.. The court noted he had “great respect” for
Dr. Contreras, and the doctor provided a positive prognosis with
respect to M.S.’s rehabilitation. However, Dr. Contreras was
unable to give a time frame for how long it would take for M.S. to
be rehabilitated, which was “exactly what [the court] wanted him
to do.” Further, Dr. Contreras’s opinion was based in part on the
positive reports from the detention officers, but the court was “in
profound disagreement” with Dr. Contreras’s view that the
officers had no incentive to give M.S. a positive reference.
Rather, the detention officers were motivated by their desire “to
have a good shift.”
The juvenile court instead agreed with Dr. Carmichael’s
conclusion that M.S. “may not be suitable” for rehabilitation
within the time frame, given the “lack of evidence of outcomes
and effectiveness of the SYTF programming.” Instead, the court
relied on Dr. Carmichael’s assessment that the most reliable data
on the effectiveness of the SYTF rehabilitation program was the
“data from [the] former DJJ regarding outcomes and recidivism,”
which reflected the lack of “specialized rehabilitation services” for
youth offenders. By contrast, “those services are available

19
through the youthful offender program through [CDCR],” which
program was “designed specifically to address youth who are
under a certain age who have these issues.” In addition, the
CDCR program was long-term and evidence-based. On this basis
the court concluded the second criterion “leans toward transfer.”
The juvenile court found the third and fourth statutory
criteria (M.S.’s previous delinquent history and the success of
previous attempts to rehabilitate him) were neutral. The court
found the previous attempts by the court to rehabilitate M.S.
were “exactly appropriate” in not detaining M.S., and instead
providing counseling and community service. As to the fifth
statutory criterion, the court found the circumstances and gravity
of M.S.’s offense weighed in favor of transfer. The court described
the offense as a “cold, callous, brutal” crime in which Brandon
“essentially . . . was executed.” In addition, the offense was not
“an act of impulsiveness” involving a threat of danger or
immediate harm. Further, evidence of M.S.’s gang involvement
weighed in favor of transfer.
The juvenile court held the prosecution met its burden by
clear and convincing evidence that M.S. was “not a fit and proper
subject for juvenile court” and he should be transferred to a court
of criminal jurisdiction. The juvenile court granted the motion
and ordered M.S. to adult court for arraignment.
M.S. timely appealed.

20
DISCUSSION

A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
Under section 707, subdivision (a)(1), when a minor
16 years or older is alleged to have committed a felony, the
prosecution “may make a motion to transfer the minor from
juvenile court to a court of criminal jurisdiction.” The
prosecution bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing
evidence that the minor “is not amenable to rehabilitation while
under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (Id., subd. (a)(3); see
In re J.S. (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 205, 211 & fn. 2 (J.S.); In re
Miguel R. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 152, 164 (Miguel R.); Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 5.770(a).) The clear and convincing evidence
standard “demands a degree of certainty greater than that
involved with the preponderance standard, but less than what is
required by the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt”;
“‘[w]here clear and convincing proof is required, the proponent
must convince the jury or judge . . . that it is highly probable that
the facts which he asserts are true.’” (Conservatorship of O.B.
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 998.)
Section 707, subdivision (a)(3), provides that a juvenile
court “shall consider” five statutory criteria in deciding whether a
minor is not amenable to rehabilitation under the court’s
jurisdiction: (1) “[t]he degree of criminal sophistication exhibited
by the minor” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(i)); (2) “[w]hether the minor
can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court’s
jurisdiction” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(B)(i)); (3) “[t]he minor’s previous
delinquent history” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(C)(i)); (4) “[s]uccess of
previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the minor”
(§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(D)(i)); and (5) “[t]he circumstances and gravity

21
of the offense alleged in the petition to have been committed by
the minor” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(E)(i)). For each of these five
criteria, section 707 provides a nonexhaustive mandatory list of
factors to which a juvenile court “shall give weight” in evaluating
the criterion. (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)(A)(ii), (B)(ii), (C)(ii), (D)(ii),
(E)(ii).)
“[T]he ultimate determination of whether ‘the minor is not
amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court’ (§ 707(a)(3)) is not the same as the second
criterion, which calls for consideration of ‘[w]hether the minor
can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court's
jurisdiction’ (§ 707(a)(3)(B)(i)).” (Miguel R., supra,
100 Cal.App.5th at p. 166; accord, In re O.F. (2026)
119 Cal.App.5th 133, 159.) Under the second factor, the court
must focus on “whether there is enough time to rehabilitate the
minor while the minor is still eligible to remain under juvenile
court jurisdiction.” (Miguel R., at p. 166.) But the court’s
ultimate finding of amenability under section 707,
subdivision (a)(3), “concerns a global assessment of the minor’s
suitability to rehabilitation,” as part of which the court must
“consider not only time but also other reasons why the minor
might or might not be responsive to the available rehabilitative
services.” (Miguel R., at p. 167; see In re O.F., at pp. 158-159; In
re S.S. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1277, 1288 [juvenile court’s
“analysis of the five criteria set forth in the statute should be
focused through the lens of amenability to rehabilitation”].)
“If the court orders a transfer of jurisdiction, the court shall
recite the basis for its decision in an order entered upon the
minutes, which shall include the reasons supporting the court’s

22
finding that the minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while
under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.” (§ 707, subd. (a)(3).)
“We review the juvenile court’s ruling on a transfer motion
for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] ‘The abuse of discretion
standard is not a unified standard; the deference it calls for
varies according to the aspect of a trial court’s ruling under
review.’” (Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 165; accord, In
re O.F., supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at p. 160.) “The juvenile court’s
findings with respect to each of section 707’s five criteria are
findings of fact reviewed for substantial evidence. [Citation.] In
conducting substantial evidence review, we draw all reasonable
inferences in support of the court’s findings.” (Miguel R., at
p. 165; accord, In re O.F., at p. 160; see People v. Cardenas (2020)
53 Cal.App.5th 102, 119.) The juvenile court’s ultimate finding
that a minor is not amenable to rehabilitation while under its
jurisdiction is likewise reviewed for substantial evidence.
(Miguel R., at p. 165.)
Because the juvenile court must make these findings by
clear and convincing evidence, we review its findings by
“determin[ing] whether the record, viewed as a whole, contains
substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could
have made the finding of high probability demanded by” the clear
and convincing evidence standard. (Conservatorship of O.B.,
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1005; see In re O.F., supra, 119 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 161-162; Miguel R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 165.)
“The [juvenile] court’s . . . conclusions of law are reviewed de
novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only
if arbitrary and capricious.’” (Miguel R., at p. 165; accord, J.S.,
supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 211.)

23
B. Substantial Evidence Supports Four of the Five Criteria
Under Section 707, Subdivision (a)(3); We Remand for
Reconsideration of the Second Criterion
M.S. contends substantial evidence does not support the
juvenile court’s ultimate finding M.S. was not amenable to
rehabilitation. He further argues substantial evidence does not
support the court’s findings on section 707, subdivision (a)(3)’s
five criteria; the court considered improper factors; and it failed
to consider required factors. We agree with M.S. with respect to
the second criterion (which we discuss last). On this basis, we
reverse.

1. Criterion 1: degree of criminal sophistication
“The criminal-sophistication criterion ‘requires a juvenile
court . . . to consider the whole picture, that is, all the evidence
that might bear on the minor’s criminal sophistication, including
any criminal sophistication manifested in the present crime.’”
(Kevin P. v. Superior Court (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 173, 192,
quoting People v. Superior Court (Jones) (1998) 18 Cal.4th 667,
683-684.) In considering this criterion, section 707,
subdivision (a)(3)(A)(ii), requires the juvenile court to “give
weight to any relevant factor, including but not limited to, the
minor’s age, maturity, intellectual capacity, and physical, mental,
and emotional health at the time of the alleged offense; the
minor’s impetuosity or failure to appreciate risks and
consequences of criminal behavior; the effect of familial, adult, or
peer pressure on the minor’s actions; the effect of the minor’s
family and community environment; the existence of childhood
trauma; the minor’s involvement in the child welfare or foster
care system; and the status of the minor as a victim of human

24
trafficking, sexual abuse, or sexual battery on the minor’s
criminal sophistication.”
As the juvenile court observed, it was a reasonable
inference that M.S. killed Brandon in retaliation for their
previous confrontation in which Brandon accused M.S. of robbing
him, as a result of which M.S. was charged with robbery and
assault. The evidence also showed M.S. planned the shooting in
advance of L.R.’s party. In February 2021 M.S. sent a text
message stating he needed a gun and was “go[ing] to war,” and in
the days leading up to the shooting, M.S. made multiple social
media posts suggesting he would shoot somebody (“‘smoke[]
some1’”) at the party. At the party, M.S. confronted Brandon by
calling him a snitch, returned to the party after being told to
leave, and continued pursuing Brandon after other attendees
tried to physically restrain him. M.S. also appeared to
understand the consequences of his actions because he fled the
scene and boasted about the killing on social media, posting a
photo of a handgun with the caption “‘Fuck a snitch.’” Further,
there was no evidence that M.S. was pressured to kill Brandon or
acted spontaneously. Accordingly, substantial evidence
supported the court’s finding that M.S.’s criminal sophistication
weighed in favor of transfer. (See J.S., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at
p. 214 [affirming finding of criminal sophistication where “[t]he
crimes were not spontaneous or impulsive but were indicative of
deliberation”]; see also People v. Superior Court (Jones), supra,
18 Cal.4th at p. 684 [planning to obtain items used for the crime
and selecting a vulnerable target “involved a degree of criminal
sophistication precluding a finding of fitness”].)
M.S. contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in
failing to consider relevant factors under section 707,

25
subdivision (a)(3)(A)(ii), other than the crime, including M.S.’s
family environment and childhood trauma, his physical,
emotional, and mental health, intellectual capacity, maturity,
impetuosity, and history of substance abuse. However, the court
acknowledged these factors on the record before addressing this
criterion, and the court stated it had considered the testimony,
evidence, transcripts, expert reports, and pleadings. As
discussed, these materials included extensive evidence of each of
the relevant factors. And with respect to substance abuse, the
court took M.S. “at his word” that he was under the influence of
Xanax at the time he committed the offense.
“Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume that the trial
court knew and applied the governing law.” (People v. Gutierrez
(2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1390; see J.S., supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at
p. 214 [rejecting argument that juvenile court failed to consider
all factors relating to criminal sophistication because the court
expressly stated it had considered the arguments, reports,
exhibits, and witness testimony, “which necessarily included
evidence of appellant’s social, emotional, and intellectual
history”].) Notwithstanding the significant evidence of M.S.’s
childhood trauma, long-term substance abuse, mental health
diagnoses, limited cognitive functioning, lack of maturity, and
impulsiveness, substantial evidence supports the finding that
M.S. exhibited a degree of criminal sophistication with respect to
his planning, committing, and boasting about the killing that
favored transfer.5

5 M.S. also contends the juvenile court abused its discretion
with respect to the first criterion in excluding a ballistics
laboratory report stating that two additional cartridges fired from
a second firearm were found at the murder scene; M.S. argues

26
2. Criteria 4 and 5: success of previous rehabilitation
attempts circumstances and gravity of the offense6
M.S. argues with respect to the fourth criterion under
section 707, subdivision (a)(3)(D)) (success of previous
rehabilitation attempts), which factor the court found was
neutral, that the juvenile court abused its discretion in focusing
only on the effect of the juvenile courts’ rehabilitation services
provided prior to the current detention, and not on M.S.’s success
in responding to the rehabilitation services offered while M.S.
was detained in the DJJ system. It is true that the court in its
ruling focused on M.S.’s response to services provided prior to his
current detention. However, the court stated it considered all the
evidence in the record, which included evidence of M.S.’s
extensive participation in rehabilitation programs available in
the DJJ system. On remand, in evaluating this factor, the court
should consider M.S.’s response to rehabilitation services offered
both before and after his current detention.
M.S. argues with respect to the fifth criterion under
section 707, subdivision (a)(3)(E)) (the circumstances and gravity
of the offense), as he did with respect to the first criterion, that
the juvenile court failed to consider evidence regarding the

this evidence showed he shot in self-defense, thereby mitigating
the severity of the offense. The court did not abuse its discretion
in excluding the evidence because “the gravity criterion focuses
on the offense ‘“alleged in the petition”’ [citation], and like the
other statutory criteria, it is ‘based on the premise that the minor
did, in fact, commit the offense.’” (Kevin P. v. Superior Court
(2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 173, 189.)
6 M.S. does not contend on appeal that the juvenile court
abused its discretion with respect to the third criterion (previous
delinquency history), which the court found was neutral.

27
relevant factors, including his mental and emotional
development. The juvenile court heard ample evidence regarding
these factors, and we presume the court considered this evidence
in making its finding on this criterion. M.S. also contends the
court gave too much weight to M.S.’s “gang lifestyle” and
continued affiliation with a gang while in detention, pointing out
that the defense gang expert stated that as of December 2024
M.S. was no longer associated with a gang. However, the court
credited the testimony of the prosecution’s gang expert that M.S.
was associated with the Playboys gang, and the court considered
the evidence that in 2024 M.S. was posting videos of him making
gang signs and using numbers associated with the Playboys
gang. We review the court’s finding for substantial evidence, not
whether the evidence would have supported a different finding.
(See In re O.F., supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at p. 160; Miguel R.,
supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 169.)

3. Criterion 2: rehabilitation prior to the expiration of
the juvenile court’s jurisdiction
In evaluating whether a minor can be rehabilitated prior to
the expiration of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, the court “shall
give weight to any relevant factor, including, but not limited to,
the minor’s potential to grow and mature.” (§ 707,
subd. (a)(3)(B)(ii).) “[T]he focus of the second criterion is whether
there is enough time to rehabilitate the minor while the minor is
still eligible to remain under juvenile court jurisdiction.” (Miguel
R., supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 166; accord, J.N. v. Superior
Court (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 706, 721.) It is undisputed that at
the time of the court’s transfer ruling, M.S. had approximately
three-and-a-half years remaining under the court’s jurisdiction.

28
M.S. contends the juvenile court erred in relying on DJJ
recidivism data to conclude (based on Dr. Carmichael’s opinion)
that M.S. may not be rehabilitated within the remaining time
period, in the absence of evidence of the effectiveness of SYTF
programming or the outcomes for juvenile offenders. We agree.
The court’s reliance on data from the failed DJJ system to predict
outcomes at the SYTF facility is at odds with the Legislature’s
stated intent in enacting “[j]uvenile justice realignment” and
establishing the SYTF system to replace the DJJ system, that
counties “use evidence-based and promising practices and
programs that improve the outcomes of youth and public safety,
reduce the transfer of youth in to the adult criminal justice
system, ensure that dispositions are in the least restrictive
appropriate environment, . . . , and reduce the use of confinement
in the juvenile justice system by utilizing community-based
responses and interventions.” (Sen. Bill 823.) (Stats. 2020,
ch. 337, § 1(e).) Realignment was also intended, as part of the
goal to rehabilitate youth offenders, “to ensure that justice-
involved youth are closer to their families and communities and
receive age-appropriate treatment,” and “to establish a separate
dispositional track for higher-need youth.” (Id., Stats. 2020,
ch. 337, §§ 1(b), 30(e); see In re Jose R. (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th
839, 845.)7

7 Prior to 2020, commitment to the DJJ served as “the state’s
most restrictive placement for its most severe juvenile offenders.”
(In re Miguel C. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 902; see In re Jose R.,
supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 845.) To effectuate the transfer of
youth offenders to the newly realigned SYTF system, in 2021 the
Legislature enacted section 875, which provided that youth
offenders who would have previously been committed to the DJJ
would instead be committed to an SYTF. (Senate Bill No. 92

29
Moreover, effective January 1, 2023, the Legislature
amended section 707 with Assembly Bill No. 2361 (2021-2022
Reg. Sess.), which (1) raised the standard of proof for a youth
offender’s transfer to adult court to clear and convincing
evidence, and (2) required any juvenile court ordering transfer to
state its reasons supporting its finding that the youth offender is
not amenable to rehabilitation while under its jurisdiction. (In re
O.F., supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at pp. 159-160; Miguel R., supra,
100 Cal.App.5th at p. 164.) These changes were made in part to
“ensure[] that youth amenable to treatment and rehabilitation
will be retained in juvenile court,” “reduce[] arbitrary transfer
determinations that are not supported by clear and convincing
evidence,” and “ensure that . . . youth transfers to adult criminal
court are reduced in the wake of DJJ’s closure.” (Assem. Com. on
Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2361 (2021-2022 Reg.
Sess.) Apr. 5, 2022, pp. 8-9.)
These legislative changes demonstrate a clear intent to
rehabilitate youth offenders in a new less restrictive setting (the
SYTF’s) in which age-appropriate community-based treatment
would provide greater rehabilitation than the former DJJ system
and reduce the number of youth offenders who are transferred to
the adult criminal justice system. But the juvenile court’s
approach in this case, by relying on data showing the likelihood
that youth offenders housed at DJJ would reoffend, did the

(2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 18, § 12); see In re Jose
R., at p. 845.) Under realignment, DJJ’s responsibilities were
transferred to California’s counties beginning on July 1, 2021
(§ 736.5, subd. (a)), and DJJ was closed on June 30, 2023 (id.,
subd. (e)). (See In re M.B. (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 435, 448.)

30
opposite—it denied M.S. the opportunity to receive the more
robust programming at SYTF on the assumption the facility
would provide the same services the former DJJ facilities
provided.
The juvenile court compounded this error by relying on
Dr. Carmichael’s opinion that M.S. was more likely to be
rehabilitated in the youth offender program at CDCR, which
would provide long-term “evidence-based” treatment. The
question before the court under section 707,
subdivision (a)(3)(B)(i), was not whether M.S. could be
rehabilitated in the adult criminal justice system, but whether he
could be rehabilitated in the juvenile justice system prior to
expiration of its jurisdiction. (See § 707, subd. (a)(3)(B)(i).)
We recognize that at the time of the February 2025 transfer
hearing, the SYTF facility had been in operation for less than two
years, and thus there was no data on the extent to which the
SYTF system would succeed in its long-term rehabilitation goals.
But there was evidence of the more comprehensive rehabilitation
services that would be available to M.S. As Miller testified based
on his year and a half working at the Nidorf SYTF, M.S. would
have access to “more robust” rehabilitation services at the SYTF
than he had received at Los Padrinos juvenile hall, including an
individualized rehabilitation plan, weekly sessions with a case
worker to ensure compliance, mental health treatment, onsite
daily substance abuse treatment, and gang intervention
resources, in addition to college courses, workforce development
programs, and other enrichment programs. By contrast, for
example, as both Robles and Rios testified, at Los Padrinos M.S.
had not received substance abuse treatment, instead having
access only to an educational program on the effects of drug and

31
alcohol use and coping skills. In addition, Miller had observed a
change in the behavior of youth offenders transferred from Los
Padrinos to the SYTF.
The juvenile court’s error in relying on the DJJ data and
the CDCR youth offender program was significant given its
prominence in the court’s conclusion that the second criterion
“leans” toward transfer. The evidence supporting this factor was
not otherwise strong. Dr. Carmichael opined M.S. had the
capacity to grow and mature, and he acknowledged it was
“possible” M.S. could be rehabilitated during the remaining time
period. Dr. Carmichael concluded it was “unlikely” M.S. could be
rehabilitated in the time remaining, based in part on the inability
of the juvenile facility to provide the necessary oversight for his
rehabilitation. Yet the SYTF would provide more intensive
rehabilitation and oversight. And, as discussed, both
Dr. Contreras and Robles opined M.S.’s prognosis for
rehabilitation was positive.
In addition, M.S. demonstrated significant progress in Los
Padrinos within the year preceding his transfer hearing, with no
further aggressive or violent conduct. It is true, as the juvenile
court observed, that M.S. continued to associate with the
Playboys gang in 2023 and 2024. But the court did not rely on
this as a central factor in its ruling. Further, in his phone calls
with L.R., M.S. vacillated as to whether he wanted to continue
the gang lifestyle. And, as discussed, the SYTF would provide
gang intervention resources and ensure that M.S. was housed in
a unit where he would not be exposed to gang conflicts.
M.S. urges us to reverse the juvenile court’s transfer
decision and to order the court to hold a jurisdictional hearing.
In light of the court’s erroneous reliance on the DJJ data and

32
CDCR youth offender program, we agree that reversal is required
with respect to section 707’s second criterion. However, it is the
court’s role in the first instance to weigh section 707’s five
statutory criteria. (See Kevin P. v. Superior Court, supra,
57 Cal.App.5th at p. 201 [“nothing in section 707 supports the
notion that the rehabilitation criterion is . . . determinative
regardless of the other criteria that must be considered”].) We
therefore reverse the order transferring M.S. to the criminal
court and remand for the juvenile court to reconsider its finding
on the second statutory criterion consistent with this opinion and
to make a new finding, after consideration of all five criteria
under section 707, subdivision (a)(3), whether the People have
shown by clear and convincing evidence that M.S. is not
amenable to rehabilitation while under the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court. In making this determination, the court shall
consider any evidence submitted by the parties relating to M.S.’s
rehabilitation since the February 2025 transfer hearing.

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s order transferring M.S. to a court of
criminal jurisdiction is reversed. We remand for the juvenile
court to reconsider the second criterion under section 707,
subdivision (a)(3)(B), consistent with this opinion, whether M.S.
can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the court’s
jurisdiction. In addition, the court is to make a finding whether,
in light of all five statutory criteria, the People have met their
burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that
M.S. is not amenable to rehabilitation (§ 707, subd. (a)(3)). On
remand, the court shall consider any evidence submitted by the

33
parties relating to M.S.’s rehabilitation since the February 2025
hearing on the transfer motion.

FEUER, J.
We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J.

SEGAL, J.

34

Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort

Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.