CourtListener 10852840•People v. Ware CA2/3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 5/4/26 P. v. Ware CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
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8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B338381
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA496865)
v.
TERRANCE WARE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Eleanor J. Hunter, Judge. Reversed and
remanded.
Sydney Banach, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Thomas C. Hsieh, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
A jury convicted Terrance Ware of two counts of second
degree murder. Ware raises numerous contentions on appeal,
including the contention that the trial court failed to instruct the
jury about how a defendant who is an initial aggressor can regain
the right to self-defense. We agree with that contention and
reverse the judgment and remand on that ground.
BACKGROUND
I. The murders of Rivera and Garcia
On July 2, 2021, at about 5:00 p.m., Luis Perez was with
the victims Isaac Rivera and Christian Garcia and a few other
men near Maple and Pico in downtown Los Angeles. The men
were in an alleyway that led to a parking lot when Tameka
Francis parked in the lot. Francis, however, left after refusing to
pay for parking.
After Francis left, Rivera, Garcia, and a third man broke
into her car and ransacked it. While they were in the car,
Francis returned and told the men to get the “ ‘fuck’ ” out of her
car. Garcia told her, “ ‘Shut up, bitch. I’m not done yet.’ ”
Francis replied, “ ‘You’re dead’ ” and said she was going to come
back with her brother. Garcia got out of Francis’s car with a
speaker he was taking from it. Francis drove away in her car.
Perez left to smoke with a friend nearby. While smoking,
Perez saw Francis walking with Ware and another man. Perez
went to warn Rivera and Garcia, but he heard gunshots and saw
Ware running away. As Ware ran away, he pointed a gun at
Perez. Rivera pointed at Ware and said, “ ‘Bro, he shot me.’ ”
Brian Barrientos was near 12th and Maple when he heard
gunshots and saw Ware holding a gun and running from where
2
the shots were fired. Perez was running after Ware and yelling,
“ ‘It’s him.’ ”
Garcia died at the scene, having been shot in his shoulder,
twice in the chest area, and in his forearm. Rivera died at the
hospital, having been shot once in the abdomen and once in the
back. Stippling was on Garcia’s body but not on Rivera’s. The
presence of stippling indicated the gun was less than four feet
from Garcia’s body.
Ware was arrested on July 7, 2021. He did not admit
involvement in the shooting. Instead, he said they were checking
on Francis’s car when they heard gunshots, so they left.
II. The crime scene and backpack
Law enforcement found six 9-millimeter casings at the
crime scene but no weapons. Detective Alejandro Abundis, the
investigating officer, testified that they found a backpack and
that law enforcement does not touch or move evidence before
taking photographs of it. When the detective saw the backpack,
all of its zippers were closed. He could not recall if the backpack
was “completely zipped,” but it “was not open,” meaning the
contents could not be seen. The detective opened the backpack at
the station and found a BB gun at the bottom.
However, photographs of the backpack at the crime scene
appear to show the backpack open. After reviewing the
photographs, Detective Abundis agreed that the backpack “could”
have been open, but his recollection was that it was closed. On
redirect examination, Detective Abundis said the BB gun was in
the backpack’s top portion, and a different part of the backpack,
the front pocket, might have been open.
3
III. Evidence of threats to a witness
At trial, Perez said that he had previously testified in
November 2022. While waiting in the court hallway, Ware’s
family members walked past him and one said, “ ‘I should slap
the shit out of him right now.’ ” Perez felt threatened, so sheriff’s
deputies escorted him out a back way to his car. As Perez was
driving out of the parking structure, a car blocked him, a woman
came up to him, and she said, “ ‘Don’t be snitching on me.’ ”
Perez took it as a threat. As of the time of trial, he remained
scared, stating, “They’re stone cold killers over a $10 parking.”
He felt that testifying put his life in danger.
IV. Defense case
Francis, Ware, and a medical expert testified in the defense
case.
A. Francis’s testimony
Francis said she was in the area that day to shoot a music
video. She and her friend parked in a lot and, after an incident
with several men, she left. But as she left, one of the men said he
was going to stab them.
Francis returned to her car to move it closer to the shoot.
Two men were in her car, and she told them to get out. After
moving her car, Francis called Ware and told him someone had
broken into her car. Ware asked for her location in case she
needed anything, but she did not tell him to come. However,
Ware did come, and she told him that she was afraid the men had
taken things from her car that had her address on it.
Ware, Francis, and their friend Hendrix walked back to the
parking lot where Francis had originally parked her car to make
sure the men did not have any information about where she lived.
4
After looking on the ground and not seeing anything, they started
to walk back. While in the alley, Francis saw one of the men,
Garcia, who had been in her car. Ware asked Garcia if he had
been in Francis’s car, and the men exchanged words that Francis
described as “a little” hostile “but not too crazy.” According to
Francis, Garcia was “saying that I was being rude to him and
that I was coming for him or trying to attack him.” Francis then
saw the second man who had been in her car, Rivera, and he was
wearing a backpack that he took off. Francis, with Ware
following her, started to leave the alley, but when Rivera reached
into the backpack, Ware told Francis to move. She was walking
away when she heard gunshots. Ware ran past her, but he did
not have a gun in his hands. Francis never saw Ware with a gun.
Francis returned to the music shoot. Later that night, she
returned to her car and the police questioned her, but she did not
mention hearing gunshots.
B. Ware’s testimony
Ware testified that he and Francis were friends, and he
also managed her modeling career. When Francis called him
that day, she said that someone had broken into her car and
“some guys were tripping.” He therefore went to her location
because he was concerned and wanted to make sure she was
okay. Ware’s friend Hendrix went with him. Ware brought his
loaded, unregistered gun, which he always carried because he
tended to carry a lot of cash.
When Ware arrived at Francis’s location, she told him that
she wanted to make sure the men had not removed things from
the car. They went to where she had originally parked her car,
but they did not find anything. While in an alley off Maple, Ware
saw gang graffiti. The graffiti made him nervous, so he took his
5
gun from his satchel and put it in his pocket. He did not know if
he would see the guys, but if he did, he did not know what their
response would be.
After entering the alley, Ware saw Garcia, and Ware asked
if he had been in Francis’s car. During the minute or so
conversation, Ware kept his hand on the gun in his pocket,
although Ware said that any hostility or aggression lasted a
“moment” but “simmered back down.” Rivera then came into the
alley on a bicycle. Rivera was “immediately irate” and yelling.
Rivera took off his backpack, unzipped it, and put his hand
inside. Garcia stuck his hands into his pants like he was trying
to pull something out.
Ware told Rivera to calm down, and he backed away from
Rivera and Garcia. Rivera, who was still straddling his bicycle,
came towards Ware. Ware’s “nerves” “immediately gone all the
way up, and now I’m in fear.” On seeing Rivera grab the handle
of a gun, Ware began firing his gun. Ware estimated he was
about 27 feet from Rivera and nine or 10 feet from Garcia when
Ware fired his gun twice at Garcia and twice at Rivera. Ware
then ran, not knowing if he hit anybody. He did not learn that
Garcia and Rivera had died until after he was arrested.
Ware denied seeing Perez or pointing a gun at him.
Ware could not remember what he did with the gun after
the shooting.
C. Medical expert
The parties stipulated that Rivera had 0.6 nanograms per
milliliter of blood of amphetamine and 2.5 nanograms per
milliliter of blood of methamphetamine in his system at the time
of his death. Dr. Ryan O’Connor, an emergency room doctor and
forensic medical expert, testified that Rivera had “extremely high
6
levels” of methamphetamine in his system, between 50 and 250
times greater than the therapeutic range and “well into the
abusive range,” approaching a potentially fatal range.
The doctor explained that methamphetamine is a stimulant
that causes a person to be hyperactive and fidgety, and to speak
quickly. At higher doses, it can cause paranoid delusions and
auditory hallucinations. “A hallmark of methamphetamine
intoxication is rapidly alternating emotions[,] so you can be
happy at one minute and then something happens maybe
relatively unoffensive but you take it the wrong way and all of a
sudden you’re in a rage. Methamphetamine, especially in high
doses is associated with anger and violent behavior and
unpredictable behavior.”
V. Verdict and sentence
The jury acquitted Ware of first degree murder and of
assault with a semiautomatic firearm on Perez but convicted
Ware of two counts of second degree murder with true findings on
personal gun use allegations. (Pen. Code,1 §§ 187, subd. (a),
12022.5. subd. (a).)
On June 3, 2024, the trial court sentenced Ware to
consecutive terms of 15 years to life. The trial court did not
impose punishment on the personal gun use allegations.
DISCUSSION
Ware’s defense was self-defense, and the trial court
accordingly instructed the jury on perfect and imperfect self-
defense. (CALCRIM No. 505.) Over Ware’s objection, the trial
1
All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
7
court also instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 3471 regarding
an initial aggressor’s right to self-defense.2 However, the trial
court omitted language from CALCRIM No. 3471 about how an
initial aggressor can regain the right to self-defense. As we now
explain, omission of that language was prejudicial error.
I. The trial court’s instructions and CALCRIM No. 3471
The People asked the trial court to instruct the jury with
CALCRIM Nos. 3471 and 3472 because Ware first approached
Garcia with a loaded gun. The defense objected, arguing that
there was no evidence Ware or Francis were the initial
aggressors; to the contrary, the defense theory was Rivera was
the initial aggressor. The trial court noted the objections, but
found that the evidence warranted giving the instructions.
The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM
No. 3471, entitled “Right to Self-Defense: Mutual Combat or
Initial Aggressor,” as follows: “A person who starts a fight has a
right to self-defense only if: [¶] 1. He actually and in good faith
tried to stop fighting; [¶] AND [¶] 2. He indicated, by word or by
conduct, to his opponent, in a way that a reasonable person would
understand, that he wanted to stop fighting and that he had
stopped fighting. [¶] If the defendant meets these requirements,
he then had a right to self-defense if the opponent continued to
fight.”
The trial court omitted the following language from
CALCRIM No. 3471: “[However, if the defendant used only non-
deadly force, and the opponent responded with such sudden and
deadly force that the defendant could not withdraw from the
2
CALCRIM No. 3471 also instructs on mutual combat but
the trial court omitted language about that theory.
8
fight, then the defendant had the right to defend (himself/herself)
with deadly force and was not required to try to stop fighting(,/
or) communicate the desire to stop to the opponent[, or give the
opponent a chance to stop fighting].]”
II. General principles and standard of review
A trial court in a criminal case must instruct on the general
principles of law that are closely and openly connected to the
facts before the court and are necessary for the jury’s
understanding of the case. (People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th
983, 1021.) This includes a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury
on an affirmative defense if it appears the defendant is relying on
such a defense or if substantial evidence supports it and it is not
inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the case. (People v.
Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 469; People v. Ramirez (2015) 233
Cal.App.4th 940, 949 (Ramirez).)
However, it is error to give an instruction that is not
supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Marshall (1997) 15
Cal.4th 1, 39–40; People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1129.)
Substantial evidence is evidence of reasonable, credible value
sufficient to deserve consideration by the jury. (People v. Wilson
(2005) 36 Cal.4th 309, 331; People v. Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 822,
835.) “In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to
warrant a jury instruction, the trial court does not determine the
credibility of the defense evidence, but only whether ‘there was
evidence which, if believed by the jury, was sufficient to raise a
reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Salas (2006) 37 Cal.4th 967, 982.)
Whether a trial court properly instructed a jury is a
question of law that we review de novo. (People v. Cole (2004) 33
Cal.4th 1158, 1210.)
9
III. Initial aggressors and the right to self-defense
Ware makes two arguments about CALCRIM No. 3471. He
first argues that it was inapplicable because there was
insufficient evidence he was the initial aggressor. Second, the
trial court prejudicially erred by omitting language that he did
not forfeit his right to self-defense in the face of sudden and
deadly escalation. As we now explain, there was substantial
evidence to warrant giving the instruction, but the trial court
erred in omitting language about when an initial aggressor
regains the right to self-defense.
A. Substantial evidence
Under CALCRIM No. 3471, an initial aggressor does not
lose his right to self-defense if he actually and in good faith tried
to stop fighting and conveyed to his opponent that he wanted to
stop fighting and had stopped fighting, but the opponent
continues to fight. Ware argues that there was no evidence he
was the initial aggressor; instead, “if anything, it was Rivera who
was the initial aggressor.”
To the contrary, the evidence showed that Francis
threatened Garcia during their first confrontation. She told
Garcia, who had taken a speaker from her car, “ ‘You’re dead,’ ”
and said she would return with her brother. Francis further
admitted that she called Ware. And although Francis and Ware
denied that Francis asked him to come to her aid, the jury could
reasonably infer that she asked him to come, given that she told
the victims she would return with her brother, an apparent
reference to Ware.
When Ware arrived, he was armed with a loaded gun and
accompanied by another man, Hendrix. (See People v. Koontz
10
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1081–1082 [defendant’s act of arming
himself with loaded weapon was evidence of planning consistent
with premeditation and deliberation finding].)3 The three—Ware,
Francis, and Hendrix—then returned to the parking lot, even
though Francis’s car was no longer parked there. Based on
Francis’s statements that she would return with her brother, the
jury could reject Ware’s and Francis’s explanation that they
returned to look for her things and believe instead that they were
looking for the victims.
Moreover, Ware testified that he removed the gun from his
satchel and put it in his pocket before he even saw the victims,
which could suggest he was preparing for a confrontation.
Indeed, Ware said he put the gun in his pocket because he did not
know what the victims’ responses would be if he encountered
them. Francis and Ware both testified that when they
encountered Garcia, Ware initiated a confrontation with Garcia,
asking if he had been in Francis’s car. Francis further testified
that Garcia “was like … basically saying that I was being rude to
him and that I was coming for him or trying to attack him.”
Ware and Francis admitted that the confrontation started a little
hostile but simmered down. Ware further admitted he had his
hand on his pocket containing the gun during the entire
confrontation.
Based on this evidence, the jury could believe that Ware
and his companions went looking for Garcia and Rivera to
confront them and, on encountering Garcia, started a fight. The
3
The jury here acquitted Ware of first degree murder. We
therefore cite this authority to support the bare proposition that
Ware’s act of arming himself can show he planned for any
encounter with the men who had fought with Francis.
11
evidence therefore was sufficient to warrant giving CALCRIM
No. 3471. That the evidence might support or raise contrary
inferences suggesting Rivera was the initial aggressor or was the
one who started a fight does not render the evidence insufficient
to support giving the instruction. (See People v. Earp (1999) 20
Cal.4th 826, 887–888 [stating the general sufficiency of the
evidence standard of review].)
B. Forfeiture of right to self-defense
Ware next contends that the trial court improperly
excluded language from CALCRIM No. 3471 regarding his right
to self-defense even if he was the initial aggressor.
As an initial matter, the Attorney General contends Ware
forfeited this contention because he failed to ask the trial court to
include the omitted language. (See People v. Jennings (2010) 50
Cal.4th 616, 671 [party may not complain on appeal that
instruction correct in law and responsive to evidence was too
general or incomplete in absence of request for clarifying
language].) Assuming forfeiture applies, we nonetheless may
decline to apply it if the instructional error affected the
defendant’s substantial rights. (§ 1259; Ramirez, supra, 233
Cal.App.4th at p. 949.) Because the contention affects Ware’s
substantial rights, we consider it.
As we have said, CALCRIM No. 3471 instructs that one
who starts a fight has a right to self-defense if he tries to stop
fighting and communicates to his opponent that he wants to stop
fighting. However, the omitted language would have further told
the jury that a defendant who starts a fight using “non-deadly
force” does not lose the right of self-defense if the opponent
responds with “sudden and deadly force.” (CALCRIM No. 3471.)
This language reflects the principle that when a defendant
12
engages in simple assault or trespass “ ‘and his opponent
responds with deadly force so suddenly that the person cannot
withdraw, a defendant may immediately use deadly force in self-
defense.’ ” (People v. Quach (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 294, 301
(Quach); accord, People v. Conkling (1896) 111 Cal. 616, 626–627;
People v. Hecker (1895) 109 Cal. 451, 464 [“Where one is the first
wrongdoer, but his unlawful act is not felonious, as a simple
assault upon the person of another, or a mere trespass upon his
property, even though forcible, and this unlawful act is met by a
counter assault of a deadly character, the right of self-defense to
the first wrongdoer is not lost”]; Ramirez, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th
at p. 949; People v. Gleghorn (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 196, 201.)
The qualification in the omitted language thus “applies where the
defendant commits a simple assault.” (People v. Salazar (2016)
63 Cal.4th 214, 249.) But if “ ‘one makes a felonious assault upon
another, or has created appearances justifying the other to
launch a deadly counterattack in self-defense, the original
assailant cannot slay his adversary in self-defense unless he has
first, in good faith, declined further combat, and has fairly
notified him that he has abandoned the affray.’ ” (Id. at p. 250
[exception did not apply where defendant approached victim with
cocked gun].)
The Attorney General asserts that the trial court had no
obligation to give the omitted language because there was no
evidence Ware committed any assault, including a simple
assault. However, a simple assault is an unlawful attempt,
coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury on
another. (§ 240.) Simple assault requires an act that by its
nature would directly and probably result in the application of
physical force to another person, and the crime does not require
13
actual physical injury or contact to the victim. (People v. Harring
(2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 483, 503.)
Here, both Ware and Francis testified that Ware confronted
Garcia by asking if he broke into Francis’s car. Ware and Francis
agreed that the confrontation was at least initially hostile and
aggressive. And Ware kept his hand over his pocket with the gun
in it during the entire confrontation. Garcia could interpret
Ware’s gesture of keeping his hand over his pocket during a
hostile conversation as a physical threat,4 especially when
coupled with Francis’s earlier threats to return with her brother
and that Garcia would be “dead.” There is evidence that this is
exactly how Garcia interpreted the confrontation, because he
accused Francis of “trying to attack him.” If the victims
responded to this nondeadly force with deadly force, then Ware
could have regained the right to defend himself. Accordingly,
there was sufficient evidence to warrant giving the omitted
language.
We therefore consider whether the trial court’s failure to
give it was prejudicial. Courts of appeal have applied the
harmless-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard in Chapman v.
California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 to the error. (See, e.g., Quach,
supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 303 [applying Chapman standard
where court gave erroneous self-defense instruction]; see
Ramirez, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 953 [applying Chapman
standard to failure to modify CALCRIM No. 3472].) The
Chapman standard requires us to “determine whether it is clear
beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have
rendered the same verdict absent the error.” (People v. Merritt
4
Indeed, Ware interpreted a similar gesture from Garcia,
who Ware said put his hand down his pants, as threatening.
14
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 819, 831.) We must reverse the conviction under
that standard unless we conclude “that no ‘rational juror who
made the findings reflected in the verdict and heard the evidence
at trial court could have had a reasonable doubt regarding the
findings necessary to convict the defendant [absent the
instructional error].’ ” (People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237,
244.)
The error was prejudicial. The evidence, while sufficient to
support the second-degree-murder verdicts, could have also
supported a theory that Ware responded to sudden and deadly
force. Ware testified that during his confrontation with Garcia,
Rivera arrived on the scene, irate and yelling. Rivera reached
into his backpack and grabbed the handle of a gun. Other
evidence corroborated Ware’s testimony. Rivera had an
extremely high level of methamphetamine in his system, which
can cause a person to be violent, and he had a BB gun in his
backpack. And whether the backpack was fully closed or open
was a subject of dispute at trial. The jury also acquitted Ware of
first degree murder, so it thereby rejected the prosecutor’s theory
that Ware was hunting the victims with the premeditated intent
to kill them. Given the evidence and verdicts, we are not
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that no juror would have
found that the victims responded to nondeadly force with sudden
and deadly force.
Nor was the omitted language inconsistent with Ware’s
defense. An instruction is inconsistent with defendant’s theory of
case if it requires acknowledging, if only inferentially, existence
of facts which defendant otherwise denied. (People v. Jo (2017)
15 Cal.App.5th 1128, 1168–1169; People v. Salas, supra, 37
Cal.4th at p. 982–983 [trial court has no duty to instruct on
15
affirmative defense inconsistent with defendant’s theory of case].)
Ware did not deny the facts or evidence relevant to the omitted
language. To be sure, his defense counsel argued in closing that
Ware did not instigate anything, rather “he was looking around
to make sure that these people weren’t around when [Francis]
came out, and he just wanted to let them know, look, is
everything cool. He wanted to have a conversation,” and he did
not take out his gun. Ware thus certainly downplayed or put a
favorable spin on the evidence surrounding his conduct in the
alley, but he did not deny the facts and evidence. Instead, the
defense provided many of the relevant facts: Ware initiated the
confrontation, the confrontation was hostile, Ware kept his hand
over his pocket containing the gun, and Garcia said he felt under
attack.
Also, neither the defense nor the prosecution discussed the
scenario of Garcia and Rivera interpreting Ware’s conduct as
threatening and the impact of such interpretation on any right to
self-defense Ware might have had. The prosecutor only
addressed when a “person starts a fight,” saying such a person
has a right to self-defense only if he actually and in good faith
tried to stop the fight, which Ware did not do. While that was
accurate, it was incomplete.
We further observe that the trial court did not (and was not
asked) to expand on the meaning of “initial aggressor” (which
phrase appears in the instruction’s title) or “starts a fight,” which
is in the instruction’s text. The jury thus would have applied a
lay and commonsense definition to those terms based on the trial
court’s instruction that some “[w]ords and phrases not specifically
defined in these instructions are to be applied using their
ordinary, everyday meanings.” (CALCRIM No. 200.) In everyday
16
parlance, an aggressor is one who commits or practices
aggression. (Merriam–Webster’s Collegiate Dict. (12th ed. 2025)
p. 25.) Aggression is (1) “a forceful action or procedure (such as
an unprovoked attack) especially when intended to dominate or
master,” (2) “the practice of making attacks or encroachments,”
and (3) “hostile, injurious, or destructive behavior or outlook
especially when caused by frustration.” (Merriam–Webster’s
Collegiate Dict. (12th ed. 2025) <https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/aggression> [as of April 30, 2026],
archived at <https://perma.cc/U5C9-73ND>.) The lay meaning of
“initial” is first. Therefore, the combined meaning of the two
words, i.e., “initial aggressor,” is the first person who engages in
aggression. While aggression certainly can refer to a
confrontation with physical force, it also could refer to something
short of that, for example, hostile behavior. We therefore cannot
rule out that the jury believed that the confrontation Ware and
Francis described made Ware the initial aggressor or that he
started a fight.
Finally, we cannot find that the jury rejected the theory
posed by the omitted language based on other instructions. The
trial court included the language it omitted from CALCRIM
No. 3471 in CALCRIM No. 3472. CALCRIM No. 3472 concerned
contrived self-defense and it instructed the jury as follows: “A
person does not have the right to self-defense if he provokes a
fight or quarrel with the intent to create an excuse to use force. [¶]
However, if the defendant used only nondeadly force, and the
opponent responded with such sudden and deadly force that the
defendant could not withdraw from the fight, then the defendant
had the right to defend himself with deadly force and was not
17
required to try and stop fighting.”5 (Italics added; see generally
Ramirez, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at pp. 947–949.)
Although CALCRIM No. 3472 contained the language
omitted from CALCRIM No. 3471, we cannot be assured that the
jury would have imported the exception for an opponent’s sudden
use of deadly force from CALCRIM No. 3472 into CALCRIM
No. 3471. Instead, CALCRIM No. 3472 applied in the limited
situation where a defendant intentionally created an excuse to
use force. (See, e.g., Ramirez, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 957
[CALCRIM No. 3472’s scienter requirement distinguishes it from
CALCRIM No. 3471, which focuses on “whether inducement of a
quarrel leads to an adversary’s attack”] (dis. opn. of Fybel, J.).) If
the jury did not believe Ware intentionally created an excuse to
use force, then it would not have even considered the exception
pertaining to an opponent’s unreasonable response, and nothing
in the instructions otherwise suggested that the exception
applied to CALCRIM No. 3471.
We therefore conclude that the error was prejudicial and
requires reversal of the judgment. Because we reverse on this
ground, we need not address Ware’s remaining contentions.
5
It is unclear why the trial court included the exception in
CALCRIM No. 3472 but omitted it from CALCRIM No. 3471.
18
DISPOSITION
We reverse the judgment and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS
EDMON, P. J.
We concur:
ADAMS, J.
HANASONO, J.
19
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