CourtListener 10851803•Bornoff v. State Farm General Ins. Co. CA2/1
Bornoff v. State Farm General Ins. Co. CA2/1
CourtListener 10851803Calctapp01.05.2026
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Filed 5/1/26 Bornoff v. State Farm General Ins. Co. CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
JENNIFER BORNOFF, B339796
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 22STCV23104)
v.
STATE FARM GENERAL
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant and
Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Thomas D. Long, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.
Todd Krauss, Todd Krauss; Law Offices of Kevin M. Zietz,
Kevin M. Zietz; Benedon & Serlin, Judith E. Posner, Wendy S.
Albers and Drew Musto for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Tharpe & Howell and Eric B. Kunkel for Defendant and
Respondent.
_______________________________
Plaintiff Jennifer Bornoff appeals from a judgment in favor
of her business insurer, Defendant State Farm General
Insurance Company (State Farm), entered after the trial court
granted State Farm’s motion for summary judgment on Bornoff’s
claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court also denied
Bornoff’s postjudgment motion for a new trial on her bad faith
claim. Bornoff concedes that State Farm was entitled to
summary adjudication of her contract claim but challenges the
summary adjudication of her bad faith claim and the denial of
her new trial motion.
We conclude that in moving for summary judgment, State
Farm failed to meet its initial burden of production under Code of
Civil Procedure section 437c to show that no triable issue existed
as to Bornoff’s claim that State Farm’s delay in paying her policy
benefits caused her extracontractual economic losses.1 Because
the burden never shifted to Bornoff to produce evidence that she
suffered such an economic loss, we conclude that the trial court
erred by summarily adjudicating Bornoff’s bad faith claim on the
ground that she failed to produce such evidence. As to whether
State Farm unreasonably delayed payment (which issue the trial
court did not reach), we conclude that the evidence in the
summary judgment record reveals a triable issue of material fact.
Because we conclude that summary judgment should not have
been granted, we need not address the additional evidence that
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
2
Bornoff submitted with her new trial motion, or her argument
that the trial court erred by denying that motion.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and remand to the
trial court with directions to enter a new order granting summary
adjudication of Bornoff’s breach of contract claim and otherwise
denying State Farm’s motion for summary judgment or summary
adjudication.
BACKGROUND
The facts summarized below are taken from undisputed
facts in the parties’ separate statements and from uncontradicted
evidence in the summary judgment record.
A. On March 6, 2022, Bornoff’s business suffered a
burglary and she submitted a claim to State Farm.
She promptly provided requested information to the
assigned claims associate, Dan Walder, who did not
request additional information.
Bornoff operates a retail business in Studio City. She
purchased from State Farm a business insurance policy effective
from March 1, 2022, to March 1, 2023.
On March 6, 2022, burglars entered Bornoff’s store by
creating a hole in a wall shared with an adjoining business,
damaged several items of property in the store, and stole a
substantial amount of merchandise. The same day, Bornoff
submitted a claim with State Farm for loss of business personal
property and loss of income.
Bornoff’s insurance policy provided: “You must see that the
following are done in the event of loss to covered property: [¶]
. . . [¶] b. Give us prompt notice of the loss. Include a description
of the lost or damaged property in the notice; [¶] c. As soon as
3
possible, give us a description of how, when and where the loss
occurred; [¶] . . . [¶] e. At our request, give us complete inventories
of the damaged and undamaged property. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] h. Send
us a signed, sworn statement of loss containing the information
we request to settle the claim. You must do this within 60 days
after our request.” (Italics added.) “We will pay for covered loss
within 30 days after we receive the sworn statement of loss, if: [¶]
(1) You have complied with all of the terms of this policy; and [¶]
(2) We have reached agreement with you on the amount of loss or
an appraisal award has been made.”
Dan Walder, the claims associate assigned to Bornoff’s
claim, testified that he never requested a sworn statement of loss
from Bornoff because he “wasn’t questioning the loss.” Indeed,
whether State Farm would pay for Bornoff’s claimed losses (after
ascertaining their value) “was never even in question.”
On March 7, State Farm notified Bornoff that Walder
would review her claim and contact her if State Farm needed
additional information. The same day, Walder emailed Bornoff a
letter identifying the information State Farm would need to
process her claim: a police report, her lease agreement, an invoice
for repair to the damaged wall, loss documentation for the stolen
and damaged property, and a “[l]oss of income review.” Walder
also emailed Bornoff a link to an online “contents collaboration
form” that she could use to submit the required inventory of her
stolen and damaged property. Bornoff spoke with Walder on the
phone later that day and told him that she did not own a
computer, was not “computer savvy,” and “would not be able to
itemize all the items lost on the [contents collaboration] form
provided.” Walder “told [her] to write everything down and send
it to him and that he would have his team fill out the form.”
4
Two days later (on March 9), in a series of emails to State
Farm, Bornoff submitted photos and videos of the damaged
property, a police report, and a letter from her landlord
confirming her responsibility for repairing the wall damage.2
Bornoff requested—but never received—confirmation of receipt of
the police report and letter from her landlord.
Another two days later (on March 11), Bornoff emailed
State Farm an invoice for initial repairs and an inventory of
stolen merchandise from one of her vendors. Bornoff wrote: “I
just learned how to use the scan app so please confirm that this
worked!” She received no response from Walder or anyone else at
State Farm.
Walder testified that after receiving the information from
Bornoff on March 11, he still needed Bornoff to provide a “full”
list of stolen items and their replacement costs. He did not
inform Bornoff of what information he still needed.
B. On March 31, 2022, Bornoff’s business suffered a
second burglary and she submitted a second claim.
On April 7, having received no contact from Walder
for a month, she hired an attorney, Todd Krauss.
On March 31, 2022, Bornoff’s store was again burglarized,
and Bornoff submitted a second claim with State Farm for loss of
business personal property and loss of income. The same day,
State Farm notified Bornoff that a different claims associate, Bo
Bailey, would review her second claim and contact her if State
Farm needed additional information. The next day (April 1),
State Farm internally reassigned Bornoff’s second claim from
2 Walder accepted the letter from Bornoff’s landlord in lieu
of the lease agreement he had requested.
5
Bailey to Walder (who remained assigned to her first claim as
well).
By April 7 (one month after Walder last contacted Bornoff
to request information for her first claim), Bornoff had not
received any correspondence from Walder or State Farm
regarding additional information she needed to submit for either
of her two claims. Bornoff felt that State Farm’s lack of response
to her repeated inquiries was “disturbing,” and she did not know
what to do. Accordingly, she hired an attorney, Todd Krauss.
C. On April 11, 2022, State Farm received a letter from
Krauss with itemized lists of lost items, separated by
each burglary. Walder did not contact Krauss until
May 26, when he asked him to (again) submit such an
inventory. Krauss did so on June 6.
On April 7, 2022, Krauss sent Walder a letter by certified
mail to the same address given on Walder’s March 7 letter to
Bornoff. Krauss also faxed the letter to State Farm’s centralized
location for receiving faxes. Krauss informed State Farm that
Bornoff had retained his office to represent her in pursuing both
of her claims, and attached various information to support the
claims, including itemized lists of lost and damaged property.
The attachments contained information about “approximately
972 stolen items[,] of which approximately 450 were unique
items, many of which were consignment inventory items.”
Krauss separated the attachment into two sections—the first
labeled “March 6, 2022 first break-in” and the second labeled
“March 31, 2022 second break-in.” Krauss emphasized Bornoff’s
desire to “get the store repaired and reopened as quickly as
possible to avoid any more losses,” and requested that Walder
contact him after reviewing the information provided.
6
Walder testified that when an insured like Bornoff suffers
an interruption to the insured’s business, time is of the essence.
Walder’s supervisor, Todd Noakes, similarly testified that such
an interruption renders prompt claims handling especially
important, and that delayed investigation or payment could
cause the insured financial hardship.
State Farm received Krauss’s letter on April 11, 2022.
However, Walder testified that he did not recall having seen the
letter. He acknowledged that reviewing the letter would have
clarified which lost items corresponded to which of Bornoff’s two
claims.
Before April 28, Krauss phoned Walder and left messages
at least two times, but received no response. On that date, he
mailed and faxed a follow-up letter to Walder, which again
requested that Walder contact him.
State Farm received the follow-up letter on May 3.
However, Walder testified that he did not recall having seen that
letter. He acknowledged that he did not contact Bornoff between
her submission of information on March 11 and State Farm’s
receipt of Krauss’s follow-up letter on May 3. He testified that “a
letter should have been sent” during that time period to advise
her of her claims’ status.
On May 13, Noakes directed Walder to inform Krauss that
State Farm lacked information regarding whether Bornoff’s
losses exceeded her $5,000 deductible (which information Krauss
had provided in his April 7 letter), and to request additional
information.
Two weeks later (on May 26), Walder emailed Krauss a link
to a contents collaboration form and asked him to have Bornoff
provide a list of costs for the lost items of property. Krauss
7
responded: “We already sent a list of items and numbers. I am
going to have her do this again but that will be it. [¶] It is not fair
to her and this should have been sent to me a month ago.”
On May 31, Krauss sent Walder the contents collaboration
form with the requested inventory of lost items. On June 3,
Krauss phoned Walder, who requested that Krauss specify which
items corresponded to which of the two burglaries. On June 6,
Krauss resubmitted the inventory, this time with handwritten
notations indicating which burglary each item had been lost in.
D. On July 15, 2022, Bornoff sued State Farm for breach
of contract and bad faith. Within days, State Farm
paid her all the policy benefits due for lost property.
On June 8, 2022, Walder assigned Bornoff’s second claim to
the Centralized Contents Team (CCT) to begin valuing Bornoff’s
lost property. On June 27, he assigned her first claim to the CCT
as well.3
On July 7 (one month after Krauss resubmitted the
inventory to Walder as requested), CCT member Shamontae
Byrd phoned Bornoff, who advised her to phone Krauss. Byrd
then told Krauss by phone that she was just starting to process
the information for the claims. Later that day, Krauss sent
Walder a letter informing him that Bornoff would sue State Farm
if State Farm did not provide a response regarding the status of
her claims by July 12.
3 On June 15, 2022 (between the two dates when Walder
assigned the claims to the CCT), Kraus sent Walder a letter
demanding information about the status of Bornoff’s claims and
stating that she would sue State Farm if it was not provided.
Walder did not respond.
8
On July 15, having received no response, Bornoff filed a
complaint against State Farm for breach of contract and breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. On July 20
(about four months after Bornoff submitted her claims), State
Farm paid Bornoff the full amount of policy benefits due for lost
property ($55,166.37 on her first claim and $75,493.53 on her
second).
Noakes testified that the four-month period to pay Bornoff’s
lost property benefits “seems like it’s too long,” although he was
not personally involved in handling her claims and did not know
the reason for the delay. Walder testified that State Farm’s
adjustment and payment of Bornoff’s claims was “slow,” but he
did not believe that it was unreasonable because (as he recalled)
State Farm did not receive the information he asked for until
early June 2022. Walder testified: “[I]t took us a while to
identify what items go to what claim. And that was -- that was
the essential slowdown, I think.”
E. Bornoff filed an amended complaint, which alleged
that State Farm’s unreasonable delay in payment
caused her extracontractual economic damages,
including attorney fees. The trial court granted
State Farm’s motion for summary judgment and
denied Bornoff’s motion for a new trial.
In August 2022, Bornoff filed her operative, first amended
complaint for breach of contract and breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Bornoff alleged that
State Farm acted in bad faith by “[u]reasonably delaying the
payment of her benefits under the policy when liability and
responsibility was reasonably clear.” She alleged that State
Farm’s unreasonable conduct caused her “damages under the
9
Policy, plus . . . other economic and consequential damages” and
emotional distress. “As a further proximate result of the
unreasonable and bad faith conduct of Defendants, Plaintiff was
compelled to retain legal counsel to obtain the benefits due under
the Policy. Therefore, Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for those
attorney fees . . . and cost[s] of litigation reasonably necessary
and incurred by Plaintiff in order to obtain the benefits . . . .” The
complaint’s prayer for relief specified that Bornoff sought to
recover such attorney fees and costs “[p]ursuant to Brandt v.
Superior Court [(1985) 37 Cal.3d 813].”4 The complaint also
prayed for economic and consequential damages, emotional
distress damages, and punitive damages.
After Bornoff filed her amended complaint, State Farm
paid Bornoff all remaining policy benefits due for covered losses
other than lost property, including lost income. We need not
further discuss those payments, because Bornoff bases her bad
faith claim solely on State Farm’s handling of her claims for lost
property.
In written discovery responses (which State Farm produced
with its subsequent motion for summary judgment), Bornoff
reiterated that she was seeking attorney fees and other economic
damages allegedly caused by State Farm’s unreasonable delay in
4 In Brandt v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 813
(Brandt), the Supreme Court held: “When an insurer’s tortious
conduct reasonably compels the insured to retain an attorney to
obtain the benefits due under a policy, it follows that the insurer
should be liable in a tort action for that expense. The attorney’s
fees are an economic loss—damages—proximately caused by the
tort.” (Id. at p. 817, italics added.) Such fees are “commonly
referred to as Brandt fees.” (Essex Ins. Co. v. Five Star Dye
House, Inc. (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1252, 1255.)
10
payment. She further alleged that the delay “resulted in her
losing exclusive vendors she worked with,” which caused her to
lose income.
State Farm moved for summary judgment or, in the
alternative, summary adjudication of Bornoff’s claims for breach
of contract, bad faith, and punitive damages. As to the bad faith
claim, it moved for summary adjudication on the following
grounds: “Plaintiff’s second cause of action for breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is without merit as a
matter of law because the undisputed evidence proves that State
Farm paid all benefits due to Plaintiff under her policy, which
Plaintiff has admitted[,] and that State Farm’s adjustment of her
claims was reasonable.” (Italics added.) Neither State Farm’s
memorandum of points and authorities nor its separate
statement addressed Bornoff’s claims for extracontractual
economic damages.
Bornoff conceded that summary adjudication was
appropriate as to her breach of contract claim, but opposed
summary adjudication of her claims for bad faith and punitive
damages. She argued that State Farm failed to meet its burden
to show that there were no triable issues of material fact as to the
bad faith claim because, among other reasons, State Farm’s
payment of the policy benefits did not resolve whether, as she
alleged, its delay in making that payment caused Bornoff other
actionable detriment.
Consistent with her discovery responses, Bornoff declared
that she “lost some of [her] exclusive merchants for jewelry”
because she could not pay them until she received State Farm’s
delayed payments. She further declared that the delay caused
her “financial hardship,” explaining: “I went through my
11
personal savings; I used my mother’s credit cards to help
purchase inventory and groceries; I borrowed money from a
family member; I used money from a Go-Fund Me campaign to
keep my business open and pay my bills.” Finally, she declared
that the delay caused her “great emotional distress,” which
resulted in insomnia, weight gain, and hair loss. Bornoff also
produced an expert declaration from Robert Worth, an attorney
and former insurance claims representative, who opined that
State Farm’s delay in paying the policy benefits was
unreasonable, in part because Walder violated an insurance
regulation requiring timely notice to an insured regarding the
status of the insured’s claim and any additional information
needed to make a determination.
The trial court heard and granted State Farm’s motion for
summary judgment. In summarily adjudicating the bad faith
claim, the trial court concluded: “The Defendant paid all benefits
owed under the policy, the Plaintiff never disputed the amount of
benefits, and the Plaintiff admitted that she was paid all benefits
owed. Accordingly, the Defendant has met its initial burden of
showing that the Plaintiff did not suffer any detriment due its
claims handling.” “[T]he Plaintiff provides no evidence that she
suffered additional detriment due to this delayed handling. The
Plaintiff declares that she experienced financial hardship because
she went through her personal savings, used credit cards to
purchase inventory and groceries, borrowed money, and used a
Go Fund Me campaign to keep her business open and pay
bills. . . . These economic harms were remedied when the
Defendant paid all benefits owed . . . .” “Because she suffered no
economic loss as a result of the delay, the Plaintiff cannot recover
12
damages for emotional distress. [¶] Summary Adjudication of the
second cause of action is Granted.”
After the trial court entered judgment in State Farm’s
favor, Bornoff moved for a new trial on her bad faith claim. The
trial court heard and denied the motion. Bornoff filed a timely
notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
A. Summary judgment burdens and standard of review
“A party may move for summary judgment . . . if it is
contended that the action has no merit . . . .” (§ 437c, subd.
(a)(1).) Similarly, “[a] party may move for summary adjudication
as to one or more causes of action within an action . . . if the party
contends that the cause of action has no merit . . . .” (§ 437c,
subd. (f)(1); see also § 437c, subd. (f)(2) [“A motion for summary
adjudication . . . shall proceed in all procedural respects as a
motion for summary judgment”].) “A defendant . . . has met that
party’s burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if
the party has shown that one or more elements of the cause of
action . . . cannot be established, or that there is a complete
defense to the cause of action. Once the defendant . . . has met
that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff . . . to show that a
triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of
action or a defense thereto.” (§ 437c, subd. (p)(2).)
Thus, “the party moving for summary judgment bears an
initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the
nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact . . . .” (Aguilar
v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (Aguilar).)
“The defendant may, but need not, present evidence that
conclusively negates an element of the plaintiff’s cause of action.
13
The defendant may also present evidence that the plaintiff does
not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence—as
through admissions by the plaintiff following extensive discovery
to the effect that [the plaintiff] has discovered nothing.” (Id. at p.
855.) “Summary judgment law in this state, however, continues
to require a defendant moving for summary judgment to present
evidence, and not simply point out that the plaintiff does not
possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.” (Id. at
p. 854, italics added and fn. omitted; see also § 437c, subd. (b)(1)
[“The motion shall be supported by affidavits, declarations,
admissions, answers to interrogatories, depositions, and matters
of which judicial notice shall or may be taken”].)
“We review summary judgment appeals by applying the
same three-step analysis applied by the trial court: First, we
identify the issues raised by the pleadings. Second, we determine
whether the movant established entitlement to summary
judgment, that is, whether the movant showed the opponent
could not prevail on any theory raised by the pleadings. Third, if
the movant has met its burden, we consider whether the
opposition raised triable issues of fact. We review these matters
de novo.” (Hawkins v. Wilton (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 936, 939-
940, italics omitted (Hawkins); accord, Ryan v. Real Estate of the
Pacific, Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 637, 642 (Ryan).)
B. Bad faith and the requirement for economic loss
“ ‘Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good
faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.’ ”
(Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 654, 683 (Foley).)
“ ‘[W]hen benefits are due an insured, “delayed payment based on
inadequate or tardy investigations, oppressive conduct by claims
adjusters seeking to reduce the amounts legitimately payable[,]
14
and numerous other tactics may breach the implied covenant
because” they frustrate the insured’s right to receive the benefits
of the contract in “prompt compensation for losses.” ’ ” (Brehm v.
21st Century Ins. Co. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1236
(Brehm).)
“Unlike with any other contract (see Foley[, supra, 47
Cal.3d at p. 684]), the breach of an insurance contract (by the
insurer) of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing will
give rise to an action in tort by the insured, as well as one in
contract, at the election of the insured (or assignee). An action
for recovery on either theory is what is commonly referred to as
one for ‘bad faith.’ There is a significant difference, however, in
the available remedies. If the insured elects to proceed in tort,
recovery is possible for not only all unpaid policy benefits and
other contract damages, but also extra-contractual damages such
as those for emotional distress, punitive damages and attorney
fees. . . . If the insured (or assignee) elects to proceed only in
contract, . . . then recovery is limited to those damages
recoverable in contract.” (Archdale v. American Internat.
Specialty Lines Ins. Co. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 449, 467, fn. 19
(Archdale); accord, Blue Shield of California Life & Health Ins.
Co. v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 727, 730, fn. 1.)
Thus, “ ‘[i]n addition to the right to sue an insurer in
contract, if the insurer acts unreasonably and without proper
cause in . . . either delaying or failing to pay benefits due under
the policy, the insured can sue in tort for breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing.’ ” (Richards v. Sequoia Ins. Co.
(2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 431, 438 (Richards).) However, “ ‘[s]ince
a tort action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing “is one seeking recovery of a property right, not personal
15
injury,” to prevail the insured must show proof of economic loss.’ ”
(Ibid.) “[W]hile unreasonable delay in paying benefits is
actionable as bad faith, ‘a delay in paying policy benefits, even if
in an unreasonable manner, does not in itself establish economic
loss to the plaintiff’ . . . .” (Major v. Western Home Ins. Co. (2009)
169 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1214 (Major).)
“On the other hand, the requirement of economic
loss . . . may be satisfied where the insured has paid legal fees
and court costs to enforce his or her claim under the policy.”
(Major, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at p. 1214; accord, Richards,
supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 438.) “When an insurer’s tortious
conduct reasonably compels the insured to retain an attorney to
obtain the benefits due under a policy, it follows that the insurer
should be liable in a tort action for that expense. The attorney’s
fees are an economic loss—damages—proximately caused by the
tort.” (Brandt, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 817.) If an insurer’s
unreasonable delay in paying policy benefits has caused the
insured to suffer economic loss (such as Brandt fees), the insured
may recover extracontractual damages, including damages for
emotional distress. (Major, at pp. 1214-1215.)
C. State Farm is not entitled to summary adjudication
of Bornoff’s bad faith claim on the ground that she
suffered no economic loss, because State Farm failed
to meet its initial burden of production.
For the reasons explained below, we conclude that State
Farm failed to meet its initial burden of production to show that
no triable issue existed as to the complaint’s claim that State
Farm’s unreasonable delay in paying Bornoff’s policy benefits
caused her extracontractual economic losses. Because the burden
never shifted to Bornoff to produce evidence that she suffered
16
such an economic loss, we conclude that State Farm is not
entitled to summary adjudication of her bad faith claim on the
ground that she failed to produce such evidence.
First, we conclude that State Farm’s undisputed evidence
that it paid Bornoff all benefits due under the parties’ contract
did not satisfy its initial burden of production to show that no
triable issue existed as to actionable economic loss. As discussed,
where, as here, a plaintiff elects to pursue a tort theory of bad
faith, actionable economic loss is not limited to policy benefits,
but also includes extracontractual economic losses. (Archdale,
supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 467, fn. 19; see also Croskey et al,
Cal. Practice Guide: Insurance Litigation (The Rutter Group
2025) ¶ 13:70, p. 16 [“Extracontractual compensatory damages
recoverable in insurance ‘bad faith’ actions typically include: [¶]
economic losses” (italics omitted)].) Thus, “[a]n insurer that pays
the full amount of its policy may be liable for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing if improper claims
handling causes detriment to the insured.” (Hedayati v.
Interinsurance Exchange of the Automobile Club (2021) 67
Cal.App.5th 833, 844 (Hedayati); accord, Schwartz v. State Farm
Fire and Cas. Co. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1329, 1339.)
Here, Bornoff’s operative complaint alleged that State
Farm’s unreasonable delay in paying the policy benefits caused
her extracontractual economic losses, including Brandt fees.
Indeed, the complaint expressly sought to recover attorney fees
“[p]ursuant to” Brandt. As noted, such fees “are an economic
loss—damages—proximately caused by the tort.” (Brandt, supra,
37 Cal.3d at p. 817, italics added.) Thus, the complaint tendered
the issue of whether Bornoff suffered economic loss in the form of
Brandt fees. Nevertheless, State Farm produced no evidence
17
that its allegedly unreasonable delay in paying the policy benefits
did not cause Bornoff to incur Brandt fees, or that she lacked and
could not reasonably obtain evidence that its delay caused her to
incur such fees.
Further, State Farm itself produced Bornoff’s discovery
responses, which specified another extracontractual economic
loss allegedly caused by State Farm’s delay in paying the policy
benefits, i.e., Bornoff’s loss of exclusive vendors and a resulting
loss of income. State Farm produced no evidence that its
allegedly unreasonable delay did not cause Bornoff to lose
exclusive vendors and associated income, or that she lacked and
could not reasonably obtain evidence that the delay caused her
such an economic loss.
State Farm argues that we must disregard the complaint’s
claim for Brandt fees because Bornoff did not direct the trial
court’s attention to that claim in her opposition to the summary
judgment motion. Relatedly, State Farm argues that Bornoff’s
claim for lost income from exclusive vendors is immaterial
because she identified no evidence identifying the amount of
income she lost. We disagree.
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment or summary
adjudication, we and the trial court apply the same three-step
analysis, which starts by consulting the pleadings—not the
nonmoving party’s opposition—to identify the issues that the
motion must address. (Hawkins, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at pp.
939-940; Ryan, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at p. 642.) “ ‘ “ ‘ “ ‘[A]
motion for summary judgment must be directed to the issues
raised by the pleadings.’ ” ’ ” ’ ” (Hedayati, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th
at p. 845, original italics.) “If the defendant does not address an
issue in a motion for summary judgment that has been raised in
18
the plaintiff’s complaint, it fails to meet its initial burden to show
the plaintiff’s action has no merit; the motion therefore fails to
shift the burden to the plaintiff to oppose summary judgment.”
(Id. at p. 846, citing Hawkins, at pp. 940, 945; accord, Union
Pacific Railroad Co. v. Ameron Pole Products LLC (2019) 43
Cal.App.5th 974, 983.)
As explained, Bornoff’s operative complaint raised the issue
of whether State Farm’s allegedly unreasonable delay caused her
extracontractual economic losses, including Brandt fees. State
Farm did not address that issue in its memorandum of points and
authorities or its separate statement, much less produce evidence
that no triable issue existed as to whether Bornoff incurred
Brandt fees or otherwise suffered an extracontractual economic
loss. On the contrary, State Farm itself produced Bornoff’s
discovery responses that alleged she suffered an additional
economic loss in the form of lost income from lost exclusive
vendors. Because State Farm therefore failed to meet its initial
burden of production, the burden never shifted to Bornoff to
oppose the motion. (Hedayati, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 846;
see also Hawkins, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 940 [“ ‘Where the
evidence presented by defendant does not support judgment in
[defendant’s] favor, the motion must be denied without looking at
the opposing evidence, if any, submitted by plaintiff’ ”]; Mosley v.
Pacific Specialty Ins. Co. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 417, 434-435
[“ ‘The court’s assessment of whether the moving party has
carried its burden—and therefore caused a shift—occurs before
the court’s evaluation of the opposing party’s papers. [Citations.]
Therefore, the burden on the motion does not initially shift as a
result of what is, or is not, contained in the opposing papers’ ”].)
19
In sum, we conclude that State Farm failed to meet its
initial burden of production to show that no triable issue existed
as to Bornoff’s claim that State Farm’s unreasonable delay in
paying the policy benefits caused her extracontractual economic
losses. Accordingly, the trial court erred by summarily
adjudicating Bornoff’s bad faith claim on the ground that she
failed to produce evidence of such an economic loss. We need not
address Bornoff’s argument that the grant of summary
adjudication on that ground violated her right to due process.
(See, e.g., County of Los Angeles v. Williamsburg National Ins.
Co. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 944, 955 [“ ‘ “we do not reach
constitutional questions unless absolutely required to do so to
dispose of the matter before us” ’ ” (quoting Santa Clara County
Local Transportation Authority v. Guardino (1995) 11 Cal.4th
220, 230)].)
D. State Farm is not entitled to summary adjudication
on the ground that its delay in paying the policy
benefits was reasonable as a matter of law, because
the evidence reveals a triable issue regarding
whether the delay was unreasonable.
“We may affirm summary adjudication on any correct legal
theory, as long as the parties had an adequate opportunity to
address that theory in the trial court.” (Zamora v. Security
Industry Specialists, Inc. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1, 38.) State
Farm urges us to affirm the summary adjudication of Bornoff’s
bad faith claim on a ground that the trial court did not reach but
both parties had addressed, i.e., that State Farm’s delay in
20
paying Bornoff’s policy benefits was reasonable as a matter of
law.5
Bornoff does not dispute that State Farm met its initial
burden of production as to the issue of reasonableness. However,
she argues that summary adjudication is unwarranted because
she met her resulting burden to produce evidence creating a
triable issue of fact regarding whether State Farm’s delay was
unreasonable. We agree.
To support a bad faith claim, an insurer’s challenged
conduct must be “ ‘ “prompted not by an honest mistake, bad
judgment or negligence but rather by a conscious and deliberate
act, which unfairly frustrates the agreed common purposes and
disappoints the reasonable expectations of the other party
thereby depriving that party of the benefits of the agreement.” ’ ”
(Wilson v. 21st Century Ins. Co. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 713, 726
(Wilson), quoting Chateau Chamberay Homeowners Ass’n v.
Associated Intern. Ins. Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 335, 346.)
However, “there is no requirement to establish subjective bad
faith” or “ ‘positive misconduct of a malicious or immoral
nature . . . .’ ” (Bosetti v. United States Life Ins. Co. in City of
New York (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1208, 1236 (Bosetti).)
“[T]he standard by which the claims handling activities of
the insurer will be judged is clear. If an insurer is to avoid
5 In its respondent’s brief, State Farm argued that because
the appellate record did not then contain the evidence that
Bornoff submitted in opposition to summary judgment, Bornoff
forfeited her appeal by failing to provide an adequate record for
our review of the reasonableness of State Farm’s conduct.
Subsequently, we granted Bornoff’s motion to augment the record
with her opposition evidence. As augmented, the record is
adequate for our review.
21
liability for bad faith, its actions and position with respect to the
claim of an insured, and the delay or denial of policy benefits,
must be ‘founded on a basis that is reasonable under all the
circumstances.’ ” (Bosetti, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 1237,
italics added by Bosetti, quoting Wilson, supra, 42 Cal.4th at
p. 724, fn. 7.) Thus, “[a] delay in payment of benefits due under
an insurance policy gives rise to tort liability only if the insured
can establish the delay was unreasonable.” (Brehm, supra, 166
Cal.App.4th at p. 1237, citing Wilson, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p.
723.) “ ‘ “[T]he reasonableness of an insurer’s claims-handling
conduct is ordinarily a question of fact, [but] becomes a question
of law where the evidence is undisputed and only one reasonable
inference can be drawn from the evidence.” ’ ” (Hedayati, supra,
67 Cal.App.5th at p. 843, quoting Pinto v. Farmers Ins. Exchange
(2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 676, 689; accord, Bartel v. Chicago Title
Ins. Co. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 655, 699.)
Here, Bornoff submitted her claims on March 6 and 31,
2022, and received payment of her policy benefits for lost
property about four months later, on July 20. Although it may
not be inherently unreasonable for an insurer to take four
months to pay policy benefits, we conclude that a reasonable jury
could find that the four-month period constituted an
unreasonable delay in the circumstances of this case.
Importantly, State Farm never questioned whether Bornoff’s
insurance policy covered her losses; the only question was the
value of her benefits, not whether State Farm would pay them.
Further, State Farm was on notice that the burglaries caused an
interruption to Bornoff’s business, rendering prompt handling of
her claims especially important. Walder and Noakes,
respectively, acknowledged that State Farm was “slow” in
22
handling the claims and seemed to take “too long” to issue
payment.
Without citing the record, State Farm argues that its delay
was reasonable as a matter of law because Bornoff’s claims
“required time and study to properly evaluate,” especially
because many of the lost items were unique and on consignment.
However, State Farm produced no evidence that the nature of the
claims or the lost items was the reason for its delay. Instead,
Walder identified the reason for his admittedly “slow” handling of
the claims as his confusion regarding which items had been lost
in which of the two burglaries—confusion that he admitted would
have been resolved if he had reviewed the letter and attachments
that State Farm received from Krauss on April 11, 2022. Those
attachments segregated the information about the lost items by
each burglary. Nevertheless, after receiving the letter on April
11, it took State Farm more than three months to pay Bornoff the
policy benefits on July 20 (days after Bornoff filed suit).
State Farm argues that Bornoff, not State Farm, caused
the delay in processing her claims because “State Farm did not
receive the information from Bornoff segregating the items by
claim until June 6, 2022.” As noted, however, State Farm
received Krauss’s information segregating the items by claim
nearly two months before that date, on April 11. Even assuming,
arguendo, that State Farm reasonably required Krauss to
resubmit such information, the evidence supports a reasonable
inference that he would have done so well in advance of June 6 if
Walder had responded to Krauss’s April 11 letter or to Krauss’s
follow-up letter and phone messages. Instead, Walder did not
contact Krauss until May 26—13 days after his supervisor,
Noakes, directed him to contact Krauss to ascertain whether
23
Bornoff’s losses exceeded her $5,000 deductible (information
which Walder should have known Krauss had already provided).
Relatedly, Walder admitted that he should have—but did
not—send Bornoff a letter about the status of her claims between
March 11, 2022 (when she submitted information in response to
his initial request) and May 3, when State Farm received
Krauss’s follow-up letter. Bornoff’s expert witness opined that by
failing to do so, Walder violated an insurance regulation
requiring an insurer to provide timely notice to an insured
regarding any additional information needed to make a
determination on the insured’s claim.6 (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 10,
§ 2695.7, subds. (b)-(c); see also Jordan v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2007)
148 Cal.App.4th 1062, 1078 [trial court properly admitted
expert’s opinion that insurer violated insurance regulations as
evidence of bad faith].)
On this record, a reasonable jury could find that Walder
unreasonably delayed payment of the policy benefits by failing to
6 “Upon receiving proof of claim, every insurer . . . shall
immediately, but in no event more than forty (40) calendar days
later, accept or deny the claim, in whole or in part.” (Cal. Code
Regs., tit. 10, § 2695.7, subd. (b).) “If more time is required than
is allotted in subsection 2695.7(b) to determine whether a claim
should be accepted and/or denied in whole or in part, every
insurer shall provide the claimant, within the [40-day] time
frame specified in subsection 2695.7(b), with written notice of the
need for additional time. This written notice shall specify any
additional information the insurer requires in order to make a
determination and state any continuing reasons for the insurer’s
inability to make a determination. Thereafter, the written notice
shall be provided every thirty (30) calendar days until a
determination is made or notice of legal action is served.” (Id.,
§ 2695.7, subd. (c)(1).)
24
communicate with Bornoff and her attorney regarding the
information needed to value the lost items. (See Fleming v.
Safeco Ins. Co. (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 31, 37 [“There was evidence
presented by plaintiff which could be reasonably interpreted as
indicating that [defendant insurer] was not pursuing the
adjustment of this claim with any degree of diligence. For
example, requests by [defendant] for information from plaintiff’s
counsel seem to have been spaced out over a much longer period
than was reasonable under the circumstances”].)
State Farm argues that the evidence does not raise a
triable issue as to whether it “consciously” delayed payment. But
State Farm produced no evidence explaining why neither Walder
nor anyone else at State Farm responded to the letter (with
attached proof of loss) that it undisputedly received from Krauss
on April 11, 2022, or to Krauss’s follow-up letter and phone
messages. Although Walder testified that he did not recall
having received those communications, that testimony would not
preclude a reasonable jury from finding that Walder received and
consciously ignored them. Thus, we conclude that the evidence
would permit a reasonable jury to find that State Farm’s delay in
payment was “ ‘ “prompted not by an honest mistake, bad
judgment or negligence but rather by a conscious and deliberate
act, which unfairly frustrates the agreed common purposes and
disappoints the reasonable expectations of the other party
thereby depriving that party of the benefits of the agreement.” ’ ”
(Wilson, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 726.)
We emphasize that “ ‘ “the reasonableness of an insurer’s
claims-handling conduct is ordinarily a question of fact . . . .” ’ ”
(Hedayati, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 843.) We conclude that
25
the evidence is not so one-sided as to compel a conclusion that
State Farm’s conduct was reasonable as a matter of law.
In sum, we conclude that State Farm is not entitled to
summary adjudication of Bornoff’s bad faith claim. Accordingly,
we will reverse the trial court’s summary adjudication of the bad
faith claim and of Bornoff’s claim for punitive damages as a
remedy for bad faith.7
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. The matter is remanded to the
trial court with directions to vacate its order granting State
Farm’s motion for summary judgment and to enter a new order
denying State Farm’s motion for summary judgment, granting
State Farm’s motion for summary adjudication of Bornoff’s
breach of contract claim, and otherwise denying State Farm’s
7 The trial court summarily adjudicated Bornoff’s claim for
punitive damages on the ground that Bornoff “cannot establish
an underlying claim upon which punitive damages may be
awarded,” in light of its conclusion that State Farm was entitled
to summary adjudication of her underlying claims for breach of
contract and bad faith. We have disagreed with that conclusion
as to the bad faith claim. State Farm does not argue that if we
reverse the summary adjudication of the bad faith claim, we
should nevertheless affirm the summary adjudication of the
claim for punitive damages.
26
motion for summary adjudication. Bornoff is entitled to recover
her costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
M. KIM, J.
We concur:
BENDIX, Acting P. J.
WEINGART, J.
27
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