In re M.A. CA4/2

CourtListener 10851798Calctapp01.05.2026

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 5/1/26 In re M.A. CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re M.A., et al., Persons Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY
CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, E087388

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.Nos. J292389 &
J292390)
v.
OPINION
M.A.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Michelle Lauron,

Judge. Conditionally reversed and remanded with directions.

Donna B. Kaiser, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

Laura Feingold, County Counsel, and Landon Villavaso, Deputy County Counsel,

for Plaintiff and Respondent.

1
Defendant and appellant M.A. II (“father”) appeals from an order terminating

parental rights over his minor children. He argues San Bernardino County Children and

Family Services (the “department”) failed to conduct an adequate inquiry under the

Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”). The department concedes its ICWA inquiry was

inadequate in part. We conditionally reverse to allow the department to conduct a proper

ICWA inquiry.1

BACKGROUND

Father has two children who are subjects of this dependency: a girl, A.A. (born

2019) and a boy, M.A. III (born 2021).2 The children have two older maternal half

siblings who are also subjects of the dependency but not this appeal, and two older

paternal half siblings who are subjects of neither the dependency nor this appeal and who

live with father full-time.

A. Dependency Background

In February 2022, A.A. and M.A. III lived with mother and their half siblings.

Father and mother were separated and father lived in San Diego with the children’s

paternal half siblings. Father could not leave San Diego because he was on probation.

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. “In
addition, because ICWA uses the term ‘Indian,’ we do the same for consistency, even
though we recognize that other terms, such as ‘Native American’ or ‘Indigenous,’ are
preferred by many.” (In re Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 739, fn. 1
(Benjamin M.), disapproved on other grounds in In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112
(Dezi C.).)

2 The children’s mother is not a party to this appeal, so we do not discuss any
procedural or factual history pertaining to her alone except as necessary.

2
That month, the department received a referral alleging mother abused and

neglected the children and their maternal half siblings. After investigating, the

department determined mother had unresolved mental health issues which presented a

danger to the children. It therefore sought and obtained a detention warrant, and detained

the children in March 2022.

The department filed a section 300 petition on March 7, 2022. The petition

alleged, among other things, that father knew or should have known about mother’s

untreated mental health issues, failed to protect the children from mother, and left them

without provision for support. The court held a detention hearing the next day, found the

petition stated a prima facie case, and detained the children.

The court held a jurisdiction hearing in July 2022. It found multiple allegations

against both father and mother true. It then held a contested dispositional hearing in

August 2022, where it denied mother’s request for family maintenance services and

ordered reunification services for both parents.

The court held a contested 12-month review hearing in September 2023. After

hearing argument and evidence, the court terminated reunification services for both

parents. In November 2025—over two years later—the court held a section 366.26

hearing, where it terminated father’s parental rights over both children.

B. ICWA History

Mother and father initially denied any Indian ancestry, but eventually recanted and

identified possible connections to specific tribes.

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In mother’s case, maternal grandmother claimed “French Canadian Native

American” ancestry. She said it was through maternal great-grandmother, but that

maternal great-grandmother was suffering from Alzheimer’s and dementia and would be

unable to provide more information. Mother also claimed Blackfeet and Cherokee

ancestry through her father. She said she did not have contact information for any living

paternal relatives besides the name and state of residence for one. Finally, mother alleged

“ ‘the Indian’s stepped in when [she] was in foster care,’ ” but a review of mother’s

dependency proceedings shows ICWA was found not to apply to her. The department

attempted to call maternal great-grandmother, but the number seemed to be for a fax

machine. The department attempted to obtain contact information for five additional

relatives by calling maternal grandmother, mother, and two family friends twice. Both

times the maternal grandmother, mother, and two family friends’ numbers did not work.

The department emailed—but did not send formal notice to—the Cherokee Nation

regarding mother’s claims of possible Cherokee ancestry. This email included mother’s

and the children’s names along with their dates of birth. The department did not notify

either of the other two federally recognized Cherokee tribes: the Eastern Band of

Cherokee Indians and the United Keetowah Band of Cherokee Indians in Oklahoma.

(See Indian Entities Recognized by and Eligible To Receive Services From the United

States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 89 Fed.Reg. 99899-99901 (Jan. 8, 2024).) The

department also sent a fax to the Blackfeet Nation with the names and dates of birth for

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mother, father, and the children. This fax did not include information about paternal

grandfather.

In May 2022, father claimed potential Yaqui ancestry through his maternal

grandfather—the children’s paternal great-grandfather—Nick M. Father said the paternal

great-grandfather was deceased, but that his maternal grandmother—the children’s

paternal great-grandmother—was alive and may have more information. However, father

did not provide the department paternal great-grandmother’s contact information, told the

department she was not available to talk, and in any case did not like talking about

paternal great-grandfather. Father said paternal grandmother was supposed to enroll in

the Yaqui tribe, but he was not sure if she did so. He said he did not have paternal

grandmother’s contact information, and when the department tried to call a number he

previously provided for her the person who responded was not paternal grandmother.

Nevertheless, the department called a representative of the Yaqui tribe, who was unable

to confirm tribal enrollment.

In July 2022 the Department filed an ICWA Declaration of Due Diligence saying

they sent formal notice to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and the Pascua Yaqui Tribe.

These notices contained detailed information about the mother and father, but less detail

for extended family members. Though the notice contained the full names of each

grandparent, only maternal grandmother had a date of birth, and none had current

addresses. The notices did not provide any information about three of the maternal great-

grandparents, but had the name and birthdate of one maternal great-grandmother. As to

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paternal great-grandparents, the notices only provided two names: a paternal great-

grandmother and paternal great-grandfather referred to as “Nick M[.]” Only paternal

great-grandmother had a current address listed, and neither had a birthdate listed. About

a month later, the department received the Pascua Yaqui Tribe’s response, which stated

that neither the children nor their parents were members of the tribe and that “the Tribe

will not intervene in this matter.”

The department finally obtained paternal grandmother’s contact information in

March 2025, about three years after sending the notices. However, she did not respond

when the department called her to ask about the children’s potential Indian ancestry.

In August 2025, father submitted a parental notification of Indian status indicating

he may have Indian ancestry through the “Yaki” tribe. He also filed a Family Find and

ICWA Inquiry form, identifying “Nick M[.]” as someone who may have information

about the children’s Indian ancestry. At a subsequent further section 366.26 hearing, the

court asked father who in his family was a registered member of a tribe, and father again

identified the paternal great-grandfather. When asked to spell the paternal great-

grandfather’s name, father spelled his first name “N-i-c-k-l-o-s.” He also said the tribe

buried the paternal great-grandfather, but could only say he was buried “[s]omewhere in

Arizona.” Father said he now had paternal great-grandmother’s phone number, and the

court directed him to give it to the department. Finally, father again repeated that

paternal grandmother was supposed to enroll in the tribe, but he did not know if she had

and did not have her phone number.

6
In September 2025 the department sent another letter to the Pascua Yaqui Tribe of

Arizona, which included the names and birth dates of both parents and both relevant

children. It also included the name of paternal great-grandfather, but misspelled his first

name as “Nickolas” rather than “Nicklos.” The Pascua Yaqui Tribe again responded that

the children were not members and were not eligible for membership in the tribe, and that

the tribe would not intervene.

In October 2025, the department sent a letter to the BIA “to confirm Native

American ancestry for the children,” but as of the filing of this appeal the department had

not yet received a response.

At the final section 366.26 hearing in November 2025, the court found the

department’s ICWA inquiry “was proper, adequate, and duly diligent,” that there was “no

reason to know that the . . . children are Indian children,” and therefore ICWA did not

apply.

ANALYSIS

Father argues the department failed to conduct an adequate inquiry under

California’s implementation of ICWA (“Cal-ICWA”). Specifically, father argues the

department’s notice efforts were insufficient, because they did not contact all Cherokee

tribes nor provide formal notice to the Blackfeet tribe. He also argues that its formal

notice to the Pascua Yaqui Tribe contained incorrect and misleading information. The

department concedes its inquiry was not sufficient because it did not contact two

7
Cherokee tribes or provide formal notice to the Blackfeet tribe with all relevant

information. We agree with the department.

ICWA establishes minimum national standards “for the removal of Indian children

from their families and the placement of such children in foster or adoptive homes which

will reflect the unique values of Indian culture.” (25 U.S.C. § 1902.) Under California

law, the trial court and county welfare department have “an affirmative and continuing

duty to inquire” whether a child subject to a section 300 petition may be an Indian child.

(§ 224.2, subd. (a); see In re D.F. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 558, 566 (D.F.).) “This

continuing duty can be divided into three phases: the initial duty to inquire, the duty of

further inquiry, and the duty to provide formal ICWA notice.” (D.F., at p. 566.)

The initial duty applies in every dependency. (In re J.S. (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th

678, 686; see § 224.2, subd. (b)(1).) The initial duty expands under subdivision (b)(2) of

section 224.2, when a child is removed from their home. Under that provision, if a child

is taken into custody, the department’s obligation “includes, but is not limited to, asking

the child, parents, legal guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others who

have an interest in the child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the

child is, or may be, an Indian child and where the child, the parents, or Indian custodian

is domiciled.” (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(2).) Extended family members include adults who are

the child’s stepparents, grandparents, aunts, uncles, brothers, sisters, nieces, nephews, and

first or second cousins. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); § 224.1, subd. (c).)

8
The law requires further inquiry only “ ‘when “the court, social worker, or

probation officer has reason to believe that an Indian child is involved [or, under Cal.

Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(4), ‘may be involved’] in a proceeding . . . .” ’ ” (J.S.,

supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 687.) “ ‘When that [“reason to believe”] threshold is reached,

the requisite “further inquiry” “includes: (1) interviewing the parents and extended

family members; (2) contacting the Bureau of Indian Affairs and State Department of

Social Services; and (3) contacting tribes the child may be affiliated with, and anyone

else, that might have information regarding the child’s membership or eligibility in a

tribe.” ’ ” (Ibid.)

If at any point during this inquiry the court finds there is “reason to know” a child

is an Indian child, the party seeking termination of parental rights must notify the tribe or

Indian custodian about the proceedings and their right to intervene in those proceedings.

(In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 5.) Such “notice must include enough information

for the tribe to ‘conduct a meaningful review of its records to determine the child’s

eligibility for membership’ [citation], including the identifying information for the child’s

biological parents, grandparents, and great-grandparents, to the extent known.” (Dezi C.,

supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1133.)

In short, “[i]f the initial inquiry gives the juvenile court or the agency ‘reason to

believe’ that an Indian child is involved, then the juvenile court and the agency have a

duty to conduct ‘further inquiry,’ [citation] and if the court or the agency has ‘reason to

9
know’ an Indian child is involved, ICWA notices must be sent to the relevant tribes.”

(Benjamin M., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 742.)

“[T]he juvenile court’s fact-specific determination that an inquiry is adequate,

proper, and duly diligent is ‘a quintessentially discretionary function’ [citation] subject to

a deferential standard of review.” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141.) Therefore, if

“a juvenile court’s findings that an inquiry was adequate and proper and ICWA does not

apply are found to be supported by sufficient evidence and record documentation as

required by California law [citation], there is no error and conditional reversal would not

be warranted even if the agency did not inquire of everyone who has an interest in the

child.” (Ibid.) On the other hand “[i]f a child welfare agency fails to obtain meaningful

information or pursue meaningful avenues of inquiry—by, for example, failing to

discover that a parent was adopted, or failing to inquire further after a parent identified an

extended family member with more information about the child’s potential Indian

ancestry—those facts would be relevant to whether the initial Cal-ICWA inquiry is

adequate.” (Id. at p. 1151.)

Finally, if our review reveals “error resulting in an inadequate initial Cal-ICWA

inquiry,” then we must order “conditional reversal with directions for the child welfare

agency to comply with the inquiry requirement of section 224.2, document its inquiry in

compliance with [California Rules of Court], rule 5.481(a)(5), and when necessary,

comply with the notice provision of section 224.3.” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at

p. 1136.)

10
We agree with the department that, at minimum, it failed in its duty of further

inquiry by not contacting all the tribes who may have had information about mother’s

claims of Indian ancestry. Mother identified possible “Cherokee” and “Blackfeet”

heritage. However, as father points out, there are three federally recognized tribes with

“Cherokee” in their name, and the department contacted only one of them: the Cherokee

Nation. The department concedes that its failure to contact the other two tribes—the

Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians and the United Keetowah Band of Cherokee Indians—

was error that requires conditional reversal and remand. The department also concedes

its communication with the Blackfeet tribe about the children’s potential Indian heritage

was flawed. That is, the department acknowledges it erred when it failed to provide

information about paternal grandfather—the exact person through whom mother claimed

Indian heritage.

We agree with the department on both points and accept its concessions.

Therefore, we must conditionally reverse the trial court’s order terminating parental

rights and finding that the ICWA inquiry was adequate, and remand so the department

can correct these errors. At minimum, on remand the department should contact the two

uncontacted Cherokee tribes, and re-contact the Blackfeet Nation with paternal

grandfather’s information.

The remaining question is whether the department’s notice to the Pascua Yaqui

Tribe was also prejudicially deficient. Father argues the notice is flawed because it

misspelled paternal great-grandfather’s name, despite paternal great-grandfather being

11
the relative through whom father claimed Indian heritage. According to father, paternal

great-grandfather’s first name is spelled “Nicklos,” but the notice says his name is

“Nick,” and the September 2025 letter to the tribe says his name is “Nickolas.” Father

argues this error may have made it impossible for the Pascua Yaqui Tribe to determine

whether paternal great-grandfather—and therefore potentially the children—had Indian

heritage. The department argues this was at most harmless error.

On this point, we agree with the department that there was no error warranting

reversal on its own.3 “The purpose of the ICWA notice provisions is to enable the tribe

or the BIA to investigate and determine whether the child is in fact an Indian child.

[Citation.] Notice given under ICWA must therefore contain enough information to

permit the tribe to conduct a meaningful review of its records to determine the child’s

eligibility for membership.” (Cheyanne F., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.)

3 In Dezi C. our Supreme Court held that error in a Cal-ICWA inquiry is not
subject to a prejudice analysis and always mandates conditional reversal. (See Dezi C.,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1152 [“[A] judgment [must] be conditionally reversed when error
results in an inadequate Cal-ICWA inquiry. It is only by conditionally reversing that we
can ascertain whether error in the inquiry is prejudicial.”].) However, it is not clear that
this also applies when reviewing alleged ICWA notice error. Indeed, Dezi C.
approvingly cites a case which held that ICWA notice error is subject to a prejudice
analysis. (Id. at p. 1133, citing In re Cheyanne F. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 571, 576
(Cheyanne F.); see Cheyanne F., at p. 577 [“Deficiencies in an ICWA notice are
generally prejudicial, but may be deemed harmless under some circumstances.”].) Since
notice is a requirement of ICWA and Cal-ICWA, whereas the duty of initial inquiry is
found only in state law, our Supreme Court may have intended for us to treat them
differently. (See 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a); In re Austin J. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 870, 882-
884 (disapproved of on other grounds in Dezi C. at p. 1152, fn. 18) [pointing out that
ICWA itself does not impose a duty of inquiry, but does impose a duty to provide
relevant tribes with notice.].) Nevertheless, because we conclude the department’s notice
efforts were satisfactory, and therefore there was no legally significant error, we do not
address whether the alleged error was prejudicial.

12
We conclude the notice contained enough information for the tribe to perform a

meaningful review. In the notice the department did not misspell paternal great-

grandfather’s name so much as shorten it. Referring to paternal great-grandfather as

“Nick” rather than “Nicklos” is akin to referring to a “Robert” as “Bob” or a “Jillian” as

“Jill.” These are common short forms, or nicknames, which we would expect the tribes

to be able to connect to the relevant individuals even without their full name. Indeed,

father himself referred to paternal great-grandfather as “Nick,” suggesting this was a

common alternate name for paternal great-grandfather. Absent some indication the tribe

was or could have been confused by this, we are not convinced this error made it

impossible for the tribe to conduct a meaningful review of its records.

Finally, while we agree that the department’s September 2025 letter misspelled

paternal great-grandfather’s first name, we do not conclude this tainted the department’s

inquiry and notice efforts so severely that we must reverse. Again, the tribe already

received information about paternal great-grandfather—including a name that was likely

close enough to his real name for the tribe’s purposes. Under these circumstances we do

not believe using the improper spelling in this subsequent letter rendered the

department’s efforts inadequate

Nevertheless, because we are reversing and remanding for further ICWA inquiry

more generally, we would encourage the department to issue corrected notices with any

updated or additional information—including the correct spelling of paternal great-

grandfather’s name. Such additional inquiry would resolve any alleged defects and

13
provide better and more accurate information to the possibly relevant tribes, and any

response would give the department and the court better and more accurate information

about the children’s possible Indian heritage. Moreover, from this record we see no

reason to believe such notice would significantly delay the proceedings. Both times the

department contacted the Pascua Yaqui Tribe, the tribe responded in approximately a

month.

Because we conclude the department erred by not contacting the uncontacted

Cherokee tribes, and by failing to provide critical information to the Blackfeet tribe, we

conditionally reverse and remand to permit the department to complete its inquiry.

DISPOSITION

We conditionally reverse the order terminating the parents’ parental rights. We

remand the matter to the juvenile court with directions to comply with the inquiry

provisions of ICWA and of sections 224.2 and 224.3—and, if applicable, the notice

provisions as well—consistent with this opinion. If, after completing the inquiry, neither

the department nor the court has reason to know that the children are Indian children,

then the court shall reinstate the order terminating parental rights. If the department has

reason to know the children are Indian children, the court shall proceed accordingly.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAPHAEL
J.
We concur:
MILLER
Acting P. J.
CODRINGTON
J.

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