CourtListener 10851402•In re Joseph S. CA2/8
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 4/30/26 In re Joseph S. CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
In re Joseph S., a Person Coming B350991
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY (Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct. No. 20LJJP00058A)
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Crystal S.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Stephanie Davis, Judge. Affirmed.
John P. McCurley, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Courtney Fisher, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________________
INTRODUCTION
Crystal S. (Mother) asserts the trial court failed to comply
with its initial inquiry obligations under the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and
California statutes furthering ICWA. We affirm because
substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that ICWA
did not apply as the trial court interviewed family elders among
other extended family members.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Dependency proceedings
The Los Angeles County Department of Children and
Family Services (DCFS) filed a petition alleging that (1) J.S.
(Father) perpetrated domestic violence against Mother while
Mother failed to protect Joseph S. under both Welfare and
Institutions Code section 300,1 subdivisions (a) and (b);
(2) Father’s substance abuse and Mother’s failure to protect from
Father’s substance abuse endangered Joseph; and (3) Mother’s
substance abuse endangered the child. Joseph was one-week old
when DCFS filed its petition.
We briefly summarize the procedural facts for context
because ICWA is the only issue on appeal. The trial court
detained Joseph from Father at the detention hearing while
releasing to Mother. Mother was a minor when the case began,
and she was also a dependent in her own dependency case.
Consistent with the parents’ waiver of rights, under section 300,
subdivision (b), the trial court found true the allegations that
(1) Father engaged in domestic violence and Mother failed to
1 All further undesignated statutory citations are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise noted.
2
protect Joseph from this domestic violence, and (2) Father’s
substance abuse placed Joseph at risk. After the disposition,
Mother maintained custody of Joseph, and the trial court
removed the child from Father.
Thereafter, DCFS filed two supplemental petitions. Under
section 387, it alleged Mother did not comply with the juvenile
court case plan, which placed Joseph at risk. Under a section 342
petition, DCFS alleged that Mother physically abused the child
under both section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b); Mother cared for
Joseph while under the influence of alcohol and failed to drug
test; Mother placed Joseph in the care of a 10-year-old for an
extended period; and Mother failed to appropriately feed Joseph.
At the detention hearing for these supplemental petitions, the
trial court detained Joseph from Mother. Joseph was placed with
a nonrelative extended family member, Joanne M. At the
adjudication of the supplemental petitions, Mother again waived
her right to contest the amended petitions, and the court
sustained amended allegations that Mother physically abused
Joseph, Mother’s alcohol use endangered her child, Mother
inappropriately allowed a 10-year-old to care for Joseph, and
Mother did not follow her case plan.
The trial court conducted a 12-month review hearing on
June 17, 2022, where it terminated reunification services for
Mother.
2. ICWA facts and termination of parental rights
We begin by summarizing DCFS’s interviews with the
parents before addressing the remaining inquiries, mostly in
chronological order. On January 22 and 28, 2020, Mother twice
denied that Joseph had Indian ancestry in interviews with DCFS
while Father denied Indian ancestry on January 28, 2020.
3
On January 30, 2020, at the detention hearing, both Mother and
Father filed forms denying Indian ancestry. DCFS reinterviewed
both parents about Joseph’s ancestry on February 11, 2020, and
they again denied Indian ancestry. On September 21, 2022,
Mother and Father again denied knowledge of Indian ancestry
for Joseph. On December 20, 2022, Mother yet again denied
knowledge of Indian ancestry, and DCFS could not reach Father.
On April 17, 2023, Mother and Father reiterated still another
time that Joseph had no Indian ancestry. Finally, on May 7,
2025, DCFS attempted to contact Mother and Father about
ICWA, but could not reach either one.
Regarding DCFS’s inquiry for other family members, in the
detention report dated January 30, 2020, DCFS spoke to paternal
aunt Maryjane A., paternal uncle Carlos A., and maternal aunt
Perla S. regarding its dependency investigation. DCFS did not
speak to these relatives about ICWA.
On January 22, 2020, DCFS spoke to the maternal
grandmother and maternal grandfather as reflected in the
detention report. While DCFS did not speak to maternal
grandmother or maternal grandfather in this case about ICWA,
in Mother’s dependency case,2 the maternal grandmother and
2 We grant DCFS’s unopposed request for judicial notice.
We take judicial notice of (1) the maternal grandmother’s
statement denying Native American ancestry in the ICWA form
from Mother’s dependency case, (2) the maternal grandfather’s
statement denying Native American ancestry on the same form,
(3) the trial court’s minute order noting the maternal
grandparents’ ICWA forms were filed, (4) two pages of a redacted
detention report from Mother’s dependency case, where maternal
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maternal grandfather both indicated Mother had no Indian
ancestry. The maternal grandparents also said their adult
daughter Gema S., a maternal aunt to Joseph, knew of facts
relating to Father’s domestic abuse of Mother. DCFS did not
interview Gema regarding the case generally or about ICWA.
Maternal grandmother also stated that one of the maternal
uncles, Beto, was homeless after the maternal grandmother had
removed him from her home.
On January 30, 2020, the trial court found that ICWA had
no application to this case.
In the March 6, 2020 jurisdiction/disposition report, Mother
stated that she has six older siblings in Southern California.
On December 19, 2022, the trial court ordered DCFS to
provide an update on ICWA. On December 28, 2022, DCFS filed
a last minute report where it attempted to reinterview Mother
and Father. Mother provided the name and phone number of
maternal aunt Esmeralda G. DCFS called Esmeralda and left a
voicemail, which was unreturned. Father’s call went to
voicemail, and he did not return the call. On January 19, 2023,
the trial court found that DCFS was complying with ICWA by
continuing to interview specific family members. The trial court
also ordered DCFS to provide an updated ICWA report in the
next section 366.26 report.
In the section 366.26 report filed on May 8, 2023, when
DCFS inquired about ICWA, Father stated that the paternal
grandmother denied Mother had Native American ancestry, and
(5) three pages of a redacted jurisdiction report from Mother’s
dependency case where maternal grandparents denied Native
American ancestry.
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grandfather was in prison and that the paternal grandmother
was deceased. Father also provided DCFS with paternal great
grandmother’s contact information.
In the same section 366.26 report, DCFS spoke with the
paternal great grandmother who denied any Native American
ancestry, and she also confirmed that the paternal grandfather
was incarcerated. In an earlier interview, she stated that the
paternal grandmother was deceased, which was consistent with
Father’s statement.
In the same report, when DCFS asked Mother about
relatives who might have ICWA information, Mother again
provided DCFS with the name and contact information of a
maternal aunt, Esmeralda. DCFS again called Esmeralda and
left a message, but she did not return the call. DCFS later
followed up with text messages, and Esmeralda responded twice.
Despite interacting with DCFS in the text conversation,
Esmeralda did not answer DCFS’s questions regarding ICWA.
On May 19, 2023, the trial court reviewed the ICWA
information in the section 366.26 report, and again found that
ICWA did not apply to Joseph.
On September 18, 2023, the trial court ordered DCFS to
provide an update on its ICWA investigation.
In a status review report, on November 20, 2023, Joseph’s
caregiver, Joanne M., said she had no information regarding
whether Joseph had any Indian ancestry. She reiterated this
point in May of 2024 and again in May of 2025.
On December 15, 2023, the trial court again ordered an
updated ICWA report and again reiterated that ICWA did not
apply to Joseph.
6
On March 27, 2024, DCFS filed a last minute report
indicating it had no new ICWA information.
On April 15, 2024, the trial court again found that ICWA
did not apply.
On May 28, 2024, DCFS filed a status review report
summarizing its previous ICWA investigation.
On December 13, 2024, the trial court again ordered DCFS
to update its ICWA investigation in the next report, focusing on
new ICWA information since the April 15, 2024 hearing.
On March 13, 2025, the trial court again found ICWA did
not apply, and referenced its previous findings on April 15, 2024,
December 15, 2023, and May 19, 2023.
On May 27, 2025, DCFS filed a status review report, which
included an update on ICWA. DCFS also spoke to Joanne M.’s
son, who denied having any ICWA information.
On May 30, 2025, DCFS filed a last minute report
indicating it had no new information regarding ICWA.
On June 13, 2025, the trial court again found that ICWA
did not apply and ordered DCFS to provide another ICWA update
in the next report.
In an informational report filed on September 25, 2025,
DCFS again noted there was no new ICWA information.
At the October 14, 2025 section 366.26 hearing, the court
again found ICWA did not apply. The trial court then terminated
parental rights.
Mother appealed on December 12, 2025.
DISCUSSION
In her opening brief, Mother contends that the trial court’s
initial ICWA inquiry into Joseph’s maternal grandmother,
maternal grandfather, paternal aunt Maryjane, paternal uncle
7
Carlos, maternal aunt Emeralda, maternal aunt Gema, and
maternal aunt Perla was deficient. Then, after reviewing DCFS’s
respondent’s brief, Mother noted the information in DCFS’s
request for judicial notice “likely show[s] that the Department’s
ICWA inquiry as to the maternal side of the family was
adequate.” We affirm as the trial court’s finding that ICWA did
not apply to this case is supported by substantial evidence.
1. ICWA principles
ICWA requires that “[i]n any involuntary proceeding in a
[s]tate court, where the court knows or has reason to know that
an Indian child is involved, the party seeking the foster care
placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child
shall notify the parent or Indian custodian and the Indian child’s
tribe” of the proceedings and the right to intervene. (25 U.S.C.
§ 1912(a).) Relatedly, California law requires notice to the child’s
parent, Indian custodian, and the child’s tribe if there is “reason
to know . . . that an Indian child is involved” in the proceeding.
(§ 224.3, subd. (a).) Juvenile courts and child welfare agencies
both “have an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether
a child for whom a petition under Section 300” could be or was
filed may be an Indian child. (§ 224.2, subd. (a); see In re Isaiah
W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 14.)
At a party’s initial appearance, the court must inquire if a
party “know[s] or ha[s] reason to know that the child is an Indian
child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (c).) Additionally, whenever a child
welfare agency takes a child into temporary custody, it must ask
of a nonexclusive group that includes the child, the parents, and
extended family members “whether the child is, or may be, an
Indian child.” (Id., subd. (b).) Extended family members include
adults who are the child’s grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or
8
sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or
second cousin, or stepparent. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2); § 224.1,
subd. (c).)
As our Supreme Court explained, “section 224.2 ‘does not
require the [child welfare] agency to “find” unknown relatives
and others who have an interest in the child, merely to make
reasonable inquiries.’ ” (In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112,
1140.) “Agencies are already tasked with investigating the
circumstances underlying the child’s removal and identifying and
locating the child’s extended family members [citation]; it is a
rather simple task to ask those family members about Indian
ancestry in this process.” (Id. at p. 1143.) The Supreme Court
agreed with the appellate court’s characterization of this duty as
“ ‘slight and swift.’ ” (Ibid.)
“If the [juvenile] court makes a finding that proper and
adequate further inquiry and due diligence . . . have been
conducted and there is no reason to know whether the child is an
Indian child, the court may make a finding that [ICWA] does not
apply to the proceedings, subject to reversal based on sufficiency
of the evidence.” (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).) We review the juvenile
court’s ICWA findings for substantial evidence. (In re Josiah T.
(2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 388, 401.)
2. The trial court’s ICWA finding is supported by
substantial evidence
Father concedes that the initial ICWA inquiry for Mother’s
side of the family “likely” is “adequate.” We agree substantial
evidence supports this inquiry. Initially, both parents denied any
Native American ancestry. In addition, both maternal
grandparents denied any Native American ancestry in the
related dependency case where Mother was a dependent, and the
9
trial court was free to rely on this information. (In re C.R. (2025)
112 Cal.App.5th 793, 801.) Moreover, the maternal grandparents
were the only extended family members in the “older
generation[]” on the maternal side family, and would have the
best information about family ancestry. (In re C.L. (2025)
116 Cal.App.5th 53, 70.) As the Supreme Court noted, prior
discrimination may “ ‘leav[e] only the older family members or
extended family members with knowledge of’ Indian ancestry.
[Citation.] Parents may simply be estranged from, or have an
unfavorable relationship with, extended family.” (In re Dezi C.,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1146.) Here, the maternal grandparents
would have the best information regarding potential Native
American ancestry, and DCFS interviewed them. The only
remaining maternal family members that Father identifies are
three maternal aunts. Given that the grandparents are family
elders above the maternal aunts in the family tree, the trial
court’s ruling regarding ICWA on the maternal side of the family
finds support in the record. This is particularly true here as the
Mother is a sibling of the three aunts, and Mother denied any
Native American ancestry as well.
Regarding the paternal side of the family, Mother points to
DCFS’s failure to interview paternal uncle Carlos and paternal
aunt Maryjane. However, DCFS spoke to the available elder in
family as paternal great grandmother denied Native American
ancestry. Regarding the paternal grandparents, paternal
grandmother passed away and paternal grandfather was in
prison. By speaking to the paternal great grandmother, DCFS
spoke to a relative above the paternal aunt and uncle in the
family tree. (In re C.L., supra, 116 Cal.App.5th at p. 70.) They
10
also spoke to Father who is on the same level of the family tree as
the paternal aunt and uncle.
Finally, we note that the DCFS inquiry here, while
sufficient, included excessive repetition. Here, Mother was asked
at least eight times whether ICWA applied to the case, and DCFS
reached out to her a ninth time to ask. Father was asked about
ICWA at least five times, and DCFS attempted to ask him about
ICWA at least two other times. The caregiver even denied
knowledge of ICWA three times. As DCFS strives to understand
the legal obligations under the developing authority interpreting
ICWA, it should not confuse a repetitive, overly time-consuming
inquiry with a thorough one.
In summary, we find substantial evidence supports the
trial court finding that ICWA did not apply to Joseph. In making
this ruling, we acknowledge disagreement with In re Claudia R.
(2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 76. Our division previously noted its
disagreement in In re K.G. (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 379, 381
because Claudia R. places additional burdens on DCFS. Our
opinion here is consistent with the view previously expressed by
our division.
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DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s section 366.26 order terminating
parental rights is affirmed.
VIRAMONTES, J.
WE CONCUR:
STRATTON, P. J.
SCHERB, J.
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