CourtListener 10851398•People v. Cruz CA2/3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 4/30/26 P. v. Cruz CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B341634
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. XEAKA116099
CHRISTIAN CRUZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Victor D. Martinez, Judge. Reversed
in part, affirmed in part, remanded with directions.
Courtney Reed, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and J. Michael Lehmann,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________________
Christian Cruz appeals from his resentencing under
Penal Code section 1172.75.1 Cruz contends (1) we must remand
the case for the court to consider the continuing validity of
his gang enhancements after Assembly Bill No. 333 and
People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388, and (2) the court erred
in reimposing the upper term on the principal count for first
degree burglary. The Attorney General agrees with Cruz
on the first point and disagrees on the second. In light of the
parties’ agreement about Lopez, we remand the case for further
proceedings on that issue. As for the second issue, we agree
with People v. Brannon-Thompson (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 455
and other cases holding the exception to section 1172.75,
subdivision (d)(4) applies. Because the trial court originally
imposed the upper term, it permissibly reimposed that term
in resentencing Cruz.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Cruz dissuades a witness2
On March 21, 2017, a man later identified as Cruz came
to Zonia M.’s door. It was dark outside. He told her he was from
Townsmen and instructed her not to come to court. Zonia knew
Townsmen was a gang. On the evening of April 21, 2017, Cruz
again came to Zonia’s home. He told her “[her] name was coming
out in the papers.” He said, “Don’t go to court on Monday.”
Zonia was scared.
1 References to statutes are to the Penal Code.
2 As the facts are unnecessary for our resolution of this
appeal, we summarize them only briefly. We take these facts
from the transcript of the preliminary hearing, attached to
the prosecution’s opposition to Cruz’s request for resentencing.
2
According to Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department
Detective Michael Hernandez, Zonia and her sister were
witnesses in an attempted murder case against Hernan Flores.
Flores was later convicted. Cruz was a self-admitted Townsmen
member with gang tattoos.
2. The charges, plea agreement, and sentence
The People charged Cruz with dissuading a witness (Zonia)
on the March and April dates, criminal threats against Zonia,
and first degree burglary, person present. The People alleged
Cruz committed the crimes for the benefit of, at the direction of,
or in association with a criminal street gang. The People also
alleged Cruz had a prison prior under section 667.5, subd. (b).
On August 15, 2018, Cruz entered into a plea agreement
with the prosecution. Cruz pleaded no contest to the criminal
threats and first degree burglary counts and admitted the
“person present” allegation on the burglary count, the gang
allegations on both counts, and the prison prior. In accordance
with the plea agreement, the court sentenced Cruz to 20 years
and four months in the state prison. On the burglary count—the
principal count—the court imposed the upper term of six years
plus 10 years for the gang enhancement and one year for the
prison prior. On the criminal threats count, the court sentenced
Cruz to one-third the midterm of two years (eight months) plus
20 months for the gang enhancement. In addition, as part of
the plea deal, the court resentenced Cruz on an earlier case he’d
had—BA446288, in which he’d been sentenced to three years—
to one-third the midterm of three years (one year), consecutive
to his sentence in this case.
3
3. The CDCR notice and resentencing
In 2023, the court apparently received a notice from the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation that
Cruz was eligible for resentencing under Senate Bill No. 483
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 483).3 The court appointed
counsel for Cruz. The prosecution filed a pleading conceding the
court must strike Cruz’s prison prior but opposing any additional
changes to his sentence. The prosecution attached a copy of the
preliminary hearing transcript, Cruz’s criminal history, and the
probation department report. Cruz’s counsel filed a petition for
resentencing, asking the court to strike the gang enhancements.
Counsel attached a forensic evaluation by Dr. Natalie Sobel
(prepared in connection with Cruz’s request for a Franklin
hearing4) and a number of letters of support.
On October 16, 2024, the parties appeared before
the court. Defense counsel asked the court to strike the gang
enhancements. He asserted Cruz had “made great strides while
in prison in terms of turning his life around” and “been involved
in school.” Counsel noted Dr. Sobel’s report “indicates he is
amenable to rehabilitation.”
Referring to the report, the court noted Cruz had an
“ongoing substance abuse issue” and had engaged in “dangerous
behavior, including physical altercations with others.” The court
stated Cruz also had “a new conviction” for assault. Cruz had
not “followed the rules,” the court said, and he was “basically still
a danger.” The court struck Cruz’s prison prior but otherwise
declined “to exercise its discretion to modify the sentence.”
3 The record on appeal does not include the notice.
4 People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261.
4
DISCUSSION
1. The parties agree we must remand the matter for
further proceedings on the gang enhancements
Citing People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388 (Lopez),
Cruz contends he was entitled to have the court consider the
changes made to section 186.22 by Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021–
2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 333). Those changes, Cruz says,
apply retroactively to his case, because his conviction was not
yet final. The Attorney General agrees.
About three months after Cruz was resentenced, our
high court decided Lopez, supra, 17 Cal.5th 388. The court held
the ameliorative changes to the gang statute made by Assembly
Bill 333 apply to cases in which “sentencing issues remain
pending before the superior court following remand.” (Lopez, at
p. 392.) As the Attorney General notes, the superior court here
did not have the opportunity to “consider whether [Cruz] met
the revised requirements for determining whether [his] gang
constituted a ‘criminal street gang’ (§ 186.22, subd. (d)), whether
it engaged in ‘a pattern of criminal gang activity’ (§ 186.22, subd.
(e)(1) & (2)), or whether [Cruz’s] actions were for the ‘common
benefit to members of a gang’ (§ 186.22, subd. (g).)” Accordingly,
we remand the matter to allow for that consideration.
2. The superior court did not err in reimposing
the upper term
Cruz also contends the trial court erred in imposing the
upper term on the burglary count. Cruz urges us to follow People
v. Gonzalez (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 312 (Gonzalez) rather than
People v. Brannon-Thompson (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 455
(Brannon-Thompson). We decline.
5
When conducting a resentencing hearing under Senate
Bill 483, section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(2) requires the court to
“apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide
for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences
and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” Effective January 1,
2022, Senate Bill No. 567 amended section 1170, subdivision (b)
(section 1170(b)) to prohibit imposition of a sentence that exceeds
the middle term where a statute specifies three possible terms.
(Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.) Section 1170, subdivision (b)(2)
permits imposing the upper term “only when there are
circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the
imposition of a term . . . exceeding the middle term and the
facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to
by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable
doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.”
The resentencing provision under section 1172.75 provides
an exception to the factfinding requirement of section 1170(b).
Section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4) (section 1172.75(d)(4)) states:
“Unless the court originally imposed the upper
term, the court may not impose a sentence
exceeding the middle term unless there are
circumstances in aggravation that justify the
imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding
the middle term, and those facts have been
stipulated to by the defendant, or have been
found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial
by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.”
The first clause—“Unless the court originally imposed
the upper term”—provides an exception from the second clause’s
factfinding requirement for defendants who were originally
6
sentenced to the upper term. According to the court in Brannon-
Thompson, the plain language of section 1172.75(d)(4) states
the factfinding requirement under section 1170(b) applies
only if the court is imposing the upper term for the first time.
(Brannon-Thompson, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at pp. 466–467.)
Brannon-Thompson concluded section 1172.75 permits the court
to reimpose an upper term sentence even if a factfinder never
found an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Brannon-Thompson, at p. 458.)
We see no ambiguity in section 1172.75 and agree with
the Brannon-Thompson court’s interpretation of it. (See People
v. Cornett (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1261, 1265 [when interpreting a
statute, “[t]he plain meaning controls if there is no ambiguity
in the statutory language”].)
Finally, citing Gonzalez, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th 312, Cruz
contends this statutory exception violates the Sixth Amendment.
People v. Mathis (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 359, review granted
August 13, 2025, S291628 (Mathis) addressed this issue. In
Mathis, the version of section 1170(b) in effect at the time of
the defendant’s original sentence in 2017 granted the trial court
broad discretion to select any of the three prison terms provided
for the offense. The middle term was not presumptive and there
was no requirement that a jury or a court find a particular fact
to justify imposition of the upper term. Section 1170(b) did not
violate the Sixth Amendment because an additional factual
determination was unnecessary to impose a greater sentence.
(Mathis, at pp. 372–374.)
According to Mathis, because this same statutory scheme
was in effect when the Legislature established section 1172.75,
the heightened factfinding requirement was not necessary for
7
defendants who originally received the upper term. (Mathis,
supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 373.) Those defendants would
have been sentenced under the earlier version of section 1170(b),
which gave courts the broad discretion to dispense with the
heightened factfinding requirement. (Mathis, at p. 373.)
Under this version of section 1170(b), an upper term sentence
would have complied with the Sixth Amendment when originally
imposed. (Mathis, at pp. 373–374.) When resentencing under
section 1172.75, a court need not engage in any additional
factfinding if the upper term originally was imposed.
The Supreme Court has granted review on this issue in
People v. Eaton (March 14, 2025, C096853) [nonpub. opn.], review
granted May 14, 2025, S289903, and it will have the final say
on whether section 1172.75(d)(4) permits a court to reimpose
an upper term sentence without satisfying the factfinding
requirement of section 1170(b). (See Mathis, supra, 111
Cal.App.5th at pp. 372–373 & fn. 6.) Until then, we agree with
Brannon-Thompson and Mathis, and decline to follow Gonzalez.
8
DISPOSITION
We vacate the trial court’s resentencing order and remand
the matter for further proceedings consistent with Lopez. We
otherwise affirm the judgment.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
EGERTON, J.
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
ADAMS, J.
9
Was bedeutet dieser Text für Ihre Situation?
Kostenlose und unverbindliche Beratung
Schildern Sie uns Ihre Situation. Unser Team meldet sich per E-Mail bei Ihnen für Ihre Beratung.
Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort
Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.