CourtListener 10851394•People v. Hebner CA1/4
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 4/30/26 P. v. Hebner CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A171034
v.
ALFRED HEBNER, (City and County of San Francisco
Super. Ct. Nos. 1605859,
Defendant and Appellant.
162235)
Alfred Hebner appeals from a trial court order resentencing him under
Penal Code section 1172.75.1 The court struck Hebner’s one-year prior prison
term enhancement originally imposed pursuant to section 667.5 and reduced
two aggravated terms to two midterms, thereby reducing his original
aggregate sentence of 48 years to 38 years in state prison. On appeal,
Hebner contends the court erred by refusing to strike his five-year prior
serious felony enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)) under section 1385.
Specifically, he argues that the court failed to adequately consider and afford
great weight to two mitigating circumstances: (1) the enhancement could
result in a sentence over 20 years; and (2) the enhancement is based on a
prior conviction more than five years old. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(C), (H)).
1 Unless otherwise stated, all further statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
1
Hebner further argues, and respondent concedes, that the court erred by
reimposing fines and fees that are no longer enforceable. We agree that the
challenged fines and fees must be vacated. The judgment is otherwise
affirmed.2
I. BACKGROUND3
A. Underlying Offenses
In October 1994, Hebner lured a woman into an apartment with the
promise of helping her find a job. Once inside, Hebner repeatedly and
violently raped her. He was later charged by information with five counts of
forcible rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2) [counts 1 –5]), assault by means of force
likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1) [count 6]), and false
imprisonment (§ 236 [count 7]). The information also alleged Hebner had a
prior conviction for first-degree burglary from November 1987, that by
definition was both a serious felony and a strike (§§ 667, subds. (a), (d) & (e),
1170.12, subds. (b) and (c)); and that he had served three separate prior
prison terms (§ 667.5, former subd. (b).) Before trial, Hebner moved to
exclude evidence of an October 1987 act of sexual misconduct involving a
different victim—without success.
A jury found Hebner guilty of all the charges, except that it found him
guilty of attempted rape (§§ 663, 261, subd. (a)(2)) as a lesser included offense
on count 5.
2 By order dated November 24, 2025, we deferred ruling on Hebner’s
request for judicial notice that was filed on November 20, 2025. Having
considered the merits of Hebner’s appeal, the request for judicial notice is not
relevant and therefore we deny the request.
3 We derive the background information from our prior nonpublished
opinion affirming Hebner’s conviction People v. Hebner (May 21, 1998,
A075672) [nonpub. opn.] (Hebner I)), as well as from the materials submitted
by the parties in connection with the petition for resentencing.
2
The trial court sentenced Hebner to a total prison term of 48 years,
consisting of 16 years (the aggravated term of eight years doubled) on count
1, 16 years fully consecutive (the aggravated term of eight years doubled) on
count 2, four years consecutive (one-third of the middle term of six years
doubled) on count 3, four years consecutive (one-third of the middle term of
six years doubled) on count 4, and two years consecutive (one-third of the
middle term of three years doubled) on count 5 (§§ 667.6, 1170.1, subd. (a)).
The court added five years to his sentence for the prior serious felony
conviction enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)), and one year representing one of
the prior prison term enhancements alleged (§ 667.5, former subd. (b)). All
other terms were stayed. Hebner was ordered to pay a $1200 restitution fine
(§ 1202.4) and a $70 AIDS education fee (former § 1463.23).
B. Resentencing
In February 2024, Hebner’s counsel filed a comprehensive
memorandum in support of resentencing, along with 20 supporting exhibits.
As relevant here, counsel argued the trial court should dismiss the prior
conviction as both a strike and as the serious felony predicate for the five-
year enhancement.
The prosecution opposed reducing Hebner’s sentence based on “his
unreasonable risk of future violence. He was convicted in 1996 for a 1994
rape, with [an Evidence Code section] 1108 witness testifying as to his 1987
residential burglary first degree plea conviction that was . . . a forcible rape
with some similarities with [the] rape from 1994.” The prosecution submitted
a copy of the original presentencing report, which referenced Hebner’s 1990
convictions for two drug offenses (occurring in between the 1987 and 1994
convictions), for which he was sentenced to three years in state prison.
3
Hebner was paroled in July 1994 and committed the underlying offenses in
October 1994.
The prosecution, relying on a psychological study Hebner submitted in
support of his petition, emphasized that if released within a year, Hebner’s
likelihood of reoffending is three times more likely than what it would be if
released in another nine years (56 vs. 64+). The prosecution added: “He is
now 55 years old, but even at 60 years old, his risk would result in a
‘dramatic drop in sexual reoffending’ ” from his current age, per his
consultant psychologist Dr. Lisa Jeko, Ph.D. Citing Hebner’s prison
disciplinary file, the prosecution highlighted that he had eight violations
since 2000 for “Overfamiliarity and Sexual Misconduct;” also, in the last ten
years he had two violations for “fighting and threatening to kill another
inmate.”
The resentencing hearing commenced on June 10, 2024, and concluded
on June 24, 2024. At the outset, the trial court stated it had reviewed each
party’s points and authorities and all of the exhibits including the
psychologist’s assessment and a mitigation report, as well as the original
pleadings, the original sentencing transcript, and the appellate court opinion.
The court initially observed that it was mandated to strike the section 667.5,
subdivision (b), one-year prior prison term enhancement pursuant to section
1172.75, which the court recognized “trigger[ed] a complete resentencing
under current law.”
In that context, the trial court then stated that, “in a nutshell,
sentencing currently in California defaults to the middle term, unless there’s
an aggravating factor shown beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury or to a
judge, if the Defendant waives jury, or by stipulation. . . . I’m not clear that
there’s any proof beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravating factors . . . to get
4
to the aggravated term. . . . Mr. Hebner hasn’t stipulated to aggravating
factors. So I don’t find that there’s adequate evidence to depart from the
middle term based on [Rule of Court] 4.420 or [section] 1170(b)(2).”
The court proceeded to determine “whether there should be a departure
downward to the mitigated or low term” by applying the factors in section
1170(b) and the aggravating and mitigating factors in the Rules of Court.
The trial court found several aggravating factors applied: specifically that
Hebner’s crimes “involved great violence and harm,” “a high degree of
callousness and viciousness,” and “some planning.” It further found that
Hebner had “a pattern of violent conduct given his prior convictions, a prior
offense, which although he was convicted of a non-sexual crime, there was
testimony that was believable that he did sexually assault another
victim . . . .” Additionally, Hebner’s “crimes were of increasing seriousness
and were numerous at the time of his incarceration.” The court observed that
Hebner had spent “almost all his adult life in custody of one kind or another”
and “was only out a few weeks or months at the time this offense occurred.”
With respect to mitigating factors, the trial court noted Hebner’s
history of childhood trauma that included physical, psychological and sexual
abuse but also his “prior serious record and significant rule violations, some
of which touch upon inappropriate sexual conduct that continues, although
it’s abating, certainly.” The court acknowledged that while Hebner had
“mental health conditions,” he also had admitted to “feigning or exaggerating
his symptoms.” The court expressly considered Hebner’s age: he was “just
over 26 at the time of this offense, and his priors occurred when he was under
26 . . . not a clear factor but it should be mentioned.” The court also noted
that Hebner “did not voluntarily acknowledge wrong doing in this case . . . .”
Finally, the court recognized that while there were initially multiple
5
enhancements in this case, “the one-year prior [prison term enhancement] is
being stricken, and the strike is not an enhancement; it’s a sentencing
scheme.” The court weighed all the mitigating and aggravating factors it
found relevant and concluded that “the aggravators far outweigh the
mitigators, so the low term wouldn’t be appropriate.”4
The trial court then considered whether to exercise its discretion to
strike the strike entirely or its application to any of the counts of conviction
under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 49 and its
progeny. The court noted again that Hebner had “spent almost his entire
adult life in prison.” Hebner “had two prior prison terms before this prison
term,” one of which involved “a sexual assault on the victim that testified at
the trial.” Hebner had prior drug convictions and had “been arrested for
mayhem.” “He also had numerous other violations of conditions of release on
those cases . . . and the record speaks for itself as to his behavior while in
prison.” The trial court concluded Hebner was not “outside the spirit of the
three-strike law given the almost constant periods of incarceration with
constant periods of being rearrested and reconvicted on very, very serious
charges.” Accordingly, the court declined to grant the Romero motion and
strike the strike.5
The trial court also evaluated pursuant to section 1385 subdivision (c),
whether to strike the five-year prior serious felony conviction enhancement
4 The court also made clear it had considered section 1170, subdivision
(b)(6) when evaluating whether to impose a low term and expressly found
that doing so would not be in the interest of justice.
5 The court ultimately granted the Romero motion to strike as to count
5, which was the conviction for attempted rape. (See People v. Garcia (1999)
20 Cal.4th 490, 499 [trial court has discretion in a Three Strikes case to
strike prior conviction allegations on a count-by-count basis].)
6
imposed pursuant to section 667(a). The court noted that, if it found that it
was not in the interests of justice to do so, it was not required to strike the
enhancement. But the court stated it had evaluated the factors in section
1385, subdivision (c) and that it had made “its determination overall as to,
again, danger, public safety danger, and the interest of justice.”
In context of this evaluation, the trial court found no discriminatory
racial impact. The court acknowledged there were multiple enhancements
but again noted that the one-year prior was stricken and the strike prior was
not an enhancement. It further explained that the application of the five-
year enhancement “does not put the sentence over 20 years. That goes over
20 independently of that.” While Hebner had suffered from mental illness,
the court again found its connection to the crimes unclear due to evidence of
malingering. The court also found unclear any connection between Hebner’s
childhood trauma and the crimes in this case. The court described the
conduct as violent and again noted Hebner committed the offenses when he
was a young adult.
The court agreed that the prior conviction was now over five years old,
but also stated that it was not at the time of the original sentencing; “and
there [were] intervening offenses regardless of the time frame between the
two. So there’s no five-year period [in]which he was free of state prison
custody.” Based on this comprehensive evaluation, the trial court decided
that it was “not going to strike the five-year prior” enhancement under
section 1385, subdivision (c).6
6 Before the court imposed Hebner’s sentence, defense counsel
reiterated: “Just to clarify that the prior was more than five years old. I
understand what you’re saying, he wasn’t out of custody during that time,
but the prior was from seven years before.”
7
The trial court ultimately imposed an aggregate prison sentence of 38
years: 12 years as the doubled middle term of six years on count 1, 12 years
as the fully consecutive doubled middle term of six years on count 2, four
years as the doubled one-third of the middle term of six years on count 3, four
years as the doubled one-third of the middle term of six years on count 4, 1
year as one-third middle term of three years on count 57 (§§ 667.6, 1170.1,
subd. (a)), and five years for the prior serious felony conviction. The court
added that “[t]he fines, fees, and assessments would remain the same. The
restitution orders would remain the same.”
II. DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), as added by Senate Bill No. 81 (2021–
2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 81) (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1), provides that
a sentencing court “[i]n exercising its discretion” to dismiss a sentencing
enhancement “shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by
the defendant to prove” certain enumerated mitigating circumstances, and
“[p]roof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly
in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal
of the enhancement would endanger public safety. ‘Endanger public safety’
means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would
result in physical injury or other serious danger to others.” As relevant here,
Hebner argues the mitigating circumstances include the following: “[t]he
application of the enhancement could result in a sentence of over 20 years”,
(§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(C)) and “[t]he enhancement is based on a prior conviction
that is over five years old” (id., subd. (c)(2)(H)).
7 Because the court granted the Romero motion as to count 5, the term
was not doubled. (See People v. Garcia, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 499.)
8
We review a court’s decision to dismiss or to strike a sentence
enhancement under section 1385 for abuse of discretion. (People v. Carmony
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 374.) “A trial court may abuse its discretion where ‘its
decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree
with it,’ ‘where the trial court was not “aware of its discretion’ ” to dismiss a
sentencing [enhancement] under section 1385, or ‘where the court considered
impermissible factors in declining to dismiss.’ ” (Nazir v. Superior Court
(2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 478, 490.)
“ ‘In reviewing for abuse of discretion, we are guided by two
fundamental precepts. First, “ ‘[t]he burden is on the party attacking the
sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or
arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is
presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its
discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set
aside on review.’ ” [Citation.] Second, a “ ‘decision will not be reversed
merely because reasonable people might disagree. “An appellate tribunal is
neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the
judgment of the trial judge.” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Pearson (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th
112, 116.)
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Declining
To Dismiss the Prior Serious Felony Enhancement
Hebner contends the court erred in failing to dismiss the prior serious
felony enhancement because it erroneously concluded that application of the
enhancement would not result in a sentence over 20 years. (§ 1385, subd.
(c)(2)(C).) He further contends the court failed to give great weight to the fact
that his prior conviction was more than five years old. (§ 1385, subd.
(c)(2)(H).)
9
1. Subdivision (c)(2)(C) Does Not Apply
Hebner claims the trial court erred in determining that the five-year
enhancement could not result in a sentence in excess of 20 years because it
wrongly focused on the effect the enhancement would have rather than the
effect it could have. Respondent maintains that this mitigating factor does
not apply because the sentence already exceeded 20 years without any
enhancement. We agree with Respondent.8
Whether subdivision (c)(2)(C) of section 1385 applies where the base
term of the sentence imposed already exceeds 20 years is a question of
statutory interpretation that we review de novo. (People v. Torres (2025) 113
Cal.App.5th 88, 93 (Torres)). “To resolve whether defendant’s interpretation
of the . . . statute[ ] is correct, we are guided by familiar canons of statutory
construction. ‘[I]n construing a statute, a court [must] ascertain the intent of
the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.’ [Citation.] In
determining that intent, we first examine the words of the respective
statutes: ‘If there is no ambiguity in the language of the statute, “then the
Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said, and the plain meaning of
the language governs.” [Citation.] “Where the statute is clear, courts will not
‘interpret away clear language in favor of an ambiguity that does not exist.’
[Citation.]” ’ [Citation.] If, however, the terms of a statute provide no
definitive answer, then courts may resort to extrinsic sources, including the
ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history. [Citation.] ‘We
must select the construction that comports most closely with the apparent
intent of the Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the
8 Pursuant to subdivision (c)(2)(C) of section 1385, a trial court in
determining whether to dismiss an enhancement “shall consider” and “give
“great weight” to whether “[t]he application of the enhancement could result
in a sentence of over 20 years.”
10
general purpose of the statute, and avoid an interpretation that would lead to
absurd consequences.’ ” (People v. Coronado (1995) 12 Cal.4th 145, 151.)
According to Hebner, subdivision (c)(2)(C) of section 1385 applies any
time “there exists a configuration where the sentence ‘could’ be longer than
20 years because of the imposition of the enhancement.” He acknowledges
that the trial court imposed an aggregate term of 33 years based on “selecting
full middle base terms for counts one and two, doubling all the terms except
on count five, and deciding to run all the terms consecutively. . . .”
Nevertheless he claims: “Under other possible configurations, however, the
sentence ‘could’ have been over 20 years because of imposition of the
enhancement. For example, if the court had not imposed any doubled terms,
the aggregate term would have been 17 years as the court itself mentioned
. . . . Or if the court had imposed 12 years on count one as the full doubled
middle term, four years on count two as the doubled consecutive term under
subdivision (a) of section 1170.1, and concurrent terms on the remaining
counts, the aggregate term would have been 16 years.”
Hebner’s argument regarding subdivision (c)(2)(C) of section 1385 is
incorrect. In Torres, the court held that based on the plain language of
section 1385 subdivision (c)(2)(C), it does not apply where the enhancement
itself does not result in a sentence exceeding 20 years. (Torres, supra, 113
Cal.App.5th at p. 93.) The court reasoned, “A sentence exceeding 20 years
could result from an enhancement where a sentence of that length arises as a
consequence of the enhancement. [Citation.] Thus, the effect of applying the
enhancement itself leads to a sentence exceeding 20 years. The word result
denotes a causal relationship between the enhancement and a sentence
exceeding 20 years. Accordingly, this subdivision concerns ‘enhancements
increasing [a] sentence above 20 years.’ ” (Id. at p. 93, second italics added.)
11
Hebner asserts that Torres is factually distinguishable and therefore
does not undermine his position because there the defendant was sentenced
to 25 years to life for murder plus another 25 years to life for a firearm
enhancement. (Torres, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 91.) He reasons that
“[w]hen the base term itself for an offense already exceeds 20 years, there
obviously are no potential sentencing configurations where an enhancement
could result in a sentence over 20 years.” (Italics omitted.) He argues that
unlike the defendant in Torres, his base term could have been less than 20
years had the court elected not to double any of the base terms as an “other
possible configuration.”
This assertion is misguided. First, Hebner cites no authority for urging
adoption of this speculative route of analysis. Second, Hebner’s argument is
based on the notion that the trial court granted the Romero motion as to all
counts—that is not what occurred. The base terms were doubled because of
the application of the prior strike conviction. Furthermore, the Three Strikes
law is an alternative sentencing scheme, not an enhancement. (People v.
Burke (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 237, 243–244.)
Similarly, we are not persuaded by Hebner’s argument that all
potential sentencing configurations must be considered in determining
whether subdivision (c)(2)(C) applies. Specifically, he argues that he could
have received a lower base term had the court elected to impose doubled low
terms (rather than mid-terms) and concurrent sentences. Again, Hebner
cites no authority for the proposition that all potential sentencing
configurations must be considered when determining whether section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2)(C) applies. Nothing in the plain language of section 1385
directs a sentencing court to calculate the lowest possible sentence before
considering the effect of adding an enhancement. Although there is no case
12
law describing the mechanism for determining whether an enhancement
could result in a sentence in excess of 20 years, the treatise relied on by
Hebner suggests that it is “[l]ikely [the subdivision] applies to the aggregate
sentence, including all base terms imposed for a consecutive sentence and all
status and conduct enhancements.” (Couzens et al., Sentencing California
Crimes (The Rutter Group 2025) § 12:11.) The treatise further explains that,
“[i]n determining whether the application of an enhancement could result in
a sentence of over 20 years, the court should first calculate the maximum
sentence that could be imposed on the underlying crimes and any
enhancements other than the enhancement at issue.” (Ibid., italics added.)
Here, as a result of the Three Strikes alternate sentencing scheme, the
maximum sentence that could have been imposed was 41 years, consisting of
16 years as the doubled upper term of eight years on count 1, 16 years as the
fully consecutive doubled upper term of eight years on count 2, four years as
the doubled one-third of the middle term of six years on count 3, four years as
the doubled one-third of the middle term of six years on count 4, one year as
one-third of the middle term of three years on count 5. (§§ 667.5, 1170.1,
subd. (a)).
Because the alternative sentencing scheme by itself resulted in a
sentence greater than 20 years, the additional five-year enhancement for the
prior serious felony did not cause the sentence to exceed 20 years. (§ 1385,
subd. (c)(2)(C); Torres, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 93.)9 Thus, subdivision
(c)(2)(C) of section 1385 does not apply.
9 Because we conclude subdivision(c)(2)(C) of section 1385 does not
apply here, we need not address Hebner’s arguments that the court erred in
failing to issue a finding that dismissal would endanger public safety.
13
2. The Court Properly Considered Subdivision (c)(2)(H)
Hebner next contends that the case should be remanded because the
court failed to give “great weight” to the mitigating factor that his prior 1987
conviction was more than five years old at the time he committed the
underlying offenses in 1994. (See § 1385, subd. (c)(2)(H); People v. O’Bannon
(2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 974, 984 [time measured from date of prior conviction
to date new offense committed].) He further asserts that given the numerous
“mitigating circumstances” he presented, “the record strongly suggests the
trial court might well have chosen to exercise its discretion in favor of
dismissing the five-year enhancement if, as required by subdivision (c)(2) of
section 1385, it had given great weight instead of no weight to the mitigating
circumstances that . . . the underlying conviction was over five years old.”
Preliminarily, it appears the court misspoke when, in addressing
whether Hebner’s prior conviction was over five years old, the court said, “It
is now but it wasn’t at the time.” It is unclear whether the court was
referring to the 1990 conviction. In any event, the record reflects the court
was aware of Hebner’s 1987 conviction and considered that there had been
“no five-year period which he was free of state prison custody.” We find
nothing arbitrary or capricious in the consideration of Hebner’s record of
violent convictions, behavior in prison, as well as his poor performance while
on parole to find dismissal of the enhancements would endanger the public.
Nor do we find the court failed to exercise its discretion according to fixed
legal principles. (See People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th
968, 977.)
We also reject Hebner’s claim that because the trial court did not
express its findings on the record, it failed to properly weigh evidence of the
risk of danger to the public or give appropriate weight to the mitigating
14
circumstances Hebner deems relevant in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2). The
record reflects the court engaged in a comprehensive analysis and weighing
of the statutory factors relevant to Hebner’s petition. Furthermore, with
respect to its consideration of whether to strike the five-year enhancement, it
did expressly state it had made “its determination overall as to, again,
danger, public safety danger, and the interest of justice.” At this point in the
hearing, the court was referencing its earlier findings involving the same or
similar factors involving selection of the base term. In any event, “ ‘[t]he trial
court is not required to state reasons for declining to exercise its discretion
under section 1385’ [citations], and ‘is presumed to have considered all of the
relevant factors in the absence of an affirmative record to the contrary.’ ”
(People v. Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608, 637.) “Absent evidence to the
contrary, we presume that the trial court knew and applied the governing
law.” (People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1390.)
“ ‘The general rule is that a trial court is presumed to have been aware
of and followed the applicable law. [Citations.] These general rules
concerning the presumption of regularity of judicial exercises of discretion
apply to sentencing issues.’ ” (People v. Martinez (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1511,
1517.) Moreover, “it is settled that: ‘A judgment or order of the lower court is
presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support
it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively
shown . . . .’ ” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.)
Accordingly, we cannot presume the trial court failed to give “great
weight” to the mitigating factor that Hebner’s prior conviction was more than
five years old. After considering both the mitigating and aggravating factors,
the court concluded that dismissing the enhancement would not be in the
furtherance of justice. This was not an abuse of discretion. (See People v.
15
Ortiz (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1087, 1099 [resentencing court did not abuse its
discretion in declining to strike enhancement by “assess[ing] the claimed
mitigating factors and, finding one such factor, acknowledg[ing] its great
weight but determin[ing] that other factors were collectively weightier”];
People v. Pearson, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 117 [same, where resentencing
court declined to strike firearm enhancement based on several aggravating
factors].)
In essence, Hebner asks us to reweigh the factors. However, it is not
our role as an appellate court to do so or to substitute our judgment for that
of the trial court especially when the record reflects as it does here, that the
trial court gave thoughtful consideration to all of the evidence presented and
demonstrated understanding of the applicable legal principles. (People v.
Pearson, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 116.) Thus, Hebner has failed to
demonstrate the court’s decision to impose the five-year sentence
enhancement was irrational or arbitrary.
C. The Restitution Fine and AIDS Education Fee Must be Vacated
When Hebner was originally sentenced on August 28, 1996, the trial
court imposed a restitution fine in the amount of $200 for each count totaling
$1200 pursuant to section 1202.4, and an AIDS education fee in the amount
of $70 pursuant to section 1463.23. When Hebner was resentenced on June
10, 2024, the trial court ordered the original fines and fees “would remain the
same.”
Effective January 1, 2025, Assembly Bill No. 1186 added subdivision
(d) to section 1465.9. It provides: “Upon the expiration of 10 years after the
date of imposition of a restitution fine pursuant to Section 1202.4, the
balance, including any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and
uncollectible and any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be
16
vacated.” (Italics added.) Accordingly, the portion of the judgment imposing
the restitution fine is vacated.
We agree with the parties that the $70 fee imposed for AIDS education
must be vacated. The original sentencing court imposed this fee pursuant to
section 264, subdivision (b), which states in relevant part: “[T]he judge may
assess a fine not to exceed seventy dollars ($70) against a person who violates
Section 261 or former Section 262 with the proceeds of this fine to be used in
accordance with Section 1463.23.” Section 1463.23, however, was repealed
effective January 1, 2018. (Stats. 2017, ch. 537, § 18.)
The parties correctly posit that the provision authorizing the AIDS
education fee (§ 264, subd. (b)) was impliedly repealed in 2018, when the
referenced statute (§ 1463.23) was actually repealed, since it is no longer
possible for “the proceeds of this fine to be used in accordance” with section
1463.23. Accordingly, the AIDS education fee is vacated.
Finally, as Hebner points out, the abstract of judgment filed on June
24, 2024 does not reflect the restitution fine or the AIDS education fee. We
further note that the sentencing minute order similarly does not refer to any
fines and fees imposed. Nevertheless, it is well established that “ ‘[w]here
there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the
minute order or the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls.’ ”
(People v. Clark (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 248, 260–261.)
Accordingly, the clerk of the superior court is ordered to prepare an
amended abstract of judgment and an amended sentencing minute order
reflecting that the previously imposed $1200 restitution fine (§ 1202.4) and
$70 AIDS education fee (§ 264, subd. (b), former § 1463.23) are vacated. (See
People v. Clark, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at pp. 259–261 [trial court ordered to
correct abstract of judgment by vacating repealed probation supervision fee].)
17
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The clerk of the superior court is ordered to
prepare an amended certified abstract of judgment and an amended
sentencing minute order reflecting that the previously imposed $1200
restitution fine (§ 1202.4) and $70 AIDS education fee (§ 264, subd. (b),
former § 1463.23) are vacated. The clerk is further ordered to forward a copy
of the amended abstract of judgment to the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation.
18
_________________________
Moorman, J.*
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Streeter, Acting P. J.
_________________________
Goldman, J.
* Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Mendocino,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
19
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