CourtListener 10851340•In re E.Z. CA2/1
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 4/30/26 In re E.Z. CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not
been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
In re E.Z., B349302
a Person Coming Under the (Los Angeles County
Juvenile Court Law. Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP03850)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
ANDREW Z.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Georgia A. Huerta, Judge. Dismissed.
Seth F. Gorman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant
County Counsel, and Peter Ferrera, Principal Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
We decide this appeal by memorandum opinion. (See Cal.
Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1.) For the reasons set forth below, we
dismiss the appeal as moot.
In January 2023, the juvenile court assumed dependency
jurisdiction over then 10-month-old E.Z. and made certain
dispositional orders concerning E.Z.’s father, appellant Andrew Z.
(Father). On September 10, 2025, the court terminated Father’s
reunification services and set the matter for future hearings.
Father timely appealed from the September 10, 2025 order.1 His
sole contention on appeal is that the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) failed to
comply with its duties of initial and further inquiry pursuant to the
federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.)
(ICWA) and California implementing law (see Welf. & Inst. Code,
§ 224 et seq.; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.480 et seq.). (See In re
Kenneth D. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1087, 1099-1100 [describing initial
and further inquiry duties].) Father requests that we conditionally
reverse and “remand with directions to the juvenile court to direct
1 Father’s notice of appeal also references orders made on
July 17, August 20, August 21, and September 5, 2025. His
appellate brief makes no argument concerning these orders. To the
extent his appeal from them is timely, we deem any claim of error
concerning those orders abandoned. (In re Mary C. (2020) 48
Cal.App.5th 793, 809.)
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[DCFS] to comply with the inquiry and further inquiry mandates”
of ICWA.
In lieu of a respondent’s brief, DCFS filed both a letter and a
motion to dismiss. DCFS concedes that it failed to discharge its
ICWA inquiry duties as of the time of the September 10, 2025 order.
DCFS’s letter asserts that “while th[is] appeal has been pending,
the juvenile court issued orders that address the issues raised in
[Father’s] opening brief” regarding the need for additional ICWA
inquiry. DCFS’s motion to dismiss contends that because Father
“has received the relief he requests on appeal,” his appeal is now
moot.
In support of its dismissal request, DCFS asks that we take
judicial notice of a March 18, 2026 minute order in which the
juvenile court has directed DCFS to (1) “make all reasonable
attempts to inquire of the paternal aunt and paternal uncle
pursuant to the ICWA,” and to “inquire of maternal relatives,
including the maternal grandmother, regarding the identity and
ancestry of the maternal grandfather”; (2) “conduct further inquiry
with the Cherokee Tribes and provide the Tribes with information
gathered on the paternal family, including the report that the
paternal great-great-great-grandfather, possibly from the 1800’s,
was a Cherokee Chief”; (3) “conduct further inquiry as needed based
on any new information provided by maternal and paternal
relatives”; and (4) “document its efforts regarding inquiry and
provide a report to the juvenile court with said documentation and
the results of its interviews and contact with any tribes.” The
minute order provides that after this inquiry and documentation, a
noticed hearing shall take place at which “the juvenile court shall
make a finding regarding the ICWA’s applicability, determine
whether DCFS has interviewed all known and available extended
family members and conducted further inquiry with relevant tribes,
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and proceed in accordance with the ICWA, including, if required,
ordering DCFS to send notices to the appropriate tribes in
accordance with the ICWA.” The minute order further directs that
“[i]f notices are sent and the juvenile court receives a response from
a tribe determining the child is an Indian child, the juvenile court
shall proceed in accordance with the ICWA.”
Father opposes our taking judicial notice of the March 18,
2026 order, relying on Kenneth D. and in particular its statement
that “[e]vidence of a postjudgment [ICWA] inquiry . . . is not a
proper subject of . . . judicial notice.” (In re Kenneth D., supra, 16
Cal.5th at p. 1106.) But the procedural posture and facts in
Kenneth D. were unlike those here. In that case, the juvenile court
terminated parental rights without first complying with ICWA’s
inquiry and notice provisions. (Id. at p. 1097.) On appeal, the
Placer County Department of Health and Human Services
requested that the appellate court augment the record to include a
memorandum describing the department’s postjudgment efforts to
comply with ICWA. (Id. at p. 1096.) The appellate court granted
the request and held that any ICWA “error was harmless in light of
the augmented record.” (Id. at p. 1097.)
Our high court reversed, explaining in pertinent part:
“Ordinarily, appellate courts review a trial court’s judgment based
on the record as it existed when the trial court ruled. [Citation.] It
is ultimately within the purview of the juvenile court to make
determinations of credibility and assessments of adequacy because
it is uniquely positioned to reach these conclusions based on its
familiarity with the case and those involved. The department’s
assertion that its postjudgment report rendered any prior failure of
inquiry harmless ‘necessarily requires that we treat the factual
assertions therein as undisputed, which we cannot do’ because,
absent exceptional circumstances, ‘[t]his type of factfinding is
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precisely what must occur in the juvenile court in the first instance
[citation], where additional and possibly competing evidence may be
offered; and the court, on a more fully developed record, will assess
weight and credibility as appropriate, and make its factual
findings.’ ” (In re Kenneth D., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1102.)
Here, DCFS does not ask us to engage in any factfinding with
respect to the March 18 order or to opine on the outcome of DCFS’s
further investigation. Rather, DCFS relies on the order merely to
demonstrate that the juvenile court (1) has ordered further ICWA-
related investigation, and (2) intends to make a finding concerning
ICWA’s applicability following that further investigation. We
therefore may consider the order without running afoul of Kenneth
D., and we grant DCFS’s request for judicial notice.
We agree with DCFS that the March 18 order renders this
appeal moot. Father contends his appeal is not moot for two
reasons. First, he notes his opening brief asks not only for DCFS to
comply with its ICWA inquiry duties (as the March 18 order
requires) but also for conditional reversal of the September 10, 2025
order (which the March 18 order does not address). Second, he
contends DCFS’s motion to dismiss is premature because no one yet
knows what will happen in response to the March 18 order or what
information regarding Native American ancestry DCFS may
discover.
Neither of these arguments persuades us. The point of a
conditional reversal is to encourage prompt, complete compliance
with ICWA early in the proceedings by DCFS and the juvenile
court, and to avoid delay and duplicative efforts. (In re Dezi C.
(2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1138-1140.) The March 18 order requires
such compliance, a conditional reversal would add no further
encouragement to DCFS or the juvenile court, and we are not
presently affirming (conditionally or otherwise) the September 10,
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2025 order. “When an [ICWA] inquiry is inadequate, the entities
charged with the duty to conduct the inquiry must attempt to cure
that error . . . .” (Id. at pp. 1138-1139.) That is exactly what the
March 18 order does.
Nor is the motion to dismiss premature. We agree with
Father that no one yet knows the outcome of the further inquiry.
But as mentioned previously, this appeal does not ask that we
decide whether E.Z. is in fact an Indian child. It instead concerns
the need for further inquiry before that question can be answered.
“[A]ll we could order in resolving this appeal is that [DCFS] and
[the] juvenile court fulfill their inquiry and notice obligations under
ICWA and related California law. Because that is what [DCFS] is
already doing, and because we are not in a position to micromanage
that process in this appeal (detailing, for instance, all those who
must be interviewed, what they must be asked, and what must be
included in any notice to tribes that is required), there is no
effective relief we can now provide. The juvenile court must direct
that process, at least in the first instance. This appeal [therefore] is
moot.” (In re Baby Girl M. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 635, 638-639, fn.
omitted.)
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DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed as moot.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
WEINGART, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
BENDIX, J.
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